Professor Neil Robinson expresses his concerns regarding a potential escalation in the crackdown on dissent, heightened control measures, intensified efforts to label domestic opponents as foreign agents or traitors, and increased indoctrination through the education and media systems following Vladimir Putin’s resounding victory in the recent election. Additionally, he underscores the notion that Putin does not operate alone at the apex of power but rather is bolstered by a circle of allies. Robinson argues, “While this has always been true, there’s now an effort to transform this ‘collective Putin’ into more than just a hegemonic identity that Russians are expected to adhere to; it’s becoming a true collective, an unquestionable identity. Thus, the expansion of these dynamics may lead us to reconsider Putinism as something distinct from official populism.”
In a landscape characterized by shifting power dynamics and heightened political tensions, Professor Neil Robinson, a distinguished scholar of Comparative Politics at the University of Limerick, offers profound insights into the evolving nature of Putinism and its ramifications for Russian politics. In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Robinson delves into the intricate layers of Vladimir Putin’s regime, shedding light on the mechanisms through which power is consolidated and dissent suppressed.
Professor Robinson’s analysis underscores a fundamental shift in the dynamics of Putinism, emphasizing the emergence of what he terms as the ‘collective Putin.’ Contrary to conventional perceptions of Putin as a solitary figure at the helm, Professor Robinson elucidates how Putin operates within a circle of allies, transforming this collective into an unquestionable identity for the Russian populace. He warns against overlooking this transformation, asserting that it signifies a departure from traditional notions of official populism, warranting a re-evaluation of Putinism as a distinct political phenomenon.
Moreover, Professor Robinson highlights his concerns regarding an escalation in the crackdown on dissent, heightened control measures, intensified efforts to label domestic opponents as foreign agents or traitors, and increased indoctrination through the education and media systems in the aftermath of Vladimir Putin’s decisive victory in the recent election.
Drawing from his extensive research, Professor Robinson elucidates the evolution of populist rhetoric in Russia, contextualizing it within broader political frames such as constitutional order and legality. He delves into the strategic deployment of these discourses to stabilize regime hybridity, putting forward how they interact to shape the political landscape. Robinson’s nuanced analysis dispels simplistic characterizations of Putinism, emphasizing its complex ideological layers rather than a cohesive doctrine. He cautions against dismissing Putinism as devoid of ideology, highlighting its profound impact on political discourse and policy formulation.
Professor Robinson provides critical insights into the intersection of official populism with cultural themes, probing its implications for addressing the material needs of diverse social groups within Russia. He explains how the cultural-centric approach adopted by the regime has ramifications for economic development and social cohesion, underscoring the inherent tensions between the cultural narrative of official populism and the economic realities faced by the populace.
Furthermore, Professor Robinson examines the strategies employed by Putin to consolidate power domestically and advance Russia’s interests on the global stage. He analyzes the utilization of events such as terror attacks and elections as opportunities to bolster the regime’s position, both domestically and internationally. Professor Robinson’s comprehensive analysis offers invaluable insights into the complexities of contemporary Russian politics, providing a nuanced understanding of Putinism and its implications for the trajectory of the Russian state.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Neil Robinson with some edits.
The Construction of Putinism Has Undergone Significant Evolution Over Time
In the article titled, ‘Populism and Political development in Hybrid regimes: Russia and Development of Official Populism’ you argue how populist rhetoric in Russia evolved alongside other political frames, such as the emphasis on constitutional order and legality. Could you elaborate on how these competing discourses were strategically employed to stabilize regime hybridity, and how they may have interacted with each other to shape political discourse in Russia?
Neil Robinson: Obviously, Russia exhibits a distinctly different type of populism compared to the forms prevalent in Europe or Latin America, although significant differences exist among those regions as well. In Russia, populism evolved as a response to electoral threats faced by the regime in 2011-2012. It aimed to ensure stability for the regime while simultaneously excluding political rivals to Vladimir Putin. This form of populism allowed the regime to assert a democratic façade while consolidating power. Therefore, while Russia saw the emergence of a more authoritarian and ideological form of politics post-2011-2012, it purported to maintain democratic continuity within the existing constitutional framework, rather than merely serving as a power grab by Putin.
This narrative of stability and continuity was constructed by amalgamating various discursive frames, including democracy, market economy, and conservative cultural values. This synthesis introduced an ideological shift from the earlier stages of Putin’s presidency. However, it’s essential to recognize that this form of populism does not advocate for radical restructuring of the political system to reflect the will of the people. Instead, it promises continuity to safeguard the popular will and prevent its displacement by foreign values.
In addition, other forms of political discourse utilized by Putin are crucial and should not be overlooked in political analysis. Unfortunately, they are often overshadowed by the focus on the traditional, conservative themes present in his speeches, with many viewing these as the sole elements of significance in his ideology. However, every aspect contributes to the construction of Putinism, and their usage has evolved over time. This adaptability has allowed the regime to address various challenges differently since 2012, particularly with the incorporation of populist tropes into its rhetoric.
Conservative Traditionalism Constituted the Core of Putin’s Populism
You discuss the development of official populism under Vladimir Putin, particularly its acceleration after 2012. Could you elaborate on the factors that contributed to this rapid acceleration, and how did war in Ukraine reinforce the narrative of official populism?
Neil Robinson: In some respects, although one should be cautious not to draw too rigid a line, there exists a distinction between articulating the official populist stance, as Sarah Milne and I described in the article you referenced, and the war in Ukraine. The official populist position was formulated to safeguard the political system and imbue it with purpose, serving as justification for Putin’s return to power. Thus, there was a pragmatic aspect to this articulation; it functioned as a tool in discourse. However, this discourse took on a life of its own as it permeated Russia’s media landscape, particularly the official media structures, fostering a more aggressive, nationalistic, and anti-liberal environment that has persisted over the past decade or so.
On one hand, the ideology of conservative traditionalism, which formed the core of Putin’s populism, seeped into the public consciousness through the media infrastructure. However, it also began to influence other areas of policymaking, albeit much later. Slowly over the course of the 2010s, it started to feature more prominently in foreign policy discourse. Furthermore, it began to shape how Russian democracy was conceptualized and what its purpose was, particularly evident in 2020 when Putin amended the constitution. These ideological themes, expressly embedded in other articles of the Russian Constitution, came to define the essence of the Russian people within the constitutional framework. Gradually, the populist message spread, evolving into a force that was increasingly independent of Putin as its original articulator. It morphed into a structural force in its own right.
Ukraine presented a dilemma within this discourse. It was perceived to be a part of the “Russian world,” sharing the same values as the Russian people and the diverse traditional religions present in Russia. However, this posed an ontological trap in Putin’s ideology. How could one claim authenticity to the “Russian world” when elsewhere within it, different ways of life existed? How could one reconcile the divergence in relationships with the West, with some embracing liberalism, which was deemed a threat, and others embracing a European direction of development, considered a betrayal of organic interests?
Though there wasn’t a straightforward trajectory from the articulation of the official populist stance in 2012 onwards, particularly during the period spanning 2012 to 2014, the war in Ukraine reflects the biases and concerns of Putin’s official populism. It can be seen as a response to the most imminent and significant threat to that discourse: the existence of individuals within the “Russian world” living in divergent ways. The onset of the war served to entrench and intensify this discourse, also engendering a necessity for mobilization around it. Initially exclusionary, the discourse aimed to undermine the political agency of liberals and ethno-nationalists in Russia, providing Putin and the Kremlin with a means to regulate political participation and discredit alternative forms of engagement as futile. However, with the advent of the war, this discourse evolved into a foundation for mobilization in its own right. This shift has led to the utilization of symbols and an increased emphasis on patriotic education, as well as the incorporation of the educational sector—encompassing both school-age children and higher education—into the ideological state apparatus. These developments have both deepened and broadened in conjunction with the war, altering the relationship with populism in Russia. While complex, this dynamic has also transformed the activation and enactment of populism within the country.
