Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa, Assistant Professor in Politics and Public Policy at Cambridge University.

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: A Democratic Revival Is Always Possible

Despite recognizing the difficulties brought by growing authoritarianism, Dr. Roberto S. Foa of Cambridge University maintains a measured optimism regarding the prospects for democratic renewal. He highlights historical patterns of democratization and shifts in public opinion—such as those triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Trump presidency—as indications that democratic principles can regain strength in response to perceived threats. However, he cautions against generalized solutions, stressing that each democracy grapples with distinct institutional and political hurdles that demand context-specific strategies for revitalization.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The resilience of democracy in the face of mounting global challenges has become one of the most pressing questions of our time. As populist leaders continue to gain traction, democratic norms erode, and authoritarian tendencies rise, many scholars and policymakers are left wondering whether these trends signal a long-term shift or a temporary setback in the cyclical evolution of governance. Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa, Assistant Professor in Politics and Public Policy at Cambridge University, has dedicated his research to understanding the dynamics of democratic deconsolidation and the conditions necessary for democratic renewal.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Foa provides a nuanced perspective on whether the recent wave of democratic backsliding—evident in both Western and emerging democracies—represents an irreversible decline or a phase within a broader historical pattern. He highlights the importance of distinguishing between informal and formal democratic norms, explaining how social media, populist rhetoric, and political polarization have eroded basic principles of civility and accountability. However, he also underscores the resilience of institutions, particularly in Western Europe, where robust political frameworks have mitigated some of the more extreme consequences of democratic decline.

A key theme in this conversation is the role of economic hardship and cultural grievances in shaping voter behavior, particularly among younger generations. Dr. Foa explores how disillusionment with mainstream politics can lead to either political apathy or support for more radical alternatives, including both left-wing and right-wing populist movements. At the same time, he argues that traditional political parties must adapt to these shifting dynamics by engaging in meaningful reform, rather than relying on outdated strategies to counteract the appeal of extremist factions.

While acknowledging the challenges posed by rising authoritarianism, Dr. Foa remains cautiously optimistic about the potential for democratic revival. He points to historical cycles of democratization, as well as recent public opinion shifts following events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Trump presidency, as evidence that democratic values can reassert themselves in reaction to perceived threats. Ultimately, he warns against simplistic, one-size-fits-all solutions, emphasizing that each democracy faces unique structural and political challenges that require tailored approaches to renewal.

This interview provides a thought-provoking analysis of the current state of democracy and the pathways available for its restoration. It is an essential read for scholars, policymakers, and citizens alike who seek to understand the evolving nature of political power in the 21st century.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa with some edits.

From Democratic Apathy to Democratic Antipathy Among Youths

A group of multicultural, peaceful activists sit outside, holding hands and displaying posters in a demonstration against climate change. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Foa, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your research on democratic deconsolidation, you highlight a decline in public support for democracy in developed nations. Do you see this trend accelerating with the second Trump presidency and with the recent surge of far-right parties in Europe?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: No, not necessarily. I think, in some ways, what we’ve seen since Trump took office in January is that there has actually been a reaction in some countries, and that’s been quite clear. If you look, for example, at the polling of Poirier in Canada. Since then, if you look at the situation here in the UK, regarding Farage’s Reform Party and public support for them, I think you’ve actually seen, to some extent, an inoculating effect.

But whether that continues really depends a lot on the example that the Trump presidency sets—whether it gets mired in deeper and deeper difficulties on the economic side, in pushing forward its domestic reform agenda, in conflicts with the courts or the bureaucracy in Washington, D.C., and in its difficulties to date in delivering on Trump’s promises of peace in the Middle East and in Ukraine. So, I think that’s still very much to be seen.

How do you explain the paradox where younger generations in some countries lean toward populist movements while in others they disengage from politics altogether?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I don’t think there’s a paradox at all. In fact, I would describe it as a two-step process. In the first phase, in some countries, younger generations become disconnected or disillusioned with mainstream politics. This manifests in lower membership in traditional political parties, reduced electoral turnout, and declining interest in politics—what could be termed democratic apathy.

If this disengagement deepens, it can escalate into what might be called democratic antipathy. In such cases, younger generations—particularly young men in the United States and many parts of Continental Europe—become more inclined to support extremist parties, including populist movements on both the left and the right.

The Erosion of Informal Norms and the Failure of Traditional Parties

Given your research on public opinion and authoritarian resilience, how do you assess the impact of far-right leaders on democratic norms and political polarization in Europe and the US​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Well, I think these are very different contexts. However, there is one common factor between Europe and the US in how democratic norms have shifted, and that is primarily on the informal side. When populist movements, whether from the left or the right, gain prominence, we often see challenges to basic norms—civility in debate, truthfulness in politics, and accountability for mistakes in political life. These informal norms have eroded in many countries.

In terms of more formal threats to democracy—such as respect for free and fair elections, acceptance of electoral outcomes, intimidation, declining electoral integrity, or the politicization of the judiciary, courts, and civil service—we see these issues more prominently in the US than in Europe, particularly Western Europe. There are specific reasons for this. The political institutions in many parts of Western Europe tend to be more robust, making them more resistant to such erosion.

Does the rise of populist leaders across Western Europe and North America signal a failure of traditional political parties in responding to economic and cultural grievances?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think it signifies a failure of traditional political parties in responding to voter demands and concerns. That is almost true by definition—whenever new political parties break through, whether they are populist or not, whether they are right-wing, left-wing, or centrist, it clearly signals some failure in the existing party system to deliver what voters are demanding.

Now, whether that is a result of economic and cultural grievances, I think there are many different factors at play. Clearly, in some countries and among certain constituencies, there have been unaddressed economic grievances. Similarly, there have been unaddressed cultural grievances, particularly in Europe regarding immigration. However, I do not think there is a generalized thesis that applies across all countries regarding the specific types of grievances at play.

The Erosion of Accountability in the Age of Social Media

 

How significant is the role of social media and digital platforms in fueling democratic deconsolidation, and are these platforms more influential than traditional media​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Okay, I’ll take that one at a time. Yes, I think the rise of social media has had a significant effect, but I would say that its impact is largely limited to the informal norms of democratic life and competition.

It used to be the case that strong media gatekeepers held politicians accountable. If a politician was caught in a corruption scandal or, like Trump, taken to court and found guilty of an offense, there was no way around it. The only option was to acknowledge the fault, take responsibility, resign if necessary, and move on.

In the social media environment we live in now, however, that is no longer the optimal strategy. Trump’s approach to politics is a great example of this. It has become much more effective to double down, continue denying accusations, and keep shifting the conversation from one topic to another—something Trump is particularly skilled at doing on social media. And, of course, Trump is not the only example. Many populist politicians have adopted similar strategies on social media, which has eroded some informal democratic norms, particularly around truthfulness, civility, and responsibility in public life.

However, I do not believe social media is to blame for democratic deconsolidation in terms of the erosion of formal institutions. When we see threats to judicial independence or harassment of civil society activists, I do not attribute that to social media. That is a separate issue and something that does not occur in every country.

A Cycle of Democratic Erosion with No Clear Limits

Your research on America’s shift from “clean” to “dirty” democracy suggests a weakening of democratic norms​. How would a second Trump term impact democratic institutions in the US and beyond?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think in the US, it’s clear—we are already seeing these trends unfold. As you referenced, my article was about understanding these developments as part of a longer-term process. The United States has been on this trajectory for more than a generation, where both Republicans and, in some cases, Democrats have attempted to change the rules of the game to gain partisan advantage. This includes the breakdown of bipartisan consensus over the political neutrality of Supreme Court appointments and the excessive politicization of the judiciary and civil service.

This shift has contributed to increased polarization, which in turn fuels the next cycle of democratic erosion. If you look at the current Trump presidency, it is evident that there are virtually no limits to what Trump is prepared to do. His administration has been planning for quite some time—through initiatives like Project 2025—to implement sweeping changes. This includes placing pressure on senior civil servants and, in many cases, firing those who are perceived as bureaucratic obstacles within the federal government. Many of these individuals were seen as sources of resistance during Trump’s first term when they attempted to uphold institutional norms.

This process is clearly already in motion, and it will undoubtedly continue at least until the midterms. Even if Republicans do not win the midterms, Trump will still control the executive branch, meaning these trends will likely persist beyond that point.

Outside the US, I do not see this process occurring in exactly the same way. Every country has its own unique political dynamics. For example, in Israel, there have been intense debates over attempts to curtail judicial independence. While democratic backsliding is a concern in multiple contexts, the US remains the primary focus and the number one concern right now.

Europe May Step Up as the US Steps Back

EU flags in EU Council building during the EU Summit in Brussels, Belgium on June 28, 2018. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How will second Trump presidency affect international organizations like NATO, the EU, and the UN, which traditionally promote democratic norms?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I actually don’t think the effect will be as large as people currently believe or fear it may be. The major impact will be on the United States’ direct influence, which is quite clear—for example, eliminating USAID, canceling democracy promotion programs, and withdrawing US support for liberal internationalism.

However, I don’t believe that an organization like the European Union will be negatively affected in its own capacity to promote democracy. If anything, the opposite is more likely—there will probably be an increase in European solidarity and a greater effort by the EU to take on some of the programs that the US discards. We can already see this in direct support for Ukraine, provided both by European countries and the United Kingdom, including military aid. If US support declines, European countries may be required to increase their contributions in the coming year to compensate.

On the international level, I don’t think Trump’s presidency will have as significant an influence as some fear. The United Nations, however, is a different case. If the Trump administration truly follows through on pulling US funding for the UN, that would present a major problem, given that the US is one of its largest financial contributors. This could create a substantial funding gap. However, what we have seen so far is a trend where other Western democracies step up to fill the void.

Far-Right Unity Is More Myth Than Reality

Given Trump’s anti-globalist stance, what impact do you expect on global democratic solidarity movements or efforts to counter authoritarianism?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think that will vary depending on the region. Within Europe, where democratic values are already well embedded and the public strongly supports international democratic solidarity, I see less of a threat. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, in Europe, the reaction has largely been to step up and fill the gaps left by the US.

However, in emerging democracies, the situation is quite different. The United States has historically provided significant bilateral support to civil society movements and political actors working to protect and advance democratic norms in many parts of the Global South. In these regions, the withdrawal of US support poses a much greater threat to democratic consolidation and resilience.

But we see a broader alignment between right-wing populist leaders globally, where Trump serves as a rallying figure for European far-right movements?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: No, no. I think this is something that is frequently misunderstood. When conducting comparative analysis across countries or examining international relations, terms like “populism” and “far-right” need to be unpacked, as they encompass a wide range of movements with differing interests that do not always align—nor do they necessarily align with Donald Trump’s agenda in the United States.

For example, within Europe, since Trump’s election, we see leaders like Giorgia Meloni in Italy largely adhering to the European line. This was already the case under Biden, particularly regarding her policy on Ukraine. Even though she personally has connections with figures like Elon Musk and Trump, she has had to navigate Italy’s commitments carefully, including apologizing for the country’s potential withdrawal from certain international agreements.

So, I would not assume there is an automatic far-right international unity. These movements are often driven more by national interests and political differences within their respective countries, making them quite disparate.

Economic Struggles Are Reshaping Youth Political Behavior

Prices of fruit and vegetables in stores: A woman holds euro banknotes against the backdrop of a vegetable stand at a local market. Photo: Andrzej Rostek.

In your study on youth and populism, you argue that economic hardship fuels support for radical movements​. Given the cost-of-living crisis in Europe, do you anticipate a further shift of young voters toward far-right parties?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think there could be a further shift. It may not necessarily be driven solely by the cost-of-living crisis, but economic factors certainly play a role. For younger generations right now, there is already evidence of economic struggles, particularly in the job market.

With automation and the replacement of jobs through AI, we are already seeing—and will continue to see—these challenges affecting younger generations as they try to establish themselves, pay off debts, secure employment, find housing, and move forward in life.

