“Populism and Socio-Political Transformation in Latin America,” byDr. Ronaldo Munck (Professor of Sociology and Director of the Centre for Engaged Research at Dublin City University).
“Varieties of Populism and Democratic Erosion: The Case of Latin America,” by Dr. Julio F. Carrión (Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Delaware).
“Global Power Dynamics and Authoritarian Populism in Venezuela,” byDr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina).
“Libertarian Populism? Making Sense of Javier Milei’s Discourse,”byDr. Reinhard Heinisch (Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Salzburg and Head of the Department of Political Science) and Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia (Director of the Center for Research in Communication and Humanities and head of Communication Studies at UPB in Cochabamba).
“The Phenomenon of ‘Bolsonarism’ in Brazil: Specificities and Global Connections,” by Dr. Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho (Professor of the Human Sciences at Universidade Federal do Maranhão).
Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo is the anticipated victor of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, boasting a political career spanning more than three decades in the country. Over the course of the past decade alone, Prabowo has undergone significant shifts in ideological stances, rhetorical appeals, and electoral strategies. He has transformed from an ultra-nationalist, chauvinist, and Islamist populist into a technocratic figure with a more approachable demeanor, strategically forming and changing alliances in his efforts to secure electoral success.
Following Indonesia’s tumultuous transition to independence, the early period of the country’s history, which has been called the years of “Guided Democracy,” was led by two successive authoritarian regimes (Barton et al, 2021a; 2021b). It was during this period that Indonesia’s new leader cut his teeth in his former role as a general of the special forces (Kopassus). Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo has emerged as a pivotal figure in contemporary Indonesian electoral politics. Simply known as Prabowo, he is a highly controversial former military officer with a past tarnished by a legacy of human rights abuses, the son-in-law of former dictator Suharto, and a prominent political actor and Presidential candidate over the past decade.
Since 2009, Prabowo has consistently participated in general elections, engaging in consecutive races during each electoral cycle (2009, 2014, 2019 and 2024) and ultimately achieving victory in the most recent elections. Throughout the years, his image, stances, and narratives have undergone notable transformations, showcasing a fascinating political fluidity and adaptivity.
Prabowo’s journey includes experiencing defeat as a vice presidential candidate alongside Megawati and against retired four-star general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009. Their ticket received only 26.79% of the total votes, while other candidates received 12.41% and 60.08% respectively (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2009).
Subsequently, he faced defeat twice in presidential elections against the popular technocrat Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in 2014 and 2019. In 2014, Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa received 46.85% of the total votes, while Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla garnered 53.15% (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2014). Similarly, in 2019, Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin secured 55.32% of the votes compared to Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno’s 44.68% (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2019).
However, in the latest demonstration of realpolitik, Prabowo has refined and redefined his political messaging, ultimately claiming victory. He formed an alliance with his former opposition in the 2024 elections by choosing Jokowi’s son as his running mate, a strategic move that secured his electoral triumph.
In past election campaigns, Prabowo was noted for exhibiting ultra-nationalist, strongly chauvinist, and Islamist populist characteristics, as observed by Yilmaz et al. (2024). However, in the recent election, Prabowo has transformed, re-emerging as a distinctly technocratic figure while still retaining some classic populist tendencies. This shift in his political persona reflects significant strategic considerations, intending to further his quest for power.
Specifically, Prabowo now presents himself as the guardian of the people’s volonté générale (general will) and employs popular communication strategies that effectively engage Indonesia’s youth. It has also been noted that his campaigning involved simplifying complex political problems and their solutions – such as his focus on a program for free lunches and milk to tackle malnutrition and food scarcity – a program that has been criticized for being unrealistic (Susilo & Prana, 2024).
Prabowo’s campaigning in 2024 also marked a notable departure from the more antagonistic aspects of populism. Particularly significant was his abandonment of chauvinistic messaging, which had previously fueled religious-based hostilities, incited outrage against minorities, directed blame against foreign powers, and scapegoated oligarchic elites to appeal to voters (Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021).
In this campaign, Prabowo refrained from emphasizing ideological issues that deepen social polarization (Yilmaz, 2023) and steered clear of his past narratives and rhetoric against Western neo-liberalism and the perceived greed of Chinese corporations (Hadiz, 2017; Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021). Additionally, he distanced himself from religious right-wing groups, notably the civilizational populist Defenders Front of Islam (FPI), with whom he had previously aligned himself in varying capacities during the 2019 election (Yilmaz et al., 2022).
Prabowo and his political campaign team also used digital culture and technologies to both appeal to Indonesia’s youth and shake off his formerly aggressive and militant reputation. This involved various strategies including rebranding to reflect a more modern and approachable vibe, engagement through social media, utilizing platforms popular among youth, and creating appealing content.
Prabowo has been newly portrayed as an adorable, friendly grandpa (gemoy). This rebranding exercise has been particularly effective among online and youth communities – Prabowo is represented in digital spaces with a cartoon photo generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Citizen Digital, 2024), and has become known for dancing the Korean Oppa style to disco music and the super hit song “Oke Gas” by the famous rapper, Richard Jersey (Jersey, 2024)
“More than half of Indonesia’s 204 million voters are millennials or younger” and Prabowo’s use of social media has proved immensely popular amongst these voters (Economist, 2024). This is a strong strategic move and reflects an understanding of the type of leader Indonesian youth are looking for. While various definitions contest what is the ‘ideal’ or ‘the hegemon’ masculinity, there is a clear indication that amongst Indonesian millennials and Gen-Zs, the traditional ideal of a ‘strongman,’ as Prabowo was formerly and widely known as being, does not attract their support. Prabowo’s sensitivity to this change led him to modify his masculinity to become more acceptable in society. Being a dancing, friendly older man has gained him the acceptance of youth – unlike the highly composed military man or conservative religious figure he has occupied in past election campaigns.
There are several other explanations which can account for his change of tactics. First, he learned from his defeats in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. In both political battles, he operationalized a populist performance, presenting himself as a charismatic leader who was pro-indigenous, defending Islam in Indonesia, and standing up against a) the corrupt and Westernized elite, and b) foreign powers and influence (Mietzner, 2020). Furthermore, in both unsuccessful campaigns, Prabowo proved eager to win the support of various nativist, racist, and hardline groups. For instance, in 2017, hoping to gain Islamist support in the elections two years later, he eagerly supported Anies Baswedan in the quest to defeat Ahok (Basuki Tjahaya Purnama), the incumbent Chinese and Christian governor of Jakarta, in the lead-up to the gubernatorial election. In the process, he went as far as encouraging a severe and dramatic process of minority criminalization and discrimination (Bachtiar, 2023). However, despite receiving the support of civilizational populist leader Rizieq Shihab, the FPI, and other Islamist groups, it did not win the votes he needed, and Prabowo likely realized he needed a new political strategy to win the 2024 election.
While he did not otherize minority groups or form an alliance with hardline Islamists in the current elections, Prabowo continued to cast ‘Europe’ as an enemy. For instance, late last year while election campaigning, he accused Europe of treating Indonesia ‘unfairly’ when discussing exports of goods such as palm oil to the EU market (Yuniar, 2023). Narratives vilifying Europe have been a regular fixture in Prabowo’s political discourse, particularly in discussions surrounding national sovereignty and international relations. This reflects Indonesia’s troubled history with colonial powers from Europe, particularly the Dutch colonizers. Although Europe has been consistently positioned as an enemy elite, Prabowo’s messaging about China and the United States has shifted according to different political tides (Reuters, 2023).
Second, while the amplification of Islamist identity politics and civilizational populism significantly intensified the people’s emotions and populist demands (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023), it also inspired a wave of resistance from the silent majority: pluralist Muslims. Identity politics succeeded in forming cross-class alliances – evident in the mass rallies against Ahok – but they also provoked resentment, including from leaders of the consequential mainstream Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both organizations maintain a sharp focus on diversity and national integration (Burhani, 2018; Bruinessen, 2021). By not appealing to – and actively repelling – the pluralist and mainstream Muslims, Prabowo learnt in hindsight that his chances of success had been considerably hindered.
Third, Prabowo went through the important process of becoming a technocrat when he agreed to join the Jokowi cabinet and accepted the role of Indonesia’s Defense Minister. In this context, he built his image as a big-hearted knight with a more inclusive outlook. In taking this role, and in refashioning his political branding, he betrayed his coalition with the civilizational populist group, the FPI, who were consequently banned by Jokowi, leading to their dissolution (Power, 2018).
Prabowo’s closer affinity with Jokowi also allowed him to enact another key strategy in his 2024 campaign: Winning Jokowi’s support and endorsement. This was partly achieved by his decision to make Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming, the vice-presidential candidate – a decision which required manipulation of the law and the Constitutional Court (Wilson, 2024). In favorable circumstances for Probowo, Jokowi had come to a head with Megawati, Soekarno’s daughter, in the camp of his party in power (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle – PDIP). Megawati had insulted Jokowi when she suggested he should submit to party leadership (as a worker/petugas partai), despite his status as President of Indonesia. As a result, Jokowi withdrew his support for Ganjar Pranowo, the governor of Central Java, who had been endorsed by the PDIP as its presidential candidate (Bachtiar, 2023). Aware of Jokowi’s popularity, particularly because of his strong economic performance, Prabowo keenly promoted himself as the candidate who would carry on this legacy (Strangio, 2024).
In conclusion, Prabowo’s transformations throughout various presidential elections have been remarkable. From 2014 to 2024, he has undergone a significant evolution in his public image, shifting from a classical populist ‘strongman’ with authoritarian tendencies and polarizing rhetoric to adopting an ultra-conservative and pious Islamist persona, and most recently, presenting himself as a soft, affable grandpa who engages with youth through TikTok dances and photos with his cats.
Even though he has outwardly shed the more hardened and aggressive parts of his persona, Prabowo’s experience in military leadership will have still played a central role; some voters are still likely drawn to an assertive style of leadership and see him as a proficient leader who can effectively attend to the welfare of everyday Indonesians (Gilang & Almubaroq, 2022), while younger voters might have felt a connection with the softer and approachable ‘grandpa’ figure they saw on the internet (The Economist, 2024).
Throughout this journey, Prabowo has continually renewed and adjusted his policy promises, political allegiances, public image, and the support bases he appeals to. Concerns remain about the authenticity of Prabowo’s shift in rhetorical and ideological messaging, and what lies underneath Prabowo’s successful attempt at gaining power and control in Indonesia. How far removed is this softer and more inclusive gemoy character from the strong and masculine, ultra-nationalist and chauvinist described by scholars previously (Hadiz, 2017; Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021)? After all, it was only recently that American Indonesianist, Slater argued Prabowo is “the sort of ethnonationalist, polarizing, strongman who would scapegoat minorities and ride roughshod to power, as other world leaders recently had” (Slater, 2023: 103-104). These concerns were also highlighted by The Guardian writers, who claimed that Prabowo’s victory in 2024 was a sign that “winter is coming” for Indonesian democracy (Ratcliffe & Richaldo, 2024). Similarly, Kurlantzick (2024) argues that democracy is truly lost with Prabowo’s victory.
The question also arises whether the current ‘happy grandpa’ persona will eventually revert to the iron-fisted strongman? While his pattern of changing ideologies and political messaging may suggest such a possibility, Prabowo has demonstrated patience and tactical acumen as a populist leader. He adapts to the expectations of voters, which are shaped by constantly changing socio-political trends. Therefore, while a metamorphosis back to his former persona cannot be ruled out, Prabowo’s ability to navigate shifting political landscapes makes his future trajectory uncertain yet intriguing.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation.