Russia Will Need to Confront Its Persisting Development Challenges
A beggar spotted begging in Red Square in Moscow, Russia. Photo: Elena Rostunova.
You argue that official populism in Russia is primarily centered around cultural themes, lacking a significant focus on socio-economic or political issues. How does this cultural-centric approach impact the regime’s ability to address the material needs of different social groups within Russia? Are there potential conflicts between the cultural narrative of official populism and the economic realities faced by the populace?
Neil Robinson: Yes, the focus was on politics, values rather than on economic and social development for Russia, and this was a deliberate choice. The regime adopted a populist approach that could be touted as successful regardless of economic circumstances. After the global economic crisis of 2008, Russia failed to address the structural causes of its own economic downturn. Uncertainty loomed over how these issues would be tackled. Thus, a political narrative of success was constructed, detached from any substantial economic changes. This populist rhetoric did not advocate for specific economic policies or structural reforms; instead, it narrowly focused on maintaining political legitimacy.
Economics, meanwhile, was relegated to other discourses, continuing ineffective attempts to blend patronage politics with marketization. These efforts had previously failed to stimulate economic growth in Russia beyond its energy sectors. The populist success that can be declared and demonstrated through speeches, as well as aggressive actions against Western hegemony, is often portrayed as something tangible and real. The regime struggled to find a solution to this dilemma, only stumbling upon a resurgence in economic growth around 2012, largely due to the accidental uptick in energy prices. This rediscovery marked a return to economic growth, albeit without a deliberate strategy in place.
Following the declaration of war in Ukraine, there has been a form of military Keynesianism, essentially injecting funds into the military economy and observing some spill-over effects into the broader economy. However, these measures do not lay the groundwork for Russia’s long-term development. Sooner or later, the war will end—hopefully sooner—and Russia will need to address its ongoing development challenges, including issues such as depletion horizons in the oil industry. The focus on cultural values has come at a cost to Russia. While this cost hasn’t been immediately detrimental to the regime due to fortunate circumstances, luck is not a sustainable strategy in the long term.
Putinism Cannot Simply Be Disregarded as Irrelevant
The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill and Russian President Vladimir Putin as they attended a ceremony celebrating the 1025 anniversary of the Baptism of Kievan Rus in Kiev, Ukraine on July, 27, 2013. Photo: Shutterstock.
In your article titled “Putin and the Incompleteness of Putinism” you argue against both the notion that Putinism resembles Soviet ideology and the idea that ideology plays a negligible role in Putin’s regime. Could you elaborate on why neither of these extremes accurately characterizes Putinism, and what implications this has for understanding contemporary Russian politics?
Neil Robinson: This question delves into a vast territory. Within the realm of Russian studies, there’s a prevalent inclination to seek parallels with the Soviet era. Much of the analysis concerning Putin and ideology is filtered through this Soviet prism. Historically, two perspectives have dominated the discussion of Soviet ideology. One perspective regards the Soviet system as fundamentally flawed and absurd—a relic of totalitarianism. Consequently, there’s a strong temptation to interpret Russia’s increasing authoritarian tendencies as a regression into Soviet-style governance. On the flip side, another viewpoint questions whether Soviet leaders genuinely adhered to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Many argue that these leaders lacked philosophical depth, especially post-Lenin, viewing their ideological pronouncements as mere lip service. So, instead of fixating on ideological roots, it’s more prudent for us to scrutinize the material interests at play in politics and prioritize our analysis accordingly.
The issue with both of these explanations is twofold. Firstly, they set an excessively high bar for defining something as ideological. By insisting that an ideology must adhere to a structured worldview like Marxism-Leninism, we inadvertently limit the scope of what can be considered ideological. This leads to a strained analysis when trying to fit Putinism into predefined ideological categories. Conversely, dismissing Putinism as non-ideological overlooks its significant impact. The articulated discourse within the Kremlin shapes media environments and political participation, extending beyond mere pragmatism.
To dismiss these factors as inconsequential would be a mistake. Putinism cannot simply be disregarded as irrelevant after over a decade of shaping policies and narratives. Assertions likening Putin to Stalin or portraying him as merely pragmatic miss the mark. The reality lies somewhere in between these extremes.
A more nuanced approach is to view Putinism not as a traditional ideology in the vein of Marxism, but rather as a complex discourse. This discourse encompasses elements of cultural conservatism alongside discussions of constitutionality, democracy, and economic development. These facets often conflict with one another, creating a dynamic and multifaceted system. Putinism cannot be neatly categorized as a continuation of the Soviet Union nor reduced to a purely pragmatic authoritarian regime serving the interests of a small elite. While the elite undoubtedly benefits, the system encompasses broader complexities that defy simplistic characterization.
There are pitfalls in veering too far in either direction. Currently, there’s a risk of leaning towards a totalitarian characterization due to the ongoing war. The heightened mobilization may indeed resemble aspects of totalitarianism, particularly in its outreach to the populace, which previous forms of populism lacked. However, it’s overly simplistic to entirely categorize these developments as totalitarian without considering their broader implications.
In my article, I aimed to caution against such extreme categorizations and advocate for a more balanced perspective. It’s essential to remain open-minded and not dismiss statements outright simply because they may seem intellectually lacking. While much of the discourse may indeed lack coherence or deep philosophical grounding, we must still examine its effects and implications. It’s a call to engage critically with ideas, even if we don’t view them as inherently profound or coherent philosophical positions.
The Indiscriminate Application of the Label “Russophobia” by Putin
You argue that Putinism has ideological layers rather than a cohesive ideology. Could you elaborate on how these layers interact and how they contribute to the overall political discourse in contemporary Russia?
Neil Robinson: This question presents a significant challenge for me, not because I lack belief in it, but rather because I perceive shifts occurring within the relationships among these layers. What I originally posited was the existence of a regime-supporting discourse emerging after 2012, characterized by conservative ideologies. This discourse was instrumental in facilitating Putin’s return to the presidency that year and in legitimizing the system. However, its scope was rather limited, focusing on specific topics. Subsequently, ideological entrepreneurs, including individuals in the media and certain political factions aligned with Putin’s regime, seized upon and expanded these ideas, forming what I term a regime-supporting discourse. They took Putin’s concepts and intertwined them with other prevailing notions in Russian politics, thereby enriching the discourse surrounding the regime. Their objective was not only to secure positions for themselves within Russia’s media infrastructure but also to extend the reach of the regime’s own narrative. Thus, we can discern multiple layers: Putin’s original discourse, augmented by additional elements, propagated by secondary political figures and media personalities associated with Putin-aligned parties, whether officially part of the opposition or not.
The demarcation between these layers remained relatively clear until around 2020. However, with the constitutional changes, Putin began incorporating ideas from the broader regime supporting discourse into the official narrative, blurring the lines between the two. This interaction marked a significant shift, epitomized by the constitutional amendments of 2020, where the regime’s discourse expanded to include elements from below, integrating them into the official rhetoric. This evolution underscores a crucial change in the landscape of ideas, challenging the notion that everything is purely pragmatic. As ideas flow from below into the official discourse and are adopted by Putin and others, disentangling from this discourse becomes increasingly challenging.
Now, one significant method to discern these shifts is by examining the language employed. For instance, within the regime-supporting discourse, arguments about Russophobia were prevalent, portraying the West as inherently anti-Russian. Initially, such rhetoric wasn’t commonly used by top political figures like Putin. They acknowledged Russophobia but were more discerning in attributing it. It wasn’t a blanket accusation against all who criticized Russia. Rather, it was a narrative cultivated within the regime-supporting discourse, emphasizing a sense of victimhood: “Look at the way the world hates us.” However, this has now undergone a reversal. Putin and others at the apex of the political system regularly utilize this rhetoric. The label of Russophobia is indiscriminately applied to almost anyone critical of Russia. This shift highlights how certain ideas migrate between layers of discourse over time.
