Protest in Istanbul

Dr. Tas: Coercion Has Become the Erdogan Regime’s Default Tool of Governance

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In this compelling interview with ECPS, Dr. Hakki Tas argues that repression—not legitimacy—has become the Erdogan regime’s default mode of rule. Highlighting the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, Dr. Taş contends that Turkey is moving further from competitive authoritarianism toward full authoritarian consolidation. As electoral legitimacy weakens, coercion fills the void, revealing a regime reliant on fear, control, and chrono-political narratives to survive. “Remaining in power,” Dr. Tas says, “is the only survival strategy.” This conversation explores the strategic logic behind repression, the shrinking political arena, and the uncertain future of ailing Turkish democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Hakki Tas, Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies, offers a sobering assessment of Turkey’s democratic trajectory under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Dr. Tas argues that “coercion has become the Erdogan regime’s default tool of governance,” signaling a shift in strategy where repression, rather than consensus or legitimacy, undergirds the government’s hold on power. This growing reliance on coercive mechanisms reflects not only the regime’s authoritarian drift but also its deepening vulnerability in the face of economic instability and eroding public support.

In Dr. Tas’s view, the political elite in Turkey face a stark reality: “remaining in power is the only survival strategy.” With dwindling economic resources, declining electoral popularity, and limited institutional buffers, Erdogan and his allies find themselves increasingly dependent on repressive tactics to maintain control. The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, widely seen as the most viable opposition figure, exemplifies this logic. For Dr. Tad, such moves do more than target individuals; they erode fundamental democratic principles by narrowing the space for political competition and undermining voter choice.

Indeed, Dr. Tas highlights the regime’s systematic efforts to degrade electoral competitiveness. While Turkey has retained the formal trappings of multiparty elections, the conditions required for genuine democratic choice—such as “electoral vulnerability,” “electoral availability,” and “decidability”—have been steadily dismantled. The elimination of high-profile opposition figures like Imamoglu not only tilts the playing field but also challenges the very notion of Turkey as a competitive authoritarian regime. As Dr. Tas succinctly puts it, “calling Turkey’s regime ‘competitive’ is increasingly difficult to justify.”

Beyond specific political maneuvers, Dr. Tas situates these developments within a broader authoritarian logic—one that employs what he calls a “chrono-political strategy” to frame every election as an existential battle for the nation’s soul. Through an intricate weaving of past grievances, present insecurities, and imagined futures, Erdogan casts challenges to his rule as threats to the entire Turkish polity. This blend of populist narrative-building, strategic repression, and institutional erosion has enabled the regime to survive despite mounting internal and external pressures.

This interview explores the implications of Imamoglu’s arrest, the fragility of Erdogan’s political toolkit, and the possible futures of ailing Turkish democracy. At stake is not only the fate of one politician or election, but the broader question of whether Turkey can still lay claim to competitive politics—or whether it has entered a new phase of authoritarian consolidation.

Dr. Hakki Tas, Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Hakki Tas with some edits.

Calling Turkey’s Regime ‘Competitive’ Is Increasingly Difficult to Justify

How does the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu fit within the broader trajectory of democratic backsliding in Turkey, and does it signify a critical turning point toward full authoritarian consolidation, or does it remain within the bounds of competitive authoritarianism?

The competitiveness of the regime in Turkey has been in question not only today but throughout the last decade as well. While Turkish elections have long been marked by significant contentiousness, this indeed does not necessarily translate into genuine political competition. True competitiveness requires conditions such as electoral vulnerability (where incumbents can realistically be unseated), electoral availability (where voters are open to changing party preferences), and decidability (where parties offer distinct and clearly communicated platforms). 

Nevertheless, by potentially eliminating the most prominent challenger from the electoral arena, the jailing of Imamoglu further undercuts each of these core democratic prerequisites. While Turkey has not yet crossed into fully authoritarian rule, actions like arresting leading opposition figures push the system closer to outright authoritarian consolidation, and the adjective “competitive” to describe the current regime becomes increasingly tenuous.

For Turkey’s Ruling Elite, Staying in Power Is the Only Survival Strategy

To what extent can Imamoglu’s arrest be interpreted as a reflection of Erdogan’s growing political insecurity in anticipation of the 2028 elections, rather than an expression of consolidated authoritarian control?

These two dimensions—growing political insecurity and authoritarian tendencies—often intersect, since remaining in power is the only survival strategy for the current political elite. The insecurity itself is clear: with economic resources depleted, Erdogan can no longer dispense patronage to his base as effectively, nor can he weave compelling narratives that resonate with voters and align with his domestic or foreign policy choices. Consequently, if he cannot win the minds and hearts of the masses, coercion becomes his default instrument. Of course, such reliance on repression highlights the fragility of the regime. Repression may not be the most effective tactic, but it probably is the only remaining path to maintain power.

In the light of Erdogan’s declining popularity and the ongoing economic crisis, to what degree can the regime continue to depend on electoral legitimacy, or is it likely to increasingly abandon the electoral route in favor of more authoritarian mechanisms?

Erdogan faces a fundamental conundrum when it comes to sustaining electoral legitimacy amidst dwindling popularity and deepening economic woes. Unlike many of his autocratic counterparts, he cannot rely on a rentier economy to placate key constituencies, nor can he fully count on a steadfast, loyal military to neutralize dissent. In this context, elections—no matter how constrained—have long served as a principal source of legitimacy. The semblance of competitiveness has permitted Erdogan to maintain at least a façade of democratic governance, preserving his rule without incurring the immediate costs of blatant authoritarianism.

Yet this tactic cuts both ways. Without holding elections, Erdogan risks forfeiting any claim to popular legitimacy, leaving him reliant on repressive mechanisms that are by no means guaranteed to remain loyal. At the same time, the very act of putting his government to an electoral test brings the danger that genuine opposition could mobilize sufficiently to threaten his grip on power.

When Parties Fail, the Streets Speak

Protests in Turkey.
Thousands gathered in Istanbul on March 23, 2025, to protest the arrest of Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. Photo: Sedat Gulec.

How might a potential state-led intervention in the CHP—modeled after kayyum-style trusteeship—reshape the Turkish party system and transform the landscape of opposition politics?

This would only underscore the fact that the traditional institutional mechanisms of political mediation have long been obsolete in Turkey and could further legitimize street-level mobilization. Dismantling the CHP’s autonomy would not only deepen the regime’s authoritarian tilt but also galvanize citizens to challenge the government outside the confines of a party framework, amplifying the prominence of direct action in shaping Turkey’s political future.

Given Imamoglu’s capacity to mobilize broad, cross-ideological support, what are the strategic implications of his removal for the Turkish opposition’s ability to mount a viable electoral challenge?

Imamoglu is one of the Turkish opposition’s most versatile and unifying figures, whose cross-ideological appeal had begun to transcend traditional fault lines; however, this broad support did not necessarily constitute a robust coalition committed to full democracy. Moreover, the regime has strategically sought to keep the political and ideological fissures among the opposition intact—most notably by attempting to reconcile with Kurdish political actors. Nonetheless, Imamoglu’s ability to attract diverse groups demonstrated a tangible path toward a more inclusive opposition discourse, one that could, at least temporarily, bridge political cleavages around a common goal. The opposition leaders have performed well so far.

From Twin Enemies to Universal Threats

How does the post-2016 securitization of political opposition compare to earlier state narratives targeting the Gulen movement, and in what ways is this logic now being extended to opposition figures such as Imamoglu?

The post-coup securitization narrative has intensified and broadened the regime’s ability to label virtually any dissent as a threat to national security, building on earlier campaigns against the Gulen movement and Kurdish groups. Historically, it was relatively straightforward to demonize these constituencies by invoking entrenched suspicions of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism—“twin enemies” in the public imagination. 

Compared to its anti-Gulen campaign, the government has deployed similar tactics—such as dehumanizing language, terrorism accusations, and show trials—; extending such rhetoric to figures like Imamoglu, however, proves more challenging, given his secular and broadly appealing profile. The scope of securitization continues to expand, as seen in the Gezi trials, and likely will intensify further, reinforcing polarization, when the support of the majority is not viable.

In what ways is the Erdogan regime deploying chrono-political narratives—fusing past, present, and future—to legitimize authoritarian measures against the opposition in the lead-up to the 2028 elections?

Currently, Erdogan lacks a popular grand narrative to frame recent developments. Instead, he taps into center-right and conservative sentiments with rhetoric about “street terrorism.” Meanwhile, pro-government media and figures recirculate default anti-Kemalist tropes, constantly reminding the AKP base of the 1997 “postmodern coup” and emphasizing the AKP’s role as the champion of an “Anatolian Revolution” against the vestiges of “Old Turkey” represented by the CHP. By melding past grievances with current insecurities, this chrono-political framing casts state crackdowns as the preservation of a people’s revolution rather than an assault on democratic norms, thereby embedding present events in a broader narrative of conflict between a secular Kemalist elite and Muslim Anatolian people.

In a Post-Truth Arena, Victimhood Becomes the Most Potent Political Weapon

What does the political discourse surrounding Imamoglu’s arrest reveal about Turkey’s ongoing shift toward post-truth politics, in which narrative construction increasingly overrides evidence-based governance?

The discourse surrounding Imamoglu’s arrest illustrates Turkey’s deepening post-truth environment, in which the regime’s narratives often eclipse factual evidence through a deluge of fake news, half-truths, and conspiracy theories. Despite its formidable control over media outlets and intensified censorship of opposition voices, the government’s ability to craft a cohesive, persuasive message appears weaker compared to earlier high-stakes moments like the 2013 Gezi Protests or the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt. This relative disarray in the official narrative highlights the regime’s further reliance on post-truth tactics to obfuscate the truth.

How does Erdogan’s portrayal of Imamoglu align with populist strategies that frame challengers as enemies of “the people,” and how does this dynamic intersect with Imamoglu’s own populist appeal?

Erdogan’s populist messaging has long relied on a Manichean division that pits “the people” against an allegedly subversive elite. Initially aimed at the Kemalist establishment during the 2000s, this rhetoric evolved to target foreign “dark forces” and domestic opponents, situating any threat to the AKP’s dominance within a grand narrative of external conspiracies seeking to weaken Turkey. In presenting Imamoglu as insolent and dismissive of the popularly elected government, Erdogan reinforces this populist framework, albeit in a manner that appears increasingly strained. The irony lies in removing a democratically elected mayor through what many view as politically motivated charges while simultaneously accusing him of undermining democracy—a strategy meant to maintain Erdogan’s self-image as the authentic representative of the public’s will.

Imamoglu, however, employs a form of counter-populism by depicting Erdogan’s regime as the entrenched new establishment and urging disparate groups marginalized under the AKP’s rule to unite. In this sense, he challenges Erdogan on his own turf, effectively turning the populist dichotomy back against the incumbent. Moreover, the very act of arresting Imamoglu grants him the victimhood status that has historically served Erdogan well, endowing Imamoglu with the same potent political currency of victimhood and moral high ground.

How Erdogan Weaponizes Crisis to Sustain Power

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: Shutterstock.

To what extent is anti-Western rhetoric being utilized to domestically legitimize the arrest of Imamoglu, and how does this tactic align with the AKP’s broader strategy of politicizing foreign policy?

Despite the AKP’s reliance on anti-Western rhetoric to legitimize controversial domestic and foreign policy moves throughout the 2010s, Erdogan has been more circumspect in explicitly invoking such themes to rationalize Imamoglu’s arrest. Some pro-government outlets have circulated conspiracy theories linking Imamoglu to foreign plots; however, Erdogan currently appears to prioritize pragmatic relations with both the European Union and the United States. This shift partly stems from renewed Western interest in Turkey’s security partnership against Russia, as well as the transactional dynamic that characterized Erdogan’s rapport with US President Donald Trump. In other words, while anti-Western discourse remains a familiar tool in the regime’s arsenal, Erdogan has downplayed it in favor of current diplomatic gains and economic considerations.

Nevertheless, the broader AKP strategy of politicizing foreign policy remains evident in the potential use of external conflicts as a diversionary tactic. Historically, Erdogan has displayed a capacity to refocus domestic anxieties onto external threats, thereby consolidating his base. If Imamoglu’s arrest triggers wider unrest, the regime may revert to stoking regional tensions and rally the public under a unifying, antagonistic narrative. Given the volatile regional landscape—replete with ongoing conflicts—there is ample opportunity to leverage foreign policy crises to overshadow or justify heavy-handed measures at home.

Does Imamoglu’s arrest represent a calculated moment within Erdogan’s chrono-political strategy to frame the 2028 election as an existential national struggle, and how does this timing contribute to the construction of a long-term authoritarian myth?

Erdogan’s repeated depiction of every electoral contest—with remarkable examples such as the December 2015 general elections and the 2017 constitutional referendum—as an existential choice for the nation epitomizes a populist politics of time. In this framework, the present becomes a decisive juncture between a promised utopia of national triumph and an apocalyptic scenario of total annihilation, all hinging on the leader’s continued rule. Imamoglu’s arrest, then, can be seen as another attempt to situate the 2028 election within this broader chrono-political strategy. Erdogan is undoubtedly a master of chrono-populism, a skill that has helped him become one of the longest-serving populist leaders in world history.

However, sustaining perpetual vigilance among the public is costly. If Erdogan cannot deliver tangible rewards beyond the mere avoidance of catastrophe, voter fatigue over these endless existential crises may erode the very support he seeks to reinforce. The timing of Imamoglu’s arrest, therefore, not only reflects a calculated bid to sustain a grand authoritarian myth but also risks overextending the populist device of crisis mobilization—leaving the regime vulnerable to disillusionment from an electorate that grows weary of ever-present emergency narratives.

Ekrem Imamoglu, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Prof. White: Erdogan’s Arrest of Istanbul Mayor a Sign of Insecurity—And That Makes It More Dangerous

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In a comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Jenny White calls the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu “absolutely… a sign of insecurity”—not strength. Professor White warns that this preemptive strike ahead of the 2028 elections reflects “regime fragility,” not confidence, adding: “If this stands… voting ceases to have any real meaning.” Drawing on her concept of “spindle autocracy,” she explains how personal loyalty has overtaken institutional merit, creating a brittle, fear-driven system. With Erdogan’s popularity fading and international pressure weakened, Professor White argues, “This is a line that has now been crossed”—one with dangerous consequences for Turkey’s democratic future.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and incisive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jenny White—renowned anthropologist and scholar of Turkish politics at Stockholm University—explores the deeper implications of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s arrest and what it reveals about the current phase of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s authoritarianism. “Oh, absolutely—it’s a sign of insecurity,” Professor White declares. “And that makes it all the more dangerous, because this is a line that has now been crossed.”

This stark assessment lies at the heart of Professor White’s reflections on how Erdogan has evolved from a populist reformer to an embattled strongman. The arrest of Imamoglu—widely seen as the opposition’s most viable presidential contender in 2028—is not an act of confidence, but of regime fragility. “If this stands… and especially if the party itself is taken over, then voting ceases to have any real meaning,” she warns.

Professor White locates this shift within a broader trajectory of democratic erosion in Turkey. Drawing from her concept of spindle autocracy, she describes a system where loyalty to the leader has eclipsed merit and institutional integrity. “You cannot disagree. If you disagree, you are a traitor,” she says, noting that once individuals fall out of favor, they are discarded—spun out like raw wool from a political spindle.

Far from being the first rupture, Imamoglu’s arrest is a culmination of earlier moves: the post-Gezi crackdown, the co-optation of the judiciary, and the mass purges following the 2016 coup attempt. “At this point, there are really no institutions left around Erdogan that have competence, aside from loyalty to him,” Professor White states.

The sense of insecurity extends beyond domestic calculations. Professor White suggests that global shifts, including the return of Donald Trump, have reinforced Erdogan’s sense of impunity. “Erdogan has nothing to fear from US censure… I’m quite sure Trump would support that kind of move,” she notes. The European Union, too, finds itself in a bind—caught between supporting human rights and preserving strategic ties with Turkey.

Despite Erdogan’s waning popularity, the fear of retaliation—and the AKP’s entrenchment in every layer of society—limits open dissent. As Professor White concludes, “You can’t forget that Erdogan still has a lot of people willing to vote for him—not necessarily because they’re passionately in love with him, but because they’re afraid of what happens if he’s gone.”

This interview sheds urgent light on the authoritarian logic of fear—and what happens when that fear governs.

Professor Jenny White, renowned anthropologist and scholar of Turkish politics at Stockholm University.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jenny White with some edits.

Turkey Is a Roller Coaster—Who’s on Top and Who’s Not Constantly Shifts

Professor White, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your articles, you describe Turkish political life as a “horizontal topography of action” rather than a vertical model of oppression and resistance. How does this framework help us better understand Erdogan’s consolidation of power post-2016 coup attempt?

Professor Jenny White: Well, I think of politics both in micro terms and over the long term. So, if you think of politics as just what’s happening now, you can try to clarify who’s on top and who’s on the bottom. But if you look at it even in just a slightly longer time frame, you see that the constituents of “Up” and the constituents of “Down” don’t stay the same. They, especially in a place like Turkey, are almost like a roller coaster. For a long time in the 20th century, the secular Kemalists were on top, and they were able to, or they tried to, determine how the rest of the population should live according to their standards. A lot of people went along with that because they also agreed with it. Those who didn’t were, you know, the religious, the peasants, the ones who lived in Turkey and tried to do well for themselves but often found that being religious or from the countryside was a drawback when it came to moving ahead. At some point, I think it was in the 1960s, you weren’t allowed to wear a headscarf in a civil service job or even to visit someone in a state hospital. Eventually, you weren’t allowed to wear a headscarf to go to university.

For many people who had been left out of the nation’s vision of progress, that was the ultimate insult. Not only were they kept down because they were peasants or migrants to the city, but they were also not allowed to practice their religion if they wanted to participate in modern society. There was this profound sense of being disenfranchised, being oppressed by the elites who, at the time, were trying to raise everyone up. So, depending on where you’re looking from, it’s determined by the observer. What’s the position of the observer in making the determination of who is oppressed or who is the oppressor? Then, of course, in the 1980s, the Islamist party started winning local elections and then national elections, representing these disenfranchised people. They came to power, and now we have the AKP. The AKP, in turn, decided to impose on the population their view of how one should live. It’s a different part of the population now.

Again, depending on who the observer is, you could either feel oppressed or say that those are the oppressors. It’s a roller coaster, with who’s on top and who’s not. Then, if you take it down another level, you look at people who are otherwise the same, like the followers of Fethullah Gulen and the members of the AKP. Before that, the Refah Party (RP) consisted of lower-middle-class merchants—not really merchants, but more like business people—and later on, they became wealthy. These were the people who had managed to step up in the new 1980s economy. They felt empowered, believing they were now on top. The Fethullah Gulen followers were heavily involved in all of this. They worked together with the government, had their own version of what they were doing, but in many ways, culturally and religiously, in terms of piety, they were indistinguishable from the AKP followers. So, you would think they wouldn’t be differentiated, but they fell afoul of the AKP, became the “bottom,” were hounded out of existence, and declared terrorists.

The scary thing for a lot of people was that you couldn’t actually know who was in and who was out, who was up and who was down. Your neighbor wore a headscarf, and you wore a headscarf. You were culturally identical and had known each other for years. How do you know who is on the up and who is on the down? There was also a culture of snitching. If you didn’t like your mother-in-law, you could snitch and claim she was a Gulenist, and then watch her fall. This is not the usual up-and-down scenario, which stems from a liberal leftist view that the world is divided into people who are oppressed—the poor, the minorities—and then the oppressors. In reality, the oppressed themselves can oppress others. It’s much more complicated than that. 

There Are No Institutions Left—Only Loyalty

In your analysis of “spindle autocracy,” you argue that personal loyalty to a leader has replaced institutional merit. How has this dynamic reshaped Turkey’s political institutions and public trust in them since the executive presidency was introduced?​

Professor Jenny White: Thank you. That’s a good question. But all I can think of right now is the US. This is so applicable. You can see the spindle forming, and just the idea of spindle autocracy, or spindle politics, as I ended up calling it, is that you move from being a country where people look at the politicians, and they may like or dislike the politician, but they look at the policies. “I like the policies of this politician, too. I like this politician.” To “I love this politician because this is an incredible outpouring of emotion, a passionate emotion that’s much more than simply liking your politician.” And I don’t really care what his policies are. I go with them because they are things that he wants us to do.

That’s an enormous difference, and the implications of that are also enormous. Because if you have a political leader who is a spindle autocrat, surrounding himself with people who are loyal as the first criterion, whether or not they are competent shouldn’t be beside the point, but often is. In the Kemalist era, there has always been a kind of big-man authoritarianism in Turkey, starting with Ataturk—the love of the leader. Atatürk is the beloved leader throughout, but whenever individuals like Menderes, Demirel, and Ozal, for example, came along, there was this attachment to particular leaders, including leftist leaders who are now icons.

So, I’m not saying this is something new with the AKP. These are old habits of power, big-man autocracy, and authoritarianism. All of this is wrapped up in a kind of patriarchy: “the devlet baba,” the state as your father, which is now personalized as Erdogan, your father figure. Intolerance of difference—people don’t like things that are different, or people who are different—has always been present in Turkey. But what is different now is the character of this central leader, right?

The styling. Another thing that’s been around for a long time is the styling, where the leader presents himself as both a hero and a victim—the heroic victim who is there to take care of you like a father. Erdogan embodies all of this, as did the leaders before him. But the difference now is that he has sort of forgotten the part where he takes care of the family. It’s almost as if remaining the leader has become a purpose in itself. All the pomp and circumstance surrounding the presidency now just feed resources and attention to the central figure. There are really no institutions left around Erdogan that have competence, aside from loyalty to him.

Obviously, not everyone is incompetent, but Erdogan has removed anyone he deemed disloyal. This started happening in the late 2000s. At one point, the Gulen movement, which had significant influence within the police, went after some of Erdogan’s family members for corruption and they wanted to arrest the government’s emissary who was traveling to Europe to negotiate a peace deal with the PKK. Erdogan didn’t like that, which caused a clash within the government.These individuals were part of government institutions, and the Gulen movement was singled out. Erdogan’s government then targeted the Gulen movement, leading to what became almost a feud—back and forth—culminating in the 2016 failed coup attempt. These were the people who had surrounded Erdogan at the beginning, and they moved down on the roller coaster, while the people who moved in were not necessarily known for their competence.

 One of the major consequences of a system like this is that nobody can disagree with the leader. In a normal political situation, even in an authoritarian context, you have advisors, right? They can discuss things with you and disagree. But in this case, because the relationships are all personal—based on loyalty and passionate devotion to the leader—you cannot disagree. If you disagree, you are a traitor. “Hain,” or traitor, is a term often thrown around in Turkey, and even though it’s used frequently, it’s always taken very seriously. If you are labeled a traitor in the newspapers, you could be arrested. It’s not something said lightly, but traitors emerge every minute, because people will disagree with what the leader is doing, and then they go down on the roller coaster.

So, it’s a very unstable system, even though it looks like it should be stable because of the strongman structure. But if you look closer at the micro level, there are always people moving in and out. If you think of the spindle, for those who don’t know, a spindle is a stick on a string that twirls, and you take raw wool and spin it until it turns into yarn that you can use to knit a sweater. Think of the raw wool coming from the sheep as the recruits who get involved around the leader, and as they do, they network and become obedient. They get “cooked in,” and then, as inevitable breakups happen, they split off. Even though it looks stable—with this leader who is always there—and if you look back in time, you’ll see many spindles, names of leaders, but you don’t see what was happening around the spindle, the people moving in and out.