References
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Activist movements such as Black Lives Matter (BLM), MeToo, Fridays for Future (FFF), Extinction Rebellion (XR) and many more use populist frameworks and rhetoric elements that contest the elites and claim the general will of the people. We see BLM standing up against the racist system of white elites. We look at #MeToo fighting against the patriarchal system of male elites. And we watch FFF and XR challenging the neoliberal, capitalist system of big corporate elites. All of these activist movements are supposedly fighting for the general will of the people, similar to populism. But how much of activist rhetoric is coopted from populist ideology, movements, and parties? And how much did populism copy from activist movements in their approach? This is what this article will try answer.
2024 is already polluted and flooded with political protests, actions and political discourses about intensifying conflicts around the world and upcoming elections as this year constitutes a very strong voting year (Buchholz, 2024). Characterized by pro-Palestine and anti-genocide actions around the world under several social and political movements including the BDS-movement (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions-Movement) and farmers protests by the agricultural sector and right-wing parties, 2024 already offers a lot of activism and political engagement (Lesnes, 2024; Tanno & Liakos, 2024). However, such political activism and engagement often comes hand in hand with polarization and populism (Sawyer, 2023).
Before we dive into the connection between activism and populism, we first need to establish working frameworks for both terms. Firstly, activism can be identified as a tool to express ideology and identity and is closely linked with protests and civil participation (Siim et al., 2018). It includes citizens voicing critical opinions through strikes, boycotts, petitions, the occupation of buildings, mass demonstrations and acts of political violence (Norris, 2004) directed against political institutions, but also public actors and figures. Political activism can play out on the local, national, or transnational level through everyday activities and political actions. It includes diverse solidarity and resistance movements and pro-diversity and pro-equality agency (Siim et al., 2018).
Secondly, populism can be defined as thin ideology, as it is flexible to be used in conjunction with other ideologies, such as environmentalism, feminism, socialism and communism, and other systems of knowledge (Stanley, 2008; Mudde, 2004). Three main components of populism can be characterized based on this approach: (1) the people, challenging (2) the corrupt elite and claiming that politics should be the expression of the (3) general will of the people (Mudde, 2004).
Connections between Activism and Populism
We can already assume that activist movements, that use ideology to justify their political agenda and motives can use their leading ideology in conjunction with populism as a means to convey their message and transform discontent through collective cognitive processes into action (Aslanidis, 2017). For example, BLM fights for racial equality as their ideology and contests the white elites, constituting a populist element (Campbell, 2021). Specifically, people of color and marginalized groups affected by white supremacy are the “people” BLM fights for. ‘The general will’ is guided by the principles of anti-discrimination and racial equality (Campbell, 2021).
Additionally, MeToo is advocating for feminism as their ideology, by criticizing the male elites, manifesting a populist element (MeToo Mvmt, 2023). MeToo fights especially for FLINTA (female, lesbian, intergender, non-binary, transgender and agender persons), for the “people” marginalized by the patriarchy. MeToo fights especially as general will for gender equality.
Moreover, FFF and XR use environmentalism as their ideology by raising awareness for sustainability and environmental protection. Thus, they challenge the capitalistic elites, forming an element of populism (Extinction Rebellion NL, 2024; Fridays for Future, 2021). FFF and XR fight specifically for people affected by the climate crisis such as climate refugees and small-scale farmers as well as people that are subject to colonialism and exploitation, which ties back to everyone to some extent as we are all affected by climate change. The general will is based on climate justice. Thus, populist elements in activist movements can be characterized.
Circling back from activist movements to the literature, different connections between activism and populism based on research can be characterized. On the one hand, Zaslove et al. (2020) suggest that people who vote for populist parties and are discontent with democracy, are, however, still supportive of the overall democratic system compared to individuals with weaker populist attitudes. Thus, people who vote for populist parties are less inclined to protest and participate in protest marches, demonstrations, or protest action (Zaslove et al. 2020). On the other hand, Karlson (2024) found that demands made by BLM and MeToo for equal recognition of marginalized groups that are being oppressed in societies, can be coopted from activism and translated into populism. Often described as populist leader is Donald Trump for example. He uses frequently the framing of “the marginalized” to attract working-class supporters that feel disregarded by national elites. Trump uses this rhetoric to incorporate “political correctness” in his agenda and attract new potential voters (Karlson, 2024).
Populism and Activism on Social Media
Moving from general relations between activism and populism to digitalization and social media, Gustafsson and Weinryb (2019) show that individualized social media activism has affinities to populism and could have serious effects on democratic procedures and bureaucratic structures. This indicates that social media activism reinforces individualized forms of charismatic authority, which refers to the collective excitement produced by external events that form a type of heroism (Weber, 1978). In the following, charismatic authority can be characterized as a form of digital enthusiasm of a collective mass, that feels interconnected and engaged as well as in a position of possibilities to challenge the political system and the status quo, which translates into digital activism (Gustafsson & Weinryb, 2019). This may have large-scale implications how populism is understood and plays out in societies.
Furthermore, research by Mazzoleni & Bracciale (2018) found that populist leaders, such as Berlusconi, Di Maio, Salvini, and Melini, prominent figures in Italy, utilize social media more extensively than mainstream party figures to counteract negative coverage by traditional media outlets. Apart from their appearances on TV shows and news broadcasts, social media platforms provide direct channels for these populist leaders to engage with their constituents (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018). This direct interaction between populist leaders and their followers can amplify social media activism and political engagement among their supporters (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018).
From these examples we can see that activism uses actively populist rhetoric. However, the narratives created by activism can be then coopted by populist leaders. Moreover, we can recognize that even though activism and populism can increase trust in democracy leading to less protests, the majority of research clearly indicates that in multiple cases activism is the accelerator nourishing populist ideology that motivates the people to act and speak up. From this we can investigate how populist parties use and affect activism.
Activism Used and Affected by Populist Parties
To make sense of populist parties infringing and utilizing activism, authoritarian and democratic populism should be distinguished. Authoritarian populist parties are anti-democratic and attack policies and the rule of law which are based on core institutional pillars of the state order (Bugarič, 2019). On the contrary, democratic populism focuses on the emancipation of voters, and the protection and defense of democracy by making institutions and the system more accountable, equitable and inclusive (Bugarič, 2019).
Research by Whiteley et al. (2019) indicates that activists are more important in populist right-wing parties, than in traditional parties, as they move the party forward and act as key roles and figures for campaigning and organizing as well as funding since they are the most committed members. Furthermore, activism can be used by right-wing populist parties and leaders to mobilize for mass demonstrations and even occupations in conjunction with social media advertisement. For example, populist radical right-wing parties such as the British Independence Party (UKIP), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) engage with activism through petitions, participation and organization of demonstrations and marches, especially in recent years against Covid19-restrictions and currently farmers protests (Whiteley et al., 2019; Euronews, 2021; Hämmerle, 2024; Neuerer, 2024). Another notable example is Donald Trump and the storming of the Capitol, where he rallied his supporters through populist rhetoric, encouraging their participation in the event (Barry et al., 2021).
Although right wing populist parties can use activism to their advantage, activism that works in their disadvantage can be also shut down by right-wing populist parties in power. Poland and Hungary oppress and silence activists through new legislation and regulations, especially anti-abortion, women’s and LGBTIQ+ activists as well as anti-fascist activists and protestors. The populist parties in Hungary (Fidesz) and Poland (Law and Justice Party) restrict and limit civil participation further and further through prohibiting strikes (Gwiazda, 2020; Winfield, 2024).
In contrast to authoritarian populist parties, democratic populist parties like the Spanish left-wing Podemos or the Dutch left-wing BIJ1 originated from activist groups (De Nadal, 2020; Ornstein, 2023). In Spain, this evolution stemmed from the Indignados movement (De Nadal, 2020). In the Netherlands, the party was formed by activists from XR and other related anti-discrimination and anti-racism movements (Ornstein, 2023; NL Times, 2023). Moreover, Podemos and BIJ1 actively participate in mass protests, demonstrations, and petition campaigns (De Nadal, 2020; Gerbaudo, 2021). Additionally, the Greek left-wing populist party Syriza and its activists engage in activism by establishing food banks, known as Solidarity Clubs, where they encourage farmers to donate food to support impoverished families and neighborhoods, often requesting items like bags of potatoes or oranges (Mason, 2017).
Activism as Antidote to Populism
As the last part of this analysis, it should be mentioned that activism can also serve as a tool to counteract anti-democratic populism. Particularly, activism aimed at combating othering and exclusion is utilized to push back against right-wing populist parties, which purport to address issues concerning European integration, multiculturalism, globalization, and migration (Siim et al., 2018). This solidarity-based activism can be specifically employed to combat hate speech and hate crimes prevalent in ostensibly tolerant and inclusive systems that are, in reality, not as tolerant as they appear. Activism against right-wing populist parties serves to bring populism to light and prompts critical reflection on concepts such as citizenship, democracy, social movements, and conflicts and cooperation around race/ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class (Siim et al., 2018). Additionally, activism can be directed against populist leaders, such as Donald Trump in the US, by supporting women’s rights, LGBTIQ+ rights, and fundamental human rights activists, who in turn amplify criticism against Trump (Žarkov, 2017).
Conclusion
To conclude, populism is neither good nor bad. It is a powerful tool especially in conjunction with activism and mass mobilization. Although we are thankful for our freedom, political engagement and connectedness through social media and digital platforms, populism and activism combined can lead to an acceleration of uncontrollable mass action completely isolated from reality and realistic political approaches.
While we are praising democratic populism that can be used through activism to make our society more inclusive, accountable, and equal, we should be cautious and careful to not let this development translate into an increase of right-wing populism. We should also keep always in mind that populist parties especially when in government positions have the power and authority to often shut down and repress activism, public participation, and criticism against their regime.
To follow-up on the examples of activist movements mentioned at the beginning of this article, it can be concluded, that populism indeed has the possibility to reinforce and support democratic, inclusive activism. However, we should not forget that populism also is used as a tool to create enemies and friends, shaping the world into a binary of good and evil. Those generalizations of “the people” and “the elite” can be indeed also harmful for our society and any political participation.
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(Adjunct Professor in the Political Science at Valencia College)
Speakers
“Populism and Socio-Political Transformation in Latin America,” byDr. Ronaldo Munck (Professor of Sociology and Director of the Centre for Engaged Research at Dublin City University).
“Varieties of Populism and Democratic Erosion: The Case of Latin America,” by Dr. Julio F. Carrión (Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Delaware).
“Global Power Dynamics and Authoritarian Populism in Venezuela,” byDr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina).
“Libertarian Populism? Making Sense of Javier Milei’s Discourse,”byDr. Reinhard Heinisch (Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Salzburg and Head of the Department of Political Science) and Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia (Director of the Center for Research in Communication and Humanities and head of Communication Studies at UPB in Cochabamba).
“The Phenomenon of ‘Bolsonarism’ in Brazil: Specificities and Global Connections,” by Dr. Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho (Professor of the Human Sciences at Universidade Federal do Maranhão).