This relay of ideas has been further bolstered by recent war as mentioned earlier. These developments contribute to the reinforcement of authoritarian tendencies and provide new justifications for repression. As these dynamics evolve, they create fertile ground for authoritarian practices in novel ways.
Efforts to Transform ‘Collective Putin’ into More Than Just a Hegemonic Identity
Vladimir Putin’s portrait. Illustration: Tpyxa_Illustartion.
In light of Vladimir Putin’s landslide victory in the recent election just weeks after murder of Alexei Navalny, what strategies do you anticipate him employing to further consolidate his power domestically, particularly considering the heightened repression of dissent and independent voices witnessed in the lead-up to the election?
Neil Robinson: More of the same: more repression, more control, more doubling down on labeling domestic opponents as foreign agents, traitors, or individuals lacking the correct patriotic spirit. There will be increased mobilization around these narratives, along with heightened efforts to embed them into people’s minds through the education and media systems.
In essence, there’s been much discussion about what’s sometimes referred to as the “collective Putin.” Putin doesn’t operate in isolation at the top; rather, he is supported by a circle of allies. While this has always been true, there’s now an effort to transform this “collective Putin” into more than just a hegemonic identity that Russians are expected to adhere to; it’s becoming a true collective, an unquestionable identity. Thus, the expansion of these dynamics may lead us to reconsider Putinism as something distinct from official populism. However, this transformation is a gradual process, and the extent and pace of its progression remain uncertain. Only time will reveal the full extent of these developments.
Election Victory Spurs Putin to Further Marginalize Dissident Voices
Mass protests in Russia demanded the release of Alexei Navalny. Police detained protesters in Moscow, Russia, on January 31, 2021. A girl holds a sign saying “Freedom for Putin from office!” Photo: Elena Rostunova.
Given the international condemnation of the election as a sham and the concerns raised about its legitimacy, how do you envision Putin leveraging his victory to advance Russia’s interests on the global stage, particularly concerning the ongoing occupation in Ukraine?
Neil Robinson: It’s evident that the election results will likely be used to justify the annexation of territories claimed as part of the Russian Federation, where purportedly overwhelming support for Putin was reported. Regions like Sevastopol, Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, etc., supposedly showed significant support for Putin, though the legitimacy of these figures is questionable. This tactic mirrors previous attempts, such as the 2014 referendum in Crimea, aimed at legitimizing annexation efforts. While such assertions may not hold sway with much of mainstream political opinion in the West, they find traction elsewhere, even among certain European politicians who congratulate Putin, citing the “will of the people.” Supporters of Putin’s populist, authoritarian, and international agenda are likely to echo the Kremlin’s narrative regarding the elections and support for Putin.
In terms of expectations, I anticipate more of the same: a reinforcement of existing narratives, further marginalization of dissident voices within Russia—evident during the election and the aftermath of Navalny’s death—and continued crackdowns on protestors. These actions perpetuate the ongoing tragedy unfolding in Russia today.
Professor Robinson, considering the recent terror attack in Moscow claimed by the Islamic State group, how do you anticipate President Putin will leverage this event to strengthen his regime’s position domestically and internationally?
Neil Robinson: I think we’ve seen it, haven’t we? There’s been this weak attempt to tie events to Ukraine, perpetuating a narrative that terrorist attacks in Russia are part of a broader global conspiracy encouraged by the West, particularly the United States. Despite repeated instances where Western intelligence agencies, including those in the US, warned against such attacks, these claims persist. It all contributes to the conspiratorial narrative integral to Putinism—a worldview characterized by an “us against the world” mentality, where individuals are either allies or adversaries. This narrative is clearly the one Russian authorities seek to propagate. They even acknowledge that some responsibility lies with Islamist terrorists like Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), but they argue that ISK itself is a byproduct of Western actions: destabilization and arrogance. According to their perspective, Russia unfairly bears the brunt of these consequences.
“The Implications of Rising Multipolarity for Authoritarian Populist Governance, Multilateralism, and the Nature of New Globalization,” by Dr. Barrie AXFORD(Professor Emeritus in Politics, Centre for Global Politics Economy and Society (GPES), School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University).
Panel -I-
Interactions Between Multilateralism, Multi-Order World, and Populism
Moderator
Dr. Albena AZMANOVA (Professor, Chair in Political and Social Science, Department of Politics and International Relations and Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent).
Speakers
“Reimagining Global Economic Governance and the State of the Global Governance,” by Dr. Stewart PATRICK (Senior Fellow and Director, Global Order and Institutions Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
“Multipolarity and a post-Ukraine War New World Order: The Rise of Populism,” by Dr. Viktor JAKUPEC (Hon. Professor of International Development, Faculty of Art and Education, Deakin University, Australia; Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Potsdam University, Germany).
Panel -II-
The Future of Democracy Between Resilience & Decline
Moderator
Dr. Nora FISHER-ONAR (Associate Professor of International Studies at the University of San Francisco).
Speakers
“The Impact of Populist Authoritarian Politics on the Future Course of Globalization, Economics, the Rule of Law and Human Rights,” by Dr. James BACCHUS (Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs; Director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity, School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, University of Central Florida, Former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body).
“Resilience of Democracies Against the Authoritarian Populism,” by Dr. Kurt WEYLAND (Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts, Department of Government University of Texas at Austin).
“Global Trends for Democracy and Autocracy: On the Third Wave of Autocratization and the Cases of Democratic Reversals,” by Dr. Marina NORD (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg).
Day II (March 20, 2024)
Keynote Speech
“How Globalization, under Neoliberal Auspices, Has Stimulated Right-wing Populism and What Might Be Done to Arrest That Tendency?” by Dr. Robert KUTTNER (Meyer and Ida Kirstein Professor in Social Planning and Administration at Brandeis University’s Heller School, Co-Founder and Co-Editor of The American Prospect).
(Postdoctoral Research Fellow, China Research Analyst at Institute of East Asian Studies, Duisburg-Essen University).
Speakers
“China’s Appeal to Populist Leaders: A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed,” by Dr. Steven R. DAVID (Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University).
“Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Vision for Globalization?” by Dr. Jinghan ZENG (Professor of China and International Studies at Lancaster University).
“Predicting the Nature of the Next Generation Globalization under China, Multipolarity, and Authoritarian Populism” byHumphrey HAWKSLEY(Author, Commentator and Broadcaster).
Special Commentator Dr. Ho Tze Ern BENJAMIN (Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, Coordinator at the China Program, and International Relations Program).
Closing Session
Economic Implications of Rising Populism and Multipolarity
(Associate Professor in International Relations at School of Society and Culture, University of Plymouth).
Speaker
“Demise of Multilateralism and Politicization of International Trade Relations and the Multilateral Trading System,” by Dr. Giorgio SACERDOTI (Professor of Law, Bocconi University; Former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body).
Reminding that elections are pivotal in justifying Iranian religious leadership and sustaining political legitimacy, Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh emphasizes that the recent turnout data from Iran’s elections serves as a stark wake-up call for authorities. He argues that the low turnout raised serious concerns for the regime’s legitimacy and underscores that the Iranian regime has come to recognize that its legitimacy is significantly at risk, perhaps even non-existent.
Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh, a distinguished Research Professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, emphasizes that the recent turnout data from Iran’s elections serves as a stark wake-up call for authorities. He underscores the significance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s consistent emphasis on the necessity of voter participation to validate the regime’s legitimacy. “Elections are pivotal in justifying Iranian religious leadership. Despite its reluctance to relinquish control, the Supreme Leader has adamantly advocated for the continuation of elections, emphasizing their importance in sustaining political legitimacy,” underlines Professor Akbarzadeh.
Iran witnessed its lowest voter turnout since the 1979 Revolution during the parliamentary elections held on March 1, 2024. Conservative politicians secured a dominant position in Iran’s parliament, maintaining control over the Islamic Consultative Assembly despite a record-low turnout amid widespread boycott calls. These results unfolded against the backdrop of heightened tensions following the tragic death of Mahsa Amini, sparking widespread protests that directly challenged the legitimacy of the regime. Akbarzadeh notes, “The low turnout raised serious concerns. The national figure of 41% is alarming, but it’s even more concerning when considering urban centers. For instance, in Tehran, the turnout was approximately 25%, significantly lower than the national average. Only a quarter of eligible voters cast their ballots in Tehran. I think the regime has come to recognize that its legitimacy is significantly at risk, perhaps even non-existent.”