Today It’s Gulenists, Tomorrow Someone Else

On 20 July 2016, Turkey’s Islamist-populist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared a state of emergency, enabling him and the AKP cabinet to bypass parliament and rule by decree. The crackdown on possible coup plotters has since been turned into an all-out witch-hunt not only against alleged Gulen sympathizers but also leftists, Kurds and anyone critical of the government.

You note that Erdogan’s regime revived the “threat paradigm” once used by Kemalists, but with updated targets like the Gulen movement. How do these manufactured inside/outside enemies influence popular support and the regime’s legitimacy?

Professor Jenny White: I think it’s something that is deeply embedded in the Turkish educational system. Children learn from a very early age that there are enemies. In the Kemalist days, that was quite overwhelming, and the enemies—there’s a whole list of them—were foreigners, the inside enemies. These were the non-Muslim minorities who, because they’re not Muslim, can’t possibly be loyal to the Turkish state and are probably working together with non-Muslim or Christian outsiders to undermine Turkey, as they had done in World War I. Some people call it the Sèvres syndrome.

So this is a serious issue that has affected the population, partly through the educational system but also through the media. It’s always present—it’s in everything, you know, even the soap operas. Even the Ottoman-era soap operas contain this underlying distrust of non-Muslim foreigners, especially Christians.

But again, on a micro level, it takes different forms, right? I’m just thinking of an example. One of the biggest threats to Turkish national unity in the 1980s and early 1990s, according to the Turkish military, was missionaries—Christian missionaries. There were almost no missionaries in Turkey. Why would this even be a thing, let alone one of the biggest threats to national unity?

It’s because it’s not really about the missionaries per se, even though some of them were actually killed or attacked by people. They were a symbol of a Christian West that is believed to be out to destroy Turkey. That’s what people believe. And you could be Jewish, you could be gay, you could be any one of the many categories of “other”—and still be lumped in. Or Armenian, right? So those are all kinds of insults when used in this way—as someone who is out to get Turkey. And they’re interchangeable.

So it’s not the particular people or the particular category that’s a threat. It’s the fact that there is this threat—it’s existential—and the category that belongs to the threat is constantly fungible. So you don’t ever hear about missionaries anymore. It’s as if that never happened, even though it was a serious thing for many years.

Now you hear about Syrians or the Gulenists—another new threat category. They’re considered an even greater threat because they are the enemy within: they are also Muslim and look just like you. So it’s a way to polarize the population. And in polarizing the population and the other political parties—because everyone feels like they have to take a stand on these issues—for many years, the CHP, the main opposition party, was in step with everyone else in demonizing both the external and internal enemies.

Well, they’ve moved away from that. Okay. But they still were—then they got on the bandwagon that everyone else was on, saying negative things about the Syrian refugees or the Kurds. Now there’s an attempt by the AKP to reach out to the Kurds in a way that I’m not sure is believable, because nothing has been given to the Kurds in return for Ocalan’s speech—or request—that the PKK lay down its arms.

But what this does is split the CHP. It also splits the Kurdish party, the DEM Party. It’s like—are they going to support the CHP candidate for president, or are they going to sit it out and see whether they can get anything in return from the AKP for what Ocalan said? 

So it’s not really a matter of fearing; it’s a matter of using fear to create division. And division is always useful in politics.

It’s Competitive—Unless There’s No More Competition

How would you characterize the current political regime in Turkey following the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu? Has the country now fully crossed the threshold into competitive authoritarianism—or something more consolidated?

Professor Jenny White: I think Turkey has been in a state of competitive authoritarianism for a long time now. Competitive authoritarianism means you have elections that are contested—parties like the CHP compete, other parties compete—but it’s not a level playing field.

Ninety percent of the media in Turkey is owned by pro-government businesses. So, if there’s an election, the CHP might—if they’re lucky—get a couple of minutes on TV, whereas the rest is all AKP, all the time. They’re not even allowed to put up posters. So, while technically competitive, the system is heavily skewed.

But it’s still “competitive” in the sense that you could, against all odds—very long odds—still win, as Imamoglu did. And then, of course, we know—was it in 2018? I’m bad with dates—but in the local election Imamoglu won, Erdoğan didn’t like the result, so he had it rerun. And then Imamoglu won again, with an even greater number of votes.

So, it is possible. But if you now arrest Imamoglu—and there’s been talk of appointing a kayyum, or the government effectively taking over the CHP, replacing its leadership with government-appointed trustees—then there’s no more competition.

Right? That’s it. It’s a competitive authoritarian regime—unless there’s no more competition.

Erdogan Will Do Whatever It Takes to Stay in Power

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transitioned from being a model of democratic political Islam to an Islamist populist autocrat. Photo: Mustafa Kirazli.

Erdogan’s authoritarian turn has evolved in phases over the past two decades. What would you say distinguishes this current phase from earlier moments of democratic erosion, such as post-Gezi or post-2016?

Professor Jenny White: You know, I was doing research in Turkey at the time the AKP was elected, and I had already done a lot of work with the previous parties. But when the AKP first came to power, it was a completely different scenario.

There was a lot of talk about what kind of Islam they represented. It was framed as a personalized Islam—practical and pragmatic. The message was: we’re pious Muslims at home, but we make decisions in office based on practical concerns, not Islamic ethics. They emphasized that while their personal ethics might inform their conduct, policy decisions would not be based on religious doctrine.

That was the beginning. And Erdogan also reached out to non-Muslim minorities. There was a sense of progression, a feeling that genuinely heartened people—that finally, we had something different, a new way of doing politics.

It felt like, maybe for once, whoever was at the top wouldn’t force everyone to conform to their lifestyle or their values. That perhaps, finally, there could be some kind of pluralism.

But it didn’t last very long. The first major turning point came with the attempt by the police to arrest people in Erdogan’s close circle on corruption charges. That was a crucial moment—because his response was to essentially co-opt the judicial system. He transferred judges to remote parts of the country where they would be unable to act effectively. He fired prosecutors and lawyers, and replaced them—if I remember correctly, around 5,000 new lawyers were brought in. These were individuals who were, in a sense, in his pocket—closely aligned with him, loyal to the system he was building. They were, as it were, attached to the spindle—being drawn in and reshaped to fit a new judicial order.

So now, you don’t really have a free judicial system, as we see time and again. The same pattern occurred with people accused of being part of “FETO,” the Gulen movement. Once the movement was designated a terrorist organization, many individuals—some with no real connection to Gulen—were swept up in the crackdown.

They went through the process regardless, often without due process. Their passports were confiscated; they became social pariahs. People didn’t want to associate with them—even their own families distanced themselves out of fear of being implicated.

Many lost their businesses, which were taken over by the state. They lost access to social security. They became, in effect, non-people—despite the absence of any fair or reliable judicial process to prove wrongdoing.

Right? So then it just continued down that path. And I think the shift was driven largely by a reaction—a fear on Erdogan’s part that he was going to be overthrown.

If you remember, there was also Tahrir Square and other uprisings happening across the region. So when Gezi Protests happened, he interpreted it as part of the same wave of dissent. And then, of course, in 2016, there was an actual coup attempt.

I think all of this stems from a deep fear of falling—from a fear of being deposed. And so, he’s been willing to do whatever it takes to maintain power. As long as he could keep getting elected—which he did, because he remained quite popular—it wasn’t really a problem.

But now, he’s not so popular—largely because the economy has been in terrible shape for many years, due in part to his own brand of voodoo economics. Of course, some people have become very wealthy under this system, but the majority of Turks—regardless of background—are now at the bottom of the roller coaster.

Even if they haven’t been arrested, many are just barely managing to get by. Right? So I think his popularity has declined to such an extent that he knows if he were to go up against a candidate like Imamoglu, he would lose.

Voting Ceases to Have Any Real Meaning

Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu at the Gazi Race award ceremony at Veliefendi Racecourse in Istanbul, Turkey, on June 30, 2024. Photo: Evren Kalinbacak.

Many observers see the arrest of Imamoglu as a ‘preemptive strike’ against opposition in the lead-up to the 2028 elections. Do you see this as a sign of regime insecurity or confidence?

Professor Jenny White: Oh, absolutely—it’s a sign of insecurity. And that makes it all the more dangerous, because this is a line that has now been crossed. If this stands—if Imamoglu, who is the CHP’s candidate (and clearly targeted for that reason), and who would have won or likely will win an election—is arrested and removed from politics, and especially if the party itself is taken over, then voting ceases to have any real meaning.

From the beginning, Erdogan has taken great pride in being the voice of the people. “I am the voice of the people.” He’s long been proud of his popular support—“People love me.”

And again, thinking of the US as a parallel, the size of the crowds matters. The optics of mass support matter. So the fact that he can no longer rely on that is telling. Most importantly, it shows that he knows he can no longer rely on that. There’s no bringing the people back unless something dramatic happens—like an economic miracle.

So the other option is simply not to hold an election. If you can’t win it, don’t have one. But that would be a monumental step for Turkey. It might not seem so dramatic in countries without a strong tradition of democratic elections, but Turkey is different. For years, I’ve observed how proud Turks are of their elections—of having the ability to elect or remove their leaders. It means a great deal to them. It’s not something they could easily give up, and I think that pride is being reflected in the streets right now.

That said, it’s mostly young people who are out there—many others are not. And that’s because young people have nothing to lose. They truly have nothing. They see no future for themselves under this government, under a regime where, unless you know someone in the ruling party, it’s nearly impossible to secure a decent job—even with a good education.

Surveys show that around 50% of young Turks want to leave the country. This was from a couple of years ago, and I remember one survey that even looked at party affiliation—it turned out that many of those young people were AKP-affiliated. So even AKP youth want to leave, because the prospects are so bleak. Put simply: they have nothing to lose.

Their parents, on the other hand, have a lot to lose. Over the past 20 years, the AKP has embedded itself so deeply into the Turkish economy and society that many people’s livelihoods now depend on being affiliated with or supportive of the party.

Whether you’re working as a civil servant or one of the women hired to rake grass—as part of a charity-style initiative distributed by the municipality to earn a bit of money—the AKP is present at every level of interaction between the state and the citizen.

They have also co-opted much of civil society. So the fear people feel is quite realistic—if the AKP falls, if Erdogan loses the election and the CHP comes to power, what will happen to me? Will I still have a job? Will they do what everyone else has done—replace the old people with their own?

For many—especially the poor, who are just barely getting by—it’s an enormous risk. Right? So I think you can’t forget that Erdogan still has a lot of people following him or people willing to vote for him, but not necessarily because they’re passionately in love with him.

The Sense of Impunity Has Emboldened Authoritarians

And lastly, Professor White, how might the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency influence Erdogan’s authoritarian behavior? Would it embolden similar tactics and reduce external democratic pressure on Turkey?

Professor Jenny White: I think it already has. Apparently—though it wasn’t officially confirmed—Erdogan and Trump had a phone call just a few days before the arrest of Imamoglu. I’m almost certain Trump said something like, “Oh yeah, go ahead”—no problem. Why would he object?

This sense of impunity has emboldened authoritarians around the world. Erdogan has nothing to fear from US censure—no expectation that Washington will hold him accountable for his human rights record or for arresting political opponents. In fact, I’m quite sure Trump would support that kind of move.

The European Union is in a different situation. But it’s also connected to Trump—because now that he’s pulling back from the US’s commitments to European defense and traditional economic relations, Europe has to reassess its strategic alliances. It doesn’t have to, but I think it would be smart for Europe to recognize how important Turkey is—not only for European defense and NATO, but perhaps in other ways as well.

If the US is no longer a reliable partner, Europe needs to look elsewhere and build its own strong networks. And Turkey will always be a key player in any such network.

So Europe finds itself in a difficult position. Even though it genuinely cares about human rights, and about Imamoglu—who, for many, represents a liberal democratic future—they’re not in a position to speak out forcefully, because they need Turkey.

And Turkey also holds a very strong position in Syria right now. So, if Erdogan is going to take this kind of action, this is a strategic moment to do it.

Le Pen & Bardella

Professor Marlière: The Far Right Has No Free Pass to Establish a Dictatorship in France

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In this timely and incisive interview, Professor Philippe Marlière (UCL) discusses Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the limits of far-right populism, and the resilience of democratic institutions in France. While Le Pen’s narrative frames her disqualification as a “denial of democracy,” Professor Marlière warns against buying into this rhetoric. “Politicians are not above the law,” he asserts, adding, “The far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” A must-read on the legal, political, and symbolic stakes of France’s 2027 presidential race.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Philippe Marlière of University College London offers a trenchant analysis of Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the broader rise of the far right in France and Europe, and the fragile boundaries between democratic politics and authoritarian temptation. Known for his work on French and European politics, Professor Marlière opens the conversation by sharply distinguishing between fascism and the far-right populism embodied by Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN). “I would describe Marine Le Pen’s National Rally as a far-right party,” he says, stressing that although it is “reactionary” and “nativist,” it is “not fascist” in the classical sense, since it operates within existing democratic institutions.

The interview takes on greater urgency in the wake of Le Pen’s conviction on corruption charges and her disqualification from running in the 2027 presidential election. According to Professor Marlière, the ruling represents a “major blow” not only to Le Pen personally—who was widely seen as a leading contender—but to the party’s claim of moral superiority over the political establishment. “The conviction is so clear-cut,” he notes, “and her defense so weak,” that overturning the verdict on appeal seems unlikely.

At the heart of the conversation is the far right’s delicate balancing act between anti-establishment rhetoric and the imperative to appear legitimate within democratic norms. Marlière cautions that while Le Pen and her allies may frame the ruling as “a denial of democracy,” they have not dared to attack the judiciary wholesale, because “if she does, she risks being seen as undermining French justice and being pushed back to the political fringe.”

This fragility, he argues, reveals the limits of populist authoritarianism in France. “In a democracy, when you are a politician, you must respect the decisions of the judiciary,” he insists, citing Montesquieu’s separation of powers. And that is why, he concludes, “the far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” Voters may be willing to punish the mainstream, but they are not prepared to dismantle liberal democratic institutions in the process.

Dr. Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics at University College London.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Philippe Marlière with some edits.

RN Is Nativist, Reactionary, Far-Right—But Not Fascist

Professor Marliere, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You’ve distinguished between authoritarianism and fascism in recent analyses. Given Le Pen’s ideological evolution and her party’s increasing parliamentary power, where would you situate her movement today?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Well, I would describe Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) as a far-right party. If you want to place it on the left-right axis, as political scientists typically do, it clearly falls on the far-right. That’s also how many people in France perceive it today. Le Pen herself resists the “far-right” label, as it implies being on the fringe or extreme end of the political spectrum. However, that is how pollsters and the media commonly categorize the party. So yes, it is far-right.

It’s not fascist. I don’t think the National Rally can be described as a fascist party. Fascism is something quite specific. You can find fascism today in some countries and in some parties, but I don’t think the National Rally is fascist. I would call it nativist. The main concern of the National Rally is the support, through policies, of the indigenous population—the French—as they describe it, as opposed to non-French people or migrants. So: nativist.

Probably reactionary. Much of the National Rally’s policy and ideology seems aimed at returning to a past—often an idealized or even mythical version of the past—that France, in reality, never fully experienced. A past, of course, with fewer migrants and fewer foreigners. In that sense, it is reactionary.

The party used to advocate policies that were decidedly illiberal. For a long time, it supported the death penalty, opposed abortion, and stood against LGBTQ rights. It has evolved on these issues, and that’s likely something we’ll discuss further. In sum: reactionary, nativist, far-right—that’s how I would describe it.

Fascism, as I’ve said, is different. It involves the attempt to establish a totalitarian regime. It can promote racial politics and undermine or directly challenge the rule of law. I don’t believe the National Rally is currently inclined to do that—although, of course, once in power, they might attempt to.

That said, within the current political context, the National Rally appears to be a party that, if elected, would operate within the main institutions of France and Europe. It would likely cooperate with European partners within the European Union. For all these reasons, it is a far-right party, but not a fascist one.

A Major Blow to the RN’s Anti-Establishment Credibility

How do you assess the political implications of Marine Le Pen’s conviction and subsequent disqualification from running for office in 2027? Given the National Rally’s efforts to portray itself as a respectable, anti-corruption alternative to the political establishment, to what extent does this judicial outcome represent a decisive rupture in the party’s quest for power—and could it destabilize its electoral momentum ahead of a crucial presidential race?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Le Pen’s conviction—alongside that of up to 20 party members, mostly elected representatives in the European Parliament—is undoubtedly a major blow. It’s especially significant for Le Pen herself. She might not be able to run in 2027. As far as I’m concerned, I don’t think the decision will be overturned on appeal. She likely won’t be a candidate, so someone else will have to step in.

For now, she’s fighting to clear her name, but the conviction is so clear-cut, the corruption charges so substantial, and both her defense and the party’s defense so weak, in my view, that overturning the verdict will be extremely difficult.

This is a serious setback for Le Pen, particularly because she was seen as having a strong chance of winning the 2027 presidential election. It now seems increasingly unlikely that she will be able to run.

But more broadly, it’s also a significant blow for the party. As you mentioned, it has increasingly been seen as a normalized political force—no longer on the extreme fringe, but rather as a party whose ideas, members, and officials have gradually gained a degree of legitimacy. I wouldn’t go so far as to say it fully belongs to the political mainstream—not yet, not entirely—but to some extent, it is certainly no longer the early National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party that once frightened a large portion of the public.

So it’s a major blow for the party because part of its appeal lay in being increasingly perceived as no longer extreme by a majority of voters—or at least by a solid base of 37 to 40% of the electorate—while simultaneously remaining highly critical of the system; that is, the other mainstream parties, which it portrayed as corrupt and part of a de facto coalition responsible for poor governance in France and for the French people.

So, of course, being convicted and found guilty of corruption is a major blow, especially since much of Le Pen’s rhetoric has focused on attacking other parties—branding them as corrupt, accusing them of collusion, and portraying them as operating within a deeply flawed system. Now, that very charge is being applied to her.

There is evidence, and according to the first opinion polls, many people now view the National Rally as a corrupt party—or at least believe that the initial conviction handed down by the judges last week was justified.

Politicians Are Not Above the Law

Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

In a democracy, how should we balance judicial independence with the political fallout when a leading presidential contender like Marine Le Pen is barred from running due to financial crimes? Do you see this ruling as reinforcing or undermining public trust in French institutions? Moreover, is there a risk that—even if legally justified—it will fuel far-right conspiratorial narratives about ‘elites’ silencing dissent? How should mainstream parties navigate this moment without inadvertently legitimizing those populist frames?

Professor Philippe Marlière: As you would expect, Le Pen’s defense—and the party’s defense—was to claim that this is a denial of democracy, that the conviction was politically motivated, that the judges are politicized, and that the goal is to bar her from running because she would likely win. That’s what she said at a large rally last Sunday at Place Vauban in Paris. She made these claims, and throughout the week, Le Pen and her supporters have continued to repeat them. Of course, that is their narrative. But that doesn’t mean the narrative is true. In my view, it should be taken with a large pinch of salt and critically examined.

Let’s start with the heart of the matter. What is that? It’s the conviction of Le Pen and her supporters. She is guilty—guilty of a serious act of corruption. Several million euros of public funds were diverted to fake jobs. So we begin with that fact: she is guilty.

However, I believe that, with the support of some media outlets in France—not all, but some—the discussion has shifted away from Le Pen’s conviction and guilt toward a debate about politicized judges and an alleged denial of democracy. I remain very skeptical, if not outright critical, of Le Pen’s narrative, because it seems to me that the judges simply did their job: they applied the law.

By the way, who passed the law—the one that led to Le Pen’s conviction and its immediate effect? It was the lawmakers themselves. A bill was passed in Parliament in 2016. So it was people like Le Pen who voted for that law. They wanted to be extremely harsh on individuals convicted of acts of corruption.

That’s why I think it would be useful to bring the debate back to the heart of the matter: Le Pen’s conviction. She was found guilty of a serious act of corruption. And secondly, the judges simply did their job. To claim that they politicized the process is incorrect—they applied the law.

This also demonstrates something important: politicians are not above the law. They are treated like ordinary citizens—and rightly so. Why should a politician—even someone intending to run for the presidency, with a real chance of winning—be exempt from the law if condemned by French justice?

That’s the real issue. That’s what we should all be reflecting on, instead of defaulting to claims like “the judges are politicized,” and so on. In my view, that is the real question.

Undermining Justice Would Push Le Pen Back to the Political Fringe

Marine Le Pen has characterized her conviction and political ban as a ‘denial of democracy,’ echoing a broader far-right populist tactic of depicting institutions as tools of political repression. In the light of your critique of ‘political nudges’ like the ‘Islamo-gauchisme’ narrative, do you see a danger that the far right will now instrumentalize this legal verdict to delegitimize the French judiciary and fuel deeper mistrust in liberal democratic institutions?

Professor Philippe Marlière: I think it will be difficult to do that. They have probably already tried—particularly Le Pen. If you heard her speak last Sunday in Paris, when she addressed a rally of supporters, she was, of course, very harsh in her response to the judgment. She said, “Of course I’m innocent, this is a denial of democracy,” and so on. She also claimed that the judges who made the decision were politicized.

But she didn’t, so to speak, issue a broader criticism of the French judiciary. She didn’t say, for example, that the entire justice system is corrupt. She avoided that, because doing so would amount to directly challenging the French judicial system as a whole—and that would be quite serious.

It would indeed be highly problematic for a leading contender for the highest office in French politics to undermine the judiciary through such criticism. In a democracy, when you are a politician, you must respect the decisions of the judiciary. Failing to do so means interfering with justice—and that is a very serious matter.

The French political philosopher Montesquieu, in the 18th century, wrote about the separation of powers—executive, legislative, and judiciary—and he said that no power, executive or legislative, should be in a position to interfere with or encroach upon the power of the judiciary. If you do that, it’s no longer a democracy; it’s a tyranny. So justice must remain independent.

That’s why Le Pen will be very careful before launching a broader attack on the justice system. So far, she hasn’t done that. Some of her supporters have likely been less cautious, but she herself has been careful not to place blame on the judiciary as a whole. Instead, she has focused on specific individuals—the judges who issued the ruling—claiming, for instance, that the presiding judge was a leftist.

But this is a difficult line for Le Pen to walk. She cannot push too far in that direction. If she does, she risks being seen as undermining French justice and, as a consequence, being pushed back to the political fringe. Her opponents will say, “Look, you’re clearly not part of the mainstream. If you were ever elected, you would interfere with the justice system.” And that, of course, would be very serious.

Le Pen Must Defend Herself Without Undermining the Rule of Law

Given your work on the ‘dé–diabolisation’ or “de–demonization” of the Rassemblement National and the normalization of the far right in France, do you think Marine Le Pen’s conviction and political ban will disrupt this process—or could it paradoxically bolster her image as a political martyr and reinforce the RN’s anti-establishment appeal? Does this verdict pose a serious challenge to the RN’s attempt to position itself as a credible party of governance, or might it instead deepen its populist narrative of being targeted by a hostile elite?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Again, this is a difficult situation for Le Pen to handle, because she will, of course, try to defend herself. She has already filed an appeal, and I believe it will proceed very quickly—much faster than it would for ordinary citizens. Normally, an appeal takes two to three years, but in this case, it is scheduled for next year, which is unusually swift.

Why next year? Because it allows time for a decision to be made before the presidential election. This gives Le Pen one last chance to run—if she is cleared on appeal. In that sense, it also serves as further evidence that the judges, or the French justice system more broadly, are not conspiring against her. On the contrary, the legal process is offering her another opportunity to stand as a candidate.