It is very clear that in countries where these challenges have been acute for a long period—such as France, Greece, and Italy—disillusionment among younger generations began much earlier, 20 to 30 years ago. I would anticipate that similar trends will continue in the US and the UK, where, until now, economic conditions for younger generations had not been seen as quite so dire.

How does the rise of nationalist-populist parties in Europe (e.g., AfD in Germany, Rassemblement National in France) affect the future of the EU and democratic cooperation​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Again, I would say it really depends on the party. When looking at far-right parties, I always distinguish between different factions. You have the ultra-conservative far right, which in the European Parliament is represented by the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) faction. This includes parties like the Conservative Party in the UK and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. These parties are actually quite pro-Western in their outlook, certainly very Atlanticist in their foreign policy platform. Their fundamental beliefs and views are a continuation of Cold War-era conservatism, structured around social conservatism, tradition, and national sovereignty. Ultimately, they may pose less of a threat to Western solidarity.

The far-right faction I see as most damaging is what I would call the mercantilist populist right. Trump is a prime example of this, as is Orbán in Hungary, and Erdogan in Turkey has increasingly adopted this approach in his international engagements. These leaders view the world through a purely mercantilist lens, focusing on national self-interest and short-term leverage—whether in trade, aid, or diplomatic concessions. As a result, they are quite willing to undermine EU solidarity, Western alliances, or NATO commitments for immediate political or economic gains. This is something we frequently see with Orbán, who consistently seeks to extract concessions at EU summits.

That said, I would not categorize either Rassemblement National (RN) in France or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany within this mercantilist populist category.

Centrist Politicians Can Learn from Populist Challengers

In your view, what strategies should centrist parties adopt to counteract the far-right’s rise, particularly in countries with increasing voter disillusionment?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: It really depends on the country. In cases where there are proportional representation systems and coalition politics, the far right can sometimes be defused by including them as a minor party within a coalition. I know that this is a controversial stance, as many people support the idea of a cordon sanitaire and believe that far-right parties should never be given even a single ministry in government. However, this approach has been used in Denmark and Austria over time, and in some cases, the experience of governing has actually weakened these parties. A taste of power often delegitimizes them—holding office makes them accountable for scandals, forces them to take responsibility for government actions, and compels them to moderate their positions to remain in the coalition. As a result, they must justify more centrist policies to their voters.

However, this strategy only works in political systems with proportional representation and coalition politics. It is a different situation in presidential systems like the United States or France, or majoritarian systems like the UK,where a far-right party could potentially gain majority power with only a minority of the vote. In these cases, centrist parties must focus on winning elections outright rather than attempting to contain the far right within coalitions.

Looking at successful cases, Macron in France provides an interesting example. He understood the collapse in support for the Socialist Party and recognized that he could position himself as an anti-establishment challenger from the center. By creating a new party and engaging in what was not quite a populist style but certainly a highly personalist political approach, he successfully revived the center and has remained in power for two terms so far. This suggests that centrist politicians can learn from populist challengers, particularly in terms of adopting new styles of political engagement.

No Permanent Shift Toward Illiberalism

Does the rise of authoritarianism in countries like Hungary and other Central European countries indicate a long-term shift, or do you see the possibility of democratic revival​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Yes, there is always the possibility of a democratic revival. When discussing democratic backsliding, especially in a global context, there is often a pessimistic view that this decline started around 2005 or 2006—depending on the measure used, such as Freedom House rankings—and has only worsened over time. However, these processes tend to be cyclical. I have long believed that another democratic wave or a restoration of belief in liberal democratic values is possible at some point.

In fact, we have already seen some evidence of this. Earlier in our conversation, we discussed the Trump effect—how witnessing democratic erosion in the United States has led citizens in other countries to reconsider similar political trajectories. Similarly, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, public opinion data showed what could be described as a rally for democracy effect. Across Western countries, there was an increase in support for NATO, Western solidarity, and even liberal democracy—not a dramatic shift, but a noticeable one, particularly on the left. So, I absolutely believe that democratic revival remains a possibility.

Are we witnessing a permanent shift toward illiberal governance, or do you see democracy rebounding in the long run?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I certainly don’t think there is ever a permanent shift in politics. Politics is not kind to those who predict permanent shifts of any kind. I do believe there is a cyclical nature to these trends. Democratization has historically occurred in waves, and we could see another wave at some point—that is always a possibility. Perhaps that is even the lesson of history in some broader sense. So no, I absolutely do not see any kind of permanent shift toward illiberalism. There is always a contest.

No One-Size-Fits-All Solution to Strengthening Democracy

And lastly, Professor Foa, if you could advise policymakers on one crucial reform to strengthen democracy, what would it be?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: You know, Tolstoy famously said that “all happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” I think the same is true for democracies. Stable democracies—like Iceland, Switzerland, or Norway—tend to share similar characteristics. However, failing democracies each have their own unique problems.

These challenges vary: in some cases, the most urgent need might be electoral reform; in others, it could be campaign finance reform—particularly in the United States, where the to-do list is quite long. In some situations, strengthening the independence of the judiciary and civil service or ending clientelism is crucial. So, while every democracy has its own set of necessary reforms, I wouldn’t say there is a one-size-fits-all solution.

 

Hanson

Professor Hanson: Trump’s Patrimonial Rule Treats the State as Personal Property and Undermining Impartial Governance

In a thought-provoking interview with the ECPS, Professor Stephen E. Hanson unpacks how US President Donald Trump exemplifies a growing global trend of patrimonial rule. Professor Hanson argues that Trump governs as if the state was his personal property—distributing power to loyalists, undermining impartial governance, and attacking state institutions. Drawing comparisons to Russia, Hungary, and Brazil, he warns of long-term damage to democratic institutions. Professor Hanson stresses the need for renewed public trust in government and a collective effort to counteract the erosion of modern governance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University, offers a compelling analysis of the erosion of modern governance under US President Donald Trump. Drawing on his co-authored works The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, Professor Hanson argues that Trump’s presidency exemplifies a broader 21st-century resurgence of patrimonial rule—a system in which leaders govern as if the state were their personal property.

Professor Hanson underscores that “the key features [of Trump’s governance] are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.” This, he argues, is a defining characteristic of patrimonialism, a governance style that many assumed had been relegated to history but is now re-emerging in modern democracies.

Through the course of the interview, Professor Hanson details how Trump’s administration actively worked to dismantle bureaucratic institutions, a trend he links to similar developments in Russia, Hungary, Turkey and Brazil. He explains that Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results—mirroring tactics used by patrimonial rulers—posed unprecedented risks to American democracy, undermining public trust in institutions like the electoral system and the judiciary.

Professor Hanson also addresses the long-term consequences of Trump’s governance, particularly in how it has fueled distrust in expertise and weakened state capacity. He describes how, under Trump, public service was increasingly devalued, discouraging young professionals from pursuing government careers. “At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized,” he warns, emphasizing that rebuilding state institutions will be a daunting, long-term challenge.

Yet, Professor Hanson remains hopeful, advocating for a reassertion of the state as a force for public good. He stresses the need for new strategies to counteract patrimonialism, urging scholars, policymakers, and civil society to shift the discourse toward defending democratic governance. His insights offer a sobering but essential perspective on the ongoing assault on the modern state—and what can be done to reverse it.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Stephen E. Hanson with some edits.

Photo: Shutterstock.

ECPS Panel — Discussing Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge

Date/Time: Thursday, March 13, 2025 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)

 

Click here to register!

 

Moderator

Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).

Speakers

“How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?” by Dr. Eric Langenbacher (Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government, Georgetown University).

“How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” by Dr. Kai Arzheimer (Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz).

“Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” by Dr. Hannah M. Alarian (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida).

The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications, by Dr. Conrad Ziller (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen).

“Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells,” by Dr. Sabine Volk (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau).

Click here to register!

 

Brief Biographies and Abstracts/Outlines

Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens. He is a former director at the United Nations specializing in asylum policies. He is known to be one of the leading advocates of Turkey’s integration into the EU. He was the Chair of European Studies at Bahçeşehir University-Istanbul. In addition to EU integration policies, Dr. Aktar’s research focuses on the politics of memory regarding ethnic and religious minorities, the history of political centralism, and international refugee law.

How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?

Dr. Eric Langenbacher is a Teaching Professor and Director of Honors and Special Programs in the Department of Government, Georgetown University. His research interests center on political culture, collective memory, political institutions, public opinion and German and European politics. His publications include From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the Twentieth Anniversary of Unification (co-edited with Jeffrey J. Anderson, 2010), Dynamics of Memory and Identity in Contemporary Europe (co-edited with Ruth Wittlinger and Bill Niven, 2013), The German Polity, 10th, and 11th, 12th edition” (2013, 2017, 2021) (co-authored with David Conradt), The Merkel Republic: The 2013 Bundestag Election and its Consequences (2015), and Twilight of the Merkel Era: Power and Politics in Germany after the 2017 Bundestag Election (2019). He is also Managing Editor of German Politics and Society, which is housed in Georgetown’s BMW Center for German and European Studies.

How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?

Dr. Kai Arzheimer is a Professor of German Politics and Political Sociology at the University of Mainz in Germany. He is particularly interested in European far right parties and their voters.

Abstract: Within just three years, Germany’s Far Right “Alternative for Germany” has managed to double the 2021 result, making them the second largest party in the new parliament. During this period, the party has undergone a bewildering transformation that involved (further) radicalization on the one hand and normalization on the other. In my presentation, I trace this process and will also use (very preliminary) survey data to look into the micro-foundations of the AfD’s meteoric rise.

Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election

Dr. Hannah Alarian is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, where she is also a faculty affiliate with the Center for Arts, Migration, and Entrepreneurship and the Center for European Studies. Dr. Alarian’s research examines questions of immigration, citizenship, and far-right politics in Europe and the United States. Her research appears in the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, and Comparative Political Studies, among others.

Abstract: The 2025 German Federal Election marked a seismic political shift. Voter turnout soared to its highest since reunification, the far-right AfD secured 20.8%, becoming the second-largest party in the Bundestag, and the FDP lost all parliamentary representation for only the second time in history. How did Germany reach this moment of far-right ascendence, and what lies ahead? This presentation addresses these pressing questions, examining the democratic challenges posed by AfD. In particular, I examine the expected driver of far-right support (i.e., immigration) and party strategies regarding accommodation or exclusion of the AfD in parliament (i.e., breaching the Brandmauer). I conclude by discussing the democratic challenges facing the next German government and strategies the coalition may employ to stave off further far-right mobilization.

The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications

Dr. Conrad Ziller is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Duisburg-Essen. His research interests focus on the role of immigration in politics and society, the radical right, and policy effects on citizens, amongst others. More information can be found here: https://conradziller.com/

Outlines: In the 2025 German federal election, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) achieved a historic 20.8% of the vote, doubling its previous performance and marking its strongest postwar result. This surge was particularly pronounced in economically disadvantaged regions, especially in the former East Germany, where the AfD secured up to 46% of votes in certain districts. Notably, the party made significant inroads in traditional Social Democratic Party (SPD) strongholds, such as Gelsenkirchen in North Rhine-Westphalia, a constituency long dominated by the SPD. Additionally, the AfD has gained popularity among young men and even attracted votes from immigrant communities, indicating a substantial realignment of voter bases. The implications for German politics over the next four years are profound. With a stronger parliamentary presence, the AfD’s will continue to challenge the traditional party system and influence debates on immigration, economic reform, and Germany’s role in the European Union. While mainstream parties have ruled out coalitions with the AfD, their electoral losses highlight growing societal divisions. Addressing the economic and cultural divisions fueling the AfD’s rise will be crucial for maintaining political stability and democratic cohesion.

Germany’s Far Right: Antifeminism Sells

Dr. Sabine Volk is a postdoctoral researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau. She is affiliated with the Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarisation, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki. Her research appears in European Societies, European Politics and Society, Frontiers in Political Science, German PoliticsPolitical Research Exchange and Social Movement Studies, as well as in edited volumes. Her research interests include populism and the far right, party politics and social movements in Germany and Europe. 