In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Akbarzadeh offers a critical analysis of the regime’s response to societal unrest and the evolving dynamics within the women’s empowerment movement against the backdrop of heightened tensions following the death of Mahsa Amini. Despite the regime’s efforts to suppress opposition, particularly in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini’s killing, Professor Akbarzadeh pays homage to the resilience of Iranian women who continue to defy oppressive norms and assert their rights.
Moreover, Professor Akbarzadeh highlights the consolidation of power by hardliners within the Iranian government and parliament, signaling a concerning homogenization of power in the hands of conservative circles. He underscores the regime’s increasing detachment from the electorate, fueled by a lack of responsiveness to popular demands and a narrowing space for dissent within the Parliament.
Looking ahead, Professor Akbarzadeh also warns of a turbulent future characterized by an increasingly hardline Iran and the potential return of the Trump administration in the US. He cautions against the uncertainty surrounding US policy towards Iran, particularly in light of past decisions that destabilized diplomatic efforts, such as the withdrawal from the nuclear agreement. Against this backdrop, Professor Akbarzadeh emphasizes the need for vigilance and foresight in navigating the complex geopolitical landscape, where the interplay between domestic discontent and international relations shapes the trajectory of Iran’s governance structures.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh with some edits.
The Iranian Regime Presents Itself as a Trailblazer to be Emulated by Muslims
Islamist populism has been a significant force in various political movements worldwide. In the context of theocratic Iran, how does sectarian Islamist populism manifest, and to what extent does it influence public discourse and policymaking?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: If you’re examining populism, populism in Iran revolves around the concept of the Ummah. The Iranian regime has risen to power with the principle of advancing the interests of the Ummah. While the Ummah is a global concept, within the Iranian context, it primarily refers to the Iranian nation. There’s a persistent notion that the Iranian nation, or the Iranian Ummah, will serve as a blueprint for the global Ummah to emulate. Therefore, when analyzing the rhetoric and messages from the Iranian leadership, it becomes evident that the Iranian revolution has paved the way to demonstrate to the global Ummah the necessary steps to establish an Islamic model of governance and justice.
That consistency has indeed been a cornerstone since the inception of the Revolution in 1979, as the notion of Iran leading the way was codified in the Constitution. This principle heavily influences Iranian foreign policy and continues to do so today. For instance, during the Arab Spring a decade ago, it was evident that the popular movements in many countries weren’t centered around Islam or an Islamic model of governance. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, a prominent player in the region, found itself grappling with how to respond effectively, essentially playing catch-up. However, Iran took a different approach, organizing events and conferences to portray the Arab Spring as an Islamic awakening. In their narrative, they depicted the Arab population as awakening to the model provided by Iran finally, positioning Iran as a trailblazer to be emulated. This narrative often revolves around the idea of representing and leading the Ummah globally, shaping Iranian stances on issues ranging from relations with the United States to Israel and events in Palestine.
Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh, a distinguished Research Professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University.
In the Iranian historical and political context, do differences in populism exist among various actors such as former and current presidents, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei, judiciary and military figures?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: There isn’t a substantial difference among various actors within the Iranian elite. Primarily, they tend to utilize populism in their approach, with the key variance lying between the reformists and the more conservative factions, particularly concerning the religious dimension of populism. Notably, only President Muhammad Khatami sought to distinguish himself by deviating from the prevailing narrative of the Ummah and instead advocating for a dialogue of civilizations, emphasizing mutual learning among peoples. This perspective introduces a civilizational angle, although it does not entirely depart from the Islamic civilization framework. Khatami’s approach represents a nuanced departure from the dominant perspective, allowing for differentiation among various cultures and individuals.
However, with President Ibrahim Raisi assuming office and the Conservatives consolidating power in Iran, there’s been a resurgence of the original four-decade-old perspective on the Islamic Ummah. Iran now positions itself at the forefront of the global Islamic Ummah, portraying itself as the champion of the Muslim nations against the United States and Israel, among other adversaries.
Iran is frequently depicted as a theocratic authoritarian state, where the amalgamation of theocratic principles with sui generis authoritarian governance profoundly shapes both domestic policies and interactions with the international community. Within this framework, the notion of theocratic populism arises as a pivotal aspect of Iran’s political terrain. How does the Iranian government strategically utilize the principles of theocracy in a populist manner to garner popular support domestically and internationally?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: I think this further elaborates on our previous discussion and reinforces prior points. The Islamic Republic portrays itself as the defender of the Muslim Ummah, thereby implicating others as betrayers of this collective identity. Consequently, neighboring states are discredited for their perceived failure to uphold Islam’s interests on a global scale. Iran particularly criticizes Saudi Arabia, its primary regional rival, for allegedly neglecting the Palestinian cause and for entertaining the notion of normalizing relations with Israel through the Abrahamic Accords. This perspective of Iran leading the global Muslim Ummah permeates its actions both regionally and internationally.
Domestically, this perspective enables the leadership to brush aside dissent, opposition to governance, and the interests of women. For instance, women’s rights are often framed as Western imports, lacking indigenous roots or compatibility with the nation’s traditions. This justification is used to enforce compulsory hijab, suppress political opposition, and mandate obedience to Islamic and governmental authorities. The regime dismisses foreign concepts and practices, including women’s rights and individual liberties, to solidify its legitimacy.
The Supreme Leader Has Ultimate Control in Iran
Considering the complex interplay between Islamism, Islamist populism, theocratic populism, and theocratic authoritarianism, what are the main challenges and opportunities for political reform or evolution within Iran, particularly in light of the country’s unique blend of theocratic governance and sui generis electoral politics?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: It’s ironic how Iran boasts about its elections as evidence of the regime’s popularity, citing the participation of citizens at the ballot box. They highlight presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections, conveniently overlooking the meticulously orchestrated nature of these events. In reality, these elections are more of a carefully choreographed spectacle. The Guardian Council holds significant sway, determining candidates’ eligibility based on their allegiance to the Supreme Leader. This has led to absurd scenarios where sitting parliamentarians critical of the conservative faction, possibly aligned with the Reformists, are barred from running for re-election due to doubts about their loyalty to the Supreme Leader.
Elections are pivotal in the justification of Iranian religious leadership. Despite its reluctance to relinquish control, the Supreme Leader has adamantly advocated for the continuation of elections, emphasizing their importance in sustaining political legitimacy. Even during the last parliamentary election, the Supreme Leader urged participation, regardless of agreement with his views, recognizing the significance of electoral engagement in validating the regime. However, these elections are carefully managed to maintain control. While they serve as a facade of legitimacy, ultimate authority lies with the unelected Supreme Leader, who wields power over the armed forces, judiciary, and the composition of the Guardian Council, which in turn determines parliamentary candidates. The supreme leader has ultimate control. This orchestration creates the illusion of choice within an authoritarian framework designed to consolidate control.
Internet Emerges as the Next Battleground for the Regime
How does the Iranian regime utilize advanced IT and digital technologies to extend the reach of its repression and authoritarian digital information strategies both domestically and internationally?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: The Islamic Republic of Iran found itself navigating new territory during the Green Movement of 2009. With Facebook emerging as a primary platform for organizing protests, it became evident that social media, Facebook rather than Twitter, played a central role in coordinating dissent. Observing the potential of the internet as a catalyst for opposition, the regime recognized the danger posed by online mobilization. This awareness was heightened by the events of the Arab Spring and similar movements in the region, where social media was instrumental in galvanizing resistance against authoritarian regimes. The regime perceived online activism as a precursor to physical demonstrations, posing a significant threat to its survival.