So it’s a very difficult situation, because they have to be extremely moderate in their criticism of the justice system; otherwise, they risk being seen as a party that challenges the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. They simply can’t afford to do that. Someone like Donald Trump may be doing so in the US and getting away with it for now—but in France, where Trump is, by the way, quite unpopular, that approach would not be well received.

So the room for maneuver for Le Pen and her party is quite limited. She can say, “I’m innocent, I’m going to appeal, the judges who made the decision were unfair,” but they cannot go much further than that. They cannot openly criticize the judicial system as a whole.

That’s why I think, in terms of image—since that’s your question—if we look at the initial opinion polls, of course, these will need to be confirmed over time. But according to the polls, people don’t seem to have changed their minds. The party remains quite high in the rankings, and Jordan Bardella appears to have, roughly speaking, the same level of support as Le Pen.

There are two distinct points here. First, it’s clear that the National Rally is currently the leading party in French politics. That was evident in the last two elections—the 2024 European election and the general election—where the party came out ahead of all others.

That’s one thing. The other is the judicial decision. And I think, overall, the opinion polls show that the French public believes the decision was fair. That’s why Le Pen can’t make too much noise about it. It’s seen as a fair judgment. French voters appear to believe that no one should be above the law—including national politicians. If they’ve done something wrong, they should be punished like anyone else would be in similar circumstances.

A Far-Right International Is Emerging—But It Won’t Help Le Pen

In the light of the vocal support Marine Le Pen has received from international right-wing figures like Donald Trump and Elon Musk, to what extent does this signal the emergence of a transnational populist narrative centered on judicial persecution or ‘lawfare’? Are we witnessing a growing global solidarity among populist leaders who frame legal accountability as political victimization by elite institutions and the consolidation of a transnational illiberal alliance?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Well, very likely. The initial signs suggest that there is a kind of de facto reactionary or far-right international that has rallied in support of Le Pen. I think all the major figures—key leaders of that movement in Europe—came out: Orbán in Hungary, Salvini in Italy, Trump, J.D. Vance, Bolsonaro. Many of them made public statements. Even Trump tweeted.

He probably doesn’t know Le Pen very well—perhaps not at all—but someone likely mentioned the case to him, so he tweeted in her support. Of course, he did so because these kinds of far-right leaders seek to undermine the rule of law in liberal democracies. They challenge judicial decisions whenever those decisions go against them, and that’s precisely what Trump has been doing in the US. So, this was more of an opportunity for them to do just that, rather than a genuine expression of support for Le Pen herself.

But yes, there is a de facto far-right international. And every time a decision appears to deprive far-right politicians of power—or simply goes against them—they tend to rally in support of that politician, as they did in this case.

What does that mean, concretely? I think this kind of reaction doesn’t clearly indicate what the future holds, one way or another. It remains very uncertain. When I refer to a far-right international, it shouldn’t be compared to something like the Socialist International, where organized parties met regularly and committed to shared policies. It’s not that structured. It’s more at the level of national leaders or heads of state issuing statements, especially via social media.

So yes, she received that support. But what does it mean for Le Pen in France? I don’t think it means much. As I mentioned, Trump is deeply unpopular in France—on both the left and the right. Almost no one likes him. So I don’t believe receiving support from those far-right figures will benefit Le Pen. I think she has to be very careful. Le Pen wants to be seen as more mainstream, so if she appears to be in cahoots with, or too close to, highly controversial politicians abroad, I don’t think it will help her.

Far Right Is Rising—But Too Divided to Replace Le Pen Easily

Le Pen & Bardella
Leaflets featuring candidates for the 2024 legislative elections in Versailles, France, on June 28, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the French perspective, does Le Pen’s downfall create space for a new figure on the European far-right, or is her symbolic centrality too embedded in the populist narrative across Europe to be easily replaced?

Professor Philippe Marlière: This highlights the central challenge facing the far-right in Europe. The far-right has been steadily growing—making electoral gains, winning elections, and even holding power in several countries. To start with Europe: they were in power in Poland; they remain in power in Hungary and Italy—a major EU country—and Le Pen and her party are performing very well in France. The AfD in Germany has also been doing well. So there is a clear, steady rise of the far-right, marked by significant gains in the most recent European elections.

That’s one of the reasons why the far-right is no longer seriously considering leaving the EU if it were to come into power. They’ve realized they can fight from within and attempt to redirect the EU’s political course.

So that’s good news for the far-right. However, does this translate into greater coordination or cohesion among far-right parties and governments in Europe? Not necessarily. For example, there are at least two parliamentary groups in the EU that include far-right parties. They were unable to form a single group, which, of course, weakens their influence because their efforts are divided across multiple blocs.

It’s also well known that far-right leaders do not necessarily get along well; they do not necessarily work together. For instance, Marine Le Pen is close to Salvini and La Lega but doesn’t get along well with the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—which is strange, because Giorgia Meloni has a legacy that is more similar to Le Pen’s. They both come from far-right parties initially. Of course, they’ve evolved somewhat and are now a little bit different. But whereas La Lega initially wasn’t a far-right party when it was created in the 1990s, it became a far-right party. So it’s very strange, and I can’t necessarily explain the logic of these de facto alliances between far-right leaders and parties.

I think it often comes down to their positions on policy, but it’s also about whether the leaders get along personally. I believe it’s more the latter. And that, in itself, is telling. Political scientists often say that the left has trouble uniting—and if you look at the French left right now, that’s clearly the case. They can’t come together.

But it seems the far right also struggles to unite, for similar reasons: ideological differences and personal rivalries. So this is where things stand at the moment. The far right has become more successful recently, but it remains divided. It is not a unified movement. Instead, it’s a collection of far-right parties spread across various parliamentary groups in the European Parliament—groups that don’t necessarily cooperate well or work together effectively.

Bardella Isn’t a Le Pen—But He May Be Even More Radical

Jordan Bardella, Le Pen’s protégé, is poised to become her replacement. Based on your analysis of generational shifts within the European far right, do you see Bardella as a mere avatar of Le Penism by remaining dependent on the Le Pen name, or does he represent a potentially more radical or technocratic trajectory?

Professor Philippe Marlière: There are differences between Le Pen and Bardella. First of all, he’s not a Le Pen. If Bardella runs in 2027, it will be the first time since Jean-Marie Le Pen launched the National Front in 1972 that no Le Pen is running for the FN/RN party. That’s the first difference.

There’s also a generational difference. Le Pen is 56, and Bardella’s youth could be appealing—particularly to younger voters—by presenting a new, youthful face of leadership. But of course, there’s a downside: he is politically untested and very inexperienced. He’s not known as a strong debater or a skilled orator. Reaching that level in politics takes time—it requires years of experience. Le Pen has improved over the years, and with Bardella, it would be a very different proposition.

There are also political differences. I think Le Pen has been—and still appears to be—more supportive of the de-demonization strategy. Unlike her father, she hasn’t attempted to shift the party to the center—the National Rally remains firmly on the far right—but she has worked to make some of its flagship policies on immigration, Islam, and the interpretation of French laïcité more acceptable to a broader segment of voters.

To make them more acceptable to other parties as well, because de-demonization works both ways. It involves you, as a far-right party, refraining from using aggressive rhetoric or making racist statements—things that generally do not resonate well with the electorate. But it also involves your opponents shifting to the right and adopting some of your policies, particularly on issues like immigration.

So there are differences, as Bardella appears to be somewhat more radical on those issues. His economic policies also differ; he’s more like Jean-Marie Le Pen of the 1980s and 1990s—more neoliberal, more supportive of laissez-faire economics than Marine Le Pen. So, you might think these are merely cosmetic differences.

And who knows what will happen if we assume that Le Pen won’t run? Bardella seems to be in a good position—he holds a strong position as the party leader. But who knows? Something might change. Other candidates might try to enter the race, and there could even be a primary election within the party.

Think, for instance, of Marion Maréchal, the niece of Marine Le Pen. She left the party a few years ago to join Éric Zemmour, but now she seems to have taken a step back from him as well. She attended the rally on Sunday in Paris in support of Le Pen. Who knows? She’s very popular among party voters. She’s a Le Pen, even though she no longer uses the name—she’s Marion Maréchal-Le Pen—and for that reason, her presence could be significant. She’s also a better orator than Bardella.

So, who knows what might happen? Bardella appears to be the front-runner to replace Le Pen, but we might be in for a surprise.

Marion Maréchal and Éric Zemmour
Portrait of French politician Éric Zemmour with Marion Maréchal (formerly Le Pen), leader of the Reconquête party, seen in Toulon during a protest against the arrival of the migrant rescue ship Ocean Viking. Photo: Laurent Coust.

Le Pen’s Legal Struggles Will Have a Limited Impact on Europe’s Far-Right Strategy

And lastly, Professor Marlière, what ripple effects might Le Pen’s conviction and framing as a martyr have on sister far-right movements in Europe, especially in states like Italy, Hungary, and Germany? Could it embolden them or shift their strategies? Do you think this case and its framing could be used by other European populists to delegitimize legal institutions, especially in countries where the rule of law is already under strain?

Professor Philippe Marlière: I might be a little optimistic on this, but I don’t think it will have a significant impact on the political situations in other countries. Of course, some will use Le Pen’s case to talk about so-called politicized judges, to claim a denial of democracy, to argue that the “true patriots”—as they describe themselves—are being sanctioned by their opponents, that they can’t speak the truth to the people, that they are restricted and constrained. You know, all the usual arguments.

I think they might refer to the Le Pen case in national debates to make those points. But I’m optimistic in the sense that each national context is different. And besides, the pace of politics today is very fast. In a few months, who will still be talking about Le Pen’s conviction?

There will be the appeal, so in a year or so, it may come back onto the agenda. But if the appeal is upheld, I think people will move on—there will be a replacement, another candidate, probably Bardella—and Le Pen will be quickly forgotten.

That’s one thing. The other reason I’m optimistic is that, as I said earlier, Le Pen has to be very careful about criticizing the judges and the justice system—not to be seen as undermining the rule of law—because that would be an extreme move. It would place her in a very radical position, one that most of the electorate, particularly conservative voters who are not far-right, would likely reject.

These are the voters who, in the second round of a presidential election, might be tempted to vote for Le Pen or someone from the National Rally against, for instance, a left-wing candidate—if one were to make it to the runoff. This electorate is conservative, right-wing, but not far-right. The National Rally needs to keep them on board and continue appealing to them. If they can’t—if they lose that electorate—they will never get elected. That’s why they have to be extremely cautious. And I think the situation is the same across most European countries—Italy, probably—with one exception: Hungary.

Hungary has been governed by Orbán for a long time, and many people say that while elections still take place, they are not very fair. It’s a highly authoritarian regime—illiberal. So, probably with the exception of Hungary, where the opposition is now quite weak due to all the laws passed by Orbán’s government, I think in other countries there are still counterpowers—opposition parties, trade unions, the media, and most importantly, the public—the electorate.

It’s not because the electorate is putting the National Rally ahead in France that they want an authoritarian regime. It’s a very complex reality to grasp. I think supporting the far right in France today means, above all, rejecting the other parties—both left and right. People believe those parties were once in power and failed. They tried Macron, and they believe he failed too. So it’s more about the idea: let’s try the only party that has never governed—the National Rally.

But that doesn’t mean voters want an authoritarian regime, or a government that will curb public freedoms or take extreme measures. That’s why Le Pen can’t see herself as the new Trump. I don’t think being a Trump figure would go down well in France. Then again, you might say, in the US, who could have predicted what happened there?

You see, that’s why I’m optimistic. But of course, things can sometimes go wrong very quickly. Still, that’s my view. I think that for Le Pen and the party to be successful and ultimately win an election, they will have to stick to their strategy of de-demonization—which means no longer being seen as an extreme or threatening party—so that enough people will be willing to vote for them.

Of course, they will maintain their policies—against immigration, against Islam, and against a number of other things—but they do so because they believe there is probably a majority of people who could support those positions. Just enough. That’s their strategy. It doesn’t mean they have a free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.

Protests in Turkey.

Dr. Cevik: Turkey Has Crossed the Critical Threshold from Competitive to Full Authoritarianism

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In a compelling interview with ECPS, Dr. Salim Cevik argues that Turkey has “crossed the biggest threshold from competitive authoritarianism to full authoritarianism.” Highlighting the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu, Dr. Cevik sees it as a targeted move to eliminate democratic competition: “He is being arrested because he could potentially defeat Erdogan.” Populism, once central to Erdogan’s rule, is giving way to raw coercion: “Force is the fundamental strategy of Erdogan.” Dr. Cevik also condemns Western silence, especially from Europe and the US, warning that their inaction amounts to complicity. “Erdogan feels very strong… because he has international backing.” Drawing a parallel with past mistakes on Putin, he cautions: “You can’t really trust a personal autocracy for strategic partnership.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and sobering interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Salim Cevik—Political Scientist and Researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs—offers a critical diagnosis of Turkey’s deepening authoritarian turn under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Framing the recent arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu as a pivotal moment in Turkey’s political trajectory, Dr. Cevik asserts that “we’ve crossed the biggest threshold from competitive authoritarianism to full authoritarianism.” While acknowledging that political repression is not new in Turkey, he emphasizes that this particular case marks a critical rupture because it directly targets “the most potent rival of Erdogan” and aims to eliminate any realistic possibility for the opposition to win an election.

Dr. Cevik situates this development within Erdogan’s long-standing strategy of personalizing power and dismantling institutional checks and balances. Over the course of two decades, Erdogan has “sidelined all important political figures,” absorbed the party into his persona, and gradually brought the judiciary, media, business sector, and civil society under his direct control. This personalization of rule has been “formalized” through the switch to a presidential system, which Dr. Cevik sees as a culmination of earlier informal power consolidations.

While Erdogan’s rule was long bolstered by a populist strategy that fused economic provision with religious-nationalist rhetoric, Dr. Cevik argues that this strategy is faltering. Erdogan is now “no longer the popular figure” he once was, as economic decline has eroded his legitimacy among even his core supporters. This, Dr. Cevik suggests, is what pushes the regime to rely increasingly on coercion rather than consent: “Populist mobilization is no longer the key term to understand Turkish authoritarianism… Force is the fundamental strategy of Erdogan.”

Of particular concern is the muted response from Western powers, which Dr. Cevik interprets as tacit approval. He criticizes both the United States and the European Union for enabling Erdogan’s autocratization, noting that “Erdogan feels both very weak because he’s losing popular legitimacy, but he’s also feeling very strong… because he has international backing.” In Europe, especially, strategic interests tied to Turkey’s military capacity and geopolitical location have led to a dangerous silence. “Europe made the same mistake with Putin,” Dr. Cevik warns. “I see no reason why Erdogan should be trusted more than Putin… It’s not only normatively and morally wrong—it’s also strategically blind thinking.”

In this critical conversation, Dr. Cevik calls attention not only to Turkey’s alarming democratic backsliding but also to the global implications of Western complacency in the face of authoritarian consolidation.

Dr. Salim Cevik
Dr. Salim Cevik—Political Scientist and Researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Salim Cevik with some edits.

Erdogan Regime Is No Longer Competitive—It’s Full Authoritarianism

Dr. Cevik, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: To what extent does the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu represent a definitive rupture in Turkey’s transition from competitive authoritarianism to full-fledged autocracy?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Thank you for inviting me, and for the question. I think this marks a major threshold. But to be honest, he is not the first politician to be arrested in Turkey. The country has been on an authoritarian trajectory for more than a decade, which has involved the imprisonment of many politicians—particularly members of the Kurdish political movement, who have been arrested en masse. Some are still behind bars, the most prominent among them being Selahattin Demirtas, who has been in prison for more than eight years. So, in that sense, Imamoglu’s arrest is nothing new in Turkey—but it is new in the sense that it aims to destroy the competitive element of the political regime.

When we talk about competitive authoritarianism, it is an authoritarian system, anyway—but what distinguishes it from full authoritarian regimes is that, in competitive authoritarianism, there is a realistic possibility that the opposition can win an election. Now, why is Imamoglu being arrested and not someone else? I think there is a clear answer to that: he is the most potent rival of Erdogan. He is being arrested because he could potentially defeat Erdogan in the next elections. If you put people who could win elections behind bars, that, by definition, undermines the competitive dimension of competitive authoritarianism. Because if you arrest whoever is going to win, then it’s no longer competitive—it becomes a fully authoritarian system. So, in that sense, I think we’ve crossed the biggest threshold from competitive authoritarianism to full authoritarianism.

Force Is Now Erdogan’s Strategy

Turkey, Protest
University students stage a protest at Beşiktaş Square in Istanbul, declaring a boycott in response to the arrest of Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu — Istanbul, Turkey, March 24, 2025. Photo: Sedat Gulec.

How has Erdogan’s brand of populism evolved into an instrument of authoritarian consolidation, and how central is the creation of internal “enemies” to this strategy?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Populism and the creation of internal enemies have been central to Erdogan’s authoritarianism. That has been the case over the years—even when he was not yet a fully autocratic leader and when Turkey’s democracy was functioning relatively well. Erdogan has consistently employed a populist strategy for political mobilization, and he has now been in power for more than two decades. The first decade was relatively—or at least acceptably—democratic, and initially even pro-democratic. However, starting with his second term, during his second decade in power, he began to grow increasingly authoritarian.

Over these more than 20 years, he has always created internal enemies, and those enemies have actually changed over time. They have included Kemalists, Gulenists, Kurds, and Turkish nationalists—at different stages of his political career, he has targeted different groups. He managed to establish a minimum winning coalition to defeat each internal enemy. That’s his political style and strategy. In that sense, populism has been integral to the establishment of authoritarianism in Turkey. 

However, when we talk about this recent event—this arrest—and Turkey crossing a threshold from competitive to full authoritarianism, I don’t think populism is the right term here. Populism, by definition, is about being popular. Populist autocrats usually mobilize the majority around themselves, and they create internal enemies in order to build this minimum winning coalition—at least to configure a majority. That tactic—creating internal enemies—has been Erdogan’s strategy for more than 20 years.

But as I said in the previous question, we are now crossing a threshold from competitive to full authoritarianism. Erdogan has been a popular politician—he has always been a very popular politician. He consistently managed to create a winning majority, a coalition of a minimum winning majority. He is now crossing that threshold because he believes, and sees, that he can no longer do that. He is no longer the popular figure. He no longer has 51 percent behind him, and that’s why he is crossing this threshold. So, I think populist mobilization is no longer the key term to understand Turkish authoritarianism.

Of course, the process I’m talking about has just started, and we don’t know where it will lead. But if everything goes according to Erdogan’s expectations—and if Turkey becomes a full authoritarian regime rather than a competitive one—then he no longer needs to be popular. It will not be a majority authoritarian regime; it will be an authoritarian regime ruled by a minority. And that means he will be ruling by force, rather than by creating the consent of the majority through populist means. But, this is just the beginning of the process. Where we are heading is that populism is no longer Erdogan’s fundamental strategy. Now on, force is the fundamental strategy of Erdogan.

Populism Dismantled the Rule of Law—Now Erdogan Rules Alone

Would you characterize the current crisis as the culmination of a long-standing populist logic that inherently undermines liberal democratic norms?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Yes. This populist strategy that Erdogan has pursued so far has enabled him to reach this point. It has allowed him to dismantle the rule of law and undermine political liberties. It has enabled him to inflict suffering on individuals and groups he has designated as internal enemies. But, as I mentioned in the previous question, those internal enemies are no longer the minority. Now, he is creating an internal enemy that will likely, by the end of this process, be the majority—making it a forceful authoritarianism. Ultimately, it was populism—and the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and the liberal protections that accompany it—that brought us to this point and enabled Erdogan to cross the threshold we are now discussing.

In what ways has the personalization of power under Erdoğan blurred institutional lines between the state, party, and judiciary?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Well, in very fundamental ways. I mean, when Erdogan came to power, the AKP was a ‘cadre’ movement. It had a number two—Abdullah Gul—a number three, Bulent Arinc. Some would even call Abdullatif Sener number four, and the list would go on. We had a powerful cabinet with very prominent politicians, etc. So, it was a genuine cadre movement. Now, there is no number two within the AKP—let alone a number three or a cadre—and the ministers no longer carry any real weight. Even in this current crisis, we see that Erdogan is, in a way, defending himself. He no longer has credible political allies to speak on his behalf. So, everything is now personalized in Turkey.

But it has first started with the personalization of power within the party. Erdogan initially hijacked the party. It had been a party of prominent figures—a cadre movement with a political ideology, or at least a claim to conservative democracy. But step by step, he personalized power within the party. He sidelined all the important political figures and stripped the party of its political substance. When we talk about the party’s ideology or political beliefs today, there’s really nothing left—because over the past 20 years, Erdogan has continuously shifted his coalitions, leaving no consistent ideological foundation. So, the party became Erdogan.

After that, he personalized other centers of power. He brought the judiciary under his control. He turned the party’s control over the state into personal control—and since the party is Erdogan, this meant bringing the judiciary, the media, the business community, and civil society under his direct influence. So, at the end of the day—with the switch to the presidential system, which in many ways formalized these already existing informal power configurations—the regime became fully personalized. That transformation, already largely complete by 2013–14, was cemented through institutional change. Now, we are talking about a single individual ruling not only over the executive, but also the judiciary, the parliament, civil society, and all segments of power.

Strong Enough to Suppress, Too Weak to Compete

Ekrem Imamoglu
Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu addresses supporters during a protest under the banner “The Nation Stands by Their Will” outside the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on December 15, 2022. Photo: Tolga Ildun

Is the recent political crackdown a sign of regime insecurity ahead of elections, or a calculated strategy to establish post-electoral authoritarian permanence?

Dr. Salim Cevik: I think it’s both a symptom of weakness and of strength at the same time. It’s a symptom of weakness because Erdogan is increasingly lacking popular support.

What made him so indispensable to his allies for so long was his ability to bring the majority of the public with him. He kept winning elections—or, to put it another way, we can certainly criticize the tactics he used to maintain his popularity—but ultimately, he succeeded in staying popular.

That’s no longer the case. In recent years, those who don’t want to see him as president now form a larger coalition than those who do. This was already true in the previous election two years ago, but he managed to survive using various tactics: he divided the opposition, ensured they backed a candidate who couldn’t unify them, and relied on judicial tools—there was already a court case against Imamoglu at the time. He used other instruments too. The key was preventing the opposition from uniting behind a single figure.

But that’s no longer working. The local elections showed that the CHP is now the central actor in the opposition and capable of building a majority larger than Erdogan’s. So in that sense, he’s very weak in terms of popular legitimacy—and that’s what’s pushing him to take these extraordinary measures.

At the same time, he remains very powerful. He controls the state apparatus, the judiciary, the media, and the security forces. And the international context—perhaps you’ll ask about this later, but I’ll mention it briefly—has emboldened him even further. He knows the US is on his side, and he knows that, for a variety of reasons, Europe will stay silent. In that sense, he’s very powerful.

So it’s a paradox: he’s powerful because he can take these steps, but weak because he has to. He can’t afford to leave the competitive authoritarian game as it is and risk an election—even a highly unfair one—that he might lose. So, he takes measures to avoid that risk. In short, he’s strong in terms of state control, but weak in terms of popular legitimacy—and that combination is exactly what’s driving these moves.