Abstract: The issue of immigration surely dominated the German federal election campaign. Mainstream parties adopted an increasingly harsh anti-immigration discourse under the impression of AfD’s increasing strength in the polls. This presentation shifts our attention to yet another important issue of far-right politics in Germany and beyond: antifeminism or ‘antigenderism’. Addressing the puzzle of AfD’s lesbian leader Alice Weidel, it examines how AfD successfully fashions itself as Germany’s key antifeminist actor. Among other things, it traces AfD’s radicalization in the issue areas of women’s reproductive rights as well as trans and gender diverse minority rights.

Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University.

Professor Hanson: Trump’s Patrimonial Rule Treats the State as Personal Property and Undermining Impartial Governance

In a thought-provoking interview with the ECPS, Professor Stephen E. Hanson unpacks how US President Donald Trump exemplifies a growing global trend of patrimonial rule. Professor Hanson argues that Trump governs as if the state was his personal property—distributing power to loyalists, undermining impartial governance, and attacking state institutions. Drawing comparisons to Russia, Hungary, and Brazil, he warns of long-term damage to democratic institutions. Professor Hanson stresses the need for renewed public trust in government and a collective effort to counteract the erosion of modern governance.

 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University, offers a compelling analysis of the erosion of modern governance under US President Donald Trump. Drawing on his co-authored works The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, Professor Hanson argues that Trump’s presidency exemplifies a broader 21st-century resurgence of patrimonial rule—a system in which leaders govern as if the state were their personal property.

Professor Hanson underscores that “the key features [of Trump’s governance] are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.” This, he argues, is a defining characteristic of patrimonialism, a governance style that many assumed had been relegated to history but is now re-emerging in modern democracies.

Through the course of the interview, Professor Hanson details how Trump’s administration actively worked to dismantle bureaucratic institutions, a trend he links to similar developments in Russia, Hungary, Turkey and Brazil. He explains that Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results—mirroring tactics used by patrimonial rulers—posed unprecedented risks to American democracy, undermining public trust in institutions like the electoral system and the judiciary.

Professor Hanson also addresses the long-term consequences of Trump’s governance, particularly in how it has fueled distrust in expertise and weakened state capacity. He describes how, under Trump, public service was increasingly devalued, discouraging young professionals from pursuing government careers. “At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized,” he warns, emphasizing that rebuilding state institutions will be a daunting, long-term challenge.

Yet, Professor Hanson remains hopeful, advocating for a reassertion of the state as a force for public good. He stresses the need for new strategies to counteract patrimonialism, urging scholars, policymakers, and civil society to shift the discourse toward defending democratic governance. His insights offer a sobering but essential perspective on the ongoing assault on the modern state—and what can be done to reverse it.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Stephen E. Hanson with some edits.

How Trump’s Governance Undermined the Modern State

US President Donald Trump speaks at a White House press briefing after a Black Hawk helicopter collided with American Airlines Flight 5342 near DCA Airport in Washington on January 30, 2025. Photo: Joshua Sukoff.

Professor Hanson, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In “Understanding the Global Patrimonial Wave,” you discuss the resurgence of patrimonial rule. How does Trump’s presidency fit into this framework, and what long-term effects might his style of governance have on American democracy?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Thanks for this question. I want to begin by acknowledging my co-author, Jeffrey Kopstein, who, of course, can’t join us for this interview, but everything we’ve done together is a completely equal collaboration. So I always begin by acknowledging his great work.

We do think, sadly, that our predictions in The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, the book we’ve just published, have unfortunately come true. The Trump administration, in its early weeks, has fulfilled these predictions practically, and we believe that our warning was, unfortunately, quite prescient.

Now, what did we see coming down the road? We argued that this new version of patrimonial rule is really a wave of the entire 21st century and quite unexpected. The old literature on patrimonialism—or neopatrimonialism, as it was often called—assumed it was a relic of traditional society destined to be overthrown by modernity. You might see periods of patrimonial interludes, particularly in the developing world, but nobody had predicted patrimonialism of the 19th-century sort, or even earlier, in countries like the US, Israel, the UK, much of Central and Eastern Europe, and now threatening the world.

So, we’ll discuss more details about the Trump administration in this interview, but the key features are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.

All of this comes directly from Max Weber, and in a way, we are simply applying Weber’s analysis to these unexpected 21st-century cases.

You highlight how strong bureaucratic institutions played a key role in managing the COVID-19 pandemic. How did the Trump administration’s approach to governance impact the US response to the crisis, and do you see lasting damage to state capacity?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: We discuss this extensively in both the book and the article. What we argue is that patrimonial-style politics is fundamentally ill-suited for handling global pandemics. The first casualty of patrimonialism is the public good because governance is not about serving the public—it’s about fulfilling the private will of the ruler.

As a result, we see poor performances in countries governed by patrimonial rulers. If we compare data statistically, countries like Russia under Putin and the US under Trump performed very poorly. Patrimonial states tend to foster both distrust in the government—which discourages people from getting vaccinated or trusting experts—and the arbitrariness of the ruler himself. Trump’s public appearances, for example, where he seemingly endorsed sunlight as a cure for COVID-19 or suggested injecting bleach in front of his expert advisors, contributed to the excess death toll in the US compared to countries like Canada, which handled the crisis much more effectively.

Now, there are instances where patrimonial-style rulers managed certain aspects of the pandemic well. For example, Operation Warp Speed under Trump led to the rapid development of the vaccine, and Netanyahu’s vaccination campaigns in Israel were quite effective. However, we argue that these successes were not the result of patrimonial rule itself but rather the legacy of state-building efforts that predated these leaders. They were able to deploy existing state capacity, experts, and institutions in response to the crisis. But, of course, if the state is eroded too much over time, those resources will no longer be available in the future.

Rethinking Regimes: Why the Democracy-Autocracy Divide Is Not Adequate

Elon Musk speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) at the Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center on February 20, 2025, in Oxon Hill, Maryland. Photo: Andrew Harnik.

Your work discusses the global trend of leaders undermining bureaucratic institutions. How does Trump’s presidency exemplify this, and what challenges does this pose for future administrations attempting to restore trust in expertise?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: The book is called The Assault on the State, and I think one reason it’s now getting some attention is that the title encapsulates what we expected to happen under Trump. Maybe even we were surprised by the extent of the assault on the state. It’s not just an attack on the so-called “deep state” as a rhetorical device—it’s an actual effort to dismantle the entirety of the US federal government. With DOGE, the agency essentially created out of the blue and directed by Elon Musk in all but name, they are now going into every single state agency in the United States. They have very young people, between the ages of 18 and 25, embedded in agencies, looking at files, personnel issues, and money flows.

While there has been some effort lately to cut that back—largely due to the anger of Trump’s Cabinet ministers—it is still in place. The long-term damage to state capacity is incalculable.

So all of this fits within our framework, but in an extreme form. I’ll add one thing that might actually be a bit surprising—and perhaps even, in a strange way, good for those of us who want to restore the state. This is happening so quickly that the damaging effects will become apparent sooner rather than later. If that happens, maybe public opposition can also be mobilized more quickly.

You argue that traditional democracy/autocracy classifications are insufficient. Given Trump’s attempts to subvert democratic norms, where would you place his presidency within your broader conceptual framework?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: One of the arguments in the book that has actually been a little bit controversial—and difficult to convey to people—is that we really don’t think the democracy-autocracy divide is adequate to understand this phenomenon. It’s ingrained in how we think about political regimes; it’s the standard framework used by political scientists, social scientists, and journalists alike.

When we talk about regime types in political science, people assume it’s a scale measured by V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy), Polity, or Freedom House. In each case, there’s a line ranging from positive—representing the most democratic—to negative—representing the most autocratic.

One reason we failed to recognize the rise of patrimonialism earlier is that it doesn’t fit into this framework. A patrimonial-style ruler can win free and fair elections repeatedly. In some cases, they even thrive in electoral competition. Trump is a great example of this, as is Boris Johnson. These leaders leverage populist tropes, portray machismo, and rail against the so-called “deep state” bureaucracy or, in the case of Europe, anti-EU politicians in Brussels. This rhetoric has a strong popular appeal, allowing them to win elections handily.

When they do, it becomes difficult to argue that they are anti-democratic, given that they just won an election. So, we argue that the axis needs to change. Our analysis must shift to a second dimension: impersonal versus personalized state governance. This concept is rooted in Weberian sociology.

If this is an independent axis, it implies that there are four regime types, not just two. You can have bureaucratically rational democracies—Denmark or Canada come to mind. You can also have personalized democracies, which are patrimonial—this is the US under Trump. Similarly, you can have personalized autocracies, which are quite common, and bureaucratic autocracies, like Singapore or the 19th-century Prussian Rechtsstaat model.

If this two-by-two framework holds, then we need to recognize that patrimonialism can exist within democratic systems without immediately eroding their democratic nature. In cases like the Philippines, voters essentially choose which patrimonial clan will rule—whether it’s Duterte’s or the Marcos family’s—but the patrimonial style remains constant. These hybrid forms of governance challenge our traditional political science classifications, requiring us to rethink how we analyze regime types.

The Legacy of Trump’s Election Denial

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results mirrors tactics used by patrimonial rulers. How does this compare to other historical or global cases, and what risks does it pose for future US elections?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Well, connecting to what we just talked about, the January 6th events and Trump’s unwillingness to admit defeat are somewhat unusual in these cases. The reason for that is that, typically, you either have a clear-cut electoral victory—like Orbán in Hungary, where he wins elections that propel him to absolute power, securing a parliamentary supermajority that allows him to amend the constitution over time—or you have leaders who reluctantly step aside without outright denying their defeat. In Orbán’s case, the space for democratic competition clearly erodes, but it happens through legal mechanisms. He doesn’t need to claim the election was fake because, in fact, he won.

There may be some elements of this with Boris Johnson’s departure, where he was reluctant to step down and continued to complain that his downfall was somehow orchestrated by others. However, he never actually claimed he deserved to be the permanent ruler, and, of course, he exited through parliamentary means rather than an election dispute.

In this respect, Trump’s insistence that he never lost the election, that it was all rigged, and that the so-called “deep state” blocked his victory is somewhat unusual in the annals of these regime types. However, it has played a significant role in further undermining trust in US state institutions—particularly in voting systems, ballot counting, and electronic voting machines.

This poses a serious issue going forward. While, as I mentioned earlier, you can have a patrimonial democracy that remains competitive, it does erode the quality of democracy over time. If the public becomes convinced that the ballot box is rigged and that votes are fake, then eventually, supporters can be persuaded that their candidate won even when they actually lost. This, of course, can lead to even worse regime outcomes.

Western Democracy in Crisis

Your research connects US political shifts to broader global patterns. Does Trump’s rise signal a deeper systemic failure in Western democracies, and how can the US counteract these trends moving forward?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: It’s definitely a bad situation. And we should add—Jeff and I are definitely in favor of democracy. Sometimes we get asked this question: “You’re so concerned about the State. Would you rather have a Reichstadt with no democracy than a democracy that’s patrimonial in some ways?” And the answer to that question is that we don’t have to make that choice.

The reality right now is that there’s no Reichstadt or a Singapore-style uncorrupted autocracy on offer. The only options available are populism in a democratic context and patrimonialism in the state context versus the old forms of liberal, rational-legal order, to use Weber’s terminology.

So part of our goal is to reclaim the State as a positive entity. We’ve seen it is bashed for so long from both the left and the right. Libertarians argue that the State is a block to liberty. On the left, critics see the military-industrial complex and the surveillance state as suppressing the people’s will. Religious nationalists believe the State is too secular and is stamping out religious life—and this isn’t just in the US but also in places like Russia. It’s different religious traditionalisms, but with the same kind of complaint.

The idea that the secular modern state is a good thing, that it helps protect the public welfare, is often missing from our political discourse. When you defend the State, you sound like you’re upholding an old, discredited status quo. But we should recognize that it’s not actually the status quo—that’s the whole problem.