Dr. Maria Isabel Puerta Riera is a political scientist with a Ph.D. in Social Sciences. She serves as an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Valencia College and holds the position of Research Fellow at GAPAC. She also chairs the LASA Venezuelan Studies Section and is a proud member of Red de Politólogas. Previously, Dr. Puerta Riera was an Associate Professor and Chair of Public Administration at Universidad de Carabobo in Venezuela. Her research interests are democratic backsliding, hybrid regimes, authoritarianism, illiberalism, populism, and immigration in Latin America. Email: mpuertariera@valenciacollege.edu Website: www.maripuerta.com
Populism and Socio-Political Transformation in Latin America
Dr. Ronaldo Munck is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Centre for Engaged Research at Dublin City University and was a member of the Council of Europe Task Force on The Local Democratic Mission of Higher Education. Professor Munck was the first Head of Civic Engagement at DCU and drove the ‘third mission’ alongside teaching and research. As a political sociologist Professor Munck has written widely on the impact of globalisation on development, changing work patterns and migration. Recent works include Migration, Precarity and Global Governance; Rethinking Global Labour: After Neoliberalism and Social Movements in Latin America: Mapping the Mosaic.
Professor Munck has led large-scale social research projects funded by The British Academy, Economic and SocialResearch Council, Human Sciences Research Council, The Horizon Fund (EU), EU Peace and Reconciliation Fund, EUCorporate Social Responsibility Project, EU AGIS framework, EU Science and Society framework, HEA/Irish AidProgramme of Strategic Co-operation, South African Netherlands Partnership for Development, Social Science andHumanities Research Council, Canada.
He is a member of the editorial board of the following international journals: Globalizations, Global Social Policy, Global Discourse, Global Labour Journal, Latin American Perspectives and Review: Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center. He is a lead author of Amartya Sen’s International Panel on Social Progress Report ‘Rethinking Society of the 21st Century.’
Abstract: In both popular and academic parlance, the term “populism” has taken on a more or less uniformly negative connotation. It implies being an enemy of democracy, anti-immigrant and, most obviously, irrationally under the sway of a charismatic leader. Yet in Latin America, populism has been an integral element of the development and democratization process and plays an important role in the contemporary process of social transformation under the left-of-centre governments that have emerged since the turn of the century. Thus, we need to deconstruct the term “populism” and explore its diverse historical manifestations, to rethink its meaning and its prospects moving forward. The term “populism” today spells, for most people in the global North, something akin to racism and with dark memories of fascism lurking in the background. The “populists” who come to mind are Orbán, Le Pen, Farage or Trump, who cultivate a mass base around the needs of the “left behind” or native-born. The political elites are cast as globalizers, not from somewhere in particular, and dangerously complacent about the dangers of being swamped by mass immigration.
In Latin America, the same term has had a very different resonance. It is bound up with democratization, the incorporation of the working classes, and the making of the national developmental state. Its emergence is marked by the crisis of the conservative export-oriented state in the 1930s that burst into the open after the Second World War, with the growth of an organized labour movement and the consolidation of nationalism in the new world order that emerged. This gave way to what can be called a compromise state that replaced the old oligarchic state, and in which the popular masses were both mobilized and controlled by what became known as populist state politics.
There have been many interpretations of populism in Latin America. Early studies tended to place it in terms of the modernization of society and the emergence of disposable masses, waiting to be captured by an ideology that would promote social change while maintaining the stability of the dominant order. This perspective was closely tied to the dominant modernization perspective promoted by the US following the Second World War, as it sought to dominate the postcolonial world. It was also deployed in a different way by the advocates of national development, a conservative modernization from above, led by the state. It was thus often seen as tied to the emergence of national inward-looking development strategies that were an integral component of the postcolonial era. National industrialists would thus support these movements, as would the military in some cases due to their national developmentalist ambitions.
Varieties of Populism and Democratic Erosion: The Case of Latin America
Dr. Julio F. Carrión holds the position of Professor of Comparative Politics, specializing in Latin American Politics and Populism, at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. Dr. Carrión’s current research focuses on the relationship between populism, illiberalism, and democracy. He teaches courses in Latin American Politics, Research Methods, and Democratization more broadly, drawing upon his extensive experience in survey data analysis and both quantitative and qualitative methods. Dr. Carrión is the author of numerous books and articles. His most recent book is A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power: The Andes in Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022). His most recent publication is “Illiberalism, Left-Wing Populism, and Popular Sovereignty in Latin America” (a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism, edited by Marlene Laruelle, 2024). He is currently working on a book manuscript tentatively entitled Public Opinion and Democracy in Peru, co-authored with Patricia Zárate and Jorge Aragón.
Abstract: Recent experience in Latin America shows that the erosion of democratic rule emanates from different sources. However, it is still the case that the most severe cases of democratic backsliding in recent years have come from populist chief executives seeking to aggrandize their power. The prominence of these cases has led many to conclude that populism in power, whether of the left or the right, leads inexorably to regime change. I argue that the record does not support this conclusion. The ascension of populism to power generally opens a moment of severe political confrontation that may or may not lead to the end of democratic rule. Thus, the relationship between populism and democracy depends on the variety of populism that crystallizes in power. The variety of populism that eventually develops is the result of the combination of permissive and productive conditions as well as the ability of non-populist actors and judicial institutions to successfully confront its autocratic predispositions. When analyzing populism in power, the most important distinction to make is not the nature of its discourse or the political coalition behind it but whether it can be constrained by non-populist actors. I also argue that those who extol the democratizing effects of populism in power are similarly mistaken. The record shows that in no instance of populism that lasted a decade or more in power resulted in a significant increase in the exercise of popular sovereignty.
Global Power Dynamics and Authoritarian Populism in Venezuela
Dr. Adriana Boersner Herrera is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at The Citadel, The Military College of Charleston. Dr. Boersner Herrera’s main areas of research are Venezuelan foreign policy, the presence of Russia in Latin America, and leadership studies focusing on the personality of dictators. Dr. Boersner Herrera has years of teaching experience both in Venezuela and the United States.
Abstract: Due to changes in global power dynamics and different centers of power having global ambitions and mutual distrust of the West, liberal democracy, neoliberalism, and the liberal international order seem to be facing a challenging test. Populist leaders have exploited this to push for a more authoritarian agenda and populist rhetoric, positioning themselves as strong leaders who will protect national interests against liberalism and what’s perceived as a failed model of liberal democracy. They have used different strategies, including institutional attacks to diminish checks and balances, hegemonic parties, surveillance, repression, and scapegoating. However, these authoritarian strategies have not been implemented separately from changes in the international context. Rather, the changes in global power dynamics in the 21st century have helped populist leaders to openly model other populists in implementing various strategies through economic dependency, geopolitical authoritarian alliances, and regional dynamics. In the case of Venezuela, since Nicolas Maduro took power in 2013, it has been prominent Venezuela’s economic dependence on China and Russia, solid and expanded authoritarian alliances with Cuba, China, Iran, Syria, and Russia, and regional isolation while Maduro’s authoritarian power has been consolidated. The focus here is to trace the rise of authoritarian populism in Venezuela and how it has been viable due to changes in global power dynamics in the 21st century.
Libertarian Populism? Making Sense of Javier Milei’s Discourse
Presenters: Dr. Reinhard Heinisch is Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics at the University of Salzburg and Head of the Department of Political Science. He earned his PhD at Michigan State University, USA. His research focuses on comparative populism and democracy. He is the author of over 40 peer-reviewed research articles and more than 50 other academic publications, including 12 books. His research been funded by numerous grants including a Marie Curie fellowship and Horizon 2020 grant. He is a faculty affiliate of the University Pittsburgh and a regular visiting lecturer at Renmin University of China.
Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia is director of the Center for Research in Communication and Humanities and head of Communication Studies at UPB in Cochabamba. He holds a PhD from the University of Barcelona. He won several journalism awards and was program director of the International Film Festival of Huesca and jury member in various film and literature competitions. He has contributed texts to journals, books, and media in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Spain, United States, France, and Mexico. His areas of research focus on film studies, the cultural and entertainment industries, philosophy of technology and aesthetics.
Abstract: Argentina’s Javier Milei is a self-proclaimed political insurgent promising radical political change. Upon assuming the presidency, he vowed to wrest power from la casta, a conceived illegitimate elite that he said had robbed the people of their resources and dignity. Milei, who is also known for his flamboyant style, cultivates the image of an anti-politician and a “madman,” meaning that only a madman, a “loco,” could take on and accomplish this task. Not surprisingly, political observers and the international media have identified Milei as a populist. Upon closer examination, however, it is unclear whether he is indeed a true populist, and even if Milei turns out to be such, it is not immediately apparent what kind of populist he is. While Milei’s anti-elitism is undisputed, his people-centeredness is. Since he is clearly also a libertarian, that means a defender of an extreme form of individualism, whereas populists generally construct some form of collective that they vow to defend. Populism without the construct of “the people” as a central reference category is unusual. Moreover, despite the bombastic rhetoric, Milei’s policy positions cannot simply be dismissed as typically shallow populist appeals to the lowest common denominator, because Milei is a serious economist. He has consistently backed up his calls with more substantive arguments. Furthermore, his proposals are not designed to be “popular,” as they promise painful medium-term cuts for long-term gains, which is also unusual for populist discourses. Lastly, he operates in a country shaped by past populist politics, which Milei blames for Argentina’s misfortunes. All of this raises the question of whether Milei is an anti-populist populist or a populist without an inherently popular agenda. More generally, our two-part research question asks whether Milei is indeed a populist and, if so, what kind of populist he is. Our goal is not merely to classify Milei’s political agenda, but more importantly to determine whether Milei represents a new type of populist, perhaps anticipating a fourth wave of populism that has emerged in Latin America in response to the wave of left-wing populism of before. To this end we undertake a comprehensive text analysis of Milei’s speeches, interviews, and social media presentations.
The Phenomenon of ‘Bolsonarism’ in Brazil: Specificities and Global Connections
Dr. Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho is Professor of History at Universidade Federal do Maranhão (UFMA) and a faculty member at the Postgraduate Program in History (PPGHis/UFMA). He holds a leadership role in the CNPq Research Group ‘Powers and Institutions, Worlds of Labor, and Political Ideas’ – POLIMT (UFMA). Additionally, he is a member of CNPq research groups ‘Peripheral Studies Network’ – REP (UFMA) and ‘Myth and Modernity’ – MiMo (UFMG). Dr. Coelho is affiliated with the Schmittian Studies Group, part of the International Network of Schmittian Studies – RIES. Furthermore, he serves as the Vice-coordinator of the Political History Working Group of History National Association – ANPUH Brazil for the biennium 2023-2025. He is also a member of the State Committee to Combat Torture under the State Secretariat for Human Rights and Popular Participation – SEDIHPOP/Government of the State of Maranhão for the biennium 2023-2025.
Abstract: The presentation aims to succinctly outline the primary characteristics of Bolsonarism, a far-right phenomenon in Brazil. While summarizing the features highlighted in local analyses, I seek to delve into its distinct aspects within the Brazilian context and identify the traits that make it a global phenomenon. Lastly, against the backdrop of “new populisms,” I intend to define the distinguishing characteristics that classify Bolsonarism as a conservative or reactionary phenomenon, contrasting it with left-wing movements.
(Emeritus Professor at the Institute of Political Science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan).