Erdogan Exploits Islam as Rhetoric, Not as Rule

Has political Islamism in Turkey under the AKP shifted from a reformist ethos to a mechanism of ideological legitimation for autocracy? Do you see the regime’s increasing reliance on religious-nationalist rhetoric as signaling a radicalization, or merely instrumental populist recalibration?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Well, as I mentioned in the previous question, political Islam in the early 2000s had adopted a reformist character. At the time, they denied being Islamists. The famous claim was that they had “changed shirts,” and instead labeled themselves as Conservative Democrats. But that was merely a rebranding—because in order to navigate Turkey’s stringent secularist laws, it was not possible to openly identify as a Muslim democratic party. Unlike in Europe, in Turkey you have to use the label “conservative,” even though the public understands that “conservative” essentially refers to Islam and religion.

So, as a Conservative Democratic party, the AKP was indeed a reformist movement in its early years. I have to say that during that period, religious discourse in society also became more pluralistic and democratic—this was part of the cultural conflict in Turkey between authoritarian secularists and the conservative majority. To defeat—or rather, to undermine—the authoritarian secularist powers, who were a minority, Islamist actors adopted the language of democratization and pushed for reform within the system.

But around 2010 to 2012–13—it’s hard to pinpoint an exact moment—once it became clear that Erdogan was no longer under threat, he no longer needed the reformist agenda. At that point, the logic shifted entirely, and Islam became an instrument of authoritarianism, used to justify his populist, majoritarian, and increasingly autocratic actions.

As for the second half of your question, I don’t believe we are witnessing a radicalization. Radicalization would imply a structural transformation of the regime toward a more overtly religious order. If I understand the question correctly, I don’t see that happening—nor has it happened over the past decade. Erdogan has consolidated power, but he has never actually used that power to turn the system into a more theocratic one—he hasn’t changed the legal framework or granted religion greater authority in the functioning of the state.

The only time he explicitly referenced the Quran in policy terms was when he lowered interest rates—an idea that was ill-advised not just from an economic standpoint, but also because it lacked a sound religious basis. Religion prohibits interest altogether—it doesn’t differentiate between high or low rates.

If he had said, “I want to remove interest entirely from Turkey’s financial system because religion requires it,” then we could talk about a genuine turn toward religious rule—where religious texts begin to dictate policy. That would have been a clear move away from secular governance. But instead, he said something else—and I find this very telling. He said, “I’m lowering the interest rates because Islam doesn’t like interest.”

In that moment, it was clear: religion was being instrumentalized to justify a pre-existing policy agenda. He didn’t abolish interest; he didn’t change the institutional rules. He used religion as a rhetorical tool. Religion, in this case, was merely a pawn. And I see no indication that this dynamic will change anytime soon.

Religious Rhetoric Remains, But the Provider Role Is Crumbling

Turkish Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks in Van province of Turkey as holding a holy Quran on April 14, 2015.

To what degree does the AKP’s Islamic narrative still resonate with its core electorate, particularly in light of economic hardship and rising dissent?

Dr. Salim Cevik: It’s difficult to answer this as a simple yes or no. On the one hand, he clearly still commands a degree of popularity. As I mentioned, he has lost the majority and will probably never recover it, but he continues to enjoy the support of—perhaps—30, 40, or even 45 percent of the electorate. I can’t cite precise numbers, but some of that support undoubtedly stems from religious sentiment. Certain segments of society view him as a devout figure. More importantly, they harbor such deep resentment toward secularists that they rally around Erdogan, whom they see as a protective barrier between themselves and the secular elite. So, part of his enduring popularity is still grounded in religion.

On the other hand, that popularity is clearly in decline, and the driving factor is economic hardship. The economy alone may not be sufficient to build a majority coalition, but it is powerful enough to dismantle one. Or let me put it this way: up to now, Erdogan has played a dual role—both as an economic provider and a religious protector. He positioned himself as the guardian of religious values while delivering material prosperity. That balance was key to sustaining his electoral majority. But if he falters on either front, that majority begins to unravel. He continues to lean on the religious narrative, but he’s steadily losing the economic argument—the “provider” role.

So, yes, his base is eroding. But as I said, it’s a gray area. Religion remains a powerful political tool for him. Yet in times of economic hardship, it alone won’t be enough.

Unlike Gezi, This Time the Protest Began with Repression, Not Resistance

How do the current mass protests compare to the 2013 Gezi Park movement in terms of mobilization dynamics, ideological coherence, and regime response? Could the protests catalyze a broader democratic awakening, or will they be contained through increased repression and securitization?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Let me start with the second half of your question. If the mobilization continues and manages to force Erdogan to back down, it could mark the beginning of a new era of democratization in Turkey. That’s possible, but unlikely. The more probable scenario is that Erdogan will suppress the current mobilization and push the system toward an even more authoritarian model. Still, it’s a process in motion—we simply can’t know for sure yet.

Now, if we compare this to the Gezi Park protests, one major difference stands out. As we discussed in the previous question regarding the economy—when the Gezi protests erupted, they were largely a middle-class reaction. People were frustrated with Erdogan’s growing personalization of power—his attitude of “I am the ruler of this country, and I don’t care what you think; everything goes the way I say.” It was a kind of delegative democracy, as political scientists would call it. “I was elected, therefore I have all the power, and I don’t need to answer to anyone.”

That attitude contributed to the uprisings. And if those protests hadn’t been met with such severe repression, I don’t think they would’ve escalated the way they did. Gezi began as a peaceful demonstration—completely legitimate—and Erdogan could have simply let it happen. Had he done so, we might not have seen the full-scale protests or the resulting political crisis.

I don’t know whether he planned it all from the start, but at some point, Erdogan seemed to decide that Gezi wasn’t a threat but rather an opportunity—a way to boost his popularity. He could frame the protesters as urban, middle-class, secular elites. And that’s classic populist strategy: pitting “the elite” against “the people.” He painted Gezi protesters as privileged, urbanites who were safe and comfortable, yet complaining about trivial matters. That framing resonated with his base.

This current wave of protests, however, is different because it started with repression. It didn’t begin as a small demonstration that spiraled into something larger due to state violence—it began with the arrest of Imamoglu. It was repression from the outset. It was an intentional move to dismantle the competitive element of the regime. So, whereas during Gezi Erdogan’s stance was “I was elected and therefore I rule,” now it’s, “You once elected me, and I’ll make sure you never get the chance to unelect me.” That’s the key difference.

This time, it wasn’t police brutality that brought people to the streets. Rather, people were already in the streets, and Erdogan is trying to stop them with police brutality. It’s a different dynamic.

Also, I don’t think this protest is being led by the middle class. It’s being led by urban youth who feel economically crushed, who don’t see a future for themselves, and who are desperate. That’s why they’re protesting. In that sense, this moment feels more radical than Gezi. Back then, protesters were largely middle-class—they had something to lose. They wanted a more responsive government, but they weren’t acting out of despair.

Today’s youth have little or nothing to lose. That’s why even harsh state repression hasn’t stopped them—at least not yet. I was a young academic during Gezi—I was a university assistant, and by Turkish standards, I had a pretty good life. I honestly don’t think even full professors today enjoy the lifestyle I had back then. The economic decline has been dramatic. And I don’t think today’s university assistants, graduate students, or undergrads see much hope in their futures. That, too, fuels their willingness to take to the streets.

So yes, in that sense, there are some fundamental differences between then and now.

Ballots Aren’t Enough—The Opposition Must Mobilize the Streets

Turkey, Protest
University students protest at Beşiktaş Square in Istanbul on March 24, 2025, declaring a boycott in response to the arrest of Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. Photo: Sedat Gulec

What does the sidelining of Imamoglu suggest about the regime’s tolerance for political pluralism within the current constitutional framework? What risks do opposition parties face in navigating between electoral participation and resistance within an increasingly autocratic system?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Well, the opposition parties are now in a dilemma. I’ve been talking about how the competitive element is disappearing. It’s becoming a fully authoritarian regime, and I’m sure that at some point people will begin to ask: “Is this just theater? Why are we playing our roles in this performative act that only serves to legitimize Erdoğan’s authoritarianism? Why are we even competing in the elections?” I think that would be a trap—the same trap the Venezuelan opposition fell into at one point.

Whatever happens, there will be pressure on the opposition to boycott the elections or withdraw—but I think that would be the wrong path. No matter what, the opposition must go to the ballot box, participate in the elections, and make it clear to the public that they won. I’m not saying the regime can necessarily be unseated through elections—I think we are passing that threshold. I use “passing” intentionally—I’m not saying we’ve already crossed it. It’s a process. But even if we eventually do pass that threshold, and it becomes impossible to remove the regime through elections alone, the opposition must still participate and demonstrate that they hold the popular majority.

At the same time, they have to acknowledge that it probably won’t be enough. You can no longer unseat Erdogan simply through words or ballots. You need to mobilize the streets—through demonstrations and by raising a broad popular demand for change. The opposition must combine both strategies: win at the ballot box and sustain mobilization on the streets.

Europe Made the Same Mistake with Putin—Why Trust Erdogan?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo: Mustafa Kirazlı.

And lastly, Dr. Cevik, how do you interpret the EU’s and US’s muted response to Imamoglu’s arrest? Can this be read as a form of tacit legitimation or geopolitical pragmatism? To what extent does Western inaction amount to a “green light” for Erdogan’s continued autocratization?

Dr. Salim Cevik: I think this is a very important question, and thank you for asking this. And, as I said in one of the previous questions, Erdogan feels both very weak because he’s losing popular legitimacy, but he’s also feeling very strong because he has control of the coercive apparatus of the state, and he also has international backing. And when we say international backing, he has the backing of both Americans and Europeans.

We have to talk about this very briefly, so let me say a few words about both. I mean, if Trump talks with Erdogan, he would probably ask for advice on how to repeat what Erdogan is doing in Turkey in the United States. So obviously there would be no backlash coming from the American side, and all democracy movements in the world have to adapt to the fact that America is no longer ruled by a democrat. I mean, America’s own record for supporting democracies has always been a critical one. It has sold out democrats when it suited its strategic interests—that’s for sure. But it has now come to a point where America is ruled by a president who actually admires autocrats more than democrats. So we’ve left that era behind.

And for the Europeans, I think it’s clear—they will criticize it, and they do criticize it with weak words and sentences, expressions of concern. But nothing will come out of it, and everybody knows that they don’t mean it, because they actually feel that they need Turkey more than ever. Once Trump made it clear that American security guarantees are no longer reliable, Europe began discussing creating its own strategic autonomy, its own defense capabilities—and Turkey emerged as a very crucial actor here, with its strong military, large population, and growing defense industry, as well as its strategic location. So Turkey is a very important partner, potentially, for European security. And Erdogan knows this and hopes that Europe will ignore his authoritarian moves because they need him—and so far, he has been proven right.

But let me finish by saying that it is not only a normative mistake for Europe to allow Erdogan to make this move—hoping that Turkey is strategically important—but it’s also strategically blind thinking. Because once Erdogan removes all the thresholds between himself and full authoritarianism—once Turkey becomes a Putin-like regime—the question for Europeans should be: can a regime like that be trusted for security cooperation? Can it really be a security partner?

Turkish–European relations have been transactional for the last decade, and an authoritarian figure like Erdogan was quite fine for that. Transactionalism allowed for bargaining, and you could prefer to deal with a single individual rather than a state—and that was fine. But once you move beyond that—if you want to create a strategic partnership between Europe and Turkey, if Turkey is to become an important part of European security—then you can’t really trust a personal autocracy.

Europe made the same mistake with Putin. They hoped that by creating economic interdependencies, Russia would never be a threat to European security—and they were proven wrong. I see no reason why Erdogan should be trusted more than Putin in that sense, and why European security should be entrusted to a political system that is ruled by the whims of a single individual.

As I said, it’s not only normatively and morally wrong—it’s also strategically blind thinking on Europe’s part.

Professor Dogu Ergil

Professor Ergil: Turkey’s Crisis Stems from Eroding Line Between Persuasion and Coercion

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

In a powerful interview with the ECPS, veteran political scientist Professor Doğu Ergil warns that Turkey has crossed from populist authoritarianism into full autocracy. “Persuasion—which was once the AKP’s greatest success—has evaporated,” he explains. “In its place, coercion has become more prominent, and the instruments of coercion, including the judiciary, have proliferated.” Professor Ergil outlines how Erdoğan’s regime has personalized power, delegitimized the opposition, and dismantled democratic norms. With Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu’s arrest and mass protests unfolding, Turkey, he says, faces a “deadlock” where the state’s legitimacy is crumbling from within. This is a timely and sobering reflection on democracy under siege.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), veteran political scientist Professor Doğu Ergil delivers a stark assessment of Turkey’s current political trajectory under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule. Framing the ongoing turmoil as a crisis of legitimacy and democratic erosion, Professor Ergil argues that the country has moved from a populist-authoritarian hybrid toward a more fully autocratic system. “The ongoing crisis,” he explains, “lies in the growing strength of the opposition and the blurring of the line between persuasion and coercion. Persuasion—which was once the AKP’s greatest success—has largely evaporated. In its place, coercion has become more prominent, and the instruments of coercion, including the judiciary, have proliferated.”

At the heart of Professor Ergil’s analysis is the paradox of populist regimes relying on democratic legitimacy while simultaneously undermining the very institutions that sustain it. “If you demonize, criminalize, and prosecute your opponents, and attack the very institutions that brought you to power,” Professor Ergil warns, “you begin to delegitimize the system—and, in doing so, yourself.” This dynamic, he observes, has led Turkey into a “deadlock,” where democratic procedures are maintained in form but hollowed out in substance.

Professor Ergil traces this degeneration to the AKP’s strategic shift from early reformism to an increasingly nationalist and authoritarian agenda, using political Islam not as a blueprint for governance, but as an ideological tool to legitimize power. He also underscores how the personalization of power around Erdoğan has dissolved the boundaries between state, government, and party—turning the state apparatus into an extension of partisan control.

Professor Ergil’s insights are especially timely in light of the recent arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, which he views as emblematic of the broader erosion of the rule of law and the manipulation of the judiciary for political ends. As Turkey experiences historical developments, this interview offers a compelling and sobering diagnosis of a political system teetering on the edge of autocracy.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Doğu Ergil with some edits.

Populism Under Erdogan Becomes Parochial and Authoritarian

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching the August 30 Victory Day Parade in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo by Mustafa Kirazli.

Professor Ergil, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would you characterize the evolution of Turkish populism and authoritarianism under AKP’s and Erdogan’s rule, and how has it redefined the boundary between the people and the political elite? In what ways has the ruling AKP’s populist discourse transformed into a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation rather than democratic inclusion?

Professor Doğu Ergil: The nature of the political regime in Turkey has always been populist. The founding party of the Republic is called the Republican People’s Party, and one of the six principles of the regime has been populism. Anyway, I mean, it’s written down as populism rather than being populist. It is populist because the ruling elite wanted to execute a revolution from above, and they found the people not ready for a revolution to join the modern society or the modern world. Hence, to transform a backward society, they took the initiative of a revolution from above—an elitist revolution—and changed the fabric of society accordingly. So, the populist nature of the regime has always been there, ingrained in it. It’s in the DNA of it.

But now, with the incumbent AKP, it has become rather diluted. It’s no longer secular, and it’s less oriented to the world. It’s expressed as localism and nationalism, because in classical populism, there are the good people and the representatives of the good people against an evil, inefficient, and rather alien elite that forcefully wants to change the society—its culture, its identity, and so forth. But this localization and nationalization—rather than westernization and modernization, which were the true assets of the Republican regime at its outset—have made Turkish society and the present regime a rather local, non-elitist, and parochial society. In a virtual sense, more peasant-like, more Eastern, more Middle Eastern if you like, and more religious rather than secular, modern, and world-oriented.

Turkey’s Populism Has Turned Fully Autocratic

Can Turkey’s current political crisis be interpreted as a case study in populism transitioning into autocracy? If so, what distinguishes the Turkish model from its global counterparts?

Professor Doğu Ergil: Of course. The Turkish regime is not only popular but also populist, and increasingly authoritarian. This is largely because the incumbent party has blurred the distinction between the state and society by merging the government with the state apparatus. When this separation erodes, central authority becomes more consolidated and less differentiated, and the division of power weakens as authority becomes more centralized and autocratic.

In the Turkish case, it has become more personalized, and the personification of the government can be identified with the present president Erdoğan. So, all powers accrue in his hands, and he can exercise authority over all aspects of life and all institutions of the government, including the judiciary. The judiciary is now used as an extension of politics and control over society. Thus, Turkish populism has not only become more populist but more authoritarian and autocratic in this sense.

There are similar regimes in the world, but the Turkish one has become overly personalized—concentrating all possible powers—political, judicial, legislative, military, and so forth—in the hands of a single individual. The party that brought this man to power has effectively faded from view; it is no longer visible. What remains is the machinery of state power in the hands of one man—and the rest of society. That society is now split into two: the supporters of the incumbent government and its leader, and those who oppose them.

The ongoing crisis lies in the growing strength of the opposition and the blurring of the line between persuasion and coercion. Persuasion—which was once the AKP’s greatest success—has largely evaporated. In its place, coercion has become more prominent, and the instruments of coercion, including the judiciary, have proliferated.

Islam Became a Tool to Bolster Populist Power

Turkish Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks in Van province of Turkey as holding a holy Quran on April 14, 2015.

How has political Islamism evolved under Erdoğan from a reformist agenda in the early 2000s to a more illiberal and authoritarian governance model today? Is the AKP’s version of political Islamism now functioning primarily as a tool for ideological legitimation, or does it still contain genuine theological, political or societal aims?

Professor Doğu Ergil: The AKP’s political Islamism is one of the contemporary ideologies that found a place in Turkish politics. The political landscape had long been partitioned: there were the socialists, and slightly to further left, the communists—though they were a small minority—followed by the social democrats, liberals, conservatives, and nationalists. Each ideology was represented by a political party with a distinct historical background.

When the AKP emerged and began to take the stage in Turkish politics, it had to anchor itself in something—and it chose religion. Religion served as a supportive mechanism for nationalism and populism. In this context, religion was not used as a foundation for governance per se, but rather as an instrument to bolster a populist, nationalist, and increasingly authoritarian regime.

This strategy was effective for a while. However, it has since lost much of its fervor and effectiveness, as religion is traditionally associated with values such as honesty, integrity, and efficiency.

All these other parties with different ideologies had not made Turkey as great as people expected. So, the Islamic powers’ rhetoric said, “Look, even the name of the party is ‘AK,’ meaning pure white.” They represented themselves as honest, non-corrupt, and also more popular—closer to the people. In that sense, they seemed more empathetic toward the people, more intertwined with their needs, and so forth. But as time passed and the AK Party exposed its weaknesses, it became clear that being religious doesn’t mean being honest. Being in control of everything—ending the tutelary system, at the center of which was the military, as you know—doesn’t mean that democracy would take root or that there would be a more efficient, less corrupt, more responsive society.

As the AKP lost its credibility, the Islamic rhetoric has also become dysfunctional. This is what has happened in Turkey. And because of that, this 23-year rule of the AKP has come to a halt with these apparent street demonstrations and protests, showing that the party and its leadership cannot deliver anymore. It cannot keep its promises. And it cannot do so any further. So, I mean, it has come to a halt.

Islamism in Turkey Has Been a Supportive Value System

To what extent has political Islamism been radicalized under the pressures of regime survival and repression of opposition groups like Kurds, Alawites, Gülen followers, and political figures like Selahattin Demirtas and, most recently, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu?

Professor Doğu Ergil: Islam could not be radicalized because the entrenched institutions and the majority of believers believe in the general assets of the Republic. Turkey has been—though the founding fathers have been criticized for adopting the Swiss civil code, for example—benefiting from it. People have enjoyed all the advantages it brought, because there is no discrimination in that code. In it, women are much freer, men can act more freely in their daily dealings. Although that code has been criticized as being alien, people have benefited from it for many years, for many decades.

In that sense, people are not opposed to the republican regime, its laws and its values. People expect those to be furthered, to be reinforced, and new advantages and developments to be integrated into society, rather than taking society backward to another century where Islam dominated with its Sharia law. In Turkey, that never happened. Only a minority want Sharia law because they believe the system is not just. But Sharia law does not make a society more just, moral, or egalitarian. People understand that.

In that sense, Islamism in Turkey has been a supportive value system for an insufficient political system that could be improved, rather than bringing an abrupt halt to it and taking society back to another century.

Turkish Politics Has Become Warlike—Not Competitive

Protests sparked by plans to build on the Gezi Park have broadened into nationwide anti government unrest on June 11, 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Thomas Koch.

To what extent has Erdoğan’s populism depended on the construction of internal “enemies”—such as the Kurds, followers of the Gülen movement, and İmamoğlu—to sustain a polarizing narrative and consolidate power?

Professor Doğu Ergil: It didn’t start with Erdoğan. Populism is built on dichotomies and contradictions, as you know—such as the idea of a good society versus a bad elite, or good people rather than bad politicians. These dichotomies help consolidate the supporters of the government, the regime, or even the nation, as envisioned by the founders of the system.

Unfortunately, these contradictions—and the inbuilt conflicts they foster—have been present since the onset of the Republic. The definition of the nation was not an inclusive one embracing all citizens, but rather based on an ethnic identity, mainly Turkishness. This approach has, of course, automatically excluded others—if not legally, then emotionally, and later in practice, including politically.

Erdoğan did not change this, although Erdoğan and his party were non-nationalistic in the beginning, because Islamism transcends nationalism and ethnic boundaries. So, you can have a body of believers coming from different ethnic backgrounds and different nationalities.

But seeing that the bulk of the people are nationalistic, and that the founding ideology of the country is nationalism, the AKP and Erdoğan adopted nationalism and reinforced its Islamic leanings with the rhetoric of religion or Islam—but primarily became nationalistic. And nationalism always needs an enemy—or more than one, always. So, when you define “us” with certain qualities and deny those qualities to others—who are then cast as enemies—you create a conflictual atmosphere in which your supporters are closely knit, while the others become more than opponents; they become enemies. Thus, Turkish politics has become, rather than competitive, warlike.

By Undermining Their Rivals, They’re Undermining the System—and Themselves

What does İmamoğlu’s arrest signify in terms of the erosion of rule of law and judicial independence in Turkey?

Professor Doğu Ergil: The rule of law has been lost for a long time. I mean, we cannot find it anywhere—it has been hiding somewhere. It has been kept in chains or hidden somewhere. But it may reemerge if the incumbent government and its leadership see no other way—then they might return to the rule of law and democracy. Today, they still believe that they can win elections. And all this latest ado—imprisonments, crackdowns on the opposition, the incarceration of anyone who criticizes the government and its leadership—is due to the fact that they are losing hope of winning the next elections. 

So, they are clearing the way: first, by removing the supposedly successful competitors, and then by undermining the rules of engagement—that is, democratic rules and norms. But here lies a contradiction—a very substantial, significant contradiction. If you demonize, criminalize, and prosecute your opponents, and attack the very institutions that brought you to power, you begin to delegitimize the system—and, in doing so, yourself. That is, you undermine the very avenue you used to come to power. So, Turkey is now living in this unfortunate deadlock, because the delegitimization of the system through the delegitimization of the opposition is taking place.

The Judiciary Is Now a Tool of Politics

How do you interpret the strategic use of the judiciary to disqualify or imprison political opponents within Turkey’s broader trajectory from competitive authoritarianism toward full autocracy?