This also connects to another issue. We are definitely in the camp that says neoliberalism has a lot to answer for over the last 30 years. The notion that the State should be reconstructed solely in service of markets, that it should be downsized as much as possible to become more efficient, or that the old welfare state was bloated and ineffective—those arguments, we believe, did significant damage. The financial crises of 2008 and then 2010–11 convinced many that the so-called meritocrats were not meritocratic, that the experts weren’t actually experts, that they didn’t know what they were doing, and that they didn’t care about ordinary people.

So now the task is to clarify that what failed was not the welfare state, nor the old establishment—it was a new group who came in, believing the establishment was inefficient and trying to dismantle the State. In some ways, returning to the State as a source and defender of public goods does not take us back to neoliberalism. It takes us further back—to the idea that the people can own the State, that the State can be democratic, and, ironically, that it can be truly republican in the sense of being a public institution that ordinary citizens own and connect to.

The Breaking of the Bureaucratic State: Can US Institutions Recover?

In ‘The Assault on the State,’ you argue that modern government is under attack. How does Trump’s presidency exemplify this trend, particularly regarding the erosion of democratic institutions and bureaucratic expertise?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: What’s happening in my country right now is painful to watch, especially for those of us closely connected to the production of expertise. I’m a university professor, and many of our students and graduate students go on to work in the federal government.

They do things like work on climate change, secure military bases against flooding, prepare for future pandemics, and test new vaccines. Even before the Trump administration, it was sometimes difficult to convince young people to join public service. Many would say, I can make more money in the private sector, or the public sector is too slow, too bureaucratic. But despite these concerns, we still managed to attract a number of brilliant young people every year who were willing to commit their entire careers to public service.

Now, that pipeline is nearly broken. At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized. But the bigger issue is long-term: How do you convince people that this won’t happen again? How do you get young professionals to invest years in degrees and early-career government positions when they know that the next administration could just come in and fire everyone again?

The damage is much more severe than just a single administration. The US may be the most extreme case, but we see versions of this pattern in every patrimonial system. Take the Tusk government in Poland—they’re struggling to restore trust in the judiciary and undo the changes made by the PiS party. Rebuilding state institutions is incredibly difficult. The old joke applies here: It’s a lot easier to turn an aquarium into fish soup than it is to turn fish soup back into an aquarium.

The destruction of the State leaves behind a mess that takes years, even decades, to repair. So I think we have to be very realistic about the crisis we face. This won’t be fixed with just one or two elections. Those of us who care about democratic states that provide public goods in the modern world—and I hope that’s a lot of people—will have to start with education, collective action, and actively countering this disastrous assault on institutions that truly matter.

Loyalty Is the Most Important Currency in Trump’s America

US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

Trump frequently positioned himself against the “deep state,” portraying government institutions as adversaries. To what extent do you see this rhetoric as a deliberate political strategy versus a genuine ideological stance?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: I don’t think patrimonial rulers are best understood as ideological. That’s the big difference between patrimonialism and fascism—certainly compared to Nazism. Leaders like Hitler and Mussolini had ideologies; they had visions of the future. You could say those visions were crackpot or outright evil, and certainly they were. But their argument was: We know where we’re leading this new empire—it will be racially pure, or it will be a resurrection of Roman virtue. Young people will imbibe this spirit, march in step, and be mobilized.

In contrast, patrimonialism tends to demobilize society. This was true of the old Tsarist style of rule, as well as older monarchies and other non-ideological regimes, which essentially said: Let the ruler take care of the state; it’s his personal possession—gender intended. Ordinary people, the Narod in Russian (the masses), were not supposed to have a direct connection to the state, which is the opposite of fascism and other mobilizational ideologies.

When it comes to Trump himself, there’s clearly no coherent ideology. He has shifted positions on all sorts of issues, but people make the mistake of assuming that means he has no center at all. He does—his center is that he alone can fix it. He sees himself as the anointed leader—now even believing that he is divinely chosen—to govern America’s patrimony.

The consistent theme underlying everything he does is that loyalty is the most important currency. If you’re not perfectly loyal, he will punish you. The deep state, those with expertise in impersonal legal norms, are actually “fakers” who need to be destroyed. And the US itself should be treated as the property of the ruling party, the ruling state, and, ultimately, the ruling household—namely, the Trump family.

We even see echoes of imperial-style patrimonialism here. Historically, patrimonial rulers made claims on territories that were supposedly part of their rightful domain. Putin, for example, asserts that Ukraine is inherently part of Russia. Now, with Trump, we start to see similar rhetoric—claims that Greenland, Canada, or even Panama somehow “belong” to the US. This imperialist mindset, tied to a patrimonial vision of governance, is something to watch closely.

Misinformation Thrives When ‘People Are Not Hearing Both Perspectives in Real Time

Your studies highlight how distrust in government is often fueled by misinformation. How did Trump’s presidency contribute to this, and what long-term effects do you foresee on public trust in US institutions?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: It really is a big part of the problem—no question. Social media, the internet more generally, the decline of local newspapers, and, again, the decline of trust in the so-called legacy media have made it much more difficult to get a coherent message out. Not everybody would have agreed with it, but at least elites in local politics across each state in the US, in each major city, used to have some common points of reference.

Back in the day, it was impossible to make a completely baseless claim and have it be repeated by media outlets all over the United States. That simply couldn’t have happened because not only did you have professional journalists reporting in each locality, but there was also the Fairness Doctrine—before the Reagan administration eliminated it. Under this rule, if you made one claim, you had to allow equal space for the opposing claim.

These sound like quaint notions now, but we actually need to return to them. Restoring the Fairness Doctrine would go a long way. I don’t know exactly how you would enforce it in today’s environment, but imagine if every podcaster or news show that put out an outrageous claim—say, all the election machines are rigged—had to give equal time immediately after for someone to say, ‘Actually, there’s no evidence for that whatsoever, and the people making this claim have been thoroughly debunked.’ Right now, people are not hearing both perspectives in real time. They are only hearing their point of view, and that clearly makes rebuilding trust difficult.

One last comparative point: If you look at the history of failed democracies, it’s not just social media that causes breakdowns. Weimar Germany famously fell into extreme party polarization, leading to a situation where budgets couldn’t be passed, and the political deadlock ultimately created the conditions for autocracy and Nazism. And all of that happened well before social media or the internet.

So, while misinformation and echo chambers exacerbate these crises today, they are not the only ways societies break down. However, once polarization takes hold, and each side of a divided society finds its own media outlets to reinforce its perspective—while completely distrusting all others—then it becomes incredibly difficult to restore public trust in government institutions.

Putin Is the Starting Point for the 21st-Century Wave of Patrimonialism

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

You discuss the global assault on modern governance. In what ways did Trump’s administration mirror or influence similar movements in countries like Hungary, Brazil, or the UK under Brexit leadership?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: The question of where it began is part of our book, and we make a claim that people found hard to believe but that we really stand by: it started with Putin.

We argue this partly through chronology. If you look carefully at the evidence before the rise of Putin in 2000 and the decades after, you had populism, of course—as you know better than anyone. There were plenty of populist movements in Europe, and they would rise on the far right or far left. They would sometimes gain parliamentary representation and make coalition-building difficult, but they never formed governments.

They were either systematically excluded from governance by pacts among mainstream parties, or they simply never achieved the electoral success to do so. The one breakthrough before Putin was Berlusconi and Forza Italia, where he briefly became Prime Minister in the 1990s. But his quick loss of power proves the rule—only after 2000, with a very close alliance with Putin, did Berlusconi’s leadership begin to take on more familiar patrimonial features.

So we place a lot of emphasis on Putin’s example. We think this is both emulation and direct support. It’s true that the Putin regime has funded pro-Russian parties worldwide, particularly in Europe. They have also pushed disinformation campaigns that serve the interests of the Russian Federation and its increasingly imperial ambitions.

Take Brexit, for example—the UK Parliamentary Commission concluded that Russia’s role in disinformation mattered in the referendum. Moscow has not been passive in this process. But beyond that, we argue the biggest factor was people simply looking at Putin’s model and realizing: “It never occurred to us before that you could build a 19th-century-style state in the 21st century—but look at what this guy has done.”

People thought Russia was finished. To quote a famous 2001 headline, Russia was seen as a laughingstock. International relations realists ignored it. And yet, Putin managed to reassert Russia as a great power, influencing global events—from Syria to US elections. Those who hated the liberal center, mostly on the right, but also some on the left, began saying: “Whatever’s going on in Russia, we need to figure it out. This guy has proven we no longer have to listen to the experts. We can beat the technocrats. We can restore traditional forms of machismo, religious veneration, and hierarchy.”

This emulation factor was very direct—for Orbán, for Netanyahu, and many others. These are empirical links, not speculation. People were surprised by our argument at first. But now, with recent events—including Trump’s presidency and the invasion of Ukraine—more people are asking us: “Did you really say Russia was the starting point for this?” Yes. That’s exactly what we said.

Patrimonialism Is Gaining Momentum—How Do We Stop It?

Even after his presidency, Trump’s influence may remain strong in shaping Republican politics. Do you see the attack on modern government as a continuing movement, and how might a second Trump term escalate these trends?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: I’m hoping when you say ‘a second Trump term,’ you mean this one—not the one that would come after. There’s already a lot of talk about amending the Constitution in the United States or reinterpreting it in a way that would allow him to serve beyond this term. This is very reminiscent of discussions in Russia in the 2000s, when Putin had to circumvent the official two-term limit in the Russian Constitution—first by installing his Prime Minister and then by changing the Constitution to allow himself to rule indefinitely.

These kinds of discussions matter for your question because, ultimately, these leaders must first be defeated before we can talk about reversing these trends. As long as they remain in power, the patrimonial style of governance will continue to be a dominant force—as everyone in the world can now see.

This is especially problematic when even China under Xi Jinping, while still a Leninist state with Leninist institutions, is increasingly taking on patrimonial features—with Xi posing as the father of the nation and asserting patrimonial rights to territories around China.

When China, the United States, and Russia—and to some extent Turkey, India, and Brazil—all lean in this direction, it becomes extremely challenging for the Macrons, the Scholzes, and the Starmers of the world. The remaining leaders who support modern democratic institutions are now struggling to figure out how to protect what’s left. So, the immediate problem is simply figuring out how to win in an increasingly lopsided world where patrimonialism is gaining momentum.

The longer-term challenge, which we discussed earlier, is about rebuilding a vision for the future—one that defends a modern, liberal state in the US (though, ironically, you can’t even use the word “liberal” anymore without it being dismissed as leftist radicalism or Marxism).

There is an enormous rhetorical and mobilizational challenge ahead—convincing ordinary citizens to resist these trends by making the case that patrimonialism doesn’t serve their public welfare. It doesn’t create a fair society. It fosters corruption, undermines integrity, and ignores public opinion. All of these principles—fairness, accountability, and good governance—depend on the survival of the modern state. Now is the time to spread that message.

The State Itself Is Under Assault—Democracy Comes Next

Demonstrators gather at the US Capitol on President’s Day to protest the actions of President Trump’s administration and billionaire Elon Musk in Washington, D.C., on February 17, 2025. Photo: Rena Schild.

And lastly, Professor Hanson, if modern governance is indeed under siege, what steps can be taken—either by policymakers, scholars, or civil society—to rebuild public trust in democratic institutions and counter the assault on the state?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: We were beginning to speak about this, and it’s the question that we all really have to engage with together. 

We end the book by saying that proper diagnosis helps on its own. One of the key steps is simply getting people to understand that it is the state itself that is under assault—and, in the longer term, democracy as well. Because if you don’t have a modern state, you eventually can’t run free and fair elections. You don’t have the impersonal procedures necessary to count votes fairly. Instead, you end up with what you see in Russia—political pressure to produce vote totals that show the leader receiving 90% or 80% of the vote, or some other absurd outcome. And that isn’t democracy. So, we are absolutely not saying that democratic erosion isn’t a problem—it is a serious problem. But it is a longer-term issue. The immediate, short-term problem is the destruction of state capacity—something that is already happening in the US and other places as well.

So, what can we do about it?