Speakers
“The State of Populism in Japan: A Comparative Perspective,”byDr. Yoshida Toru (Full Professor of Comparative Politics at Doshisha University in Japan).
“The Nature of Populism in Japan: Japan As an Uncharted Territory of Global Populism?” byDr. Airo Hino (Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University)
“Populism in Taiwan: Rethinking the Neo-liberalism–Populism Nexus,” by Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu (Assistant Professor, Political Science, McMaster University).
“How Professionalized Are Parties’ Populist Communication Strategies on Facebook? A Case Study of 2024 Taiwan National Election,”byDr. Jiun-Chi Lin (Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Marketing Communication, National Sun Yat-sen University).
Pretorius, Philip Christo & Sithole, Neo. (2024). Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 5, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0053
This report offers a summary of the tenth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series, titled “Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan,” which took place online on February 29, 2024. Dr. Dachi Liao moderated the panel, featuring insights from four distinguished panelists.
Report by Philip Christo Pretorius & Neo Sithole
This report provides a brief overview of the tenth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping European Populism (MEP) panel series, titled “Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan” held online on February 29, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Dachi Liao, Emeritus Professor at the Institute of Political Science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan, the panel featured speakers Dr. Toru Yoshida, Full Professor of Comparative Politics at Doshisha University in Japan, Dr. Airo Hino, Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu, Assistant Professor, Political Science, McMaster University,Dr. Jiun-Chi Lin, Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Marketing Communication, National Sun Yat-sen University.
Panel moderator Dr. Dachi Liao began the panel with an overall assessment on the various facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan. In this assessment, she identified four populist figures, two from each country, before going on to define “populism” to allow for a mutually clear and understood definition to be used throughout the panel session.
According to Dr. Liao, the underlying assumption/common understanding of populism and populist studies globally is based on the permanent division between the ‘elite’ and the common people. She highlighted three important facets for her conceptualization of the populist phenomenon: the provocation of a “social cleavage,” charismatic leaders that can stir anxious moods towards the social cleavage, and the use of an emotional and colloquial communication style.
Next, Dr. Liao provided various factors that he believes to be causing the populist trend, including economic, political, cultural, institutional and technological, while from the drawing scholarly works of Michael J. Sandel’s The Tyranny of Merit, and Ernesto Laclau’s Populism: What’s in a Name?
Ending this opening presentation, she highlighted that although the populist trend has a positive effect on policy change and power restructuring, it has also caused a political breakdown and polarization within society. With the definition of populism established, Dr. Liao made a preliminary comparison between Japanese and Taiwanese populist trends indicating that in her research she found that economic factors were a stronger driving factor for Japanese populism, compared to the political nationalism found in Taiwan, and that she found Japanese institutions were more authoritarian in design compared to Taiwan’s Liberal Democratic institutions.
Dr. Toru Yoshida: “The State of Populism in Japan: A Comparative Perspective”
Dr. Yoshida highlights the distinction between Japanese populism and its Western counterpart, emphasizing that the Japanese national government already leans towards social conservatism and economic protectionism, unlike many Western governments. However, Dr. Toru’s research reveals that ‘populists’ in Japan tend to adopt a more politically moderate stance compared to Western standards. Rather than embracing authoritarian or hardline views typical of Western populism, they often take a centrist approach to political issues.
Dr. Toru Yoshida’s presentation focused on a comparative perspective between the state of populism in Japan and other countries, especially those of the West. He highlighted that in Western politics the key difference between right-wing and left-wing populism, these being that right-wing populism presents itself as politically nationalistic/nativist, socially conservative and authoritarian while left-wing populism is more politically cosmopolitan/progressive and socially inclusive. However, Dr. Yoshida commented on how both share the common trait of being economically protectionist.
In his analysis of populism in Japan Dr. Yoshida highlighted that although populists in Japan practice the ‘good people’ versus the ‘evil elite’ discourse used in Western settings, they are usually elected through local-level politically reformist campaigns that have a pro-market stance. As these findings contrast what is found in the West, Dr. Yoshida investigated this further through two research questions: Why are Japanese populists mainly regional politicians; and why are they politically reformist and economically liberal?
As an answer to both questions, Dr. Yoshida hypothesizes that populist politicians are elected on a local level due to the proportional representative electoral system and that local governments are seen as “protectors of the people” against the “corrupt elite” of the national government. This is the result of local politicians seeking institutional reform as a strategically rational way of trying to win the vote of independent voters who often support neo-liberal reform policies and have low confidence in politicians and national institutions.
Dr. Yoshida highlights the distinction between Japanese populism and its Western counterpart, emphasizing that the Japanese national government already leans towards social conservatism and economic protectionism, unlike many Western governments. However, Dr. Yoshida’s research reveals that ‘populists’ in Japan tend to adopt a more politically moderate stance compared to Western standards. Rather than embracing authoritarian or hard-line views typical of Western populism, they often take a centrist approach to political issues.
Dr. Airo Hino: “The Nature of Populism in Japan – Japan as an Uncharted Territory of Global Populism?”
‘Populism’ in Japan has often been connected to ideas and policies which are seen as pandering to the electorate with short-term benefits, and is reflected in the language where ‘populism’ appears together with ‘taishū-geigō’ (literally meaning ‘pandering to the masses’) in more than half the articles published since the 1990’s. As a result, ordinary people have become accustomed to seeing the two ideas used together, thus resulting in an overall negative connotation of ‘populism’ today.
In his presentation Dr. Airo Hino looked to disprove the underlying assumption that Japan is free from populism and immune to the spread of it. By using historical examples, Dr. Hino highlighted that Japan has not only experienced populism before but suggests that these experiences have prevented the surge of fully-fledged populism.
Following defining how populism is analytically perceived within the country, Dr. Hino unpacked how populists in Japan reduce politics to common populist tropes of the ‘ordinary people’ versus the ‘elite,’ the morally good versus evil, and friends versus enemies, and in the process exploiting the mass media using this dramatic ‘theatrical style’ of rhetoric. Using this analytical framework as a basis, Dr. Hino displayed how certain populist politicians have used this theatrical rhetoric in campaigns both in the past and continue to do so now.
Continuing his presentation, he argued that populism is not only an analytical concept, but a frame which has shaped Japanese politics since the 1990’s. To do so, Dr. Hino graphed references to “populism” and “populists” in Japanese newspapers and academic journals that indicated four waves of populism first emerging during the 1990’s in the era of “reform politics.”
‘Populism’ in Japan has often been connected to ideas and policies which are seen as pandering to the electorate with short-term benefits, and is reflected in the language where ‘populism’ appears together with ‘taishū-geigō’ (literally meaning ‘pandering to the masses’) in more than half the articles published since the 1990’s. As a result, ordinary people have become accustomed to seeing the two ideas used together, thus resulting in an overall negative connotation of ‘populism’ today.
Continuing this line of argument, Dr. Hino brough up that due to a series of scandals in the 1990s, criticism and attacks of the central government increased in parallel with anti-elite sentiments, all resulted in the positive perception of populism, leading into the Koizumi era of neo-liberal reforms where Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi presented himself theatrically as a hero batting entrenched interests.
Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu: “Populism in Taiwan, Rethinking the Neoliberalism-Populism Nexus”
Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu contends that Taiwan provides a notable example of the integral state, established by the KMT regime following World War II. Initially, Taiwan operated under a developmental model that significantly boosted its economic growth. However, come the 1980s, the state faced dual crises: economic stagnation and challenges to political legitimacy, prompting the need for extensive restructuring. This effort entailed the adoption of neoliberal reforms aimed at rejuvenating the economy while concurrently aiming to uphold political control and social stability.
Based off her most recent article on the neoliberalism-populism nexus, Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu’s presentation looked at finding the correlation between economic liberal globalization and rise of populism, especially amongst the working class who are more inclined to elect populist leaders. Here Dr. Hsu begun by explaining what she conceptualizes as the ‘neoliberalism-populism nexus’ which is explained to be the popular view that contemporary populist is an outcome of neoliberal globalization and the economic grievances attached to it (which then creates the inclination towards populist leaders for the working-class).
However, Taiwan’s experience complicates this narrative, something that prompted Dr. Hsu to reevaluate the relationship between neoliberalism and populism by asking “can neo-liberalism rise from populism?” and is populism a consequence, counterforce, or constitutive component of neo-liberalism?
Turning to East Asian cases of populism, Dr. Hsu highlights that experiences are diverse in East Asia because there are indeed elected neo-liberal populist leaders, but also anti-neoliberal popular movements such as the Candlelight Movement in South Korea and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, which highlights that the connection between neo-liberalism and populism isn’t as clear cut as one would believe.
In analyzing these dynamics, Dr. Hsu utilizes the integral state concept and non-reductionist class analysis derived from Gramscian and Marxist theories. The Gramscian integral state emphasizes the dual objectives of facilitating capitalist economic accumulation and securing political legitimacy for the governing authority. It contends that capitalist accumulation and political hegemony are interlinked, and crises in one domain often trigger disruptions in the other, leading to volatile socio-political relations.
According to Dr. Hsu, the manifestation of the integral state is most evident in Taiwan, where it was established by the KMT regime in the aftermath of World War II. Initially, Taiwan operated under a developmental model that effectively propelled its economic growth. However, by the 1980s, the state encountered dual crises – economic stagnation and political legitimacy challenges – necessitating a comprehensive restructuring effort.
This restructuring endeavor involved the implementation of neoliberal reforms aimed at revitalizing the economy while simultaneously seeking to maintain political control and social stability.
Dr. Hsu also delved into the post-restructuring period that witnessed the emergence of two forms of populism in Taiwan: liberal populism and neoliberal populism. Liberal populism, exemplified by movements such as the 2006 “Red Shirt” movement and the 2013 “White Shirt” movement, focused on moral outrage and demands for political reform. However, it failed to address structural causes and ultimately reinforced the existing power structures.
Dr. Juin-Chi Lin – “How Professionalized Are Parties’ Populist Communication Strategies on Facebook? An Observation the 2024 Taiwan National Election”
Dr. Juin-Chi Lin and his colleagues have delineated populism within a communication framework, emphasizing core tenets such as people-centralism, anti-elitism, and the restoration of popular sovereignty. They assert that this ‘campaign professionalization’ is frequently associated with the involvement of experts during election cycles. However, Dr. Lin contends that such professionalization is more intricately tied to technological innovations. To effectively engage with voters on social media platforms, political parties must prioritize professionalizing their communication strategies.
Dr. Juin-Chi Lin’s talk focused on a practical approach of investigating populism, specifically the use of populist rhetoric in elections on social media, centrally in the increased interest overall in how parties communicate to their voters, and thus investigating the language used by mainstream parties in building a relationship with its voters on online platforms is an important starting point in investigating the professionalization of populist communication.
To do this Dr. Lin and his colleagues established populism through a communication framework with key ideas such as people-centralism, anti-elitism, and restoring popular sovereignty. This ‘campaign professionalization’ was explained to often be linked to the role of experts during the election cycle, but Dr. Lin argued that campaign professionalization is instead linked to the technological innovations, and to establish a good relationship with voters on social media, parties need to learn how to professionalize communication.