Professor Doğu Ergil: It’s so obvious. If you move from competitive authoritarianism to brute authoritarianism, of course the judiciary is either dismissed or becomes a tool of politics. That’s inevitable. This occurs everywhere in the world where the government or the regime becomes more authoritarian. So, this is almost inevitable. This is a choice, and this government and its leadership have chosen the path to autocratization and authoritarianism.

Do you see parallels between the Erdoğan regime’s control of institutions and historical patterns of soft coups in Turkish political history, or is this an unprecedented form of civil authoritarianism?

Professor Doğu Ergil: No, it’s not unprecedented. I mean, the same patterns are visible all over the world. We see it in Russia, Belarus, Latin America, Hungary, and so forth. In that sense, there is nothing unusual. The real question is why people tolerate such a deterioration of the regime. That’s important. I believe that where there is corruption, there is also the consent—at least by part of society—effectively becoming a silent partner in that corruption. In that sense, the people also need greater education in democracy. Rather than giving in to an authoritarian regime in return for favors, advantages, or privileges—rather than insisting on rights, freedoms, and equality—society, unfortunately, ends up deserving the poor governance it supports, at least for a time.

Ongoing Protests Have a Leader and a Clearer Purpose

Following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, protests erupted across numerous cities in Turkey. Citizens took to the streets to voice their opposition to the decision and express growing discontent.
Photo: Dreamstime.

How do the ongoing mass protests compare to the Gezi Park movement in terms of scope, motivation, and political potential?

Professor Doğu Ergil: In the Gezi Park demonstrations, it was so colorful, so unexpected, and so detached from any particular political party, social class, or political agenda—it was a wonderful, kaleidoscopic movement, I would say. It had no organization, no leadership, and no ideology. When I say ideology, I mean—if not totally and neatly defined—at least a trajectory for action and its aftermath. What will happen later? How will we proceed, to do what? And what will we do after the moment? That’s a broad definition of ideology. In that sense, Gezi didn’t have this.

But this time, although people erupted into the streets unexpectedly, inadvertently, they found the CHP—the Republican People’s Party—already there protesting and already a victim of oppression and crackdown. So this wave, this popular wave, pushed the Republican Party forward, making it the leader of the movement. And the CHP lived up to that expectation. So far, it has successfully led the opposition. Although we do not know where it will take the movement, to what extent it can lead it, or what the outcome will be, the conditions of leadership and organization have so far been met.

Now, what will happen? How the regime will be transformed—and into what—is still unknown. But it’s clear that corruption must end, oppression must end, democratic institutions must be restored, and Turkey must become more aligned with the world. In that sense, there is no need for a neat ideology or ideological agenda. If these goals can be met, the outcome of these protests can be very productive.

With İmamoğlu sidelined, what implications does this have for the legitimacy of the upcoming local and general elections?

Professor Doğu Ergil: We do not know what will happen—whether the government’s crackdown will continue, and what the response of the people will be. I mean, whether protests will grow and the pressure placed on the government will lead it to change its authoritarian stance, or whether the crackdown will intensify and we will become an absolutely authoritarian regime. And whether the system can endure this much pressure—I mean, the economy, which is on the brink of collapse, may collapse entirely, and conflicts may escalate into outright friction in the streets or elsewhere. So, it’s hard to say. It depends on how events evolve, I think, and on the response of the opposing factions in the process.

Erdogan Regime Is Too Useful to Be Criticized by the West

And lastly, Professor Ergil, how do you think the second Trump administration is affecting Erdoğan and his regime?

Professor Doğu Ergil: Well, it has been rather surprising that the US government—not only Trump and his entourage, but in general the American civil society, and, for that matter, the European Union and European governments—have been rather quiet on the authoritarian ascent of the Turkish government. All these parties—American and European actors—are expecting things from trade. Europe wants to keep all those millions of refugees and migrants in Turkey, so that Turkey would not open the gates of the dam and let the flood into Europe. Europe is very apprehensive on that stance.

Secondly, they don’t want the radicalism that’s simmering in the Middle East to reflect on Europe, and they see Turkey as a barrier to it. And thirdly, now with Russia—after a possible peace deal with Ukraine—being a threat against the security of Europe, and with the US abandoning Europe and making its security rather liable, Europe needs Turkey as a military power—as cheap soldiers—and does not want to antagonize the Turkish government because of this.

As for the US government, as long as Turkey does not threaten the security and interests of Israel—which it doesn’t—Turkey is a good friend of the White House. Secondly, Syria has to be stabilized, and Turkey, as a neighboring country and as a factor that’s present on the Syrian political stage, can contribute to the stabilization of Syria. How? By supporting the transitional government in Damascus and also reconciling the Kurds and others with the incumbent government in Syria.

Thirdly, the US wants Turkey to be in the anti-Iranian axis—to share this with its other allies, at the top of which is Israel. All these combined, the US—meaning the Trump administration—sees Turkey as a rather advantageous ally in this volatile region, and it could serve the purposes of American foreign policy.

Faded USA vs Germany vs Japan national flags icon isolated on broken weathered cracked wall background, abstract US Germany Japan politics relationship divided conflicts concept texture wallpaper.

The Future Course of German and Japanese Capitalism in a Multipolar World under Trump 2.0

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In his compelling analysis, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk explores how “Trumpism 2.0” and a multipolar world order are challenging the foundations of German and Japanese capitalism. As the US shifts toward protectionism, economic nationalism, and corporate oligarchy, both countries—once revitalized by American support after WWII—must now reassess their strategic and economic futures. Ozturk examines how trade wars, supply chain disruptions, and declining US cooperation threaten their export-driven models. From demographic decline to digital transformation, Germany and Japan face urgent structural reforms. This timely commentary not only maps the common and unique risks confronting these two economic giants but also outlines actionable strategies to maintain resilience in a fragmented world. 

By Ibrahim Ozturk 

I argued in my commentary that “Trumpism 2.0” marks a fundamental shift in global capitalism, blending nationalist protectionism, corporate oligarchy, and digital feudalism. The United States (U.S.) is transitioning from ‘neutral’ state capitalism to a model where government policies explicitly serve dominant private entities, eroding economic democracy and consolidating monopolistic power. This transformation deepens domestic inequality while driving international economic fragmentation, trade wars, and strategic decoupling. Meanwhile, the Global South is asserting greater autonomy, challenging Western dominance, and reshaping economic alliances. If these trends persist, escalating geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, and financial instability may define the coming decades. Yet, this period of turbulence—reminiscent of the 1930s—also presents an opportunity for systemic change, though it raises the risk of large-scale global conflict.

This process will also challenge German and Japanese capitalism, distinct derivatives of America’s preferences after World War II and shaped by the demands and constraints of the Cold War context and the mentalities and cultural dynamics of German and Japanese societies. 

Considering new challenges, this commentary reveals a potential roadmap for German and Japanese capitalism. First, the article compares the characteristics of American and Japanese capitalism. Next, it examines the role of the US in revitalizing the struggling German and Japanese economies. The third section addresses the common and unique issues these countries face, along with the effects of the Trump Administration and a US-less world. The fourth section summarizes the possible responses from Germany and Japan.

Three Models of Capitalism under Flux

To compare Japanese, German, and American capitalism, one must examine their economic structures, government-business relations, corporate governance, labor markets, and cultural influences. As Robert Gilpin puts it, American, German, and Japanese capitalism embody distinct models shaped by historical, cultural, and institutional contexts. American capitalism, a Liberal Market Economy (LME), is highly market-driven and individualistic, characterized by minimal government intervention, shareholder-focused businesses, a flexible labor market, and a strong entrepreneurial culture, fostering innovation and financial dominance but also leading to corporate volatility, weaker social safety nets, and economic instability. 

On the other hand, German capitalism, a Coordinated Market Economy (CME), follows a stakeholder-oriented model with strong labor unions, long-term investment strategies, and an export-driven manufacturing sector, ensuring stability, high-quality production, and social welfare, though facing challenges in labor market rigidity, trade dependency, and adapting to disruptive technologies. 

Similarly, Japanese capitalism, a form of Developmental State Capitalism, is rooted in state-business coordination, the keiretsu corporate system, lifetime employment traditions, and a focus on incremental innovation, enabling industrial stability and technological leadership but struggling with an aging population, stagnant wages, and slow digital transformation.

Each capitalist model has distinct strengths and weaknesses: US capitalism is highly dynamic, fostering innovation and financial dominance but prone to volatility and inequality; German capitalism offers stability and social equity but lacks flexibility; and Japanese capitalism prioritizes long-term stability and industrial coordination but adapts slowly to change. While each system has trade-offs, nations often adjust their models over time. On the other hand, in the modern era, American influence played a significant role in shaping the German and Japanese models, and it is exerting pressure for change in another direction now.

America’s Revival of Japan and Germany

Germany’s assertive expansionism in Europe and Japan’s in Asia, driven by an obsession with becoming a leading global powerhouse during the first half of the 20th century, led both countries into the catastrophe of World War II. However, despite having inflicted severe defeats on them and initially signing humiliating surrender agreements that deeply restricted their rights to self-governance, independence, and sovereignty, the US, which emerged as the new hegemonic power—replacing Britain—did not choose to “punish” these nations after the war, due to the new global power contestations. Throughout the Cold War, the US considered the spread of communism the greatest threat to its hegemony and democracy, capitalism, and the free market economy. In response, it took steps to rebuild Europe, particularly Germany, and in Asia, Japan. By doing so, the US provided both nations a lifeline after the most devastating destruction in their histories, fundamentally changing their fate in favor of democracy and economic development.

Both countries were rebuilt through American economic aid, market access, and security guarantees, which allowed them to focus on economic growth rather than military spending. In terms of Japan, the US contributed to its economic development and industrialization via its post-war economic reconstruction through Marshall Aids, the war boom that came with the Korean War, and access to the US market with a Most Favored Nation status (MFN).

Starting with Japan, first under US occupation, led by General Douglas MacArthur’s SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), Japan’s economic reconstruction period (1945–1952) involved

🛑 Structural reforms like the demilitarization and restructuring of its economy.

🛑Land reforms that redistributed land from landlords to tenant farmers improved agricultural productivity.

🛑 The dissolution of Zaibatsu, large conglomerates that supported Japanese atrocities in Asia, aimed to dismantle industrial monopolies; however, later, keiretsu networks emerged, but this time, contributed to the development of a civilian and trade-oriented economy through the formerly well-established discipline and perseverance.

🛑 Labor reforms promoted unionization and strengthened worker rights. However, that measure was reversed after Japan’s alliance with the US against the expansion of communism in Asia.

🛑 Implementing the Dodge Plan 1949 aimed at fiscal austerity to manage inflation and stabilize Japan’s currency. As a result, the plan established a fixed exchange rate (1 USD = 360 yen), making Japanese exports competitive.  

Second, the measures’ first significant and advantageous outcome emerged during the Korean War Boom (1950–1953), when the US war effort in Korea turned Japan into a vital supply base, leading to rapid industrial growth. In this context, heavy industries (steel, machinery, textiles) thrived as Japan became a supplier of military goods. Moreover, US military protection under the US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) freed Japan from defense spending, allowing it to focus entirely on economic growth.  

Third, the expansion of the Japanese production economy, characterized by a strong export focus, extended beyond the market established by the Allied forces in Korea. Notably, the MFN status allowed Japan access to the US market and supported its economic integration from the 1950s to the 1970s. In addition to full access to American markets, which enabled companies like Toyota, Sony, and Honda to grow globally, technology transfers and guidance from US firms helped Japan modernize its industries. Substantial US investment in Japanese sectors facilitated technological upgrades, and by the 1980s, Japan had become the world’s second-largest economy, challenging even the US in some areas. With government-industry coordination (MITI—Ministry of International Trade and Industry), Japan’s Economic Miracle (1955–1980s), focused on export-led growth and high-quality manufacturing, emerged prominently. 

In the case of Germany, first, American support for the war-thorned German economy included the Marshall Plan(1948–1952), which envisaged the disbursement of $1.4 billion (part of Europe’s $13 billion US aid package). The fund helped rebuild factories, roads, and energy infrastructure destroyed during the war. Like Japan, currency reform (1948) helped introduce the Deutsche Mark, replacing the unstable Reichsmark and stabilizing inflation.  

Second, West Germany’s membership in NATO (1955) allowed a US military presence and security umbrella, which meant Germany could spend less on defense and more on industry. The Cold War made West Germany a key US ally, ensuring sustained economic and military aid.  

The third significant contribution stemmed from Germany’s access to the U.S. market. The US encouraged trade with Europe (EEC in 1957, which later became the EU), integrating West Germany into global markets. Moreover, US investments in the German industry strengthened the growth of advanced manufacturing (e.g., Siemens, Volkswagen, BASF).  

Consequently, technological advancements and innovations enabled Germany to become an export powerhouse in manufacturing. They fueled GDP growth at 8–10% annually during the 1950s, culminating in the so-called West German Economic Miracle (Wirtschaftswunder, 1950s–1970s). This era, along with Ludwig Erhard’s free-market policies and US support, led to rising wages and improved living standards. By the 1970s, Germany had emerged as the world’s third-largest economy, boasting robust automobile, machinery, and chemical sectors.

Key Similarities & Differences in US Support for Japan and Germany.

 

The US Impact on specific industries in Japan and Germany

Automobile industry: After World War II, the US played a crucial role in rebuilding and shaping the economies of Japan and West Germany, particularly in industries like automobiles, technology, and finance. This support was driven by Cold War strategy—strengthening allies against communism—and economic pragmatism, ensuring both nations became stable markets and production hubs.  

Technology transfers, quality management, and access to the U.S. market were the three most critical contributions to the automotive industry. Among other factors, introducing modern management and production techniques, such as W. Edwards Deming’s quality control principles, formed the backbone of the Japanese Total Quality Management (TQM) revolution, which enabled Japanese automakers to dominate the global market. Additionally, the US opened its market to Japanese cars, allowing brands like Toyota and Honda to thrive with fuel-efficient, high-quality vehicles, particularly after the 1973 Oil Crisis when American consumers looked for alternatives to fuel-hungry domestic cars. However, Japan’s MFN status almost culminated with the Plaza Accord (1985), when the US pressured Japan to revalue the Yen, making exports more expensive and prompting Japan to establish factories in the US, which led to direct investment and job creation.  

Like Japan, the precise contribution of the US to the automobile industry in Germany originated from the partnership between Daimler-Benz and Ford. Also, American capital and expertise played a pivotal role in revitalizing companies such as Volkswagen, which had fallen into disrepair after WWII. Through transatlantic trade and global expansion, the US emerged as a crucial export destination, allowing German luxury brands like BMW and Mercedes to dominate the premium segment.  

Technology and Electronics: Japan’s electronics giants, such as Sony, Panasonic, and Toshiba, benefited from US military R&D spillovers and Cold War-era procurement. However, the US-Japan trade war in the 1980s later limited their dominance in the semiconductor market. Meanwhile, Germany’s industrial powerhouses, including Siemens and Bosch, regained global market access through US investment, with NATO and defense contracts fueling demand for their precision engineering.

Financial and Banking Sectors: The US tolerated Japan’s keiretsu system, where conglomerates like Mitsubishi and Sumitomo were linked to banks, enabling rapid industrialization. However, in the 1980s, it encouraged Japan to deregulate its banking sector, contributing to the asset bubble that burst in the 1990s. Similarly, the U.S. supported Germany’s financial reintegration by promoting Deutsche Bank’s global expansion and stabilizing the Deutsche Mark through the Bretton Woods system, aiding Germany’s integration into the international economy.

In conclusion, US economic support was crucial in transforming Japan and Germany into global industrial powerhouses, with Japan benefiting from technology transfers and market access. At the same time, Germany rebuilt its engineering and manufacturing sectors through US aid. Without US assistance, market access, and security guarantees, neither nation could have industrialized as rapidly post-WWII, highlighting a US-driven framework that still influences their economies today.

However, to understand how Trump and the emerging multipolar world—discussed in the next section—might shape the future of German and Japanese capitalism, it is crucial to recognize that the US approach to these economies reflects both global dynamics and America’s domestic interests. Since the 1980s, especially after the collapse of communism, the US has influenced the economic trajectory of these nations, which it began to see as “systemic rivals,” through trade disputes, financial pressures, and currency interventions. In the evolving, leaderless global order—often referred to as the “New Cold War Era”—changes in US strategy seem inevitable, bringing significant consequences for both Germany and Japan.

Germany and Japan under the Trump Administration and US-less World

Some of the problems and challenges facing the German and Japanese economies will be structural, some conjunctural, and some, it seems, will be Trump-related. Thus, the German and Japanese economies face a mix of common and unique challenges. Both countries struggle with similar demographic issues, such as aging populations and declining birth rates, leading to labor shortages, pressure on social welfare systems, and increasing healthcare costs, all of which impede long-term economic growth. Additionally, both nations face obstacles in modernizing their economies through digital innovation, with Germany contending with outdated infrastructure and excessive bureaucracy. At the same time, Japan wrestles with traditional work cultures and the slow adoption of AI and digital technologies. Furthermore, both economies heavily depend on exports, making them vulnerable to global slowdowns and geopolitical risks—Germany’s reliance on China and Japan’s exposure to US-China tensions exacerbate these vulnerabilities.

However, each country faces its distinct challenges. Germany’s energy crisis—from the shift away from Russian energy and delays in renewable infrastructure—has increased costs, impacting its industrial competitiveness. The transition to electric vehicles (EVs) and high manufacturing expenses have weakened Germany’s position amid fierce competition from China and the US. Meanwhile, bureaucracy hampers innovation, particularly in the public sector and among SMEs. In contrast, Japan is dealing with stagnant wages and deflation, which restrict consumer spending and hinder economic growth. The country also faces high debt levels, with government debt exceeding 250% of GDP, raising concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. Additionally, Japan’s dependence on energy imports and raw materials and supply chain vulnerabilities, especially semiconductor disruptions, put its key industries at risk.

With Trump ascending to the presidency for a second time, Germany and Japan are confronted with significant economic and strategic challenges. Their concerns about the Trump administration stem from worries regarding the effects of his protectionist trade policies, geopolitical unpredictability, economic nationalism, and the sidelining of the rule of law in favor of contingency management. Additionally, there is a tendency to exert power and force while ignoring international norms and values.

🛑Trade wars and tariffs caused key economic fears for Germany and Japan. To remind you, Trump previously imposed 25% tariffs on European and Japanese steel and aluminum under national security grounds (Section 232). He has also threatened new tariffs on European and Japanese cars, which could severely hurt Germany’s auto industry (VW, BMW, Mercedes) and Japan’s car exports (Toyota, Honda, Nissan). He has also criticized US trade deficits with both countries, which could lead to harsher trade barriers.  

🛑 The second fear concerns the disruption of global supply chains. Trump’s “America First” policy prioritizes reshoring manufacturing to the US, which could pressure Japanese and German companies to shift production away from their home countries. If Trump weakens or removes from the World Trade Organization (WTO), global trade could become more chaotic and unpredictable.  

🛑 Security concerns are the most common fear in Japan and Germany. Trump has threatened to withdraw the US from NATO, forcing Germany to increase military spending significantly. If US security guarantees weaken, Germany may have to allocate more funds for defense rather than industrial investment. Russia could exploit this security gap, leading to economic instability in Europe. Similarly, Trump has repeatedly criticized Japan for not paying enough for US military protection. If the US reduces its military presence, Japan may have to massively boost defense spending, affecting government budgets and economic growth. 

Potential Economic Scenarios for Germany & Japan Under Trump

Germany and Japan’s Possible Responses

The problems of German and Japanese capitalism go beyond Trump’s negative impact and the rise of the new Cold War era under multipolarity. Germany faces significant structural challenges, including energy dependence, industrial competitiveness, demographic decline, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and gaps in digitalization. Addressing these issues requires comprehensive reforms, strategic investments, and policy changesto enhance long-term economic resilience and competitiveness.

🛑 The expansion of renewable energy should be accelerated while diversifying LNG and nuclear sources, and industries should support green hydrogen to strengthen energy security and industrial competitiveness.

🛑 Strengthening manufacturing demands increased R&D in AI and semiconductors, support for SMEs and startups, and investment in EV and battery production.

🛑 Addressing labor shortages necessitates streamlined immigration policies, expanded childcare and reskilling programs, and greater adoption of automation.

🛑 Reducing bureaucracy through digital public services, tax reforms, and faster permit approvals will improve business efficiency.

🛑 Finally, accelerating digital transformation with nationwide 5G, AI-driven innovation, and enhanced tech education will elevate Germany’s competitiveness in the global economy.

On the other hand, Japan also faces deep-rooted economic challenges, including an aging population, stagnant wages, deflation, high public debt, slow digital transformation, and supply chain vulnerabilities. Addressing these issues requires structural reforms, policy shifts, and innovation-driven strategies to ensure long-term economic resilience.

🛑 Japan must implement bold reforms to address its structural challenges and ensure long-term economic resilience.

🛑 To combat labor shortages and demographic decline, it should expand childcare support, streamline immigration policies, and invest in automation and AI.

🛑 Breaking stagnant wages and deflation requires tax incentives for wage growth, stimulating domestic consumption, and maintaining moderate inflation.

🛑 Reducing public debt calls for gradual fiscal consolidation, efficient public spending, and pension reforms.

🛑 Accelerating digital transformation through 5G expansion, AI adoption, and corporate modernization will enhance productivity and innovation.

🛑 Lastly, strengthening supply chains by diversifying energy sources, investing in domestic semiconductor production, and securing trade partnerships will improve economic stability. By tackling these issues, Japan can sustain its global competitiveness and long-term growth.

More recently, Trump has introduced new dimensions to these challenges in both countries. His return has resulted in increased tariffs, trade barriers, and geopolitical instability, putting pressure on the export-driven economies of Germany and Japan. Both nations must diversify trade, invest in strategic industries, and strengthen their regional alliances to reduce economic risks. The following measures and policy recommendations are plausible and foreseeable solutionsregarding conjunctural progress under the Trump administration and multipolarity. 

Strengthen Trade Ties with Other Regions.

🛑 Germany could deepen EU-China trade or increase ties with India and ASEAN.  

🛑 Japan could increase trade with Southeast Asia, Australia, and the EU. 

Accelerate Industrial and Technological Independence

🛑 Reduce reliance on US markets by boosting domestic demand and innovation.  

🛑 Invest in digital industries, AI, and green tech to diversify economies.  

Strategic Military and Security Adjustments

🛑 Germany may increase defense budgets and push for greater EU military cooperation.  

🛑 Japan may develop stronger regional security partnerships (e.g., with Australia, India, and South Korea).  

Conclusion

The resurgence of “Trumpism 2.0” and the evolving multipolar world are reshaping global capitalism, posing significant challenges for German and Japanese economic models. Historically shaped by American influence, both nations now face increasing pressure from protectionist policies, geopolitical uncertainty, and domestic structural issues. While Germany grapples with energy dependence, digital transformation, and industrial competitiveness, Japan contends with demographic decline, deflation, and technological adaptation. 

To navigate these shifts, both countries must pursue strategic diversification to navigate these shifts—strengthening trade alliances beyond the US, investing in innovation and industrial resilience, and adapting security strategies to new geopolitical realities. 

The coming years will test their ability to maintain economic stability and global influence amid rising fragmentation. However, this era of disruption also presents opportunities for transformation, pushing Germany and Japan toward greater economic autonomy and leadership in a rapidly changing world.

German Scholars.

ECPS Panel — Discussing Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge

by Extremism & RadicalisationVideos

Date/Time: Thursday, March 13, 2025 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Moderator

Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).