They embarked on seeking solutions, studying China and other nations’ approaches. They realized the necessity of gaining control over the internet and social media. Consequently, they heavily invested in developing mechanisms to regulate online activity, drawing inspiration from China’s firewall strategy. This culminated in plans for a national intranet, effectively isolating Iranian internet users from the global web. This poses a significant threat to freedom of expression and access to information within Iran, as it disconnects citizens from the outside world. Once implemented, bypassing such restrictions becomes exceedingly challenging. Despite this, Iranian internet users have demonstrated resourcefulness, employing various methods such as VPNs and satellite connections. Nevertheless, the establishment of such controls remains a formidable obstacle to accessing information for Iranian citizens.
The regime has also advanced its surveillance capabilities with sophisticated technologies like facial recognition, strategically deploying cameras in public spaces to monitor the population closely. This allows the regime to swiftly respond to potential protests by deploying security forces and identifying individuals of interest using facial recognition software. Consequently, the internet has emerged as the next battleground for the regime to assert control and stifle dissent. This ongoing struggle presents significant challenges, and while the regime hasn’t definitively triumphed in securing and manipulating the internet, the risks posed by their efforts are considerable.
Iran Relies on Russia and China to Safeguard Its Interests in International Forums
President Vladimir Putin of Russia and then-Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in Yerevan, Armenia, attending the session of the supreme Eurasian Economic Council on October 1, 2019. Photo: Gevorg Ghazaryan.
It is widely acknowledged that authoritarian regimes engage in extensive and intensive collaboration among themselves. In this context, how does the Iranian regime collaborate with countries such as China, Russia, etc., to expand its capacity to enforce its theocratic authoritarianism?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: Iran’s strategic outlook has indeed turned towards China for technological expertise, particularly in internet control and surveillance, as previously mentioned. Additionally, Iran seeks Chinese investment in its infrastructure, facilitated through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Iranian economy has long suffered under sanctions, necessitating external investment and access to Chinese technology to mitigate the adverse effects. Consequently, China emerges as a pivotal player in Iran’s quest to address the economic challenges and bolster its armed forces.
Similarly, Russia holds significant importance for Iran, albeit in a different capacity. While Russia’s role may not primarily involve technological transfers, it provides crucial diplomatic and political protection to Iran. This relationship has intensified due to escalating tensions between Russia and the United States, aligning their interests further. Iran actively demonstrates its commitment to and value for Russia, particularly in countering Western influence and Western hegemony. This convergence of interests is evident during the conflict in Ukraine.
Iran has developed its own drone technology, largely indigenous, which has proven highly effective, especially with low-flying drones capable of evading radar detection. These drones, more cost-effective than sophisticated US models, have demonstrated their utility in overwhelming defense systems. Russia, impressed by their performance in hitting Ukraine, has invited Iran to establish a drone manufacturing base in its territory. This exchange represents a transfer of relatively low-tech capabilities from Iran to Russia, underscoring Iran’s desire to maintain close ties with Russia on the global stage.
Iran relies on Russia and China to safeguard its interests in international forums such as the United Nations Security Council, particularly when facing resolutions or sanctions. However, while Iran expects unwavering support, historical precedent suggests that Russia and China carefully weigh their own economic and strategic interests before fully backing Iran. Nevertheless, from Iran’s perspective, maintaining strong relationships with Russia and China is a prudent move, serving its long-term interests in navigating international politics.
Low Turnout in Elections Raised Serious Legitimacy Concerns
Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Hamaney on billboard in Tabriz, Iran on August 11, 2019.
The latest Iranian presidential election and recent parliamentary elections saw a historically low turnout, signaling widespread disillusionment with the Mullah regime among the electorate. To what extent do you perceive the record-low turnout of 41% in the recent elections, which was the first in the aftermath of the killing of Mahsa Amini, as indicative of deeper societal shifts and potential challenges to the legitimacy and future of the current regime in Iran?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: This incident served as a significant wake-up call for the authorities. As previously mentioned, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has consistently emphasized the importance of participation in elections. He has reiterated, “Even if you disagree with me, exercise your right to vote.” For him, voting signifies the legitimacy of the regime regardless of dissenting opinions. Thus, the low turnout raised serious concerns. The cited national figure of 41% is alarming, but it’s even more concerning when considering urban centers. For instance, in Tehran, the turnout was approximately 25%, significantly lower than the national average. Only a quarter of eligible voters cast their ballots in Tehran.
This revelation is indeed shocking, though not entirely unexpected given the sentiments expressed during Mahsa Amini’s tragic death while in custody over an alleged hijab violation. The outcry from women in the streets condemning the Supreme Leader and calling for an end to dictatorship was unmistakable. Their demands extended beyond mere choice regarding the hijab; they contested the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic regime as representatives of the nation. Unfortunately, this protest was brutally suppressed, as authoritarian regimes often resort to brute force to maintain control. They deploy soldiers and security forces to quash dissent, resorting to violence, torture, and imprisonment. Regrettably, this ruthless tactic proved effective once again.
I think the regime has come to recognize that its legitimacy is significantly at risk, perhaps even non-existent. The turnout for the election, with only 41% nationwide and 25% in Tehran, serves as another stark reminder and indicates the depth of the regime’s troubles.
Iranian Parliament Tilts Further Towards Hardline Stance within Conservative Camp
In light of the recent legislative elections held on March 1, could you provide an analysis of the historical significance of these elections within the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political evolution and the broader trajectory of its governance structures?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: We’ve already addressed the issue of lack of legitimacy, which remains a significant factor. What this election has underscored is the consolidation of power by the hardliners across all branches of the Iranian government. The judiciary, the Presidency, and the Parliament are now firmly under their control. In the past, there was some level of diversity and dissent within the Parliament, even if it leaned towards conservatism. However, the current composition of the Parliament lacks that diversity. It’s now a predominantly conservative body, indicating a concerning homogenization of power and personnel in Iran.
Now, with that being said, we’re also observing some differentiation within the conservative faction. Conservatives can now even be categorized into pragmatists and hardliners. For instance, take Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who held a prominent position in the previous Parliament. He’s a conservative, not a reformist. However, he’s not gaining traction in this election, even finding himself sidelined. This shift indicates a consolidation of power within the conservative ranks, leaning more towards the hardline stance. So, what does this indicate? It suggests that the regime is further distancing itself from the population, creating an even wider gap between the government and the people. The leadership is increasingly detached from the electorate.
What does this imply for policy? I believe it has rather dire political implications because of this growing disconnect. They no longer feel compelled to heed popular demands, perhaps even feeling they don’t need to respond due to their increasing isolation. The Parliament has evolved into more of an echo chamber, devoid of internal challenge. With the President, Parliament, and judiciary all aligned with the conservative hardline ideology, it becomes a reinforcing echo chamber for their ideological convictions regarding Iran’s direction and both domestic and international policies.
In the wake of the tragic killing of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, how would you characterize the regime’s response to the perceived erosion of its authority, particularly in relation to its handling of societal discontent, and what insights can we glean from the evolution of the women’s movement regarding advancements in women’s empowerment within Iran?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: In the wake of Masha Amini’s killing and amidst the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, what became evident was that the grip of fear factor was diminishing, losing its sharpness. The fear factor wasn’t enough to disperse the crowds from the streets. The public rallies couldn’t be quelled solely through suppression. I make this statement with some caution because it did take the authorities about a year or so to suppress the popular movement, which they eventually managed to do. As a result, public rallies are no longer commonplace.
However, I believe this suppression succeeded not merely through brute force, but also due to the absence of organized leadership within the opposition. There was no clear alternative presented to the Islamic Republic. The opposition was fragmented into various groups—leftists, loyalists, liberals, among others—resulting in a lack of a unified voice. Despite everyone being united against the regime, the absence of unity for an alternative significantly weakened the opposition movement.
However, I also want to acknowledge and pay tribute to the women of Iran for their resilience and courage in standing up for themselves over the years. Even now, on social media, one can witness Iranian women walking in the streets, going shopping, going about their daily lives without wearing the hijab or headscarf, displaying remarkable fearlessness. I believe it’s crucial to recognize their bravery.