  1. Diagnosis – The first step is recognizing that this is a political issue that must be tackled directly.
  2. Reviving Public Service – The second is getting people to care about public service as a legitimate and worthwhile career—which is incredibly difficult these days, as I mentioned earlier, given the material concerns of young people. But, at the same time, I see many students at William & Mary every day who genuinely want to do good in the world—who want their lives to be dedicated to service.

And the truth is, there are many people like that around the world—especially in modern democracies—who would agree that if we don’t have the institutional capacity to deal with climate change, the next pandemic, immigration, or any number of existential global threats, then we simply won’t be able to solve them. As a species, we will not succeed.

So, I think another crucial step is getting the rhetoric right. Instead of constantly accusing patrimonial leaders and their supporters of being anti-democratic, which only alienates their voters, we should frame the argument differently. If you tell Trump voters, “Trump is an anti-democrat, and you’re an idiot for supporting him,” they will naturally reject that. They will see it as just another elitist telling them what to think—which only fuels the cycle of resentment. But if you frame the issue as “What’s happening is the destruction of the state’s ability to do good in the world,” you can actually win people over. 

Maria Christofidis

Maria Christofidis is a master’s student in Philosophy at the University of Oxford. She also holds a first-class joint honours MSci in Physics and Philosophy from King’s College London. Her primary research is in political philosophy, with a particular focus on states’ moral obligations towards refugees and undocumented migrants. Currently, she is working on her Master’s thesis, entitled Why Prospective Migrants aren’t Morally Obliged to Comply with Immigration Law, in which she explores the moral relationship between states and prospective immigrants.

Amna Ben Amara

Amna Ben Amara is a researcher and consultant in intercultural management. She holds two master’s degrees: one in Intercultural Management from Slovenia and another in Cultural Studies from the Faculty of Arts and Humanities in Sousse, Tunisia, her home country. Currently, she is pursuing a Ph.D. at the University of Tours, France, focusing on the geopolitical construction of the Middle East in American foreign policy discourse. Amna has authored several journal articles and presented her work at numerous national and international conferences. She has also completed various training programs through Erasmus+ and DAAD. Most recently, she served as a visiting researcher at the University of Paris-Est Créteil, France.

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Unveiling China’s ‘Transnational Populism’ and Sharp Power Politics: The Case of the Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

In a mutually reinforcing context, the rise of multipolarity and the decline of the rules-based liberal multilateral world order have transformed populism from a national phenomenon into one with global dimensions, characterized by transborder transgressiveness. Rooted in nationalist rhetoric that emphasizes independence and sovereignty, this dynamic challenges the norms and values of multilateralism, fuels a vicious cycle of sharp power politics (SPP), and opens new fronts in the competition for national interests. China’s recent political and economic trajectory under President Xi Jinping provides a compelling case for examining the interplay between these factors. Drawing on the evolving theoretical framework of populism and an analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this article argues that Xi Jinping’s strategic framing of SPPs within an appealing populist narrative does not qualify him as a transnational populist leader. Notably, Chinese rhetoric lacks a cohesive ideology, a clearly defined transnational citizenry with shared interests, and a corresponding mechanism for the participatory representation of global citizens.

Keywords: Populism, sharp-power politics, multipolarity, multilateralism, China, governance, development, (in)dependence, global public goods, cooperation.

 

 

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Keywords: Populism, sharp-power politics, multipolarity, multilateralism, China, governance, development, (in)dependence, global public goods, cooperation.

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Professor Dan Hough, a leading expert on corruption and populist politics from the University of Sussex.
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By Ibrahim Ozturk

Introduction

The transformation of global power dynamics, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has exposed vulnerabilities in the Western-dominated liberal multilateral order, leading to a multipolar world (dis)order. This shift has also curtailed the dominance of any single superpower, intensifying competition for influence and resources. This complex landscape has witnessed two notable political phenomena: the global rise of right- and left-wing populism and the adoption of Sharp Power Politics (SPP) by rising powers like Russia and China to enhance their global influence.

   
   

The emergence of this geopolitical landscape significantly limits the global cooperation necessary for collective action to effectively secure global public goods. Increasingly characterized by a “negative-sum game,” this environment poses deeply troubling implications for the future. It fosters the development of a causal chain in which populism, typically addressed at the national level, transcends borders and amplifies the influence of sharp-power politics.

While populists often portray themselves as champions of the people, challenging the established order on behalf of the masses, SPP co-opts populist rhetoric to serve the interests of authoritarian regimes, ultimately consolidating their power. A plausible transmission mechanism involves the gradual co-option of a functioning, though flawed, rule-based democracy by exclusionary, interest-driven coalitions of established elites. These elites prioritize their class interests at the expense of long-term efficiency, leading to stagnation. Over time, populist leaders exploit systemic vulnerabilities, using their rhetoric to gain power. If they maintain power long enough, they eventually transform the system into a form of authoritarianism, reinforcing this new status quo through sharp-power tactics both domestically and internationally to expand their influence and national interests.

Within this framework, the central aim of this article is to explore the extent to which the concept of “transnational populism” (TNP) can be considered an intermediate stage linking the progression from national-level populism to authoritarianism and, subsequently, to SPP beyond national borders. Following these theoretical discussions, the article also seeks to examine whether the notion of TNP can be inferred from the extensive use of populist rhetoric within China’s SPP framework, specifically in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Disembarkation of 300 migrants from Libya from the German rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 in Pozzallo, Province of Ragusa, Italy, on June 9, 2022. Photo: Alec Tassi.

The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe

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Please cite as:
Yogo, Edouard Epiphane. (2025). “The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 4, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0048

 

Abstract
This research examines the influence of populism on the redefinition of citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. It explores how populist movements leverage anti-immigrant sentiments to shape political discourse, laws, and societal attitudes. The study combines qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants, and quantitative data from national surveys to analyze changes in citizenship laws and social inclusion challenges. Through case studies, it highlights variations in populist influence across European countries. The research concludes with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society amidst rising populism.

Keywords: Populism, citizenship, social inclusion, migration dynamics, European societies

 

By Edouard Epiphane Yogo*

Introduction 

The rise of populism in Europe has become one of the most significant political phenomena of the 21st century, fundamentally altering the political landscape and reshaping discussions surrounding citizenship and social inclusion for migrants. According to Arzheimer & Carter (2006), populist movements have emerged across various European countries, characterized by their anti-elite sentiments and a rhetoric that often scapegoats immigrants and minorities for societal issues (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). As these movements gain traction, they exploit and amplify anti-immigrant sentiments, influencing political discourse, legislation, and societal attitudes toward migrants. This dynamic presents a critical need to explore how populism is redefining citizenship and the concept of social inclusion within the broader context of migration (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

At the heart of this inquiry lies a fundamental question: How does populism redefine the essence of citizenship? This question invites us to consider the shifts in legal frameworks, societal norms, and public perceptions surrounding the rights and identities of migrants in Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The changing landscape of citizenship laws particularly the principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) illustrates how populist narratives can reshape notions of national belonging (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). Moreover, the impact of these changes on the social integration of migrants poses significant implications for the cohesiveness of European societies.

To investigate these pressing issues, this research adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants with quantitative data derived from national surveys. This comprehensive analysis aims to uncover not only the changes in citizenship laws but also the challenges to social inclusion faced by migrants in various European contexts. By examining the intersection of populism and migration, the study seeks to illuminate how populist movements influence citizenship policies and shape societal attitudes toward migrants.

One of the central themes of this research is the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions of migrants. In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping these perceptions (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Populist leaders and parties often utilize rhetoric that stigmatizes migrants, framing them as threats to national security, cultural identity, and economic stability (Talani, 2021). Such narratives contribute to the development of negative stereotypes and social divisions, making it increasingly difficult for migrants to achieve social integration in education, employment, and healthcare (Scheiring et al., 2024).

The first section of the study will examine how populist narratives reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship. By analyzing the rhetoric employed by populist movements, the research will highlight the ways in which these narratives seek to define and limit national belonging. Furthermore, it will explore case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries, illustrating how populism has influenced legislative reforms aimed at restricting migrants’ rights and opportunities.

The second section will focus on the challenges to social inclusion for migrants under the influence of populism. By investigating the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions, the study will analyze the stigmatization of migrants and the resulting impacts on their ability to integrate into society. The research will delve into how negative portrayals in the media can lead to societal attitudes that hinder access to essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, ultimately affecting migrants’ social standing and quality of life.

In exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion, the research will address the restrictive measures that impact integration efforts. These policies often prioritize the needs and rights of native citizens over those of migrants, resulting in systemic barriers that prevent meaningful social inclusion. The study will also incorporate case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of populist policies based on varying economic and historical contexts across European countries. This analysis aims to demonstrate how local conditions shape the outcomes of populist approaches to social inclusion and migration dynamics.

To interpret these dynamics effectively, this research will utilize the phenomenological constructivism framework proposed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 2011). According to Berger and Luckmann (2011), this theoretical approach posits that social reality is constructed through human interactions and is deeply influenced by the contexts in which these interactions occur. By applying this framework, the study will explore how populist narratives and policies are socially constructed and how they influence perceptions of citizenship and social inclusion (Mudde, 2014). This perspective will allow us to examine the processes through which migrants are categorized, marginalized, and included or excluded from the social fabric of European societies.

Using Berger and Luckmann’s insights, the research, based on phenomenological constructivism, will analyze how societal constructs surrounding nationality and belonging are negotiated and redefined in the context of populism (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). It will facilitate a deeper understanding of the ways in which individual and collective identities are shaped by populist discourse, as well as the implications of these construct s for migrants’ experiences of citizenship and social integration. By situating our analysis within this theoretical framework, we aim to highlight the significance of social constructions in shaping the realities of migrants in Europe. In addition to phenomenological constructivism, this research will also employ François Thual’s geopolitical method to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Thual’s approach emphasizes the importance of contextual factors such as geography, history, and socio-political dynamics in shaping political behavior and policy decisions. This method allows us to analyze how populist movements are not only a response to immediate political conditions but are also deeply rooted in historical and geographical contexts that influence their evolution and impact (Thual, 1996). 

Thual’s geopolitical method will guide the exploration of how different European countries experience and respond to populism in distinct ways (Loyer, 2019). By examining the geographical and historical backgrounds of specific case studies, we can uncover the localized factors that drive populist sentiments and how these sentiments manifest in citizenship laws and social inclusion policies (Zajec, 2018). This analytical lens will enhance our understanding of why certain countries adopt more restrictive policies while others may strive for inclusivity in the face of populism. 

As the research unfolds, it will emphasize the need for inclusive policies that can counteract the negative effects of populism on citizenship and social inclusion. By synthesizing the findings, the study will conclude with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society in the face of rising populism. These recommendations will focus on strategies that promote equitable access to rights and opportunities for migrants, thereby enhancing social cohesion and countering the divisive narratives propagated by populist movements.

In summary, this research seeks to illuminate the complex interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. By examining the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions and legislative reforms, the study will provide valuable insights into the challenges migrants face in achieving social integration. Ultimately, the findings will underscore the importance of developing inclusive policies that address the needs and rights of all members of society, fostering a more equitable and cohesive European community amidst the challenges posed by populism.

The Impact of Populism on the Redefinition of Citizenship

In the current global landscape shaped by the rise of populism, discussions around citizenship and national identity have gained renewed significance. Recent changes in citizenship laws reflect the increasing influence of populist movements that seek to redefine national belonging. This document will examine two key aspects: Changes in citizenship laws and principles under populist influence (A) and the relationship between populism and the concept of national identity (B), highlighting the tensions and redefinitions that arise.

Changes in Citizenship Laws and Principles Under Populist Influence

Discussing on changes in citizenship laws and principles leads us to examine two key areas. Firstly, the shifts in jus soliand jus sanguinis citizenship principles (1) and secondly, the influence of populist discourse on recent legislative reforms (2). 

Analysis of Shifts in Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis under Populist Influence

The principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) are long-established frameworks that define how individuals acquire nationality (Retailleau, 2024). Jus soli grants citizenship to those born within a country’s territory, promoting inclusion and diversity, while jus sanguinis bases citizenship on parentage, linking it to lineage and heritage. Many countries have historically blended both principles to accommodate social and political contexts. However, the rise of populist movements has altered how these principles are applied, with significant implications for citizenship laws (El País, 2024).