Speakers

“How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?” by Dr. Eric Langenbacher (Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government, Georgetown University).

“How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” by Dr. Kai Arzheimer (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz).

“Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” by Dr. Hannah M. Alarian (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida).

“The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by Dr. Conrad Ziller (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen).

“Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells,” by Dr. Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau).

Photo: Shutterstock.

ECPS Panel — Discussing Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge

by EventsExtremism & RadicalisationPast Events

Date/Time: Thursday, March 13, 2025 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)

 

Click here to register!

 

Moderator

Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).

Speakers

“How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?” by Dr. Eric Langenbacher (Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government, Georgetown University).

“How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” by Dr. Kai Arzheimer (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz).

“Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” by Dr. Hannah M. Alarian (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida).

“The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by Dr. Conrad Ziller (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen).

“Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells,” by Dr. Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau).

Click here to register!

 

Brief Biographies and Abstracts/Outlines

Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens. He is a former director at the United Nations specializing in asylum policies. He is known to be one of the leading advocates of Turkey’s integration into the EU. He was the Chair of European Studies at Bahçeşehir University-Istanbul. In addition to EU integration policies, Dr. Aktar’s research focuses on the politics of memory regarding ethnic and religious minorities, the history of political centralism, and international refugee law.

How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?

Dr. Eric Langenbacher is a Teaching Professor and Director of Honors and Special Programs in the Department of Government, Georgetown University. His research interests center on political culture, collective memory, political institutions, public opinion and German and European politics. His publications include From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the Twentieth Anniversary of Unification (co-edited with Jeffrey J. Anderson, 2010), Dynamics of Memory and Identity in Contemporary Europe (co-edited with Ruth Wittlinger and Bill Niven, 2013), The German Polity, 10th, and 11th, 12th edition” (2013, 2017, 2021) (co-authored with David Conradt), The Merkel Republic: The 2013 Bundestag Election and its Consequences (2015), and Twilight of the Merkel Era: Power and Politics in Germany after the 2017 Bundestag Election (2019). He is also Managing Editor of German Politics and Society, which is housed in Georgetown’s BMW Center for German and European Studies.

How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?

Dr. Kai Arzheimer is a Professor of German Politics and Political Sociology at the University of Mainz in Germany. He is particularly interested in European far right parties and their voters.

Abstract: Within just three years, Germany’s Far Right “Alternative for Germany” has managed to double the 2021 result, making them the second largest party in the new parliament. During this period, the party has undergone a bewildering transformation that involved (further) radicalization on the one hand and normalization on the other. In my presentation, I trace this process and will also use (very preliminary) survey data to look into the micro-foundations of the AfD’s meteoric rise.

Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election

Dr. Hannah Alarian is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, where she is also a faculty affiliate with the Center for Arts, Migration, and Entrepreneurship and the Center for European Studies. Dr. Alarian’s research examines questions of immigration, citizenship, and far-right politics in Europe and the United States. Her research appears in the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, and Comparative Political Studies, among others.

Abstract: The 2025 German Federal Election marked a seismic political shift. Voter turnout soared to its highest since reunification, the far-right AfD secured 20.8%, becoming the second-largest party in the Bundestag, and the FDP lost all parliamentary representation for only the second time in history. How did Germany reach this moment of far-right ascendence, and what lies ahead? This presentation addresses these pressing questions, examining the democratic challenges posed by AfD. In particular, I examine the expected driver of far-right support (i.e., immigration) and party strategies regarding accommodation or exclusion of the AfD in parliament (i.e., breaching the Brandmauer). I conclude by discussing the democratic challenges facing the next German government and strategies the coalition may employ to stave off further far-right mobilization.

The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications

Dr. Conrad Ziller is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Duisburg-Essen. His research interests focus on the role of immigration in politics and society, the radical right, and policy effects on citizens, amongst others. More information can be found here: https://conradziller.com/

Outlines: In the 2025 German federal election, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) achieved a historic 20.8% of the vote, doubling its previous performance and marking its strongest postwar result. This surge was particularly pronounced in economically disadvantaged regions, especially in the former East Germany, where the AfD secured up to 46% of votes in certain districts. Notably, the party made significant inroads in traditional Social Democratic Party (SPD) strongholds, such as Gelsenkirchen in North Rhine-Westphalia, a constituency long dominated by the SPD. Additionally, the AfD has gained popularity among young men and even attracted votes from immigrant communities, indicating a substantial realignment of voter bases. The implications for German politics over the next four years are profound. With a stronger parliamentary presence, the AfD’s will continue to challenge the traditional party system and influence debates on immigration, economic reform, and Germany’s role in the European Union. While mainstream parties have ruled out coalitions with the AfD, their electoral losses highlight growing societal divisions. Addressing the economic and cultural divisions fueling the AfD’s rise will be crucial for maintaining political stability and democratic cohesion.

Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells

Dr. Sabine Volk is a postdoctoral researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau. She is affiliated with the Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarisation, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki. Her research appears in European Societies, European Politics and Society, Frontiers in Political Science, German Politics, Political Research Exchange and Social Movement Studies, as well as in edited volumes. Her research interests include populism and the far right, party politics and social movements in Germany and Europe. 

Abstract: The issue of immigration surely dominated the German federal election campaign. Mainstream parties adopted an increasingly harsh anti-immigration discourse under the impression of AfD’s increasing strength in the polls. This presentation shifts our attention to yet another important issue of far-right politics in Germany and beyond: antifeminism or ‘antigenderism’. Addressing the puzzle of AfD’s lesbian leader Alice Weidel, it examines how AfD successfully fashions itself as Germany’s key antifeminist actor. Among other things, it traces AfD’s radicalization in the issue areas of women’s reproductive rights as well as trans and gender diverse minority rights.

Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University.

Professor Hanson: Trump’s Patrimonial Rule Treats the State as Personal Property and Undermining Impartial Governance

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsLeadership & Persona

In a thought-provoking interview with the ECPS, Professor Stephen E. Hanson unpacks how US President Donald Trump exemplifies a growing global trend of patrimonial rule. Professor Hanson argues that Trump governs as if the state was his personal property—distributing power to loyalists, undermining impartial governance, and attacking state institutions. Drawing comparisons to Russia, Hungary, and Brazil, he warns of long-term damage to democratic institutions. Professor Hanson stresses the need for renewed public trust in government and a collective effort to counteract the erosion of modern governance.

 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University, offers a compelling analysis of the erosion of modern governance under US President Donald Trump. Drawing on his co-authored works The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, Professor Hanson argues that Trump’s presidency exemplifies a broader 21st-century resurgence of patrimonial rule—a system in which leaders govern as if the state were their personal property.

Professor Hanson underscores that “the key features [of Trump’s governance] are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.” This, he argues, is a defining characteristic of patrimonialism, a governance style that many assumed had been relegated to history but is now re-emerging in modern democracies.

Through the course of the interview, Professor Hanson details how Trump’s administration actively worked to dismantle bureaucratic institutions, a trend he links to similar developments in Russia, Hungary, Turkey and Brazil. He explains that Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results—mirroring tactics used by patrimonial rulers—posed unprecedented risks to American democracy, undermining public trust in institutions like the electoral system and the judiciary.

Professor Hanson also addresses the long-term consequences of Trump’s governance, particularly in how it has fueled distrust in expertise and weakened state capacity. He describes how, under Trump, public service was increasingly devalued, discouraging young professionals from pursuing government careers. “At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized,” he warns, emphasizing that rebuilding state institutions will be a daunting, long-term challenge.

Yet, Professor Hanson remains hopeful, advocating for a reassertion of the state as a force for public good. He stresses the need for new strategies to counteract patrimonialism, urging scholars, policymakers, and civil society to shift the discourse toward defending democratic governance. His insights offer a sobering but essential perspective on the ongoing assault on the modern state—and what can be done to reverse it.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Stephen E. Hanson with some edits.

How Trump’s Governance Undermined the Modern State

US President Donald Trump speaks at a White House press briefing after a Black Hawk helicopter collided with American Airlines Flight 5342 near DCA Airport in Washington on January 30, 2025. Photo: Joshua Sukoff.

Professor Hanson, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In “Understanding the Global Patrimonial Wave,” you discuss the resurgence of patrimonial rule. How does Trump’s presidency fit into this framework, and what long-term effects might his style of governance have on American democracy?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Thanks for this question. I want to begin by acknowledging my co-author, Jeffrey Kopstein, who, of course, can’t join us for this interview, but everything we’ve done together is a completely equal collaboration. So I always begin by acknowledging his great work.

We do think, sadly, that our predictions in The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, the book we’ve just published, have unfortunately come true. The Trump administration, in its early weeks, has fulfilled these predictions practically, and we believe that our warning was, unfortunately, quite prescient.

Now, what did we see coming down the road? We argued that this new version of patrimonial rule is really a wave of the entire 21st century and quite unexpected. The old literature on patrimonialism—or neopatrimonialism, as it was often called—assumed it was a relic of traditional society destined to be overthrown by modernity. You might see periods of patrimonial interludes, particularly in the developing world, but nobody had predicted patrimonialism of the 19th-century sort, or even earlier, in countries like the US, Israel, the UK, much of Central and Eastern Europe, and now threatening the world.

So, we’ll discuss more details about the Trump administration in this interview, but the key features are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.

All of this comes directly from Max Weber, and in a way, we are simply applying Weber’s analysis to these unexpected 21st-century cases.

You highlight how strong bureaucratic institutions played a key role in managing the COVID-19 pandemic. How did the Trump administration’s approach to governance impact the US response to the crisis, and do you see lasting damage to state capacity?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: We discuss this extensively in both the book and the article. What we argue is that patrimonial-style politics is fundamentally ill-suited for handling global pandemics. The first casualty of patrimonialism is the public good because governance is not about serving the public—it’s about fulfilling the private will of the ruler.

As a result, we see poor performances in countries governed by patrimonial rulers. If we compare data statistically, countries like Russia under Putin and the US under Trump performed very poorly. Patrimonial states tend to foster both distrust in the government—which discourages people from getting vaccinated or trusting experts—and the arbitrariness of the ruler himself. Trump’s public appearances, for example, where he seemingly endorsed sunlight as a cure for COVID-19 or suggested injecting bleach in front of his expert advisors, contributed to the excess death toll in the US compared to countries like Canada, which handled the crisis much more effectively.

Now, there are instances where patrimonial-style rulers managed certain aspects of the pandemic well. For example, Operation Warp Speed under Trump led to the rapid development of the vaccine, and Netanyahu’s vaccination campaigns in Israel were quite effective. However, we argue that these successes were not the result of patrimonial rule itself but rather the legacy of state-building efforts that predated these leaders. They were able to deploy existing state capacity, experts, and institutions in response to the crisis. But, of course, if the state is eroded too much over time, those resources will no longer be available in the future.

Rethinking Regimes: Why the Democracy-Autocracy Divide Is Not Adequate

Elon Musk speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) at the Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center on February 20, 2025, in Oxon Hill, Maryland. Photo: Andrew Harnik.

Your work discusses the global trend of leaders undermining bureaucratic institutions. How does Trump’s presidency exemplify this, and what challenges does this pose for future administrations attempting to restore trust in expertise?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: The book is called The Assault on the State, and I think one reason it’s now getting some attention is that the title encapsulates what we expected to happen under Trump. Maybe even we were surprised by the extent of the assault on the state. It’s not just an attack on the so-called “deep state” as a rhetorical device—it’s an actual effort to dismantle the entirety of the US federal government. With DOGE, the agency essentially created out of the blue and directed by Elon Musk in all but name, they are now going into every single state agency in the United States. They have very young people, between the ages of 18 and 25, embedded in agencies, looking at files, personnel issues, and money flows.

While there has been some effort lately to cut that back—largely due to the anger of Trump’s Cabinet ministers—it is still in place. The long-term damage to state capacity is incalculable.

So all of this fits within our framework, but in an extreme form. I’ll add one thing that might actually be a bit surprising—and perhaps even, in a strange way, good for those of us who want to restore the state. This is happening so quickly that the damaging effects will become apparent sooner rather than later. If that happens, maybe public opposition can also be mobilized more quickly.

You argue that traditional democracy/autocracy classifications are insufficient. Given Trump’s attempts to subvert democratic norms, where would you place his presidency within your broader conceptual framework?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: One of the arguments in the book that has actually been a little bit controversial—and difficult to convey to people—is that we really don’t think the democracy-autocracy divide is adequate to understand this phenomenon. It’s ingrained in how we think about political regimes; it’s the standard framework used by political scientists, social scientists, and journalists alike.

When we talk about regime types in political science, people assume it’s a scale measured by V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy), Polity, or Freedom House. In each case, there’s a line ranging from positive—representing the most democratic—to negative—representing the most autocratic.

One reason we failed to recognize the rise of patrimonialism earlier is that it doesn’t fit into this framework. A patrimonial-style ruler can win free and fair elections repeatedly. In some cases, they even thrive in electoral competition. Trump is a great example of this, as is Boris Johnson. These leaders leverage populist tropes, portray machismo, and rail against the so-called “deep state” bureaucracy or, in the case of Europe, anti-EU politicians in Brussels. This rhetoric has a strong popular appeal, allowing them to win elections handily.

When they do, it becomes difficult to argue that they are anti-democratic, given that they just won an election. So, we argue that the axis needs to change. Our analysis must shift to a second dimension: impersonal versus personalized state governance. This concept is rooted in Weberian sociology.

If this is an independent axis, it implies that there are four regime types, not just two. You can have bureaucratically rational democracies—Denmark or Canada come to mind. You can also have personalized democracies, which are patrimonial—this is the US under Trump. Similarly, you can have personalized autocracies, which are quite common, and bureaucratic autocracies, like Singapore or the 19th-century Prussian Rechtsstaat model.

If this two-by-two framework holds, then we need to recognize that patrimonialism can exist within democratic systems without immediately eroding their democratic nature. In cases like the Philippines, voters essentially choose which patrimonial clan will rule—whether it’s Duterte’s or the Marcos family’s—but the patrimonial style remains constant. These hybrid forms of governance challenge our traditional political science classifications, requiring us to rethink how we analyze regime types.

The Legacy of Trump’s Election Denial

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results mirrors tactics used by patrimonial rulers. How does this compare to other historical or global cases, and what risks does it pose for future US elections?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Well, connecting to what we just talked about, the January 6th events and Trump’s unwillingness to admit defeat are somewhat unusual in these cases. The reason for that is that, typically, you either have a clear-cut electoral victory—like Orbán in Hungary, where he wins elections that propel him to absolute power, securing a parliamentary supermajority that allows him to amend the constitution over time—or you have leaders who reluctantly step aside without outright denying their defeat. In Orbán’s case, the space for democratic competition clearly erodes, but it happens through legal mechanisms. He doesn’t need to claim the election was fake because, in fact, he won.

There may be some elements of this with Boris Johnson’s departure, where he was reluctant to step down and continued to complain that his downfall was somehow orchestrated by others. However, he never actually claimed he deserved to be the permanent ruler, and, of course, he exited through parliamentary means rather than an election dispute.

In this respect, Trump’s insistence that he never lost the election, that it was all rigged, and that the so-called “deep state” blocked his victory is somewhat unusual in the annals of these regime types. However, it has played a significant role in further undermining trust in US state institutions—particularly in voting systems, ballot counting, and electronic voting machines.

This poses a serious issue going forward. While, as I mentioned earlier, you can have a patrimonial democracy that remains competitive, it does erode the quality of democracy over time. If the public becomes convinced that the ballot box is rigged and that votes are fake, then eventually, supporters can be persuaded that their candidate won even when they actually lost. This, of course, can lead to even worse regime outcomes.

Western Democracy in Crisis

Your research connects US political shifts to broader global patterns. Does Trump’s rise signal a deeper systemic failure in Western democracies, and how can the US counteract these trends moving forward?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: It’s definitely a bad situation. And we should add—Jeff and I are definitely in favor of democracy. Sometimes we get asked this question: “You’re so concerned about the State. Would you rather have a Reichstadt with no democracy than a democracy that’s patrimonial in some ways?” And the answer to that question is that we don’t have to make that choice.

The reality right now is that there’s no Reichstadt or a Singapore-style uncorrupted autocracy on offer. The only options available are populism in a democratic context and patrimonialism in the state context versus the old forms of liberal, rational-legal order, to use Weber’s terminology.

So part of our goal is to reclaim the State as a positive entity. We’ve seen it is bashed for so long from both the left and the right. Libertarians argue that the State is a block to liberty. On the left, critics see the military-industrial complex and the surveillance state as suppressing the people’s will. Religious nationalists believe the State is too secular and is stamping out religious life—and this isn’t just in the US but also in places like Russia. It’s different religious traditionalisms, but with the same kind of complaint.

The idea that the secular modern state is a good thing, that it helps protect the public welfare, is often missing from our political discourse. When you defend the State, you sound like you’re upholding an old, discredited status quo. But we should recognize that it’s not actually the status quo—that’s the whole problem.

This also connects to another issue. We are definitely in the camp that says neoliberalism has a lot to answer for over the last 30 years. The notion that the State should be reconstructed solely in service of markets, that it should be downsized as much as possible to become more efficient, or that the old welfare state was bloated and ineffective—those arguments, we believe, did significant damage. The financial crises of 2008 and then 2010–11 convinced many that the so-called meritocrats were not meritocratic, that the experts weren’t actually experts, that they didn’t know what they were doing, and that they didn’t care about ordinary people.

So now the task is to clarify that what failed was not the welfare state, nor the old establishment—it was a new group who came in, believing the establishment was inefficient and trying to dismantle the State. In some ways, returning to the State as a source and defender of public goods does not take us back to neoliberalism. It takes us further back—to the idea that the people can own the State, that the State can be democratic, and, ironically, that it can be truly republican in the sense of being a public institution that ordinary citizens own and connect to.

The Breaking of the Bureaucratic State: Can US Institutions Recover?

In ‘The Assault on the State,’ you argue that modern government is under attack. How does Trump’s presidency exemplify this trend, particularly regarding the erosion of democratic institutions and bureaucratic expertise?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: What’s happening in my country right now is painful to watch, especially for those of us closely connected to the production of expertise. I’m a university professor, and many of our students and graduate students go on to work in the federal government.

They do things like work on climate change, secure military bases against flooding, prepare for future pandemics, and test new vaccines. Even before the Trump administration, it was sometimes difficult to convince young people to join public service. Many would say, I can make more money in the private sector, or the public sector is too slow, too bureaucratic. But despite these concerns, we still managed to attract a number of brilliant young people every year who were willing to commit their entire careers to public service.

Now, that pipeline is nearly broken. At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized. But the bigger issue is long-term: How do you convince people that this won’t happen again? How do you get young professionals to invest years in degrees and early-career government positions when they know that the next administration could just come in and fire everyone again?

The damage is much more severe than just a single administration. The US may be the most extreme case, but we see versions of this pattern in every patrimonial system. Take the Tusk government in Poland—they’re struggling to restore trust in the judiciary and undo the changes made by the PiS party. Rebuilding state institutions is incredibly difficult. The old joke applies here: It’s a lot easier to turn an aquarium into fish soup than it is to turn fish soup back into an aquarium.

The destruction of the State leaves behind a mess that takes years, even decades, to repair. So I think we have to be very realistic about the crisis we face. This won’t be fixed with just one or two elections. Those of us who care about democratic states that provide public goods in the modern world—and I hope that’s a lot of people—will have to start with education, collective action, and actively countering this disastrous assault on institutions that truly matter.

Loyalty Is the Most Important Currency in Trump’s America

US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

Trump frequently positioned himself against the “deep state,” portraying government institutions as adversaries. To what extent do you see this rhetoric as a deliberate political strategy versus a genuine ideological stance?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: I don’t think patrimonial rulers are best understood as ideological. That’s the big difference between patrimonialism and fascism—certainly compared to Nazism. Leaders like Hitler and Mussolini had ideologies; they had visions of the future. You could say those visions were crackpot or outright evil, and certainly they were. But their argument was: We know where we’re leading this new empire—it will be racially pure, or it will be a resurrection of Roman virtue. Young people will imbibe this spirit, march in step, and be mobilized.

In contrast, patrimonialism tends to demobilize society. This was true of the old Tsarist style of rule, as well as older monarchies and other non-ideological regimes, which essentially said: Let the ruler take care of the state; it’s his personal possession—gender intended. Ordinary people, the Narod in Russian (the masses), were not supposed to have a direct connection to the state, which is the opposite of fascism and other mobilizational ideologies.

When it comes to Trump himself, there’s clearly no coherent ideology. He has shifted positions on all sorts of issues, but people make the mistake of assuming that means he has no center at all. He does—his center is that he alone can fix it. He sees himself as the anointed leader—now even believing that he is divinely chosen—to govern America’s patrimony.

The consistent theme underlying everything he does is that loyalty is the most important currency. If you’re not perfectly loyal, he will punish you. The deep state, those with expertise in impersonal legal norms, are actually “fakers” who need to be destroyed. And the US itself should be treated as the property of the ruling party, the ruling state, and, ultimately, the ruling household—namely, the Trump family.

We even see echoes of imperial-style patrimonialism here. Historically, patrimonial rulers made claims on territories that were supposedly part of their rightful domain. Putin, for example, asserts that Ukraine is inherently part of Russia. Now, with Trump, we start to see similar rhetoric—claims that Greenland, Canada, or even Panama somehow “belong” to the US. This imperialist mindset, tied to a patrimonial vision of governance, is something to watch closely.

Misinformation Thrives When ‘People Are Not Hearing Both Perspectives in Real Time’

Your studies highlight how distrust in government is often fueled by misinformation. How did Trump’s presidency contribute to this, and what long-term effects do you foresee on public trust in US institutions?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: It really is a big part of the problem—no question. Social media, the internet more generally, the decline of local newspapers, and, again, the decline of trust in the so-called legacy media have made it much more difficult to get a coherent message out. Not everybody would have agreed with it, but at least elites in local politics across each state in the US, in each major city, used to have some common points of reference.

Back in the day, it was impossible to make a completely baseless claim and have it be repeated by media outlets all over the United States. That simply couldn’t have happened because not only did you have professional journalists reporting in each locality, but there was also the Fairness Doctrine—before the Reagan administration eliminated it. Under this rule, if you made one claim, you had to allow equal space for the opposing claim.

These sound like quaint notions now, but we actually need to return to them. Restoring the Fairness Doctrine would go a long way. I don’t know exactly how you would enforce it in today’s environment, but imagine if every podcaster or news show that put out an outrageous claim—say, all the election machines are rigged—had to give equal time immediately after for someone to say, ‘Actually, there’s no evidence for that whatsoever, and the people making this claim have been thoroughly debunked.’ Right now, people are not hearing both perspectives in real time. They are only hearing their point of view, and that clearly makes rebuilding trust difficult.

One last comparative point: If you look at the history of failed democracies, it’s not just social media that causes breakdowns. Weimar Germany famously fell into extreme party polarization, leading to a situation where budgets couldn’t be passed, and the political deadlock ultimately created the conditions for autocracy and Nazism. And all of that happened well before social media or the internet.

So, while misinformation and echo chambers exacerbate these crises today, they are not the only ways societies break down. However, once polarization takes hold, and each side of a divided society finds its own media outlets to reinforce its perspective—while completely distrusting all others—then it becomes incredibly difficult to restore public trust in government institutions.

Putin Is the Starting Point for the 21st-Century Wave of Patrimonialism

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

You discuss the global assault on modern governance. In what ways did Trump’s administration mirror or influence similar movements in countries like Hungary, Brazil, or the UK under Brexit leadership?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: The question of where it began is part of our book, and we make a claim that people found hard to believe but that we really stand by: it started with Putin.