A Turbulent Ride Ahead with an Increasingly Hardline Iran and Potential Return of Trump in the US
The Iranian leadership appears confident in the prevailing “saner heads” in Washington, leading them to continue grandstanding and goading the United States in the absence of a nuclear deal. With the upcoming elections and possible return of Donald Trump to power in the US, how do you anticipate the shifting political landscape might affect Iran’s strategy and its relationship with the West?
Shahram Akbarzadeh: Iran has mastered the art of brinkmanship. Throughout various negotiations, particularly in the realm of nuclear talks, Iran has consistently pushed to the brink, aiming to extract maximum concessions from its partners, including the United States and Europe. Remarkably, this strategy has proven effective because its interlocutors have generally been rational actors. Iran has engaged with different administrations, finding success because the responses from US administrations have been rational, as have those from European counterparts.
With the possibility of Donald Trump returning to office, it’s uncertain whether the Administration in Washington would act rationally. There’s a strong likelihood of irrational behavior. In fact, the reality of the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, despite years of negotiation and its proven effectiveness for around two and a half years, underscores this concern. The Trump Administration opted to pull out with the promise of securing a better deal, which never materialized. This decision destabilized the nuclear deal and set us on a path of heightened tension and uncertainty. Consequently, with the potential return of Trump to office, we are facing an extremely uncertain future. With conservative hardliners in power in Iran and an unpredictable US administration, we’re in for a turbulent ride. Predicting what will happen next becomes exceedingly difficult in such a volatile scenario.
Venga, Luca & Guidotti, Andrea. (2024). Old and New Facets of Populism in Latin America. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 20, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0052
This brief report offers a summary of the first event in ECPS’s Regional Panel series titled “Old and New Facets of Populism in Latin America” which took place online on March 7, 2024. Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera moderated the panel, featuring insights from six distinguished populism scholars.
This report provides an overview of the first event in ECPS’s Regional Panel series titled “Old and New Facets of Populism in Latin America” and held online on March 7, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Maria Puerta Riera, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Valencia College, the panel featured speakersDr. Ronaldo Munck , Professor of Sociology, Dublin City University, Dr. Julio F. Carrión, Professor of Comparative Politics, Delaware University,Dr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera, Assistant Professor of Political Science at The Citadel, The Military College of Charleston,Dr. Reinhard Heinisch and Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia, respectively Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics at the University of Salzburg and director of the Center for Research in Communication and Humanities and head of Communication Studies at UPB in Cochabamba, and Dr. Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho, Professor of History at Universidade Federal do Maranhão.
Introduction
Moderator Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera opened the panel by offering an overview of the state of the research on populism, commenting on its existing varieties and on its adaptability to different contexts. She identified an ideological view of populism – one that sees the setting up of a confrontation between two antagonistic, homogenous groups (the “pure people” and the “corrupted elites”) as the crucial element of this phenomenon – and a more pragmatic view, one that sees populism as a strategy for charismatic personalities to dominate national life and break their political exclusion.
Dr. Puerta Riera thus highlighted the flexible nature of the concept, but also pointed at some common, shared trends – chief among them the idea of a radical democracy which dispenses with the formalities of liberal democracy in favour of a direct connection between the people and their leader. She then surveyed the existing varieties of populism in Latin America, distinguishing between populists who rely on ethno-nationalism, anti-imperialism, and on socio economic grievances as the foundations of their discourse.
Dr. Puerta Riera sketched a temporal division of populism in Latin America: After a “first stage” characterized by populist support for a shift away from agriculture and towards industry (at the expense of the landowning elite) came a “second stage” with the advent of neoliberal economics and popular support of shock therapy in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Lastly, she pointed at a “third stage” characterized by the return of socialist populism, which first came to power through democratic elections before turning towards authoritarianism.
In the authoritarian tendencies of many populist leaders, whether on the left or the right of the political spectrum, Dr. Puerta Riera found further evidence of the adaptability of this political phenomenon, paving the way for a discussion of its facets by the various panelists.
Dr. Ronaldo Munck: “Populism and Socio-Political Transformation in Latin America”
Professor Ronaldo Munck underscores that populism usually stems from crisis, as economic failures generate the conditions for populist leaders to emerge and capitalize on the anger of the masses – as evidenced by the waves of populism that followed each major economic downturn. He covered a number of historical examples ranging from Peron to Chavez before raising a number of questions for future reflection.
The first panelist, Professor Ronaldo Munck, opened the discussion by highlighting the negative normative connotations associated with populism in the “western” world, while acknowledging that Latin America is likely to see this phenomenon under a different light, given its peculiar history in this regard. Dr. Munck also distinguished between a kind of socio-economic dimension of populism, centered around the fight against the landed elites of colonial times, a pragmatic view that portrays populism as an opportunistic strategy, and a third perspective, of post-structuralist nature, which focuses on populist discourse and its narratives. He further described populism as an empty signifier, one that is filled with meaning depending on its context and circumstances, adapting to the cleavages that divide society and that depends on the conscious construction of two groups as antagonists.
Dr. Munck added that populism usually stems from crisis, as economic failures generate the conditions for populist leaders to emerge and capitalize on the anger of the masses – as evidenced by the waves of populism that followed each major economic downturn. He covered a number of historical examples ranging from Peron to Chavez before raising a number of questions for future reflection: Firstly, he pondered over a “re-Gramscification” of populism, with an increased emphasis on hegemony and the role it plays in populist politics, and secondly he called for an increased focus on the role of emotions and desires in filling the “empty signifier” with powerful images, myths and ideas that capture popular imagination.
Dr. Julio F. Carriòn: “Varieties of Populism and Democratic Erosion: The Case of Latin America”
Professor Julio F. Carriòn’s general argument is that there are two main varieties of populism, both the product of the political processes and the shape of populist mobilization. The first is ‘constrained populism,’ in which you may see democratic erosion but not generally regime change. The second is ‘unconstrained populism,’ close to forms of authoritarianism and leading most often to regime changes. The general argument is that every populist leader/movement encounters at a point a moment of confrontation vis-à-vis opposite forces that determines or not the creation of power asymmetry – that consequently paves the way for democratic backsliding or regime change.
Professor Julio F. Carriòn offered a speech based on his book ‘A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power. The Andes in Comparative Perspective.’ The key question of the book is the relationship between populism and the likelihood of regime change, following the comparative strain in the political sciences literature. Populism is then mainly viewed as a strategy to seek and exercise power, with the exhibition of a personalistic style of leadership, an anti-pluralistic and confrontational mentality, and a general distrust of checks and balances.
His general argument is that there are two main varieties of populism, both the product of the political processes and the shape of populist mobilization. The first is ‘constrained populism,’ in which you may see democratic erosion but not generally regime change. The second is ‘unconstrained populism,’ close to forms of authoritarianism and leading most often to regime changes. The general argument is that every populist leader/movement encounters at a point a moment of confrontation vis-à-vis opposite forces that determines or not the creation of power asymmetry – that consequently paves the way for democratic backsliding or regime change. The process can be generally divided in three key moments: A tsunami phase where populism take off, a Hobbesian moment where populists are confronting other forces that can lead either to a re-equilibrations phase or to the desired populist in power moment. The development of power asymmetries during the confrontation phase will also consequently determine whether populist forces will be of a constrained or of an unconstrained type: If asymmetries arise, the political system will favor constrained populism.
To conclude, the second panelist discussed the ways to potentially apply this framework beyond the Andes. There are a few cases of constrained populism accompanied by democratic erosion in the American continent taken more broadly: Alan Garcia in Perù, Collor de Mello in Brazil, Menem and the Kirchners in Argentina, Trump in the US. But we can also argue for cases of unconstrained populism in Latin America and beyond where we can observe major processes of democratic erosion: Ortega in Nicaragua, Orban in Hungary, Erdogan in Turkey, Bukele in El Salvador.