Populism, characterized by its anti-immigration and nationalist rhetoric, has shifted the conversation toward more restrictive definitions of citizenship, often challenging jus soli by framing it as too inclusive (Giugni & Grasso, 2021; Le Monde, 2024). Populist leaders argue that automatic birthright citizenship allows individuals with no cultural or historical ties to the nation to gain full membership. For example, in the United States, under the Trump administration, jus solicame under scrutiny, with arguments about “anchor babies” used to portray birthright citizenship as a loophole exploited by immigrants (Schmidt, 2019).

Similarly, in Europe, populist movements have pushed for limiting or abolishing jus soli to preserve national identity. Germany, for instance, had integrated jus soli to respond to globalization, but recent populist pressures aim to reverse these changes.

While jus soli face restrictions, populist leaders have embraced jus sanguinis. This principle aligns with their focus on ethnicity, heritage, and national purity, promoting a more exclusionary form of citizenship based on ancestral ties (Le Monde, 2024). In Hungary, for instance, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s policies prioritize ethnic Hungarian identity, offering citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad while maintaining a rigid stance against immigrants and refugees. Likewise, Italy emphasizes jus sanguinis, granting citizenship to individuals of Italian descent but placing increasing scrutiny on migrants and refugees (Le Monde, 2024; Kymlicka, 2001).

The preference for jus sanguinis reflects a broader trend of ethno-nationalism under populist regimes. By favoring bloodline-based citizenship, populists create a narrower definition of national identity, excluding individuals without ancestral ties to the country (Joppke, 2010). This shift has serious consequences for social cohesion, as it marginalizes immigrants and minorities, potentially deepening societal divides.

The erosion of jus soli particularly affects children born to immigrant families, who may face statelessness or legal obstacles to full integration. Meanwhile, the reinforcement of jus sanguinis perpetuates exclusionary notions of citizenship, creating a tiered system where only those with ethnic or cultural ties to the state are considered full citizens (Le Monde, 2024). This dynamic threatens to alienate large segments of the population, especially in multicultural societies, contributing to increased social tensions.

The changes to jus soli and jus sanguinis driven by populist movements illustrate a shift toward restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies. These alterations not only affect individuals directly impacted by more rigid laws but also have broader implications for the social and political stability of nations grappling with diversity and globalization (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). As populist ideologies continue to shape political discourse, the future of citizenship laws remains a contentious issue.

Influence of Populist Discourse on Legislative Reforms

Populism has significantly impacted global politics, shaping discourse and driving legislative reforms. Defined by its appeal to “the people” against perceived elites, populism thrives on nationalism, anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and protectionism (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019). Populist leaders push simplified solutions to complex issues, leaving lasting effects on policies related to immigration, citizenship, labor laws, and the judiciary. 

Populism views politics as a battle between the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elites, positioning populist leaders as defenders of the common citizen against established institutions. Exploiting grievances over economic inequality, cultural alienation, or fears of losing national identity, populists advocate for radical reforms (Olivas Osuna, 2020). Their emotionally charged rhetoric resonates with voters who feel marginalized, fostering a political environment that supports swift, often divisive, legislative changes.

One of the most significant areas of populist influence is immigration and citizenship policy. Populists frame immigration as a threat to national identity and economic security, pushing for stricter controls. In the US, Donald Trump’s administration implemented controversial policies such as the Muslim Ban and attempted to end birthright citizenship (Inglehart, 2016). These moves, rooted in populist rhetoric, sought to restrict immigration and tighten borders, casting immigrants as burdens on the system. Similarly, in Europe, populist leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán have championed anti-immigration laws, presenting migrants as threats to national security and Christian identity (Dahlgren, 2006). These legislative changes, shaped by populism, have led to a more hostile environment for migrants and refugees, contributing to growing xenophobia.

Economic protectionism is another key area influenced by populism. Populist leaders, responding to fears of globalization and job displacement, advocate for policies that protect domestic industries. Trump’s “America First” rhetoric resulted in tariffs aimed at protecting American jobs, leading to trade wars with countries like China (Jones, 2019). While these policies offered short-term relief to certain industries, they also raised consumer prices and strained international trade relations. In Europe, populist figures like Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy have similarly pushed for economic protectionism, though such policies often hinder long-term growth and international cooperation (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019).

Populists also target the judiciary, portraying it as an elitist institution disconnected from the people. This view justifies legislative reforms that increase executive control over the judiciary, undermining democratic checks and balances (Bauer & Becker, 2020). In Poland, the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) introduced reforms giving the government greater control over judicial appointments, weakening judicial independence. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan similarly used populist discourse to justify constitutional changes that consolidated executive power and diminished the judiciary’s role (Blokker, 2019). These reforms, driven by populist ideals, threaten democratic governance by reducing the separation of powers and weakening the rule of law.

Cultural nationalism is another area where populist discourse drives legislative changes. Populist leaders often promote national culture while resisting multiculturalism. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government enacted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, which grants citizenship to non-Muslim refugees, marginalizing Muslims and promoting Hindu nationalism (Adamidis, 2021). This, along with the National Register of Citizens (NRC), exemplifies how populist rhetoric can shape exclusionary legislative reforms, reshaping national identity along religious lines (Tushnet, 2020).

Populism’s influence on legislative reforms is profound, particularly in immigration, economics, judiciary control, and national identity. Although populists claim to represent the will of the people, their policies often lead to restrictive, exclusionary measures that challenge democratic principles (Löfflmann, 2022). As populism continues to grow, its influence on legislative processes will likely persist, raising concerns about the future of democratic governance and civil liberties worldwide.

Populism and the Concept of National Identity

This section delves into the relationship between populism and national identity, focusing on two critical aspects: The use of anti-immigrant rhetoric to reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship, highlighting how such discourse seeks to define and limit national belonging (1) and Case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries (2). 

The Use of Anti-immigrant Rhetoric to Reinforce Exclusive Citizenship

Populist leaders frequently employ anti-immigrant rhetoric to portray immigrants as existential threats to a nation’s cultural, economic, and social fabric. This rhetoric becomes a powerful tool to shape national identity in exclusionary terms, typically casting immigrants as outsiders based on racial, ethnic, or religious differences (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Through this discourse, populist movements argue that immigrants dilute national culture, displace native workers, and strain public resources, all while posing threats to national security. By framing immigration in such stark terms, populist rhetoric fosters fear and division, creating a political climate in which restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies can be justified (Mudde, 2014).

At the core of populist anti-immigrant rhetoric lies the concept of an “authentic” national identity one that is rooted in historical, cultural, and sometimes religious heritage. This identity is portrayed as under siege by foreign influences, particularly immigrants who are seen as incapable of integrating into the national fabric (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Populist leaders often evoke a sense of nostalgia for a perceived golden age when national culture was more “pure” or homogeneous, untainted by external influences. This idealized past is contrasted with the present, where immigration is depicted as eroding the cultural unity and social cohesion of the nation (Talani, 2021). By appealing to this notion of cultural purity, populist leaders can present themselves as defenders of the nation’s true identity, rallying support from those who feel alienated or threatened by globalization and multiculturalism.

Immigrants, particularly those from non-Western or non-Christian backgrounds, are often depicted as fundamentally different from and incompatible with the values, traditions, and way of life of the host country (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This portrayal not only amplifies existing prejudices but also legitimizes exclusionary policies. In many populist narratives, immigrants are scapegoated for a range of societal problems from unemployment and housing shortages to crime and the perceived decline of national values. This scapegoating simplifies complex socio-economic issues, presenting immigration as the primary cause of these challenges and offering a convenient target for public anger and frustration (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

The distinction between “us” (native citizens) and “them” (immigrants) is a central feature of populist rhetoric. This binary division serves to reinforce a sense of national unity among the “native” population while casting immigrants as a threatening “other” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). This division is often racialized, with immigrants from non-European or non-Christian backgrounds portrayed as more dangerous or culturally alien. In some cases, populists draw on religious differences, framing Muslim immigrants, for example, as a threat to secular or Christian values (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). 

These distinctions are used to justify policies that restrict immigrants’ access to citizenship, limit their rights, and reduce their opportunities for social and economic integration (Manatschal et al., 2020). One of the most prominent ways in which this rhetoric translates into policy is through reforms aimed at restricting immigration and tightening citizenship requirements. Populist leaders often advocate for measures that make it more difficult for immigrants to acquire legal status, obtain work permits, or access public services (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). In some cases, they push for the revocation of citizenship for naturalized immigrants who are deemed to have violated national norms or values. These policies are framed as necessary steps to protect the nation’s identity and security, resonating with voters who feel that their cultural heritage and economic opportunities are being undermined by immigration.

This anti-immigrant rhetoric also extends to asylum seekers and refugees, who are often portrayed as economic migrants in disguise, seeking to exploit the nation’s welfare system rather than fleeing genuine persecution (Talani, 2021). By blurring the lines between refugees and economic migrants, populist leaders erode public sympathy for those seeking asylum and create a narrative in which all forms of immigration are seen as illegitimate or dangerous. This narrative provides political cover for policies that deny refugees access to asylum processes, push them back at borders, or place them in detention centers with limited legal rights (Hammar, 1990).

Beyond shaping immigration and asylum policies, populist rhetoric also influences broader social attitudes. By constantly framing immigrants as threats to national security and culture, populist leaders normalize xenophobic and exclusionary attitudes (Löfflmann, 2022). This not only stokes fear and resentment among the native population but also creates an environment in which discrimination against immigrants and minorities is more likely to be tolerated or even encouraged. In some cases, this rhetoric has been linked to increases in hate crimes and other forms of violence against immigrant communities (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

Moreover, populist anti-immigrant rhetoric undermines the principles of equality and inclusion that are foundational to democratic citizenship. By advocating for policies that exclude certain groups based on their race, religion, or ethnicity, populist leaders challenge the idea of universal citizenship and equal rights for all individuals within a nation (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Instead, they promote a hierarchical vision of citizenship, where some individuals are deemed more deserving of rights and protections than others based on their cultural or ethnic background.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric serves as a key tool for populist leaders to shape national identity in exclusionary terms. By portraying immigrants as threats to culture, economy, and security, populists legitimize policies that restrict immigration, deny citizenship, and limit the rights of minorities (Talani, 2021). This rhetoric not only fuels fear and division but also reshapes public policy in ways that undermine the principles of equality and inclusion, leading to a more fragmented and polarized society. As populist movements continue to gain traction globally, the challenge of balancing national identity with inclusivity and tolerance remains a pressing issue for modern democracies (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

Case Studies of Citizenship Policy Adjustments in Select European Countries

Across Europe, populist movements have played a pivotal role in shaping national identity and citizenship policies, often pushing for more restrictive laws that make it harder for immigrants to gain citizenship or legal residency. This shift reflects the growing influence of populist rhetoric, which frames immigration as a threat to national culture and security. By examining the cases of Hungary, Italy, and France, it becomes evident how populist leaders have redefined national identity and driven legislative reforms that reflect exclusionary views of citizenship.

In Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the government has adopted a strongly anti-immigrant stance, particularly targeting Muslim-majority countries. Orbán’s administration has positioned itself as the defender of Hungary’s Christian identity, presenting immigration as an existential threat to the nation’s cultural and religious fabric (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). The construction of border fences to block refugees, along with Hungary’s refusal to participate in EU refugee resettlement programs, demonstrates the government’s commitment to preventing the settlement of immigrants (Palonen, 2018). This emphasis on exclusion is further reflected in the tightening of citizenship laws, which aim to maintain a homogenous national identity, rooted in ethnic and religious purity.