Therefore, through the integration of different communication styles, negative and emotional communication have been found to best reinforce populist messages. Using this framework, Dr. Lin’s team investigated if they could find certain trends in the communication styles used by parties during the 2024 Taiwan election. To do so, Facebook posts from December 2023 to Mid-January 2024 acted as the preliminary starting point for their investigation. Dr. Lin used key examples from his finding in the presentation to highlight his argument, starting with the DPP who’s first post featured gratitude for the people, and emphasizes personal characteristics of leaders. In the second example, the party used the negative style of communication, focusing on national sovereignty, and criticizing the KMT. The DPP particularly emphasized their opponents as the “elite” and as the enemy, using the corruption crisis to polarize the people against them. In a final example given during the presentation the DPP focus on one of their candidate’s charisma – emphasizing her positive features as ambassador to the United States.
Similarly, when investigating the KMT political party, Dr. Lin’s team also focused on people centrism, restoring popular sovereignty, and have a sociable style of communication. In a first example, Dr. Lin presents an advertisement where KMT emphasizes that they care about the people, specifically focusing on the anecdote that one of their leaders went to shake hands with everyone he met, looking after the people, and that KMT’s candidates are professional and seeks to improve people’s lives.
They also made anti-elite posts, strongly criticizing the DPP, asking voters to elect the KMT for the chance to change politics in the next four years. Dr. Lin concludes by giving attention the major communicative characteristics of mainstream parties including people-centrism, restoring popular sovereignty and anti-elitism.
Dr. Tatsiana Kulakevich underscores the resilience of the Belarusian protest movement amidst systematic repression and violence. Despite recent parliamentary elections failing to incite significant dissent, she suggests that future electoral events, especially presidential elections, could ignite substantial change. Despite the challenges ahead, the Belarusian people remain hopeful for a window of opportunity to usher in a new regime and reclaim their rights and freedoms. Kulakevich also draws attention to the plight of political prisoners in Belarus, whose uncertain fate mirrors Navalny’s tragic end.
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, numerous post-Soviet countries have struggled to establish and consolidate liberal democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights and freedoms. After two and a half decades, a concerning trend toward populism, authoritarianism, and autocracy has emerged among several of these nations, with some, such as Belarus, never having experienced a functioning democracy. Giving an exclusive interview to European Center for Populism Studies, Dr. Tatsiana Kulakevich, an Associate Professor at the University of South Florida’s School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies and a research fellow and affiliated faculty at the USF Institute for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, sheds light on the underlying causes of these failures and their implications for Belarus.
Kulakevich begins by addressing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent expectations of reform and democratization among former Soviet Republics. However, disillusionment soon followed as many countries experienced kleptocracy and oligarchic rule. The global financial crisis of 2008 further eroded confidence in liberal democracy, leading to the rise of populist leaders who capitalized on public discontent.
Belarus, under the authoritarian rule of Alexander Lukashenko, stands out amidst this backdrop. Kulakevich emphasizes the regime’s shift towards “Sultanism,” characterized by the consolidation of power in the hands of one man. However, to her, unlike traditional totalitarian regimes, Belarus lacks a unifying ideology, instead revolving around the arbitrary exercise of power.
Dr. Kulakevich underscores the resilience of the Belarusian protest movement amidst systematic repression and violence. Although recent parliamentary elections on February 25 did not evoke significant dissent, she notes that future electoral events, particularly presidential elections, could catalyze meaningful change. Despite the formidable challenges ahead, Dr. Kulakevich emphasizes that the Belarusian people remain hopeful for a window of opportunity to usher in a new regime and reclaim their rights and freedoms.
Dr. Kulakevich said the murder of Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian opposition figure, casts a grim shadow over Belarusian dissidents. Kulakevich highlights the plight of political prisoners in Belarus, whose uncertain fate echoes Navalny’s tragic end. The regime’s ruthless tactics, exemplified by Navalny’s assassination attempt, resonate with Belarusian dissidents, who face similar threats to their lives and freedoms.
Dr. Tatsiana Kulakevich underscores the resilience of the Belarusian protest movement amidst systematic repression and violence. Despite recent parliamentary elections failing to incite significant dissent, she suggests that future electoral events, especially presidential elections, could ignite substantial change. Despite the challenges ahead, the Belarusian people remain hopeful for a window of opportunity to usher in a new regime and reclaim their rights and freedoms. Kulakevich also draws attention to the plight of political prisoners in Belarus, whose uncertain fate mirrors Navalny’s tragic end.
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, numerous post-Soviet countries have struggled to establish and consolidate liberal democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights and freedoms. After two and a half decades, a concerning trend toward populism, authoritarianism, and autocracy has emerged among several of these nations, with some, such as Belarus, never having experienced a functioning democracy. Giving an exclusive interview to European Center for Populism Studies, Dr. Tatsiana Kulakevich, an Associate Professor at the University of South Florida’s School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies and a research fellow and affiliated faculty at the USF Institute for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, sheds light on the underlying causes of these failures and their implications for Belarus.
Kulakevich begins by addressing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent expectations of reform and democratization among former Soviet Republics. However, disillusionment soon followed as many countries experienced kleptocracy and oligarchic rule. The global financial crisis of 2008 further eroded confidence in liberal democracy, leading to the rise of populist leaders who capitalized on public discontent.
Belarus, under the authoritarian rule of Alexander Lukashenko, stands out amidst this backdrop. Kulakevich emphasizes the regime’s shift towards “Sultanism,” characterized by the consolidation of power in the hands of one man. However, to her, unlike traditional totalitarian regimes, Belarus lacks a unifying ideology, instead revolving around the arbitrary exercise of power.
Dr. Kulakevich underscores the resilience of the Belarusian protest movement amidst systematic repression and violence. Although recent parliamentary elections on February 25 did not evoke significant dissent, she notes that future electoral events, particularly presidential elections, could catalyze meaningful change. Despite the formidable challenges ahead, Dr. Kulakevich emphasizes that the Belarusian people remain hopeful for a window of opportunity to usher in a new regime and reclaim their rights and freedoms.
Dr. Kulakevich said the murder of Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian opposition figure, casts a grim shadow over Belarusian dissidents. Kulakevich highlights the plight of political prisoners in Belarus, whose uncertain fate echoes Navalny’s tragic end. The regime’s ruthless tactics, exemplified by Navalny’s assassination attempt, resonate with Belarusian dissidents, who face similar threats to their lives and freedoms.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Tatsiana Kulakevich with some edits.
Disappointments in Anticipated Changes Led to Rise of Populism in Eastern Europe
After nearly three and a half decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, numerous post-Soviet countries continue to struggle with consolidating liberal democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights and freedoms. Many of these nations have experienced a recent trend toward populism, authoritarianism, and autocracy. What are the underlying and shared causes of these failures?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: I would start with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the definition of Eastern Europe. Some countries experiencing a shift towards right-wing politics, such as Poland and Hungary, are often categorized as Eastern Europe by the United Nations, although some prefer to be called Central Europe. These countries, numbering around 10, are situated close to the former Soviet Union, with some being members of the European Union and others not.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, people in the former Soviet Republics had high expectations. However, many experienced kleptocracy and oligarchic rule, including Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine, as well as certain European Union countries that were not yet members at that time. Upon joining the European Union in the 2000s, there was an expectation of economic reform and a reduction in kleptocracy. However, the reality fell short of expectations, and kleptocracy persisted, leading to a second disappointment.
Furthermore, the global financial crisis of 2008 further eroded confidence in liberal democracy, prompting some to seek alternative solutions. This disillusionment paved the way for populist leaders who offered different promises, resonating with the discontented populace. Ultimately, historical disappointments in anticipated changes have gradually led to the rise of populist politics in these regions.
After the Protests of 2020, Belarus Shifted towards Sultanism
We are witnessing a resurgence of populism in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, while Belarus solidifies its authoritarian rule under a one-man regime. What are the fundamental differences between the experiences of Eastern European countries and Belarus in terms of populism, and are there any notable similarities? How has the war in Ukraine impacted the consolidation of the authoritarian regime in Belarus?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: Here, it’s important to make a clear distinction between European Union members and post-Soviet Republics that are not part of the EU. While European Union countries may be experiencing a decline in certain values, they still maintain democratic structures. It’s crucial to recognize that democracy is not a one-size-fits-all concept; there are varying degrees of democracy among nations, as indicated by different democracy rankings.
European Union countries, despite any decline, continue to uphold democratic principles. On the other hand, countries like Belarus, and Moldova and Ukraine, which aspire to EU membership, are on a different trajectory. While they may be EU candidates, they are not yet EU members and thus have different processes and challenges to contend with.
When discussing Belarus, it’s evident that the country is under an authoritarian regime, which has only strengthened following the crackdown on the 2020 protests, the largest in Belarusian history. Presently, Belarus seems to be veering towards a form of Sultanism, characterized by the consolidation of power in the hands of one individual. Some may refer to the Belarusian regime as “new totalitarian,” but I hesitate to categorize it as such. Unlike traditional totalitarian regimes, Belarus lacks a unifying ideology and widespread mobilization of the populace. Instead, politics in Belarus revolve around a single individual, akin to a Sultan. Such a system doesn’t necessarily rely on a coherent ideology but rather on arbitrary exercises of power. Therefore, while Belarus can be classified as an authoritarian regime, labeling it as totalitarian may not capture all its nuances.
In Belarus, the shift towards Sultanism began to manifest after the protests of 2020, when Lukashenko’s previous balancing act became untenable due to opposition pressure and the closing of doors to the European Union. With limited options and a desire to cling to power, Lukashenko aligned himself more closely with his ally Vladimir Putin. It became apparent that Lukashenko had little choice but to acquiesce to Putin’s demands, allowing Russian military presence and missile launches from Belarusian territory. The crackdown initiated in 2020 has persisted and intensified, rather than commencing in 2022.
Given the erosion of the so-called pillars of Lukashenko’s populism—his alleged proximity to the people, his self-portrayal as a guarantor of peace, and promise of economic and political stability—what internal and external factors contributed to this erosion?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: The erosion of Lukashenko’s populist regime accelerated after 2020, particularly undermining his image as a guarantor of stability. The imposition of numerous sanctions post-2020, exacerbated by Belarus’s involvement in the war, further destabilized the economy and shattered the illusion of economic stability. The brutal suppression of the 2020 protests, documented by the United Nations with reports of violence including rape with batons and deaths, tarnished Lukashenko’s perceived proximity to the people, eroding trust and fueling disappointment. With nearly 1500 political prisoners, the regime’s repression has intensified. Moreover, Lukashenko’s claim as a guarantor of peace disintegrated following Belarus’s complicity in allowing Russian missile launches from its territory during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, rendering the country a co-aggressor in the war.
Pervasive Atmosphere of Fear Prevents Meaningful Dissent
Alexander Lukashenko’s main election rival was Svetlana Tikhanovskaya in the 2020 election in Belarus. People attend a pre-election meeting in Minsk, Belarus, on September 7, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.
In your presentation at an ECPS panel last year, you noted Lukashenko’s success in creating an image of the political elite as working for the people. How has this perception evolved among Belarusian citizens, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, which brought about economic and security challenges?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: People witnessed the true nature of the Lukashenko regime and became disillusioned, realizing they had been misled on multiple fronts. For instance, during the 2020 presidential election, people wore white bracelets as a symbol of support for the opposition candidate, Svyatlana Tsihanouskaya. They observed each other at polling stations, noting the widespread presence of these bracelets. When Lukashenko claimed an implausible 80% victory while allocating only 10% to Tsihanouskaya, it was a blatant manipulation that many found incredulous. Reflecting on this, one might speculate that if Lukashenko had claimed a more plausible 60%, the situation might have unfolded differently, but this is not to defend the regime; rather, it’s a facetious assessment.