Dr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera: “Global Power Dynamics and Authoritarian Populism in Venezuela”
Dr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera explained how Hugo Chavez used populism in Venezuela as a guiding ideology to build a cut of support around him, making use of old and new tools to channel participation and support, leading to feelings of empowerment while maintaining a rigid top-down control over their priorities and opportunities. Chavez portrayed himself as a champion of the oppressed and an enemy of imperialism, modulating his discourse to diverse settings, while controlling the elites around him and stymieing dissenting voices. Maduro kept using Chavismo as a guiding ideology whilst he increasingly lost public support and repressed dissent within party ranks, and economic conditions worsened.
Dr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera provided a tightly focused presentation on Venezuela, comprehensively surveying the case of this country. She begun by distinguishing between populism and authoritarian populism, as the second is systematic in its rejection of pluralism and its concentration of power in the hands of a leader. The authoritarian populism is the more dangerous form, as it undermines democratic checks and balances and often includes extremist ideological elements – both from the left and the right. She then flagged how populism cannot be studies as a phenomenon bounded by national borders, since global events such as the rise of China or the retrenchment of the United States have important impacts on the trajectories of populist leaders and their ideas.
This allowed her to introduce the case of Venezuela, as Dr. Boersner-Herrera underlined the transnational element of Hugo Chavez’s populist project, constructed in explicit opposition to the United States and in solidarity and cooperation with other allied regimes. A populist approach and discourse were used to capitalize on the divisions between the Global South and the Global North, and eventually to undermine democratic governance in Venezuela.
She offered an overview of the main stages of “Chavismo,” beginning with the drafting of a new Constitution in 1999, moving to the creation of Bolivarian Circles in 2001 and the 2006 address to the United Nations. Dr. Boersner Herrera explained how Chavez used populism as a guiding ideology to build a cut of support around him, making use of old and new tools to channel participation and support, leading to feelings of empowerment while maintaining a rigid top-down control over their priorities and opportunities. He portrayed himself as a champion of the oppressed and an enemy of imperialism, modulating his discourse to diverse settings, while controlling the elites around him and stymieing dissenting voices.
Dr. Boersner-Herrera concluded by remarking on the regime’s economic foundations, and on the transition that led to the inauguration of the new President, Nicholas Maduro. She gave evidence supporting the theory that Maduro kept using Chavismo as a guiding ideology whilst he increasingly lost public support and repressed dissent within party ranks, and economic conditions worsened. Attention was also paid to Venezuela’s global networks, developed by Maduro to shore up his position and reap the benefits of anti-western discourse. Thus, Dr. Boersner-Herrera linked this specific case back to her broader suggestion that populism’s international dimension needs to be better understood and studied.
Dr. Reinhard Heinisch & Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia: “Libertarian Populism? Making Sense of Javier Milei’s Discourse”
According to Professor Reinhard Heinisch and Professor Andrés Laguna Tapia, Peron is considered the quintessence of populism in Argentina, exemplifying personalistic leadership, anti-institutionalist ideas, and following a redistributive economic agenda. In this sense ‘Peronism vs anti-Peronism’ remains a defining feature of Argentine politics, continuing to shape the nation’s political discourse. Against this backdrop, Javier Milei stands as a divergent figure, especially in the economic agenda layered out during his electoral campaign. Milei can be seen as a sui generis populist, fitting just some populist features and precisely Moffit’s theoretical approach about populist as performers of crisis.
Professor Reinhard Heinisch and Professor Andrés Laguna Tapia gave a speech about Javier Milei’s political discourse. The aim of their presentation was to analyze Milei’s character under the lens of theories of populism in order to better position his figure in the political (populist) spectrum. To them, this is important because the literature describes Milei as a ‘half populist’ leader, in addition to the fact that he considers himself as a liberal libertarian vis-à-vis other populists in Argentina. To do that, Dr. Heinisch and Dr. Laguna Tapia looked at his discourse from three different approaches: Ideational populism, populism as a discursive frame, populism as a strategy, populism as performing crisis. The strategy employed to analyze Milei’s discourse has been to track his position in speeches and postings on the medias collected from the beginning of his campaign to the elections, under a holistic deductive coding methodology.
Dr. Laguna Tapia gave an historical summary of the unique perspective of Argentine populism, recalling the three-phases division of a ‘classical’ phase in the 1940s and 1950s, the ‘neo-populist’ era in the late 1980s and 1990s, and the resurgence phase in the early 21st century. Particularly, Peron is considered the quintessence of populism in Argentina, exemplifying personalistic leadership, anti-institutionalist ideas, and following a redistributive economic agenda. In this sense ‘Peronism vs anti-Peronism’ remains a defining feature of Argentine politics, continuing to shape the nation’s political discourse. Against this backdrop, Milei stands as a divergent figure, especially in the economic agenda layered out during his electoral campaign.
Dr. Heinisch then presented the findings of the research from every angle outlined above. From the ideational approach, Milei doesn’t refer much to the concept of ‘the people’ as opposed to ‘corrupt elites,’ that he spends a lot of time in identifying as enemies. There is also not much Manichean opposition between these two forces, and his host ideology is clearly a libertarian one, with a quasi-religious nature. Therefore, Milei does not fit the ideational pattern.
Moving to the discursive framing approach, ‘the people’ is again not fully defined as a concept, while he focuses a lot on the diagnosis of the problems, without leaning a lot on the prognosis and about what he wants specifically to change. As well as before, he is clearer mostly on the economic agenda. Also here, he thus fails to satisfy this theoretical approach.
Considering the third theoretical pattern, populism as a strategy, Dr. Heinisch argued that is difficult to tell whether populism is in itself a strategy or not, given that every politician has a strategy by definition. Milei is strategic here in the sense that he distances himself mainly from fellow conservatives and the representatives of the government. Hence, this approach is just half satisfactory to tackle Milei’s populism.
Following the last line of investigation based on the performance of crisis, there is more evidence pointing to Milei as a populist. He talks extensively, strongly, and morally about the crisis Argentina is facing, describing enemies and detractors in extremely negative terms, while positioning ‘the people’ as opposed to them. To conclude, Milei can be seen as a sui generis populist, fitting just some populist features and precisely Moffit’s theoretical approach about populist as performers of crisis.
Professor Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho: “The Phenomenon of ‘Bolsonarism’ in Brazil: Specificities and Global Connections”
Professor Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho offered an overview of ‘Bolsonarism,’ a peculiarly Brazilian phenomenon with a global dimension that is closely connected with populism. He drew comparisons between Bolsonarism and other far-right populist movements, noting similarities such as the reliance on a supposedly ‘outsider’ leader and the use of polarizing language, while also shedding light on the international connections of the Bolsonaro family within the galaxy of right-wing movements, before offering some remarks around the idea of populism and Bolsonarism as a symptom of the crisis of the current liberal-capitalist model.
The last panelist, Professor Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho, offered an overview of ‘Bolsonarism,’ a peculiarly Brazilian phenomenon with a global dimension that is closely connected with populism.
Professor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho begun with a general definition of populism, highlighting which elements are necessary for a movement to be labelled as populist. He identified the presence of a strong, charismatic leader, a discursive emphasis on the “us versus them” mentality, and a tension between liberal democracy and the movement’s impulses as the crucial facets of populism, before delving into the intricacies of the ‘people versus elites’ discourse. He underlined how these narratives are not necessarily based on pre-existing societal divisions but are built around ‘empty signifiers’ which act as catalysts to unite the people and construct an enemy to target.
Professor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho then discussed the ways in which the highly publicized Lava Jato scandal was instrumentalized by the far-right to craft an anti-corruption narrative centered around the ideas of a clean, minimal state; a beacon of entrepreneurial freedom juxtaposed with the wasteful, inefficient ‘big state’ promoted by the left. This vision was presented as an apolitical quest in the nation’s interest, but Professor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho pointed at its inherently political agenda and at its ideological undertones.