A key piece of legislation that encapsulates Hungary’s approach to immigration is the “Stop Soros” law, named after Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros, who has supported pro-migrant policies (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). The law criminalizes aid to asylum seekers and organizations working with immigrants, reinforcing the idea that immigrants are unwelcome in Hungary. Orbán’s government has used this law to portray immigrants as threats to the nation, while redefining Hungarian national identity along ethnically and religiously exclusionary lines. By positioning itself as the protector of a pure, Christian Hungary, the government has marginalized anyone perceived as foreign or different, particularly those from Muslim backgrounds (Pappas, 2019).

Italy, another example of populist influence on citizenship policies, has seen significant changes under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing League party. Salvini, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, built his political platform around the idea of protecting Italy’s national identity from the perceived dangers of immigration (Varshney, 2021). His “Italians First” campaign emphasized limiting immigration, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, as a way to safeguard Italy’s cultural and economic interests.

Salvini’s government enacted several legislative changes that made it harder for immigrants to gain legal residency and citizenship. For example, the “security decree” introduced during his tenure tightened residency requirements and made it easier for the government to revoke asylum status. These policies were framed as necessary for maintaining public safety and reducing the immigrant population (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). By casting immigrants as criminals or economic burdens, Salvini tapped into public anxieties about national identity and security, securing popular support for more restrictive immigration and citizenship laws. His efforts also extended to children born to foreign parents in Italy, for whom gaining citizenship became increasingly difficult under the new regulations.

France, under the influence of Marine Le Pen and her National Rally party, has similarly witnessed a rise in populist-driven immigration policies. Le Pen has long advocated for a reduction in immigration and the protection of French identity, positioning herself as a defender of the nation’s cultural heritage (Mayer, 2013). Her party has pushed for laws that would end birthright citizenship, making it harder for children born in France to immigrant parents to acquire citizenship (Soffer, 2022). This approach reflects a broader desire to redefine French citizenship in exclusive terms, prioritizing the interests of native-born citizens over those of immigrants.

Le Pen’s framing of national identity is closely tied to the preservation of France’s cultural and historical legacy, often in opposition to immigration from Muslim-majority countries. During her 2017 and 2022 presidential campaigns, Le Pen emphasized the need to protect French values from external influences, linking immigration to issues of national security, cultural erosion, and economic instability (Bonikowski et al., 2018). While she has not won the presidency, her influence has pushed mainstream political parties in France to adopt stricter stances on immigration and citizenship, showing the broader impact of her populist rhetoric.

In all three countries, populist leaders have successfully reshaped public discourse around immigration and citizenship, using anti-immigrant rhetoric to justify more restrictive policies. By framing immigrants as threats to national identity and security, they have fostered a climate of fear and division, where exclusionary measures are seen as necessary to protect the cultural and social fabric of the nation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This dynamic not only makes it more difficult for immigrants to integrate and gain citizenship but also redefines what it means to be a member of the nation, often in ways that marginalize racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

Clearly, populist movements across Europe have significantly influenced citizenship policies by promoting exclusionary definitions of national identity. Whether in Hungary, Italy, or France, populist leaders have used anti-immigrant rhetoric to push for legislative reforms that limit immigration, restrict access to citizenship, and reinforce a narrow conception of national belonging. These changes reflect broader concerns about preserving cultural homogeneity in an increasingly globalized world, where immigration is often framed as a threat rather than a source of enrichment.

Challenges to Social Inclusion for Migrants Under Populism

In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions of migrants. These portrayals can significantly influence societal attitudes and policies. This study will explore two key areas: Media representations and public perceptions of migrants (A) and the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion (B), examining how these narratives and policies interact and impact marginalized communities.

Media Representations and Public Perceptions of Migrants

In this section, we investigate the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions of migrants. We focus on two key aspects: first, the influence of populist narratives on the stigmatization of migrants, examining how these narratives contribute to negative stereotypes and social divisions; and second, the impacts of these perceptions on social integration in education, employment, and healthcare, highlighting the challenges migrants face in accessing essential services and opportunities in society.

Influence of Populist Narratives on Migrant Stigmatization

Populist narratives have a powerful influence on the stigmatization of migrants, shaping public perceptions in ways that often fuel fear, division, and hostility. These narratives simplify complex social issues by framing migrants as threats to national identity, economic stability, and security, which amplifies existing societal tensions. In many countries, populist leaders use anti-immigrant rhetoric to galvanize political support, constructing migrants as scapegoats for various social and economic challenges (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015). This stigmatization has far-reaching consequences, reinforcing negative stereotypes and shaping public policy in exclusionary ways.

At the heart of populist narratives is the concept of “otherness,” where migrants are depicted as fundamentally different from the native population. This otherness is often framed along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, with migrants presented as a homogeneous group that poses a threat to the nation’s cultural identity. In Europe, for instance, populist parties frequently depict Muslim migrants as unwilling or unable to assimilate into Western societies, associating them with extremism or radicalism (Hawley, 2016). This portrayal suggests that migrants are not merely different but incompatible with the nation’s values and way of life. Populist leaders, such as Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor Orbán in Hungary, leverage these fears of cultural erosion to rally support, positioning themselves as protectors of the nation’s authentic identity (Wojczewski, 2019).

Populist rhetoric often goes beyond cultural concerns to frame migrants as economic threats, claiming that they steal jobs, exploit social services, and drain public resources. This portrayal is particularly prevalent during economic downturns, when populist leaders can channel public anxieties about unemployment and financial insecurity into anti-immigrant sentiment (Steele & Homolar, 2019). Migrants are depicted as competitors for scarce resources, pitting them against native citizens in a zero-sum game where the prosperity of one group is seen as coming at the expense of the other. The media plays a significant role in perpetuating this narrative by sensationalizing stories of migrants benefiting from welfare or engaging in criminal activities, often without providing context or balance (Betz, 1994). This selective reporting reinforces the perception that migrants are a burden on society, even when evidence shows their positive contributions to the economy.

In addition to cultural and economic threats, populist narratives often link migrants to security risks, portraying them as potential criminals or terrorists. This is particularly pronounced in countries that have experienced terrorist attacks, where populist leaders frequently draw direct connections between immigration and security (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). By framing migrants as dangerous outsiders who pose a threat to national safety, populist leaders can justify restrictive immigration policies and securitization measures. In the United States, for example, President Donald Trump used rhetoric that depicted migrants (Becker, 2019), especially those from Latin America, as criminals and rapists, capitalizing on fears of crime to promote his anti-immigration agenda (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This rhetoric resonates with portions of the electorate who are already concerned about safety and security, amplifying support for exclusionary policies.

Populist leaders skillfully use media platforms to spread these narratives, particularly in today’s highly polarized media landscape. Traditional news outlets, social media, and even political advertisements become conduits for anti-immigrant rhetoric, allowing populist leaders to reach broad audiences with messages that vilify migrants. In this environment, misinformation and sensationalism thrive (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). False or exaggerated stories about migrant crime rates, welfare fraud, or cultural clashes circulate widely, reinforcing negative perceptions of migrants. Social media, in particular, has proven to be a fertile ground for these narratives, where algorithms amplify divisive content and create echo chambers that reinforce preexisting biases (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

The consequences of this stigmatization are profound and far-reaching. As populist narratives gain traction, public opinion shifts toward greater hostility and mistrust of migrants, making it easier for populist leaders to enact exclusionary policies. This shift in public sentiment often leads to increased support for policies that restrict immigration, limit access to citizenship, and curtail the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (Mudde, 2019). For example, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government has passed a series of laws that severely limit immigration and criminalize activities that support asylum seekers, framing these measures as necessary to protect Hungary’s Christian identity. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s anti-immigrant rhetoric helped fuel the passage of laws that tightened residency requirements and made it easier to revoke asylum statuses, reflecting a broader European trend of hardening immigration policies.

Beyond policy, the stigmatization of migrants has deep social consequences. It fosters an environment where xenophobia and discrimination become normalized, affecting the daily lives of migrants and their ability to integrate into society (Wodak, 2015). Migrants face prejudice in the workplace, in schools, and in public spaces, often experiencing social exclusion and hostility based on their perceived status as outsiders. This stigmatization also fuels tensions between native populations and migrant communities, deepening social divisions and undermining efforts toward inclusion and cohesion.

Impacts on Social Integration in Education, Employment, and Healthcare

The stigmatization of migrants, fueled by populist narratives, significantly impacts their social integration in key areas such as education, employment, and healthcare. These effects not only hinder the ability of migrants to contribute to society but also exacerbate social divisions, perpetuating cycles of marginalization and exclusion (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). By examining these three critical sectors, we can better understand how negative perceptions of migrants shape their experiences and opportunities in host countries.

In the realm of education, migrant children often face significant challenges that hinder their ability to integrate successfully. Populist rhetoric can create an environment of hostility in schools, where migrant students may be perceived as outsiders or even blamed for the struggles faced by the local population (Palonen, 2018). This stigma can lead to bullying, discrimination, and social isolation, significantly impacting the emotional and psychological well-being of these children (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Additionally, language barriers and differences in educational backgrounds can further complicate their integration. Schools may lack the necessary resources and training to support non-native speakers, resulting in disparities in academic achievement and engagement (Mayer, 2013). Consequently, many migrant children may fall behind their peers, limiting their educational opportunities and long-term prospects.

Furthermore, the negative perceptions of migrants can influence the attitudes of teachers and school administrators, leading to biased expectations and treatment. In environments where populist sentiments prevail, educators may unconsciously lower their expectations for migrant students, perpetuating a cycle of disadvantage (Soffer, 2022). This systemic bias can result in fewer opportunities for advanced coursework or extracurricular activities, limiting the social networks that are crucial for future success. As a result, the educational system, instead of serving as a vehicle for social mobility, can reinforce existing inequalities, ultimately affecting the broader societal fabric.

In the employment sector, stigmatization often manifests in barriers to job opportunities and professional advancement for migrants. Populist narratives typically portray migrants as competitors for jobs, leading to negative stereotypes that they are less qualified or less committed than native workers (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This perception can result in discriminatory hiring practices, where employers may favor native candidates over equally qualified migrants. Studies have shown that migrants, particularly those from non-Western backgrounds, often face significant hurdles in securing employment, despite possessing relevant skills and qualifications (Pappas, 2019). They may be relegated to low-wage jobs or sectors characterized by high turnover and job insecurity, limiting their economic mobility and integration.

Moreover, even after securing employment, migrants may encounter challenges in the workplace stemming from stigma. They might face harassment, exclusion from social networks, or limited access to professional development opportunities (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This can create a hostile work environment that not only affects job satisfaction but also impacts overall mental health and well-being. The lack of upward mobility can lead to a sense of disillusionment and alienation, reinforcing feelings of being an outsider in their host society (Kymlicka, 2001). 

In terms of healthcare, the stigma surrounding migrants can create significant barriers to accessing essential services. Fear of discrimination or negative treatment can deter migrants from seeking medical care, even when needed (Goodman, 2010). Populist narratives often frame migrants as burdens on public health systems, perpetuating the idea that they are undeserving of resources and services. This perception can lead to healthcare providers exhibiting implicit biases, resulting in inadequate treatment or care (Joppke, 2010). Migrants may experience delays in receiving necessary medical attention, contributing to poorer health outcomes.

Additionally, cultural differences and language barriers can further complicate healthcare access for migrants. Many may struggle to navigate complex healthcare systems or communicate their needs effectively, leading to misunderstandings and misdiagnoses. In some cases, these barriers can prevent migrants from receiving preventive care, increasing their vulnerability to chronic health conditions and exacerbating existing health disparities. 

The impact of these challenges extends beyond individual migrants; it affects families and communities as well. When migrants struggle to integrate into education, employment, and healthcare systems, it creates a cycle of disadvantage that can perpetuate intergenerational poverty and marginalization (Bauer & Becker, 2020). Children of migrants may inherit these challenges, facing compounded obstacles in their own efforts to integrate and succeed. This can lead to a lack of social cohesion, where communities become polarized along lines of nationality, ethnicity, or immigration status. 