This pivotal moment exposed the regime’s deceit, galvanizing people to protest even before the brutal crackdown ensued. They rallied around symbols like the historic opposition colors of white, red, and white, distinct from the regime’s associations with bloodshed and the official red and green flag. This newfound solidarity formed the basis of a new imagined community, which resonated deeply with those seeking change.
Once people have witnessed such truths, they cannot simply forget or unsee them. Since the regime’s efforts to suppress dissent and stifle civil society, individuals who oppose the regime within Belarus live in constant fear. The regime’s reach extends to monitoring social media activity and intercepting individuals at the border. This pervasive atmosphere of fear and intimidation prevents meaningful dissent, as people are acutely aware of the potential consequences of speaking out.
Lukashenko’s Regime Does Not Fully Exercise Sovereignty
You argue that Russia unofficially controls Belarus, which has significantly influenced Lukashenko’s alignment with Putin’s interests. Could you elaborate on how this control manifests in Belarusian governance and decision-making processes, particularly in matters concerning pro-Putin foreign policy and military cooperation with Russia?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: In this context, it’s crucial to recall the concept of sovereignty as defined in political science: the monopoly of violence within specific borders. Lukashenko’s regime does not fully exercise sovereignty throughout Belarus, lacking complete control over the use of force within its borders. When we refer to violence here, we’re not discussing crime, but rather the authority of police and military to maintain order and security within a territory.
If you look at Ukraine, Ukraine doesn’t have complete sovereignty because the Russian forces are on Ukrainian territory. Similar situation is happening in Belarus but in a different aspect. While the Ukrainians are paying for their sovereignty with blood, Belarusian sovereignty has been challenged peacefully by moving Russian forces on the Belarussian territory. The trainings are happening, and I hear that Russianmilitary officers have been in control of some army units.
Another aspect of this challenge to sovereignty is the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil, which are under Russian control. While these weapons are not owned by Belarus, their presence directly challenges Belarus’ monopoly of violence within its borders. This gradual erosion of sovereignty occurs quietly but significantly, posing a threat to the Belarusian people who are not aligned with the regime.
Hence, it’s crucial to recognize that Belarus, too, faces a threat, as its people are not necessarily aligned with the Belarusian regime. While the conflict unfolds on Ukrainian soil, Belarus finds itself under a similar, albeit quieter, threat of gradual erosion of its sovereignty.
In your article “Anti-authoritarian learning: Prospects for democratization in Belarus based on a study of Polish Solidarity,” you explore the anti-Lukashenko protest movement in Belarus through a comparative lens with the Solidarity movement in Poland. Why do you believe the anti-Lukashenko democracy movement has not achieved success comparable to the Solidarity movement in Poland? What are the primary differences and similarities between the two movements?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: In this article, we discussed the four stages that social movements undergo to succeed or falter. In Belarus, however, the movement did not achieve the bureaucratization phase, which is crucial for its progression. The movement must initiate with people seeing each other, symbolizing its inception. Subsequently, as people continue to unite, the movement begins to bureaucratize, ultimately culminating in either success or failure.
In Belarus, we witnessed the initial two stages unfold. A significant number of people, approximately half a million, gathered to protest during weekends, demonstrating a collective realization that they are not alone in their desire for change. However, the third stage, bureaucratization, which entails the emergence of leadership, faced challenges. Bureaucratization primarily occurred outside the country’s borders, presenting difficulties as it was forced into exile.
Comparatively, in Poland, bureaucratization occurred internally, albeit amidst regime suppression, signifying a contrasting dynamic. Although the process of bureaucratization did occur in Belarus, its efficacy was hindered by external factors, resulting in minimal progress. It’s essential to acknowledge that successful movements, such as Polish Solidarity, often require significant time to achieve their goals. The Polish example illustrates that it took eight years and persisted until the collapse of the Soviet Union for success to be realized.
Despite the challenges, there is hope that a similar solidarity movement is brewing in Belarus, albeit underground. Viewing these processes positively is crucial, recognizing the existence of the movement and its leadership. The Belarusian people and opposition await a potential window of opportunity, which, if seized, could usher in a new regime.
The Upcoming Presidential Elections Could Serve as Catalysts for Opposition
Peaceful protests on Niezaliežnasci street in Minsk. People rallying and marching towards Independence Avenue in Minsk, Belarus on August 23, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.
In the same article, you assert that “the 2020 presidential election generated the largest protests in the history of independent Belarus. Masses of Belarusian citizens took to the streets to protest what they considered to be a corrupt and fraudulent election.” However, in the recent elections on February 25, characterized by the Council of Europe as a “travesty of democracy,” there were not many public demonstrations. Why do you think Belarusians did not mobilize to protest the fraudulent elections this time around? Has the demand for change in Belarus been killed by systematic repression and violence? Or how do you assess the state of resilience and determination of the protest movement in the face of such adversity?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: It’s important to differentiate between the parliamentary and presidential elections in Belarus. Parliamentary elections typically don’t elicit significant public outcry or protest; historically, the turnout for dissent is minimal, often involving only a handful of individuals or none at all. This lack of mobilization is unsurprising given that parliamentary candidates are often regime-appointed, with little chance of electoral success for opposition candidates. People in Belarus have lost faith in the prospect of meaningful change through these elections due to pervasive fear and skepticism. The fear of imprisonment or reprisal discourages many from participating in dissent, especially when they perceive the current electoral cycle as lacking in critical opportunities for change. The next presidential election is likely to be the focal point for more substantial protest, especially considering President Lukashenko’s indication of running again. Therefore, while the recent parliamentary elections may not have spurred significant protest, future electoral events could serve as catalysts for more meaningful dissent.
What is the significance of parliamentary and local elections held on Feb. 25 in Belarus? What do the elections tell us about the nature of the regime in the country?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: Historically, these elections have failed to provoke dissent or resentment among the populace because people perceive little opportunity for meaningful change. The prevailing fear within the country suppresses protest during parliamentary elections, underscoring the belief that President Lukashenko remains firmly entrenched in power and is willing to crack down on any signs of dissent.
Opposition Closed the Door on Lukashenko’s Balancing Act
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What role does Putin’s Russia play in the consolidation of Lukashenko’s regime and the suppression of popular dissent? How has this suppression in Belarus affected the support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: Let’s delve into the events of 2020, when Lukashenko’s regime was known for its balancing act. This approach involved seeking financial support from either Russia or the European Union depending on the circumstances. For instance, if Putin withheld funds or made unfavorable demands, Lukashenko would turn to the European Union, often promising to release political prisoners in exchange for financial assistance. They were deeply entrenched in their relationships, and this strategy proved effective for decades.
However, everything changed after 2020 when Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya emerged and sought refuge in the European Union, specifically Lithuania. Tsikhanouskaya’s lobbying efforts with leaders in the European Union and the United States effectively closed the door on Lukashenko’s previous balancing act. Consequently, Lukashenko found himself heavily reliant on Putin’s support. Let’s turn our attention to Russia and the onset of the protests.
In 2020, we witnessed a two-week period of inaction by the Lukashenko regime. During this time, there was a noticeable absence of activity, with people peacefully protesting. Despite the confusion apparent within Lukashenko’s regime, he remained passive, even seen riding with a rifle but making no significant moves. Then, suddenly, there was a sharp escalation, depicted graphically as a sudden crackdown. The question arises: why?
The answer lies in Lukashenko’s newfound confidence, gained through promises of financial and political support from Putin. This support emboldened him to quash the protests decisively. It’s as if Putin whispered, “Enough is enough, Alexander,” signaling the end of the two-week grace period. From then on, Lukashenko relied heavily on Putin to maintain his grip on power, trading sovereignty for political survival. Putin, in turn, kept Lukashenko in his pocket, utilizing Belarus for strategic purposes such as missile launches and nuclear deployments.
While Putin holds considerable sway, Lukashenko maintains a semblance of autonomy, albeit within the confines of Putin’s influence. He navigates a delicate balance, ensuring his own rule while serving Putin’s interests in Belarus. Thus, while Putin remains in power, Lukashenko recognizes the necessity of compliance while preserving his own domain, however limited it may be.
Lukashenko Continues to Suppress Dissent Thanks to Russia’s Support
(L-R) Iran President Hassan Rouhan, Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the session of the supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Yerevan, Armania on October 1, 2019. Photo: Asatur Yesayants.
Belarus’ strategic significance for Russia in the context of the Ukraine war is underscored by its long border with Ukraine and its role as a staging ground for Russian military operations. Considering this, what are the potential long-term implications of Belarus’ cooperation with Russia on regional security dynamics and the broader geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: Belarus appears poised to remain in its current state, with hopes pinned on a favorable outcome for Ukraine. Should Ukraine find itself mired in a frozen conflict or an unfavorable peace agreement, it’s unlikely they will willingly accept it. Any peace accord would likely be imposed rather than voluntary. Thus, the anticipation rests on the United States to provide crucial foreign and financial aid to Ukraine, potentially opening a window for change in Belarus. If Ukraine emerges victorious and triggers shifts within the Russian government, Belarusian opposition forces may find an opportunity for change. However, absent such developments, the outlook for change appears grim. Lukashenko maintains the support of Russia and continues his crackdown on dissent, with reports indicating an escalation in repression, including fatalities in Belarusian prisons. Unfortunately, there seems to be little prospect for improvement at present.
The presence of Russian troops in Transnistria presents a significant obstacle to Moldova’s territorial control, a crucial condition for EU membership. How do you foresee Moldova addressing this issue as part of its EU accession process?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: In this case, Moldova finds itself in a fortuitous position. While Belarus grapples with challenges to its sovereignty and Ukraine fiercely defends its own, Moldova could have easily been the next target had Russian forces advanced into Transnistria. Moldova lacks a strong military presence to resist such aggression.
The aspiration in Moldova is to align with the European Union, a path that includes Transnistria. Despite the presence of Russian troops in Moldova, the hope remains alive. However, understanding the context is crucial. Even before 2014, prior to Russia’s conspicuous intervention in Ukraine, a murky situation existed along the border with Transnistria and Ukraine, characterized by arms smuggling.
Following the events of 2014, Ukraine bolstered its border control, recognizing Russia as an adversary. With Russian soldiers stationed in Transnistria, Ukraine tightened its grip on the border, impeding movement into Transnistria through its territory. Moldova’s capital also intensified its vigilance over these activities.
Russian soldiers traverse into Transnistria, officially Moldovan territory, including through Moldova’s airports, under watchful eyes. Moldova’s stance is clear: why permit further incursions of soldiers into its territory, even if destined for Transnistria, where they’ve been stationed since 1992. Consequently, accessing Transnistria via Ukraine has become increasingly challenging for Russian officers.
Given that the frozen conflict in Transnistria has persisted since the early 1990s, specifically since 1992, the original Russian soldiers involved have long been replaced. The current soldiers are often descendants of those initial officers, hailing not necessarily from Russia but predominantly from Transnistria itself. For them, Transnistria is their homeland, not Russia; hence, their loyalties are complex, tethered not solely to Russia but also to their own land.