We argue this partly through chronology. If you look carefully at the evidence before the rise of Putin in 2000 and the decades after, you had populism, of course—as you know better than anyone. There were plenty of populist movements in Europe, and they would rise on the far right or far left. They would sometimes gain parliamentary representation and make coalition-building difficult, but they never formed governments.

They were either systematically excluded from governance by pacts among mainstream parties, or they simply never achieved the electoral success to do so. The one breakthrough before Putin was Berlusconi and Forza Italia, where he briefly became Prime Minister in the 1990s. But his quick loss of power proves the rule—only after 2000, with a very close alliance with Putin, did Berlusconi’s leadership begin to take on more familiar patrimonial features.

So we place a lot of emphasis on Putin’s example. We think this is both emulation and direct support. It’s true that the Putin regime has funded pro-Russian parties worldwide, particularly in Europe. They have also pushed disinformation campaigns that serve the interests of the Russian Federation and its increasingly imperial ambitions.

Take Brexit, for example—the UK Parliamentary Commission concluded that Russia’s role in disinformation mattered in the referendum. Moscow has not been passive in this process. But beyond that, we argue the biggest factor was people simply looking at Putin’s model and realizing: “It never occurred to us before that you could build a 19th-century-style state in the 21st century—but look at what this guy has done.”

People thought Russia was finished. To quote a famous 2001 headline, Russia was seen as a laughingstock. International relations realists ignored it. And yet, Putin managed to reassert Russia as a great power, influencing global events—from Syria to US elections. Those who hated the liberal center, mostly on the right, but also some on the left, began saying: “Whatever’s going on in Russia, we need to figure it out. This guy has proven we no longer have to listen to the experts. We can beat the technocrats. We can restore traditional forms of machismo, religious veneration, and hierarchy.”

This emulation factor was very direct—for Orbán, for Netanyahu, and many others. These are empirical links, not speculation. People were surprised by our argument at first. But now, with recent events—including Trump’s presidency and the invasion of Ukraine—more people are asking us: “Did you really say Russia was the starting point for this?” Yes. That’s exactly what we said.

Patrimonialism Is Gaining Momentum—How Do We Stop It?

Even after his presidency, Trump’s influence may remain strong in shaping Republican politics. Do you see the attack on modern government as a continuing movement, and how might a second Trump term escalate these trends?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: I’m hoping when you say ‘a second Trump term,’ you mean this one—not the one that would come after. There’s already a lot of talk about amending the Constitution in the United States or reinterpreting it in a way that would allow him to serve beyond this term. This is very reminiscent of discussions in Russia in the 2000s, when Putin had to circumvent the official two-term limit in the Russian Constitution—first by installing his Prime Minister and then by changing the Constitution to allow himself to rule indefinitely.

These kinds of discussions matter for your question because, ultimately, these leaders must first be defeated before we can talk about reversing these trends. As long as they remain in power, the patrimonial style of governance will continue to be a dominant force—as everyone in the world can now see.

This is especially problematic when even China under Xi Jinping, while still a Leninist state with Leninist institutions, is increasingly taking on patrimonial features—with Xi posing as the father of the nation and asserting patrimonial rights to territories around China.

When China, the United States, and Russia—and to some extent Turkey, India, and Brazil—all lean in this direction, it becomes extremely challenging for the Macrons, the Scholzes, and the Starmers of the world. The remaining leaders who support modern democratic institutions are now struggling to figure out how to protect what’s left. So, the immediate problem is simply figuring out how to win in an increasingly lopsided world where patrimonialism is gaining momentum.

The longer-term challenge, which we discussed earlier, is about rebuilding a vision for the future—one that defends a modern, liberal state in the US (though, ironically, you can’t even use the word “liberal” anymore without it being dismissed as leftist radicalism or Marxism).

There is an enormous rhetorical and mobilizational challenge ahead—convincing ordinary citizens to resist these trends by making the case that patrimonialism doesn’t serve their public welfare. It doesn’t create a fair society. It fosters corruption, undermines integrity, and ignores public opinion. All of these principles—fairness, accountability, and good governance—depend on the survival of the modern state. Now is the time to spread that message.

The State Itself Is Under Assault—Democracy Comes Next

Demonstrators gather at the US Capitol on President’s Day to protest the actions of President Trump’s administration and billionaire Elon Musk in Washington, D.C., on February 17, 2025. Photo: Rena Schild.

And lastly, Professor Hanson, if modern governance is indeed under siege, what steps can be taken—either by policymakers, scholars, or civil society—to rebuild public trust in democratic institutions and counter the assault on the state?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: We were beginning to speak about this, and it’s the question that we all really have to engage with together. 

We end the book by saying that proper diagnosis helps on its own. One of the key steps is simply getting people to understand that it is the state itself that is under assault—and, in the longer term, democracy as well. Because if you don’t have a modern state, you eventually can’t run free and fair elections. You don’t have the impersonal procedures necessary to count votes fairly. Instead, you end up with what you see in Russia—political pressure to produce vote totals that show the leader receiving 90% or 80% of the vote, or some other absurd outcome. And that isn’t democracy. So, we are absolutely not saying that democratic erosion isn’t a problem—it is a serious problem. But it is a longer-term issue. The immediate, short-term problem is the destruction of state capacity—something that is already happening in the US and other places as well.

So, what can we do about it?

  1. Diagnosis – The first step is recognizing that this is a political issue that must be tackled directly.
  2. Reviving Public Service – The second is getting people to care about public service as a legitimate and worthwhile career—which is incredibly difficult these days, as I mentioned earlier, given the material concerns of young people. But, at the same time, I see many students at William & Mary every day who genuinely want to do good in the world—who want their lives to be dedicated to service.

And the truth is, there are many people like that around the world—especially in modern democracies—who would agree that if we don’t have the institutional capacity to deal with climate change, the next pandemic, immigration, or any number of existential global threats, then we simply won’t be able to solve them. As a species, we will not succeed.

So, I think another crucial step is getting the rhetoric right. Instead of constantly accusing patrimonial leaders and their supporters of being anti-democratic, which only alienates their voters, we should frame the argument differently. If you tell Trump voters, “Trump is an anti-democrat, and you’re an idiot for supporting him,” they will naturally reject that. They will see it as just another elitist telling them what to think—which only fuels the cycle of resentment. But if you frame the issue as “What’s happening is the destruction of the state’s ability to do good in the world,” you can actually win people over. 

Disembarkation of 300 migrants from Libya from the German rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 in Pozzallo, Province of Ragusa, Italy, on June 9, 2022. Photo: Alec Tassi.

The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe

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Yogo, Edouard Epiphane. (2025). “The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 4, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0048

 

Abstract
This research examines the influence of populism on the redefinition of citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. It explores how populist movements leverage anti-immigrant sentiments to shape political discourse, laws, and societal attitudes. The study combines qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants, and quantitative data from national surveys to analyze changes in citizenship laws and social inclusion challenges. Through case studies, it highlights variations in populist influence across European countries. The research concludes with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society amidst rising populism.

Keywords: Populism, citizenship, social inclusion, migration dynamics, European societies

 

By Edouard Epiphane Yogo*

Introduction 

The rise of populism in Europe has become one of the most significant political phenomena of the 21st century, fundamentally altering the political landscape and reshaping discussions surrounding citizenship and social inclusion for migrants. According to Arzheimer & Carter (2006), populist movements have emerged across various European countries, characterized by their anti-elite sentiments and a rhetoric that often scapegoats immigrants and minorities for societal issues (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). As these movements gain traction, they exploit and amplify anti-immigrant sentiments, influencing political discourse, legislation, and societal attitudes toward migrants. This dynamic presents a critical need to explore how populism is redefining citizenship and the concept of social inclusion within the broader context of migration (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

At the heart of this inquiry lies a fundamental question: How does populism redefine the essence of citizenship? This question invites us to consider the shifts in legal frameworks, societal norms, and public perceptions surrounding the rights and identities of migrants in Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The changing landscape of citizenship laws particularly the principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) illustrates how populist narratives can reshape notions of national belonging (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). Moreover, the impact of these changes on the social integration of migrants poses significant implications for the cohesiveness of European societies.

To investigate these pressing issues, this research adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants with quantitative data derived from national surveys. This comprehensive analysis aims to uncover not only the changes in citizenship laws but also the challenges to social inclusion faced by migrants in various European contexts. By examining the intersection of populism and migration, the study seeks to illuminate how populist movements influence citizenship policies and shape societal attitudes toward migrants.

One of the central themes of this research is the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions of migrants. In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping these perceptions (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Populist leaders and parties often utilize rhetoric that stigmatizes migrants, framing them as threats to national security, cultural identity, and economic stability (Talani, 2021). Such narratives contribute to the development of negative stereotypes and social divisions, making it increasingly difficult for migrants to achieve social integration in education, employment, and healthcare (Scheiring et al., 2024).

The first section of the study will examine how populist narratives reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship. By analyzing the rhetoric employed by populist movements, the research will highlight the ways in which these narratives seek to define and limit national belonging. Furthermore, it will explore case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries, illustrating how populism has influenced legislative reforms aimed at restricting migrants’ rights and opportunities.

The second section will focus on the challenges to social inclusion for migrants under the influence of populism. By investigating the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions, the study will analyze the stigmatization of migrants and the resulting impacts on their ability to integrate into society. The research will delve into how negative portrayals in the media can lead to societal attitudes that hinder access to essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, ultimately affecting migrants’ social standing and quality of life.

In exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion, the research will address the restrictive measures that impact integration efforts. These policies often prioritize the needs and rights of native citizens over those of migrants, resulting in systemic barriers that prevent meaningful social inclusion. The study will also incorporate case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of populist policies based on varying economic and historical contexts across European countries. This analysis aims to demonstrate how local conditions shape the outcomes of populist approaches to social inclusion and migration dynamics.

To interpret these dynamics effectively, this research will utilize the phenomenological constructivism framework proposed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 2011). According to Berger and Luckmann (2011), this theoretical approach posits that social reality is constructed through human interactions and is deeply influenced by the contexts in which these interactions occur. By applying this framework, the study will explore how populist narratives and policies are socially constructed and how they influence perceptions of citizenship and social inclusion (Mudde, 2014). This perspective will allow us to examine the processes through which migrants are categorized, marginalized, and included or excluded from the social fabric of European societies.

Using Berger and Luckmann’s insights, the research, based on phenomenological constructivism, will analyze how societal constructs surrounding nationality and belonging are negotiated and redefined in the context of populism (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). It will facilitate a deeper understanding of the ways in which individual and collective identities are shaped by populist discourse, as well as the implications of these construct s for migrants’ experiences of citizenship and social integration. By situating our analysis within this theoretical framework, we aim to highlight the significance of social constructions in shaping the realities of migrants in Europe. In addition to phenomenological constructivism, this research will also employ François Thual’s geopolitical method to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Thual’s approach emphasizes the importance of contextual factors such as geography, history, and socio-political dynamics in shaping political behavior and policy decisions. This method allows us to analyze how populist movements are not only a response to immediate political conditions but are also deeply rooted in historical and geographical contexts that influence their evolution and impact (Thual, 1996). 

Thual’s geopolitical method will guide the exploration of how different European countries experience and respond to populism in distinct ways (Loyer, 2019). By examining the geographical and historical backgrounds of specific case studies, we can uncover the localized factors that drive populist sentiments and how these sentiments manifest in citizenship laws and social inclusion policies (Zajec, 2018). This analytical lens will enhance our understanding of why certain countries adopt more restrictive policies while others may strive for inclusivity in the face of populism. 

As the research unfolds, it will emphasize the need for inclusive policies that can counteract the negative effects of populism on citizenship and social inclusion. By synthesizing the findings, the study will conclude with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society in the face of rising populism. These recommendations will focus on strategies that promote equitable access to rights and opportunities for migrants, thereby enhancing social cohesion and countering the divisive narratives propagated by populist movements.

In summary, this research seeks to illuminate the complex interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. By examining the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions and legislative reforms, the study will provide valuable insights into the challenges migrants face in achieving social integration. Ultimately, the findings will underscore the importance of developing inclusive policies that address the needs and rights of all members of society, fostering a more equitable and cohesive European community amidst the challenges posed by populism.

The Impact of Populism on the Redefinition of Citizenship

In the current global landscape shaped by the rise of populism, discussions around citizenship and national identity have gained renewed significance. Recent changes in citizenship laws reflect the increasing influence of populist movements that seek to redefine national belonging. This document will examine two key aspects: Changes in citizenship laws and principles under populist influence (A) and the relationship between populism and the concept of national identity (B), highlighting the tensions and redefinitions that arise.

Changes in Citizenship Laws and Principles Under Populist Influence

Discussing on changes in citizenship laws and principles leads us to examine two key areas. Firstly, the shifts in jus soliand jus sanguinis citizenship principles (1) and secondly, the influence of populist discourse on recent legislative reforms (2). 

Analysis of Shifts in Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis under Populist Influence

The principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) are long-established frameworks that define how individuals acquire nationality (Retailleau, 2024). Jus soli grants citizenship to those born within a country’s territory, promoting inclusion and diversity, while jus sanguinis bases citizenship on parentage, linking it to lineage and heritage. Many countries have historically blended both principles to accommodate social and political contexts. However, the rise of populist movements has altered how these principles are applied, with significant implications for citizenship laws (El País, 2024).

Populism, characterized by its anti-immigration and nationalist rhetoric, has shifted the conversation toward more restrictive definitions of citizenship, often challenging jus soli by framing it as too inclusive (Giugni & Grasso, 2021; Le Monde, 2024). Populist leaders argue that automatic birthright citizenship allows individuals with no cultural or historical ties to the nation to gain full membership. For example, in the United States, under the Trump administration, jus solicame under scrutiny, with arguments about “anchor babies” used to portray birthright citizenship as a loophole exploited by immigrants (Schmidt, 2019).

Similarly, in Europe, populist movements have pushed for limiting or abolishing jus soli to preserve national identity. Germany, for instance, had integrated jus soli to respond to globalization, but recent populist pressures aim to reverse these changes.

While jus soli face restrictions, populist leaders have embraced jus sanguinis. This principle aligns with their focus on ethnicity, heritage, and national purity, promoting a more exclusionary form of citizenship based on ancestral ties (Le Monde, 2024). In Hungary, for instance, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s policies prioritize ethnic Hungarian identity, offering citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad while maintaining a rigid stance against immigrants and refugees. Likewise, Italy emphasizes jus sanguinis, granting citizenship to individuals of Italian descent but placing increasing scrutiny on migrants and refugees (Le Monde, 2024; Kymlicka, 2001).

The preference for jus sanguinis reflects a broader trend of ethno-nationalism under populist regimes. By favoring bloodline-based citizenship, populists create a narrower definition of national identity, excluding individuals without ancestral ties to the country (Joppke, 2010). This shift has serious consequences for social cohesion, as it marginalizes immigrants and minorities, potentially deepening societal divides.

The erosion of jus soli particularly affects children born to immigrant families, who may face statelessness or legal obstacles to full integration. Meanwhile, the reinforcement of jus sanguinis perpetuates exclusionary notions of citizenship, creating a tiered system where only those with ethnic or cultural ties to the state are considered full citizens (Le Monde, 2024). This dynamic threatens to alienate large segments of the population, especially in multicultural societies, contributing to increased social tensions.

The changes to jus soli and jus sanguinis driven by populist movements illustrate a shift toward restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies. These alterations not only affect individuals directly impacted by more rigid laws but also have broader implications for the social and political stability of nations grappling with diversity and globalization (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). As populist ideologies continue to shape political discourse, the future of citizenship laws remains a contentious issue.

Influence of Populist Discourse on Legislative Reforms

Populism has significantly impacted global politics, shaping discourse and driving legislative reforms. Defined by its appeal to “the people” against perceived elites, populism thrives on nationalism, anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and protectionism (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019). Populist leaders push simplified solutions to complex issues, leaving lasting effects on policies related to immigration, citizenship, labor laws, and the judiciary. 

Populism views politics as a battle between the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elites, positioning populist leaders as defenders of the common citizen against established institutions. Exploiting grievances over economic inequality, cultural alienation, or fears of losing national identity, populists advocate for radical reforms (Olivas Osuna, 2020). Their emotionally charged rhetoric resonates with voters who feel marginalized, fostering a political environment that supports swift, often divisive, legislative changes.

One of the most significant areas of populist influence is immigration and citizenship policy. Populists frame immigration as a threat to national identity and economic security, pushing for stricter controls. In the US, Donald Trump’s administration implemented controversial policies such as the Muslim Ban and attempted to end birthright citizenship (Inglehart, 2016). These moves, rooted in populist rhetoric, sought to restrict immigration and tighten borders, casting immigrants as burdens on the system. Similarly, in Europe, populist leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán have championed anti-immigration laws, presenting migrants as threats to national security and Christian identity (Dahlgren, 2006). These legislative changes, shaped by populism, have led to a more hostile environment for migrants and refugees, contributing to growing xenophobia.

Economic protectionism is another key area influenced by populism. Populist leaders, responding to fears of globalization and job displacement, advocate for policies that protect domestic industries. Trump’s “America First” rhetoric resulted in tariffs aimed at protecting American jobs, leading to trade wars with countries like China (Jones, 2019). While these policies offered short-term relief to certain industries, they also raised consumer prices and strained international trade relations. In Europe, populist figures like Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy have similarly pushed for economic protectionism, though such policies often hinder long-term growth and international cooperation (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019).

Populists also target the judiciary, portraying it as an elitist institution disconnected from the people. This view justifies legislative reforms that increase executive control over the judiciary, undermining democratic checks and balances (Bauer & Becker, 2020). In Poland, the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) introduced reforms giving the government greater control over judicial appointments, weakening judicial independence. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan similarly used populist discourse to justify constitutional changes that consolidated executive power and diminished the judiciary’s role (Blokker, 2019). These reforms, driven by populist ideals, threaten democratic governance by reducing the separation of powers and weakening the rule of law.

Cultural nationalism is another area where populist discourse drives legislative changes. Populist leaders often promote national culture while resisting multiculturalism. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government enacted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, which grants citizenship to non-Muslim refugees, marginalizing Muslims and promoting Hindu nationalism (Adamidis, 2021). This, along with the National Register of Citizens (NRC), exemplifies how populist rhetoric can shape exclusionary legislative reforms, reshaping national identity along religious lines (Tushnet, 2020).

Populism’s influence on legislative reforms is profound, particularly in immigration, economics, judiciary control, and national identity. Although populists claim to represent the will of the people, their policies often lead to restrictive, exclusionary measures that challenge democratic principles (Löfflmann, 2022). As populism continues to grow, its influence on legislative processes will likely persist, raising concerns about the future of democratic governance and civil liberties worldwide.

Populism and the Concept of National Identity

This section delves into the relationship between populism and national identity, focusing on two critical aspects: The use of anti-immigrant rhetoric to reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship, highlighting how such discourse seeks to define and limit national belonging (1) and Case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries (2). 

The Use of Anti-immigrant Rhetoric to Reinforce Exclusive Citizenship

Populist leaders frequently employ anti-immigrant rhetoric to portray immigrants as existential threats to a nation’s cultural, economic, and social fabric. This rhetoric becomes a powerful tool to shape national identity in exclusionary terms, typically casting immigrants as outsiders based on racial, ethnic, or religious differences (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Through this discourse, populist movements argue that immigrants dilute national culture, displace native workers, and strain public resources, all while posing threats to national security. By framing immigration in such stark terms, populist rhetoric fosters fear and division, creating a political climate in which restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies can be justified (Mudde, 2014).

At the core of populist anti-immigrant rhetoric lies the concept of an “authentic” national identity one that is rooted in historical, cultural, and sometimes religious heritage. This identity is portrayed as under siege by foreign influences, particularly immigrants who are seen as incapable of integrating into the national fabric (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Populist leaders often evoke a sense of nostalgia for a perceived golden age when national culture was more “pure” or homogeneous, untainted by external influences. This idealized past is contrasted with the present, where immigration is depicted as eroding the cultural unity and social cohesion of the nation (Talani, 2021). By appealing to this notion of cultural purity, populist leaders can present themselves as defenders of the nation’s true identity, rallying support from those who feel alienated or threatened by globalization and multiculturalism.

Immigrants, particularly those from non-Western or non-Christian backgrounds, are often depicted as fundamentally different from and incompatible with the values, traditions, and way of life of the host country (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This portrayal not only amplifies existing prejudices but also legitimizes exclusionary policies. In many populist narratives, immigrants are scapegoated for a range of societal problems from unemployment and housing shortages to crime and the perceived decline of national values. This scapegoating simplifies complex socio-economic issues, presenting immigration as the primary cause of these challenges and offering a convenient target for public anger and frustration (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

The distinction between “us” (native citizens) and “them” (immigrants) is a central feature of populist rhetoric. This binary division serves to reinforce a sense of national unity among the “native” population while casting immigrants as a threatening “other” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). This division is often racialized, with immigrants from non-European or non-Christian backgrounds portrayed as more dangerous or culturally alien. In some cases, populists draw on religious differences, framing Muslim immigrants, for example, as a threat to secular or Christian values (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). 

These distinctions are used to justify policies that restrict immigrants’ access to citizenship, limit their rights, and reduce their opportunities for social and economic integration (Manatschal et al., 2020). One of the most prominent ways in which this rhetoric translates into policy is through reforms aimed at restricting immigration and tightening citizenship requirements. Populist leaders often advocate for measures that make it more difficult for immigrants to acquire legal status, obtain work permits, or access public services (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). In some cases, they push for the revocation of citizenship for naturalized immigrants who are deemed to have violated national norms or values. These policies are framed as necessary steps to protect the nation’s identity and security, resonating with voters who feel that their cultural heritage and economic opportunities are being undermined by immigration.

This anti-immigrant rhetoric also extends to asylum seekers and refugees, who are often portrayed as economic migrants in disguise, seeking to exploit the nation’s welfare system rather than fleeing genuine persecution (Talani, 2021). By blurring the lines between refugees and economic migrants, populist leaders erode public sympathy for those seeking asylum and create a narrative in which all forms of immigration are seen as illegitimate or dangerous. This narrative provides political cover for policies that deny refugees access to asylum processes, push them back at borders, or place them in detention centers with limited legal rights (Hammar, 1990).

Beyond shaping immigration and asylum policies, populist rhetoric also influences broader social attitudes. By constantly framing immigrants as threats to national security and culture, populist leaders normalize xenophobic and exclusionary attitudes (Löfflmann, 2022). This not only stokes fear and resentment among the native population but also creates an environment in which discrimination against immigrants and minorities is more likely to be tolerated or even encouraged. In some cases, this rhetoric has been linked to increases in hate crimes and other forms of violence against immigrant communities (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

Moreover, populist anti-immigrant rhetoric undermines the principles of equality and inclusion that are foundational to democratic citizenship. By advocating for policies that exclude certain groups based on their race, religion, or ethnicity, populist leaders challenge the idea of universal citizenship and equal rights for all individuals within a nation (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Instead, they promote a hierarchical vision of citizenship, where some individuals are deemed more deserving of rights and protections than others based on their cultural or ethnic background.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric serves as a key tool for populist leaders to shape national identity in exclusionary terms. By portraying immigrants as threats to culture, economy, and security, populists legitimize policies that restrict immigration, deny citizenship, and limit the rights of minorities (Talani, 2021). This rhetoric not only fuels fear and division but also reshapes public policy in ways that undermine the principles of equality and inclusion, leading to a more fragmented and polarized society. As populist movements continue to gain traction globally, the challenge of balancing national identity with inclusivity and tolerance remains a pressing issue for modern democracies (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

Case Studies of Citizenship Policy Adjustments in Select European Countries

Across Europe, populist movements have played a pivotal role in shaping national identity and citizenship policies, often pushing for more restrictive laws that make it harder for immigrants to gain citizenship or legal residency. This shift reflects the growing influence of populist rhetoric, which frames immigration as a threat to national culture and security. By examining the cases of Hungary, Italy, and France, it becomes evident how populist leaders have redefined national identity and driven legislative reforms that reflect exclusionary views of citizenship.

In Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the government has adopted a strongly anti-immigrant stance, particularly targeting Muslim-majority countries. Orbán’s administration has positioned itself as the defender of Hungary’s Christian identity, presenting immigration as an existential threat to the nation’s cultural and religious fabric (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). The construction of border fences to block refugees, along with Hungary’s refusal to participate in EU refugee resettlement programs, demonstrates the government’s commitment to preventing the settlement of immigrants (Palonen, 2018). This emphasis on exclusion is further reflected in the tightening of citizenship laws, which aim to maintain a homogenous national identity, rooted in ethnic and religious purity.

A key piece of legislation that encapsulates Hungary’s approach to immigration is the “Stop Soros” law, named after Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros, who has supported pro-migrant policies (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). The law criminalizes aid to asylum seekers and organizations working with immigrants, reinforcing the idea that immigrants are unwelcome in Hungary. Orbán’s government has used this law to portray immigrants as threats to the nation, while redefining Hungarian national identity along ethnically and religiously exclusionary lines. By positioning itself as the protector of a pure, Christian Hungary, the government has marginalized anyone perceived as foreign or different, particularly those from Muslim backgrounds (Pappas, 2019).

Italy, another example of populist influence on citizenship policies, has seen significant changes under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing League party. Salvini, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, built his political platform around the idea of protecting Italy’s national identity from the perceived dangers of immigration (Varshney, 2021). His “Italians First” campaign emphasized limiting immigration, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, as a way to safeguard Italy’s cultural and economic interests.

Salvini’s government enacted several legislative changes that made it harder for immigrants to gain legal residency and citizenship. For example, the “security decree” introduced during his tenure tightened residency requirements and made it easier for the government to revoke asylum status. These policies were framed as necessary for maintaining public safety and reducing the immigrant population (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). By casting immigrants as criminals or economic burdens, Salvini tapped into public anxieties about national identity and security, securing popular support for more restrictive immigration and citizenship laws. His efforts also extended to children born to foreign parents in Italy, for whom gaining citizenship became increasingly difficult under the new regulations.

France, under the influence of Marine Le Pen and her National Rally party, has similarly witnessed a rise in populist-driven immigration policies. Le Pen has long advocated for a reduction in immigration and the protection of French identity, positioning herself as a defender of the nation’s cultural heritage (Mayer, 2013). Her party has pushed for laws that would end birthright citizenship, making it harder for children born in France to immigrant parents to acquire citizenship (Soffer, 2022). This approach reflects a broader desire to redefine French citizenship in exclusive terms, prioritizing the interests of native-born citizens over those of immigrants.

Le Pen’s framing of national identity is closely tied to the preservation of France’s cultural and historical legacy, often in opposition to immigration from Muslim-majority countries. During her 2017 and 2022 presidential campaigns, Le Pen emphasized the need to protect French values from external influences, linking immigration to issues of national security, cultural erosion, and economic instability (Bonikowski et al., 2018). While she has not won the presidency, her influence has pushed mainstream political parties in France to adopt stricter stances on immigration and citizenship, showing the broader impact of her populist rhetoric.

In all three countries, populist leaders have successfully reshaped public discourse around immigration and citizenship, using anti-immigrant rhetoric to justify more restrictive policies. By framing immigrants as threats to national identity and security, they have fostered a climate of fear and division, where exclusionary measures are seen as necessary to protect the cultural and social fabric of the nation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This dynamic not only makes it more difficult for immigrants to integrate and gain citizenship but also redefines what it means to be a member of the nation, often in ways that marginalize racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

Clearly, populist movements across Europe have significantly influenced citizenship policies by promoting exclusionary definitions of national identity. Whether in Hungary, Italy, or France, populist leaders have used anti-immigrant rhetoric to push for legislative reforms that limit immigration, restrict access to citizenship, and reinforce a narrow conception of national belonging. These changes reflect broader concerns about preserving cultural homogeneity in an increasingly globalized world, where immigration is often framed as a threat rather than a source of enrichment.

Challenges to Social Inclusion for Migrants Under Populism

In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions of migrants. These portrayals can significantly influence societal attitudes and policies. This study will explore two key areas: Media representations and public perceptions of migrants (A) and the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion (B), examining how these narratives and policies interact and impact marginalized communities.

Media Representations and Public Perceptions of Migrants

In this section, we investigate the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions of migrants. We focus on two key aspects: first, the influence of populist narratives on the stigmatization of migrants, examining how these narratives contribute to negative stereotypes and social divisions; and second, the impacts of these perceptions on social integration in education, employment, and healthcare, highlighting the challenges migrants face in accessing essential services and opportunities in society.

Influence of Populist Narratives on Migrant Stigmatization

Populist narratives have a powerful influence on the stigmatization of migrants, shaping public perceptions in ways that often fuel fear, division, and hostility. These narratives simplify complex social issues by framing migrants as threats to national identity, economic stability, and security, which amplifies existing societal tensions. In many countries, populist leaders use anti-immigrant rhetoric to galvanize political support, constructing migrants as scapegoats for various social and economic challenges (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015). This stigmatization has far-reaching consequences, reinforcing negative stereotypes and shaping public policy in exclusionary ways.

At the heart of populist narratives is the concept of “otherness,” where migrants are depicted as fundamentally different from the native population. This otherness is often framed along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, with migrants presented as a homogeneous group that poses a threat to the nation’s cultural identity. In Europe, for instance, populist parties frequently depict Muslim migrants as unwilling or unable to assimilate into Western societies, associating them with extremism or radicalism (Hawley, 2016). This portrayal suggests that migrants are not merely different but incompatible with the nation’s values and way of life. Populist leaders, such as Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor Orbán in Hungary, leverage these fears of cultural erosion to rally support, positioning themselves as protectors of the nation’s authentic identity (Wojczewski, 2019).

Populist rhetoric often goes beyond cultural concerns to frame migrants as economic threats, claiming that they steal jobs, exploit social services, and drain public resources. This portrayal is particularly prevalent during economic downturns, when populist leaders can channel public anxieties about unemployment and financial insecurity into anti-immigrant sentiment (Steele & Homolar, 2019). Migrants are depicted as competitors for scarce resources, pitting them against native citizens in a zero-sum game where the prosperity of one group is seen as coming at the expense of the other. The media plays a significant role in perpetuating this narrative by sensationalizing stories of migrants benefiting from welfare or engaging in criminal activities, often without providing context or balance (Betz, 1994). This selective reporting reinforces the perception that migrants are a burden on society, even when evidence shows their positive contributions to the economy.

In addition to cultural and economic threats, populist narratives often link migrants to security risks, portraying them as potential criminals or terrorists. This is particularly pronounced in countries that have experienced terrorist attacks, where populist leaders frequently draw direct connections between immigration and security (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). By framing migrants as dangerous outsiders who pose a threat to national safety, populist leaders can justify restrictive immigration policies and securitization measures. In the United States, for example, President Donald Trump used rhetoric that depicted migrants (Becker, 2019), especially those from Latin America, as criminals and rapists, capitalizing on fears of crime to promote his anti-immigration agenda (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This rhetoric resonates with portions of the electorate who are already concerned about safety and security, amplifying support for exclusionary policies.

Populist leaders skillfully use media platforms to spread these narratives, particularly in today’s highly polarized media landscape. Traditional news outlets, social media, and even political advertisements become conduits for anti-immigrant rhetoric, allowing populist leaders to reach broad audiences with messages that vilify migrants. In this environment, misinformation and sensationalism thrive (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). False or exaggerated stories about migrant crime rates, welfare fraud, or cultural clashes circulate widely, reinforcing negative perceptions of migrants. Social media, in particular, has proven to be a fertile ground for these narratives, where algorithms amplify divisive content and create echo chambers that reinforce preexisting biases (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

The consequences of this stigmatization are profound and far-reaching. As populist narratives gain traction, public opinion shifts toward greater hostility and mistrust of migrants, making it easier for populist leaders to enact exclusionary policies. This shift in public sentiment often leads to increased support for policies that restrict immigration, limit access to citizenship, and curtail the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (Mudde, 2019). For example, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government has passed a series of laws that severely limit immigration and criminalize activities that support asylum seekers, framing these measures as necessary to protect Hungary’s Christian identity. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s anti-immigrant rhetoric helped fuel the passage of laws that tightened residency requirements and made it easier to revoke asylum statuses, reflecting a broader European trend of hardening immigration policies.

Beyond policy, the stigmatization of migrants has deep social consequences. It fosters an environment where xenophobia and discrimination become normalized, affecting the daily lives of migrants and their ability to integrate into society (Wodak, 2015). Migrants face prejudice in the workplace, in schools, and in public spaces, often experiencing social exclusion and hostility based on their perceived status as outsiders. This stigmatization also fuels tensions between native populations and migrant communities, deepening social divisions and undermining efforts toward inclusion and cohesion.

Impacts on Social Integration in Education, Employment, and Healthcare

The stigmatization of migrants, fueled by populist narratives, significantly impacts their social integration in key areas such as education, employment, and healthcare. These effects not only hinder the ability of migrants to contribute to society but also exacerbate social divisions, perpetuating cycles of marginalization and exclusion (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). By examining these three critical sectors, we can better understand how negative perceptions of migrants shape their experiences and opportunities in host countries.

In the realm of education, migrant children often face significant challenges that hinder their ability to integrate successfully. Populist rhetoric can create an environment of hostility in schools, where migrant students may be perceived as outsiders or even blamed for the struggles faced by the local population (Palonen, 2018). This stigma can lead to bullying, discrimination, and social isolation, significantly impacting the emotional and psychological well-being of these children (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Additionally, language barriers and differences in educational backgrounds can further complicate their integration. Schools may lack the necessary resources and training to support non-native speakers, resulting in disparities in academic achievement and engagement (Mayer, 2013). Consequently, many migrant children may fall behind their peers, limiting their educational opportunities and long-term prospects.

Furthermore, the negative perceptions of migrants can influence the attitudes of teachers and school administrators, leading to biased expectations and treatment. In environments where populist sentiments prevail, educators may unconsciously lower their expectations for migrant students, perpetuating a cycle of disadvantage (Soffer, 2022). This systemic bias can result in fewer opportunities for advanced coursework or extracurricular activities, limiting the social networks that are crucial for future success. As a result, the educational system, instead of serving as a vehicle for social mobility, can reinforce existing inequalities, ultimately affecting the broader societal fabric.

In the employment sector, stigmatization often manifests in barriers to job opportunities and professional advancement for migrants. Populist narratives typically portray migrants as competitors for jobs, leading to negative stereotypes that they are less qualified or less committed than native workers (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This perception can result in discriminatory hiring practices, where employers may favor native candidates over equally qualified migrants. Studies have shown that migrants, particularly those from non-Western backgrounds, often face significant hurdles in securing employment, despite possessing relevant skills and qualifications (Pappas, 2019). They may be relegated to low-wage jobs or sectors characterized by high turnover and job insecurity, limiting their economic mobility and integration.

Moreover, even after securing employment, migrants may encounter challenges in the workplace stemming from stigma. They might face harassment, exclusion from social networks, or limited access to professional development opportunities (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This can create a hostile work environment that not only affects job satisfaction but also impacts overall mental health and well-being. The lack of upward mobility can lead to a sense of disillusionment and alienation, reinforcing feelings of being an outsider in their host society (Kymlicka, 2001). 

In terms of healthcare, the stigma surrounding migrants can create significant barriers to accessing essential services. Fear of discrimination or negative treatment can deter migrants from seeking medical care, even when needed (Goodman, 2010). Populist narratives often frame migrants as burdens on public health systems, perpetuating the idea that they are undeserving of resources and services. This perception can lead to healthcare providers exhibiting implicit biases, resulting in inadequate treatment or care (Joppke, 2010). Migrants may experience delays in receiving necessary medical attention, contributing to poorer health outcomes.

Additionally, cultural differences and language barriers can further complicate healthcare access for migrants. Many may struggle to navigate complex healthcare systems or communicate their needs effectively, leading to misunderstandings and misdiagnoses. In some cases, these barriers can prevent migrants from receiving preventive care, increasing their vulnerability to chronic health conditions and exacerbating existing health disparities. 

The impact of these challenges extends beyond individual migrants; it affects families and communities as well. When migrants struggle to integrate into education, employment, and healthcare systems, it creates a cycle of disadvantage that can perpetuate intergenerational poverty and marginalization (Bauer & Becker, 2020). Children of migrants may inherit these challenges, facing compounded obstacles in their own efforts to integrate and succeed. This can lead to a lack of social cohesion, where communities become polarized along lines of nationality, ethnicity, or immigration status. 

To end, the stigmatization of migrants, largely driven by populist narratives, has profound impacts on their social integration across education, employment, and healthcare sectors. These negative perceptions hinder the ability of migrants to access opportunities, contribute to society, and achieve their full potential. The consequences of this marginalization are far-reaching, not only affecting the lives of migrants but also undermining the social fabric of host communities. To foster greater social integration, it is essential to combat harmful stereotypes and promote inclusive policies that recognize and value the contributions of migrants. By addressing these barriers, societies can work towards a more equitable and cohesive future, benefiting everyone involved.

Consequences of Populist Policies on Social Inclusion

Exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion compels us to understand the restrictive measures that impact inclusion and integration. Additionally, it invites us to examine case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of these policies based on varying economic and historical contexts.

Restrictive Policies on Inclusion and Integration

The rise of populist movements across various countries has led to the implementation of restrictive policies that significantly impact social inclusion and integration, particularly for migrants and marginalized communities (Varshney, 2021). These policies are often framed as necessary measures to protect national identity, security, and the interests of the native population, but they frequently create barriers that hinder the full participation of individuals from diverse backgrounds in society.

One of the most significant aspects of restrictive policies is the tightening of immigration laws, which can result in limited pathways for legal residency and citizenship for migrants. Many populist governments have introduced measures that require higher income thresholds, extensive documentation, or language proficiency tests that disproportionately disadvantage less affluent or non-native speakers (Blokker, 2019). Such requirements not only exclude potential immigrants but also create an environment of uncertainty and fear among those already residing in the country (Adamidis, 2021). The fear of deportation or legal repercussions can deter migrants from seeking essential services, including healthcare, education, and employment, thereby exacerbating their marginalization.

Moreover, these policies often reinforce negative stereotypes about migrants, portraying them as potential threats to public safety or as burdens on social services. Populist rhetoric frequently capitalizes on economic anxieties by suggesting that migrants take jobs from locals or strain public resources (Tushnet, 2020). This narrative is particularly powerful during times of economic downturn, where competition for jobs and services is heightened. As a result, policies that restrict access to social benefits for migrants can lead to a situation where these individuals are excluded not only from economic opportunities but also from social protections that are essential for integration (Hammar, 1990).

In many countries, populist leaders have also targeted specific groups of migrants, often based on their nationality, ethnicity, or religion. For example, anti-immigrant laws may specifically affect those from predominantly Muslim countries or refugees fleeing conflict (Schmidt, 2019). This targeted exclusion fosters a climate of division, where certain communities are systematically marginalized. In schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods, this can lead to increased tension and hostility, making it challenging for migrants to form connections with the broader community and hindering their ability to integrate socially (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2015). 

Furthermore, restrictive policies on inclusion are often accompanied by a lack of investment in programs that promote social cohesion and integration. For instance, funding for language classes, job training, and cultural exchange initiatives may be cut or deprioritized in favor of enforcement mechanisms aimed at controlling immigration (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This lack of support means that even those migrants who wish to integrate and contribute to their new communities face significant obstacles (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). The absence of inclusive policies sends a clear message that diversity is not welcomed, further entrenching social divisions.

In addition to impacting migrants, these restrictive policies can have broader societal implications. By promoting exclusion rather than inclusion, populist policies undermine the social contract that binds communities together (Bonikowski et al., 2018). This erosion of trust can lead to increased polarization within society, where divisions based on nationality, ethnicity, and class are exacerbated. The resultant societal fragmentation can hinder collective action and diminish the capacity for communities to address common challenges, ultimately impacting national cohesion and stability.

To counteract the negative impacts of these policies, it is crucial for governments and civil society to advocate for more inclusive approaches to social integration. This involves not only reforming immigration laws to create fair and accessible pathways to residency and citizenship but also investing in programs that promote understanding and collaboration among diverse communities (Manby, 2018). By fostering an environment of inclusivity, societies can harness the potential contributions of migrants and build resilient communities that thrive on diversity rather than fear.

Case Studies on Differentiated Effects Based on Economic and Historical Contexts

The consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform; they vary significantly based on the economic and historical contexts of different countries (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Examining case studies from diverse regions provides valuable insights into how populism shapes social inclusion and reveals the complexities of these dynamics.

One notable example is the case of Hungary under PM Orbán. Hungary’s historical context, shaped by its post-communist transition and ongoing struggles with national identity, has made it particularly susceptible to populist rhetoric (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Orbán’s government has employed a narrative that frames immigration as a threat to Hungary’s Christian identity and cultural homogeneity (Becker, 2019). As a result, restrictive policies have been implemented, including the construction of border barriers and the introduction of laws aimed at criminalizing support for asylum seekers.

These measures have had profound effects on social inclusion in Hungary. The narrative of an “us versus them” mentality has resulted in a climate of fear among migrants and refugees, many of whom have faced violence and discrimination (Győrffy, 2018). The historical context of Hungary’s tumultuous past has contributed to a national discourse that prioritizes ethnic homogeneity, leading to the marginalization of diverse groups. Consequently, the restrictive policies have not only limited the rights and opportunities of migrants but have also created a polarized society where fear and hostility thrive (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2018).

In contrast, the case of Canada illustrates a different approach to populism and social inclusion. While Canada has experienced populist movements, its historical context of multiculturalism and immigration has shaped a more inclusive national identity (Triandafyllidou, 2015). Policies that promote diversity and integration, such as the Multiculturalism Act, have fostered an environment where immigrants are seen as valuable contributors to society (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). While populist rhetoric has attempted to challenge this narrative, the overall economic and historical framework has led to a more resilient approach to social inclusion.

Canada’s commitment to welcoming refugees and immigrants has resulted in positive economic outcomes, as diverse groups bring varied skills and perspectives that enrich the workforce. However, challenges remain, particularly in addressing the needs of marginalized communities and combating discrimination (Granovetter, 1973). The contrasting experiences of Hungary and Canada underscore how historical narratives and economic conditions influence the outcomes of populist policies on social inclusion.

Another significant case study is Italy, where the rise of populism under leaders like Matteo Salvini has led to restrictive immigration policies that have profoundly affected social integration. Italy’s historical context, marked by economic challenges and high unemployment rates, has fueled a perception of migrants as competitors for scarce resources (UNHCR, 2012). Salvini’s “Italians First” campaign sought to capitalize on these anxieties, leading to policies that restrict access to social services and legal residency for migrants.

The effects of these policies have been particularly pronounced in regions where economic struggles are most acute. Migrants in Italy often face discrimination in the job market, and many are relegated to precarious employment (OECD, 2020). Additionally, populist rhetoric has fostered an environment where xenophobia is normalized, leading to increased violence against migrant communities (ECRI, 2024). This case illustrates how economic conditions, combined with populist narratives, can exacerbate the challenges faced by marginalized groups, resulting in significant barriers to social inclusion.

In summary, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are shaped by a complex interplay of economic and historical factors. Case studies from Hungary, Canada, and Italy reveal how these dynamics can lead to divergent outcomes in terms of social integration. Understanding these contexts is crucial for addressing the challenges posed by populism and developing strategies that promote inclusivity and social cohesion in increasingly diverse societies. By recognizing the differentiated effects of these policies, stakeholders can work towards creating environments that foster belonging and participation for all members of society.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the role of populism in redefining citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe reveals a complex and often troubling landscape. The emergence of populist movements has significantly influenced citizenship laws and principles, shifting the focus toward more exclusionary practices that prioritize ethnonational identity over inclusive citizenship. Through an analysis of changes in jus soli and jus sanguinis, it is evident that populist rhetoric has led to legislative reforms that reinforce a narrow definition of national belonging, marginalizing migrant communities and reshaping the fabric of European societies.

The implications of these changes extend beyond legal frameworks to the societal level, where public perceptions of migrants are increasingly shaped by populist narratives. These narratives often stigmatize migrants, portraying them as threats to national identity and social cohesion. As a result, migrants face considerable challenges in accessing essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, hindering their social integration and reinforcing systemic inequalities.

Furthermore, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform across Europe; they vary significantly based on historical and economic contexts. Case studies from countries like Hungary, Italy, and Canada illustrate the divergent effects of populism on social inclusion, revealing how economic anxieties and historical narratives shape the experiences of migrants. While some nations adopt restrictive measures that foster division and exclusion, others maintain more inclusive approaches that recognize the contributions of migrants to society.

Ultimately, this exploration underscores the pressing need for a reevaluation of citizenship and social inclusion policies in the face of rising populism. Addressing the challenges posed by exclusionary practices and fostering a more inclusive understanding of citizenship can enhance social cohesion and resilience in diverse societies. To achieve this, it is essential for policymakers, civil society, and communities to work collaboratively in promoting narratives that celebrate diversity, combat discrimination, and advocate for equitable access to rights and opportunities for all individuals, regardless of their background. In doing so, Europe can navigate the complexities of globalization while ensuring that its commitment to fundamental human rights and social justice remains unwavering. 

(*) Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo is a lecturer of political science and Executive Director of the Bureau of Strategic Studies (BESTRAT). He teaches at the University of Yaoundé II and has over 20 years of experience as a leading consultant in peace, security, and defense. With 11 books and more than 30 academic articles, his research focuses on security dynamics in Central Africa and the Lake Chad Basin, addressing issues like terrorism and conflict management. His expertise has contributed to numerous international peacebuilding efforts, and he regularly consults for organizations such as the United Nations System. Email: edouardyogo@yahoo.fr  

 

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Inglehart, R. F. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash. HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026.

Jones, E. (2019). Testing liberal democracy: Populism in Europe: What scholarship tells us. Survival, 61(4), 7–30.

Löfflmann, G. (2022). Introduction to special issue: The study of populism in international relations. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 24(3).

Methods and Tools

Loyer, B. (2019). Géopolitique : Méthodes et concepts. Armand Colin.

Rannikmäe, M.; Holbrook, J. & Soobard, R. (2021). Social constructivism: A new paradigm in teaching and learning environment. In Science education in theory and practice (pp. 259–275). Perennial journal of history, 2(2).

Thual, F. (1996). Méthodes de la géopolitique : Apprendre à déchiffrer l’actualité. Relations internationales et stratégiques.

Zajec, O. (2018). Introduction à l’analyse géopolitique : Histoire, outils, méthodes. Éditions du Rocher.