To end, the stigmatization of migrants, largely driven by populist narratives, has profound impacts on their social integration across education, employment, and healthcare sectors. These negative perceptions hinder the ability of migrants to access opportunities, contribute to society, and achieve their full potential. The consequences of this marginalization are far-reaching, not only affecting the lives of migrants but also undermining the social fabric of host communities. To foster greater social integration, it is essential to combat harmful stereotypes and promote inclusive policies that recognize and value the contributions of migrants. By addressing these barriers, societies can work towards a more equitable and cohesive future, benefiting everyone involved.

Consequences of Populist Policies on Social Inclusion

Exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion compels us to understand the restrictive measures that impact inclusion and integration. Additionally, it invites us to examine case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of these policies based on varying economic and historical contexts.

Restrictive Policies on Inclusion and Integration

The rise of populist movements across various countries has led to the implementation of restrictive policies that significantly impact social inclusion and integration, particularly for migrants and marginalized communities (Varshney, 2021). These policies are often framed as necessary measures to protect national identity, security, and the interests of the native population, but they frequently create barriers that hinder the full participation of individuals from diverse backgrounds in society.

One of the most significant aspects of restrictive policies is the tightening of immigration laws, which can result in limited pathways for legal residency and citizenship for migrants. Many populist governments have introduced measures that require higher income thresholds, extensive documentation, or language proficiency tests that disproportionately disadvantage less affluent or non-native speakers (Blokker, 2019). Such requirements not only exclude potential immigrants but also create an environment of uncertainty and fear among those already residing in the country (Adamidis, 2021). The fear of deportation or legal repercussions can deter migrants from seeking essential services, including healthcare, education, and employment, thereby exacerbating their marginalization.

Moreover, these policies often reinforce negative stereotypes about migrants, portraying them as potential threats to public safety or as burdens on social services. Populist rhetoric frequently capitalizes on economic anxieties by suggesting that migrants take jobs from locals or strain public resources (Tushnet, 2020). This narrative is particularly powerful during times of economic downturn, where competition for jobs and services is heightened. As a result, policies that restrict access to social benefits for migrants can lead to a situation where these individuals are excluded not only from economic opportunities but also from social protections that are essential for integration (Hammar, 1990).

In many countries, populist leaders have also targeted specific groups of migrants, often based on their nationality, ethnicity, or religion. For example, anti-immigrant laws may specifically affect those from predominantly Muslim countries or refugees fleeing conflict (Schmidt, 2019). This targeted exclusion fosters a climate of division, where certain communities are systematically marginalized. In schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods, this can lead to increased tension and hostility, making it challenging for migrants to form connections with the broader community and hindering their ability to integrate socially (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2015). 

Furthermore, restrictive policies on inclusion are often accompanied by a lack of investment in programs that promote social cohesion and integration. For instance, funding for language classes, job training, and cultural exchange initiatives may be cut or deprioritized in favor of enforcement mechanisms aimed at controlling immigration (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This lack of support means that even those migrants who wish to integrate and contribute to their new communities face significant obstacles (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). The absence of inclusive policies sends a clear message that diversity is not welcomed, further entrenching social divisions.

In addition to impacting migrants, these restrictive policies can have broader societal implications. By promoting exclusion rather than inclusion, populist policies undermine the social contract that binds communities together (Bonikowski et al., 2018). This erosion of trust can lead to increased polarization within society, where divisions based on nationality, ethnicity, and class are exacerbated. The resultant societal fragmentation can hinder collective action and diminish the capacity for communities to address common challenges, ultimately impacting national cohesion and stability.

To counteract the negative impacts of these policies, it is crucial for governments and civil society to advocate for more inclusive approaches to social integration. This involves not only reforming immigration laws to create fair and accessible pathways to residency and citizenship but also investing in programs that promote understanding and collaboration among diverse communities (Manby, 2018). By fostering an environment of inclusivity, societies can harness the potential contributions of migrants and build resilient communities that thrive on diversity rather than fear.

Case Studies on Differentiated Effects Based on Economic and Historical Contexts

The consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform; they vary significantly based on the economic and historical contexts of different countries (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Examining case studies from diverse regions provides valuable insights into how populism shapes social inclusion and reveals the complexities of these dynamics.

One notable example is the case of Hungary under PM Orbán. Hungary’s historical context, shaped by its post-communist transition and ongoing struggles with national identity, has made it particularly susceptible to populist rhetoric (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Orbán’s government has employed a narrative that frames immigration as a threat to Hungary’s Christian identity and cultural homogeneity (Becker, 2019). As a result, restrictive policies have been implemented, including the construction of border barriers and the introduction of laws aimed at criminalizing support for asylum seekers.

These measures have had profound effects on social inclusion in Hungary. The narrative of an “us versus them” mentality has resulted in a climate of fear among migrants and refugees, many of whom have faced violence and discrimination (Győrffy, 2018). The historical context of Hungary’s tumultuous past has contributed to a national discourse that prioritizes ethnic homogeneity, leading to the marginalization of diverse groups. Consequently, the restrictive policies have not only limited the rights and opportunities of migrants but have also created a polarized society where fear and hostility thrive (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2018).

In contrast, the case of Canada illustrates a different approach to populism and social inclusion. While Canada has experienced populist movements, its historical context of multiculturalism and immigration has shaped a more inclusive national identity (Triandafyllidou, 2015). Policies that promote diversity and integration, such as the Multiculturalism Act, have fostered an environment where immigrants are seen as valuable contributors to society (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). While populist rhetoric has attempted to challenge this narrative, the overall economic and historical framework has led to a more resilient approach to social inclusion.

Canada’s commitment to welcoming refugees and immigrants has resulted in positive economic outcomes, as diverse groups bring varied skills and perspectives that enrich the workforce. However, challenges remain, particularly in addressing the needs of marginalized communities and combating discrimination (Granovetter, 1973). The contrasting experiences of Hungary and Canada underscore how historical narratives and economic conditions influence the outcomes of populist policies on social inclusion.

Another significant case study is Italy, where the rise of populism under leaders like Matteo Salvini has led to restrictive immigration policies that have profoundly affected social integration. Italy’s historical context, marked by economic challenges and high unemployment rates, has fueled a perception of migrants as competitors for scarce resources (UNHCR, 2012). Salvini’s “Italians First” campaign sought to capitalize on these anxieties, leading to policies that restrict access to social services and legal residency for migrants.

The effects of these policies have been particularly pronounced in regions where economic struggles are most acute. Migrants in Italy often face discrimination in the job market, and many are relegated to precarious employment (OECD, 2020). Additionally, populist rhetoric has fostered an environment where xenophobia is normalized, leading to increased violence against migrant communities (ECRI, 2024). This case illustrates how economic conditions, combined with populist narratives, can exacerbate the challenges faced by marginalized groups, resulting in significant barriers to social inclusion.

In summary, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are shaped by a complex interplay of economic and historical factors. Case studies from Hungary, Canada, and Italy reveal how these dynamics can lead to divergent outcomes in terms of social integration. Understanding these contexts is crucial for addressing the challenges posed by populism and developing strategies that promote inclusivity and social cohesion in increasingly diverse societies. By recognizing the differentiated effects of these policies, stakeholders can work towards creating environments that foster belonging and participation for all members of society.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the role of populism in redefining citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe reveals a complex and often troubling landscape. The emergence of populist movements has significantly influenced citizenship laws and principles, shifting the focus toward more exclusionary practices that prioritize ethnonational identity over inclusive citizenship. Through an analysis of changes in jus soli and jus sanguinis, it is evident that populist rhetoric has led to legislative reforms that reinforce a narrow definition of national belonging, marginalizing migrant communities and reshaping the fabric of European societies.

The implications of these changes extend beyond legal frameworks to the societal level, where public perceptions of migrants are increasingly shaped by populist narratives. These narratives often stigmatize migrants, portraying them as threats to national identity and social cohesion. As a result, migrants face considerable challenges in accessing essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, hindering their social integration and reinforcing systemic inequalities.

Furthermore, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform across Europe; they vary significantly based on historical and economic contexts. Case studies from countries like Hungary, Italy, and Canada illustrate the divergent effects of populism on social inclusion, revealing how economic anxieties and historical narratives shape the experiences of migrants. While some nations adopt restrictive measures that foster division and exclusion, others maintain more inclusive approaches that recognize the contributions of migrants to society.

Ultimately, this exploration underscores the pressing need for a reevaluation of citizenship and social inclusion policies in the face of rising populism. Addressing the challenges posed by exclusionary practices and fostering a more inclusive understanding of citizenship can enhance social cohesion and resilience in diverse societies. To achieve this, it is essential for policymakers, civil society, and communities to work collaboratively in promoting narratives that celebrate diversity, combat discrimination, and advocate for equitable access to rights and opportunities for all individuals, regardless of their background. In doing so, Europe can navigate the complexities of globalization while ensuring that its commitment to fundamental human rights and social justice remains unwavering. 


(*) Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo is a lecturer of political science and Executive Director of the Bureau of Strategic Studies (BESTRAT). He teaches at the University of Yaoundé II and has over 20 years of experience as a leading consultant in peace, security, and defense. With 11 books and more than 30 academic articles, his research focuses on security dynamics in Central Africa and the Lake Chad Basin, addressing issues like terrorism and conflict management. His expertise has contributed to numerous international peacebuilding efforts, and he regularly consults for organizations such as the United Nations System. Email: edouardyogo@yahoo.fr  


 

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Becker, J. (2019). Review of Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism, by P. Norris & R. Inglehart. International Affairs, 95(5), 1168–1169. 

Bonikowski, B., Halikiopoulou, D., Kaufmann, E., & Rooduijn, M. (2018). Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: A scholarly exchange. Nations and Nationalism, 25(1), 58-81.

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Germany, AfD, Donald Trump, US, China, Trade War, Tariffs,

Professor Fetzer: Populist Grievances Are More About Perception Than Reality

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Thiemo Fetzer argues that populist grievances are largely shaped by perception rather than lived experience. “Populism is a phenomenon of information overload,” Fetzer explains. “Many grievances amplified by populists are not grounded in demographic or economic realities but are shaped by narratives, particularly those spread through modern media.” Discussing global trade, economic inequality, and the rise of far-right movements, he warns that misinformation fuels discontent, making societies more vulnerable to populist rhetoric. From the future of the liberal order to the geopolitics of energy, Fetzer offers a data-driven perspective on the forces reshaping today’s world.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Thiemo Fetzer, an economist at the University of Warwick and the University of Bonn, argues that populist grievances are largely rooted in perception rather than actual lived experiences. However, as he warns, populists are particularly adept at exploiting these narratives for political gain.

Populism is a phenomenon of information overload,” Professor Fetzer explains. “Many grievances that populists amplify are not based on actual demographic or economic realities but are shaped by narratives, particularly those spread through modern media.” He highlights how, in many cases, communities most resistant to immigration often have little to no firsthand experience with immigrants—a paradox that underscores the role of perception over reality.

Professor Fetzer’s research delves into the economic, political, and social forces driving contemporary populism. In this interview, he explores the dynamics of global trade, industrial policy, economic inequality, and geopolitical shifts, particularly in the wake of a second Trump presidency.

Discussing global trade realignments, he explains that while China has aggressively localized production and built dominance over key supply chains, the US has primarily specialized in financialization, service-sector trade, and digital technology. This has led to geopolitical tensions, as China’s strategic control over minerals and industrial supply chains threatens US economic leadership.

Regarding the rise of far-right movements like the AfD in Germany, Professor Fetzer stresses that economic grievances alone do not fully explain their appeal. Instead, he argues, populist movements often thrive on a combination of perceived cultural shifts, economic anxieties, and declining trust in institutions.

He also critiques the role of digital media in fueling discontent, stating that “the collapse of traditional media landscapes has created an environment where misinformation and sensationalized narratives shape public perception more than facts.”

Finally, addressing the decline of the liberal world order, he challenges the idea that neo-mercantilism and protectionism signal its end. Instead, he suggests that a shift toward industrial policy—particularly in the energy sector—has long been in motion.

With economic nationalism, trade wars, and geopolitical realignments defining today’s global landscape, Professor Fetzer provides a data-driven perspective on the forces shaping modern populism.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Thiemo Fetzer with some edits.