This complexity plays into Moldova’s favor to some extent. These soldiers may prioritize the interests of Transnistria over those of Russia. For Transnistria, ties with Russia have been beneficial, offering retirement benefits and subsidized gas. Meanwhile, Moldova has cultivated strong trade relations with the European Union, particularly through its close cultural affinity with Romania. Consequently, Transnistria finds itself in a position where it benefits from both Russia and Moldova yet leans more towards the EU due to the advantages gained through Moldova’s EU agreements. This dynamic underscore Moldova’s desire to integrate Transnistria, despite the challenges involved. Russia’s persistent influence and disturbance in Transnistria complicates this goal, as it continues to support disruptions in the region, thereby hindering Moldova’s aspirations for stability and unity.
Navalny’s Death Sparked Awareness of Political Prisoners in Belarus
People mourn for Alexei Navalny in Budapest, Hungary on February 16, 2024. Photo: Alexey Gorovoi.
Lastly, today (on Friday) Alexei Navalny’s funeral was held in Moscow. Does the death of Navalny say anything to dissidents in Belarus?
Tatsiana Kulakevich: Yes, indeed, we mustn’t forget. That’s the first thing Belarus compels us to consider, especially after Navalny’s death sparked awareness of the numerous political prisoners in Belarus. Among them are relatives and opposition figures, unheard of for almost a year, or even longer. Their uncertain fate is alarming. We’re not talking about just one person; it’s a matter of concern for many. Navalyn is a big name in Russia. Belarus is no stranger to such cases; there are several prominent names whose fates remain uncertain. It is crucial to emphasize the severity of the situation in Belarus, particularly regarding political prisoners. While overshadowed by the Ukrainian conflict due to its smaller scale and lack of direct bloodshed, Belarus suffers its own form of anguish through the erosion of its citizens’ freedoms.
A few days ago, we received news of yet another political prisoner’s death. His name was somewhat elusive, not quite fully captured, but his passing marks the fifth such tragedy within Belarusian prisons. It’s a grim reality we’re confronting. Reflecting on the demise of Navalny, personally, I found it not entirely surprising. After all, the regime had attempted on his life previously. So, in a sense, they simply finished what they started. It’s a ruthless strategic move, reminiscent of how they dealt with Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin, illustrating that traitors meet their demise. However, Belarus has its own harrowing story, particularly concerning its treatment of political prisoners. The details remain obscured at this point, leaving much to be uncovered.
Emphasizing the pressing challenges confronting Indonesian democracy, Professor Hadiz stressed, “The current concern with Prabowo’s election lies in his deep ties to the oligarchy.” He highlighted Prabowo’s track record of human rights violations and his family’s (his brother) involvement in questionable economic activities, resulting in outstanding debts to the state. Additionally, Prabowo’s disregard for democratic processes, principles, and human rights was underscored. Acknowledging Indonesia’s enduring struggle with its oligarchic tendencies, Professor Hadiz warned that Prabowo’s election heralds a new level of danger for Indonesian democracy.
Amidst the global rise of populist movements, Indonesia emerges as a captivating case study, where the intricate interplay between populism, democracy, and Islamism unfolds amidst socio-economic transformations and political contests. The recent electoral triumph of Prabowo Subianto has ignited fervent discussions regarding the trajectory of democracy in the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation. In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Vedi Hadiz, Director and Professor of Asian Studies at the Asia Institute, and Assistant Deputy Vice-Chancellor International at the University of Melbourne, provides insights into the nuanced dynamics of populism, Islamism, and democracy in Indonesia.
Professor Hadiz underscores the prevailing notion that Indonesia is often lauded as a model of successful democratic transformation, a reputation he acknowledges as, in many respects, well-deserved. However, he also draws attention to the darker realities overshadowing Indonesia’s democratic journey. Despite its strides towards democracy, Indonesia has long grappled with deep-rooted issues such as corruption and significant flaws, casting a shadow over its democratic credentials.
Moreover, Professor Hadiz highlights a pressing concern regarding the entrenchment of oligarchic power structures and the erosion of democratic norms, particularly under Prabowo’s possible leadership. He emphasizes that the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups have consistently faced limitations within the Indonesian context. Crucially, Indonesia remains under the sway of what he terms an oligarchy—an alliance between the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie elite. This oligarchy wields influence over virtually all major political parties and exerts dominance over key state institutions and mass organizations, shaping the trajectory of Indonesian politics and governance.
Highlighting the imminent challenges facing Indonesian democracy, Professor Hadiz emphasized, “The current concern with Prabowo’s election lies in his deep ties to the oligarchy.” As the former son-in-law of Suharto, the former dictator, Prabowo epitomizes the entrenched habits of the oligarchy that democratic reforms aimed to mitigate. Professor Hadiz pointed out Prabowo’s history of human rights violations and his family’s (his brother) involvement in questionable economic activities, which have left outstanding debts to the state due to these connections. Furthermore, Prabowo has displayed scant regard for democratic processes, principles, and human rights.
While acknowledging Indonesia’s longstanding struggle with its oligarchic nature, Professor Hadiz warned that Prabowo’s election heralds a new level of danger for Indonesian democracy, amplifying concerns about its future trajectory.
By unpacking the concept of populism and Islamic populism within the Indonesian context, Professor Hadiz also emphasizes its class dimensions and nuanced manifestations in the archipelago. Professor Hadiz elucidates how populism intersects with Islamism, shedding light on the distinctive features of Islamic populism and its historical evolution in Indonesia. Drawing parallels with other Muslim-majority countries, particularly Turkey and Egypt, he navigates through the intricate tapestry of socio-political forces shaping Islamic populism across diverse contexts.
Emphasizing the pressing challenges confronting Indonesian democracy, Professor Hadiz stressed, “The current concern with Prabowo’s election lies in his deep ties to the oligarchy.” He highlighted Prabowo’s track record of human rights violations and his family’s (his brother) involvement in questionable economic activities, resulting in outstanding debts to the state. Additionally, Prabowo’s disregard for democratic processes, principles, and human rights was underscored. Acknowledging Indonesia’s enduring struggle with its oligarchic tendencies, Professor Hadiz warned that Prabowo’s election heralds a new level of danger for Indonesian democracy.
Amidst the global rise of populist movements, Indonesia emerges as a captivating case study, where the intricate interplay between populism, democracy, and Islamism unfolds amidst socio-economic transformations and political contests. The recent electoral triumph of Prabowo Subianto has ignited fervent discussions regarding the trajectory of democracy in the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation. In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Vedi Hadiz, Director and Professor of Asian Studies at the Asia Institute, and Assistant Deputy Vice-Chancellor International at the University of Melbourne, provides insights into the nuanced dynamics of populism, Islamism, and democracy in Indonesia.
Professor Hadiz underscores the prevailing notion that Indonesia is often lauded as a model of successful democratic transformation, a reputation he acknowledges as, in many respects, well-deserved. However, he also draws attention to the darker realities overshadowing Indonesia’s democratic journey. Despite its strides towards democracy, Indonesia has long grappled with deep-rooted issues such as corruption and significant flaws, casting a shadow over its democratic credentials.
Moreover, Professor Hadiz highlights a pressing concern regarding the entrenchment of oligarchic power structures and the erosion of democratic norms, particularly under Prabowo’s possible leadership. He emphasizes that the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups have consistently faced limitations within the Indonesian context. Crucially, Indonesia remains under the sway of what he terms an oligarchy—an alliance between the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie elite. This oligarchy wields influence over virtually all major political parties and exerts dominance over key state institutions and mass organizations, shaping the trajectory of Indonesian politics and governance.
Highlighting the imminent challenges facing Indonesian democracy, Professor Hadiz emphasized, “The current concern with Prabowo’s election lies in his deep ties to the oligarchy.” As the former son-in-law of Suharto, the former dictator, Prabowo epitomizes the entrenched habits of the oligarchy that democratic reforms aimed to mitigate. Professor Hadiz pointed out Prabowo’s history of human rights violations and his family’s (his brother) involvement in questionable economic activities, which have left outstanding debts to the state due to these connections. Furthermore, Prabowo has displayed scant regard for democratic processes, principles, and human rights.
While acknowledging Indonesia’s longstanding struggle with its oligarchic nature, Professor Hadiz warned that Prabowo’s election heralds a new level of danger for Indonesian democracy, amplifying concerns about its future trajectory.
By unpacking the concept of populism and Islamic populism within the Indonesian context, Professor Hadiz also emphasizes its class dimensions and nuanced manifestations in the archipelago. Professor Hadiz elucidates how populism intersects with Islamism, shedding light on the distinctive features of Islamic populism and its historical evolution in Indonesia. Drawing parallels with other Muslim-majority countries, particularly Turkey and Egypt, he navigates through the intricate tapestry of socio-political forces shaping Islamic populism across diverse contexts.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Vedi Hadiz with some edits.
Islamic Populism Replaces “the People” with “the Ummah”
How do you define populism (or Islamist populism) within the context of Indonesia and the broader Islamic world, and what are its distinguishing features compared to other forms of populism? Can you discuss the relationship between Islamist populism and illiberalism & authoritarianism in Indonesia, particularly how these dynamics intersect and influence each other within the political landscape?
Vedi Hadiz: First of all, let’s delve into populism in a broad sense, followed by a discussion on populism within Indonesia, specifically Islamic populism, and its correlation with various forms of illiberalism. At its core, populism can be succinctly defined as a political inclination that frames societal dynamics as a struggle between the elites and the masses, portraying the elite as corrupt, exploitative, rapacious, or culturally detached, while depicting the people as inherently good and virtuous. However, this definition merely scratches the surface, and it’s crucial to acknowledge the contextual nuances inherent in contemporary populisms worldwide. In my analysis, I argue that all contemporary populisms in the world invariably stem from the socio-economic and political repercussions of neoliberal globalization, manifesting differently across diverse societies and impacting domestic social structures in various ways.
The second proposition I advance is that populism contains a class dimension, a facet often overlooked in scholarly discourse. Specifically, within the contemporary framework of neoliberal globalization, populism reflects varying class alliances in different contexts. I posit that these alliances are products of social and historical circumstances intersecting with globalization, resulting in asymmetrical class compositions. For instance, in some contexts, populism may represent the interests of segments of the bourgeoisie, middle class, working class, or peasantry, with power dynamics skewed towards particular classes or class relationships. The asymmetry arises because the driving force within these populist alliances can stem from a specific class or a complex interplay between different classes, where power and influence are not distributed equitably.
In Indonesian populism, there exists an alliance among the classes I mentioned, predominantly comprising individuals from the middle and lower middle classes. These are people with aspirations for upward social mobility yet find themselves hindered by the structures shaped by neoliberal globalization, resulting in widespread social inequalities evident in major economies globally. However, in some instances, such as in America, populist movements receive backing from sections of big business. Nevertheless, the primary social agents driving these movements are often from the lower middle class, whose socio-economic aspirations remain unfulfilled amidst processes of social and economic development. Similarly, aspirations of the lower classes are impeded, albeit with less organization and access to socio-economic and political resources compared to the educated middle classes.
Returning to Indonesia, and focusing directly on the concept of Islamic populism, it presents a distinct form of populism where the notion of “the people” is replaced by the idea of the Ummah, the community of believers. Despite globalization, this concept becomes increasingly nationally defined, as the struggles of the Ummah are framed within national borders. The social agents of Islamic populism in Indonesia typically represent the lower middle classes, whose social mobility has been impeded despite education and efforts at advancement. These individuals articulate their grievances through the lens of social justice, drawing upon Islamic cultural resources rather than liberal or leftist ideologies.
The distinction between Indonesian and Turkish Islamic populism lies in their class dynamics. Indonesian Islamic populism primarily emerges from the middle class, unable to establish alliances with segments of the big bourgeoisie. In contrast, Turkish Islamic populism has been fueled by the Anatolian bourgeoisie—a group of businesses from the provinces challenging the traditional Kemalist elite. This alliance offers resources to uplift the poor, including urban populations, by leveraging the organizational capacity of the middle class and financial backing to implement social welfare initiatives.
Whereas in Indonesia, the challenge arises from the fact that the big bourgeoisie is predominantly ethnically Chinese and not considered part of the Ummah. Consequently, the formation of alliances akin to those in Turkey is considerably restricted. This limitation significantly hampers the ability of the social agents of Islamic populism, primarily concentrated in the urban lower middle class, to uplift the lower classes through initiatives such as social welfare and education. These constraints underscore the broader issue of responses to social inequality and competition stemming from neoliberal globalization in Asia.
Populisms vary in manifestation and expression due to socio-historical disparities and the availability of cultural resources. For instance, in Muslim-majority countries, particularly where the left is either absent or weak, Islam often serves as the framework for political discourse, allowing ideas about social justice to be articulated within an Islamic context. Conversely, in countries like Brazil where Islam does not play a significant role in shaping political discourse, alternative cultural resources are sought to frame a language that can foster the cross-class alliances previously mentioned.
Islamist Populists in Indonesia Are Not Entirely Anti-Democratic
What are the key characteristics of Islamist populist movements in Indonesia since the 1960s, and how have they interacted with democracy in the post-Suharto era? Can you provide a historical overview of the relationship between populism and Islamism in Indonesia, and explain their impact on governance, societal dynamics, political mobilization, policymaking, social cohesion, and identity politics?
Vedi Hadiz: I draw a distinction between what I term as older forms of Islamic populism and newer forms of Islamic populism. The former tends to be rooted in the petty bourgeoisie, traditional traders and small landowners. In contrast, modern Islamic populism is centered around the urban lower middle class and the educated middle class, whose aspirations have been thwarted despite promises of modernity. Unlike the 1960s, Islamic populism in Asia is no longer primarily fueled by these traditional traders and small landowners, but rather by a new segment of society emerging from the modernization process—the urban middle and lower middle classes. Consequently, their aspirations and motivations differ as well.
In older forms of Islamic populism, there typically exists a suspicion of capitalism, rooted in its association with foreign dominance through colonialism and imperialism. However, in newer forms, attitudes toward capitalism can vary. On one hand, there may be strong anti-foreign sentiments, particularly in Indonesia, where anti-Chinese sentiments arise due to the perception of ethnic Chinese control over big business. On the other hand, there’s an acknowledgment that capitalism can offer avenues for upward social mobility, leading to a willingness to compromise with it. This perspective is influenced by examples such as Turkey, where capitalism facilitated upward mobility and access to state power for social agents previously marginalized under Kemalist rule. In Indonesia, however, such outcomes have been limited, if not entirely absent, highlighting a key distinction between old and new Islamic populism.
In Indonesia, the relationship between this new Islamic populism and democracy is also a bit complex. On one hand, some social agents argue that democracy is incompatible with Islam due to the concept of a Caliphate. However, others recognize that, alongside opportunities within the market, democracy offers avenues for upward social mobility and access to state power. Consequently, there are Islamic populists who establish political parties and engage in democratic competition. They are not entirely anti-democratic; in fact, they show sympathy towards democratic mechanisms, acknowledging instances where democracy has facilitated upward social mobility and enabled control over certain aspects of the state.
Islamic Populists in Indonesia Lack Material Resources to Secure Votes of Poor
Former Minister of Defense and winner of the February 14, 2024, Presidential election, Prabowo Subianto, pictured at the 77th-anniversary celebration of the Indonesian Air Force in Jakarta on April 9, 2023. Photo: Donny Hery.
How do you assess the role of populist rhetoric and strategies in the recent Indonesian elections, particularly regarding Prabowo Subianto’s victory? What factors contributed to his success, and how significant was the influence of populism in shaping voter preferences?
Vedi Hadiz: This case is intriguing because in the previous elections of 2014 and 2019, there was significant mobilization of popular sentiment from both nationalist and Islamist factions. However, in the 2024 election, the rhetoric was notably restrained. This shift occurred partly because Prabowo, the candidate, abandoned his previous allies within the Islamic populist community in favor of aligning with status nationalists who wield control over the state bureaucracy. This strategic move stemmed from the Islamic populists’ inability to provide Prabowo with the necessary material resources to secure the votes of the poor.
Consequently, there was a concerted effort to distribute social aid such as food and rice to the poor, orchestrated by the state machinery, to portray Prabowo as a nationalist populist. Notably, Anies Baswedan, a former ally of the Islamists, failed to mount an effective Islamic populist challenge against this state bureaucratic-led mobilization effort. Such activation would have necessitated alliances with specific state social agents, including the military and local government, which were mobilized in favor of Prabowo. This highlights the limited influence of Islamic populism in Indonesia compared to Turkey, where its upward and downward connections are stronger.
In Indonesia, Islamic populism requires alliances with particular state social agents to be effective. However, in this instance, those alliances were directed away from Islamic populists toward a more nationalist-oriented form of populism exploited by the winning candidate, General Prabowo.
What implications does Prabowo Subianto’s recent electoral victory have for democracy in Indonesia? Are there concerns regarding the consolidation of populist leadership and its impact on democratic institutions and processes, and how might this victory influence societal divisions, governance structures, and the overall political landscape in the country?
Vedi Hadiz: Indonesia is often hailed as a successful example of democratic transformation, and in many ways that reputation is well deserved. However, it’s crucial to recognize that Indonesia’s democracy has long been plagued by corruption and significant flaws. The rights of minorities and vulnerable groups have been consistently limited. Additionally, Indonesia remains under the control of what I’ve termed an oligarchy—a coalition between the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy and the upper echelons of bourgeoisie. This oligarchy was established during the authoritarian era under Suharto, and despite democratization efforts since 1998, it has persisted and entrenched itself within Indonesia’s democratic and governance institutions. Today, this oligarchy holds sway over virtually all major political parties and dominates key state institutions, mass organizations and so on. Thus, Indonesian democracy has always been characterized by oligarchic domination.
The current concern with Prabowo’s election lies in his deep ties to the oligarchy. As the former son-in-law of Suharto, the former dictator, he epitomizes the entrenched habits of the oligarchy that democratic reforms aimed to mitigate. This includes a history of human rights violations and his family’s (his brother) involvement in questionable economic activities, with outstanding debts to the state due to these connections. Moreover, Prabowo has shown scant regard for democratic processes, principles and human rights. While Indonesian democracy has long grappled with its oligarchic nature, the Prabowo’s election adds a new level of danger.
Indonesian Democrats Should Worry Whether Substantive Democracy Will Endure
The New York Times ran a story right after the elections claiming that ‘Prabowo Subianto’ victory has cast doubts on the future of one of the world’s most vibrant democracies.’ And added that: ‘The era of liberty that followed the ouster of Suharto, critics say, could now be under threat with Mr. Prabowo’s ascent to power.’ Let me ask you bluntly is the biggest Muslim democracy and the third largest democracy in the world in danger?
Vedi Hadiz: The reality is that many rights have regressed over the past decade, signaling a troubling trend. What Prabowo’s rise to power signifies, in my opinion, is an acceleration of this regression—a further erosion of rights and a deepening crisis for Indonesian democracy. It’s reasonable for supporters of democracy in Indonesia to worry whether substantive democracy will endure beyond the mere act of holding elections.
With Subianto in power with nationalist populism and Islamism, are we going to witness a replay of Narendra Modi in India or Donald Trump in US meaning the era of liberal democracy has ended?
Vedi Hadiz: First and foremost, it’s essential not to romanticize Indonesia’s recent past in terms of liberal democracy, as there have never been strong liberal democratic or social democratic parties. The major political forces in Indonesia have typically been nationalist or Islamic nationalist in nature. Thus, Indonesia has never experienced a liberalized democracy that could be dismantled. Instead, what Prabowo’s potential ascension represents is a significant setback. It threatens to extinguish the impulses within Indonesian society that have historically sought to counter the illiberal tendencies of the oligarchy and advocate for the expansion of rights across society despite oligarchic dominance.
Ultimately, Prabowo’s rise would likely signify the oligarchy’s near-total control over Indonesian democracy. This would stifle challenges aimed at securing and broadening rights, achieving greater social equality, and expanding access to power and economic resources.
Preemptive Adoption of Islamic Rhetoric Contributes to Illiberalism in Indonesia
DKI Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan with residents of Kampung Akuarium in Jakarta, Indonesia on April 14 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
In your article ‘No Turkish delight: the impasse of Islamic party politics in Indonesia,’ you compare the cases of AKP (The Justice and Development Party) and PKS (The Prosperous Justice Party – Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). Where did PKS fail to achieve where AKP in Turkey succeeded? What results does this comparison between AKP and PKS yield in terms of populisms the respective parties employed?
Vedi Hadiz: It’s evident in Turkish elections that the AKP consistently emerges victorious, while the PKS tends to suffer defeats, including in its support for presidential candidates. This underscores what I mentioned earlier: Islamic populism in Indonesia, although present, has not developed to the extent seen in Turkey. Consequently, it relies on alliances and compromises to exert influence, yet remains largely outside the core of power. However, this doesn’t mean it lacks influence altogether. On the contrary, forces outside Islamic networks often adopt Islamic rhetoric preemptively, as seen in recent legislation incorporating moralistic concerns advocated by Islamists regarding sexual relations.
This preemptive adoption of Islamic rhetoric serves to preempt Islamist forces from using such issues to attack those in power. Yet, despite their electoral losses, the mainstreaming of their ideas contributes to the illiberalism of Indonesian democracy. This is because many of these ideas lean towards the illiberal end of the spectrum, further shaping the political landscape even in their absence from power.
Alright. And the lastly, Professor, how does the phenomenon of Islamist populism in Indonesia compare and contrast with similar movements in other Muslim-majority countries, and what insights can be drawn from these comparative analyses? What are the similarities and differences especially between Islamist populism in Indonesia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region?
Vedi Hadiz: These phenomena have a long historical trajectory, traceable back to at least the early 20th century. However, in the past, they were dominated by older forms of populism, which have since evolved into more modern iterations. This trend is evident in the MENA region as well. For instance, in Egypt, supporters of the now-defunct Muslim Brotherhood included professionals such as doctors, engineers, and lawyers, marking a departure from the provincial figures of the 1950s. Similarly, in Turkey, Islamic populism encompasses a diverse range of individuals. While the social transformations brought about by capitalist development and globalization have impacted the MENA region in a similar manner, the specific histories and interactions with neoliberal globalization have resulted in distinct manifestations in each country.
In Turkey, Islamic populism has largely dominated both the state and a significant portion of civil society. In contrast, in Egypt, Islamic populism once held sway over civil society but failed to extend its influence on the state. In Indonesia, Islamic populism has thus far been unable to exert dominance over either the state or civil society.