He then proceeded to explain how former President Jair Bolsonaro took ownership of this anti-corruption discourse, mixing it with a strong anti-communist rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War and of the years of the military dictatorship. Further, he pointed out how a new moral dimension was added by Evangelical and Neo-Pentecostal supporters of the former president, as corruption became an all-encompassing target in the ‘culture wars.’
Professor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho thus dissected the supposedly apolitical nature of these campaigns, exposing their roots in far-right thinking and in the frustrated aspirations of millions of Brazilians. He explained how the absence of a true national project, the state’s reliance on agribusiness, and the model of ‘consumer citizenship’ all led to a crisis of expectations, as economic conditions worsened, and many Brazilians felt robbed of their future. He placed these trends in the larger, global milieu, linking them with the 2008 financial crisis and with the worldwide neoliberal project, which creates new forms of subjectivation and promotes the rollback of an already absent state.
Finally, Professor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho drew more comparisons between Bolsonarism and other far-right populist movements, noting similarities such as the reliance on a supposedly ‘outsider’ leader and the use of polarizing language, while also shedding light on the international connections of the Bolsonaro family within the galaxy of right-wing movements, before offering some concluding remarks around the idea of populism and Bolsonarism as a symptom of the crisis of the current liberal-capitalist model.
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Bachtiar, Hasnan; Smith, Chloe & Shakil, Kainat. (2024). “Fluctuating Populism: Prabowo’s Everchanging Populism Across the Indonesian Elections.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 15, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0030
Abstract
This paper introduces an interesting aspect or variant of populism which we call ‘fluctuating populism’ through a case study of Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo, the winner of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, and a career politician for over three decades in the country. We define ‘fluctuating’ quality of populism as the strategic adjustments made by populist leaders to their rhetoric and ideological messaging across different political campaigns in pursuit of electoral victory. Based on the Indonesian presidential elections of 2009, 2014, 2019, and 2024, the paper demonstrates the dynamic nature of populism. It reveals that over just a decade, Prabowo has undergone shifts in ideological stances, rhetorical appeals, and electoral strategies in each election cycle. He has evolved from an ultra-nationalist, chauvinist, and Islamist populist to a technocratic figure with a much softer side. We also find that within these election periods, he never fully prescribed an ideology or rhetoric, but instead fluctuated according to the political landscape. Prabowo’s success in the 2024 election underscores the effectiveness of ‘fluctuating populism’ in navigating Indonesia’s political landscape. This case study shows that this concept offers a framework for understanding the strategic adjustments made by populist leaders and warrants further examination in comparative studies of political leadership.
Following Indonesia’s tumultuous transition to independence, the early years of the country’s history fell under two successive authoritarian regimes, called the years of “Guided Democracy” (Yilmaz & Barton, 2021). The oppression and silencing of various ethnic, religious, and social groups during these years, together with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, served to exacerbate existing grievances and societal cleavages. The backlash against these developments pushed the country into a new era as President Suharto was forced out of office, and the era of the “New Order” under him came to an end (Yilmaz & Barton, 2021).
Indonesia became a politically important case study of successful democratization in a post-dictatorship country. Since the late 1990s, Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country and one of the largest democracies in the world, has experienced a proliferation of political parties and a significant expansion of civil society-led organizations. It had enjoyed the status of being a “Free” democracy from 2005 to 2013 (Freedom House, 2005; Freedom House, 2013), losing this status in 2014 as “Partly Free” (Freedom House, 2014) since it has not been spared by the democratic backsliding which is being observed around the globe (Haggard & Kaufman, 2021). In 2023, Freedom House ranked the country at only 58 out of 100 points on a scale of freedom, classifying it as “Partly Free” (Freedom House, 2023). This marks a significant decline from 2009 when the country was declared entirely “Free” in a similar report (Freedom House, 2009: 332; Freedom House, 2010). It is important to study countries like Indonesia that are experiencing forms of democratic regression or democratic backsliding including in their governance and political leadership.
This paper focuses on understanding populism in the rapidly changing political landscape of Indonesia, with a specific focus on the years between 2009 and 2024. The case study is based on the latest Indonesian presidential election’s winner Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo. A former general of the special forces (Danjen Kopassus), Prabowo Subianto has become a critical figure in the contemporary context of elections in Indonesia. Known as simply Prabowo, he is a highly controversial former military officer, the son-in-law of former dictator Suharto, and a candidate who ran in the consecutive presidential elections of 2009, 2014, 2019 and 2024.
Fluctuating Populism: A New Concept
Using the case study of Prabowo, this paper introduces the concept of “fluctuating populism.” We define this concept as, “the strategic adjustments made by populist leaders to their rhetoric and ideological messaging across different election cycles in pursuit of electoral victory.” Although there are numerous approaches to defining populism and analysing its phenomena, researchers identify a consensus in populism literature regarding the key features of populism. First, it must claim to speak on behalf of ordinary people (Bryant & Moffitt, 2019), and that the will of these people (‘the people’) is the “cornerstone of political action” (Jawad et al., 2021). Second, these ordinary people must be counterposed to ‘the elites’ (this could be establishments, organisations, governments, political actors etc.) who are preventing them from fulfilling their political preferences (Bryant & Moffitt, 2019; Kurylo, 2022: 129). It is common for minorities and ‘others’ in society to be aligned with ‘the elites’ in populism and are consequently often central to populism’s antagonisms (Kurylo, 2022). Fluctuating populism is closely aligned with Kurt Weyland’s ‘populism as a political strategy’ approach, which focuses on the ability of political actors to interpret the contextual and strategic political environment they inhabit and base their strategy on this assessment (Widian et al., 2023: 365; Weyland, 2017).
Fluctuating populism builds on this understanding but applies it in a different way to explain how populist political actors modify this strategy throughout several electoral campaigns. It specifically highlights the dynamic nature of populism, in which leaders may modify their appeals to capitalize on changing political dynamics, public sentiment, and electoral demands. Fluctuating populism therefore underscores the tactical calculations and pragmatism employed by populist leaders, who may adjust their ideological content and messaging to maximize electoral support and maintain relevance over time. This is congruent with Weyland’s assessment that “the driving force behind populism is political, not ideological” (Weyland, 2017: 70).
Given the fluctuating populism, characterized by shifting ideas, discourses, and self-representation of leaders, as well as political representation of ‘the people,’ we contend that analyzing the discourses and performances of populist leaders is the most effective method for capturing the strategic adjustments made throughout their political careers (Moffitt, 2016; Moffitt, 2020).
Indonesian Presidential Campaigns of Prabowo between 2009-2024
Former Minister of Defense and winner of the February 14, 2024, Presidential election, Prabowo Subianto, pictured at the 77th-anniversary celebration of the Indonesian Air Force in Jakarta on April 9, 2023. Photo: Donny Hery.
Prabowo has contested Indonesia’s consecutive Presidential Elections since 2009, securing his first victory in 2024. In 2009, he ran as vice presidential candidate with Megawati, but was defeated by a retired four-star general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Megawati-Prabowo received 26.79%, while Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto and SBY-Boediono received 12.41% and 60.08% of the total votes (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2009).
In the following elections, he was twice defeated by popular technocrat, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in the 2014 and 2019 Presidential elections. In 2014, Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla received 53.15%, while Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa received 46.85% of the total votes from the total electorate (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2014). Then, in 2019, when Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin received 55.32% of the votes, Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno lost the election with 44.68% of votes from the total electorate (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2019).
The 2024 Indonesian Presidential Elections witnessed Prabowo refine and redefine his political messaging. He allied with his former political opposition leader for 2024 as he chose Jokowi’s son as his running mate – and finally secured an electoral victory. The Prabowo-Gibran team received 58.83% of the total provisional vote count percentage, while Anies-Muhaimin and Ganjar-Mahfud received 24.49% and 16.68% respectively (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2024).
The analysis that follows will outline the fluctuating populism Prabowo has demonstrated across these elections, considering the reasons behind – and implications of – his chameleon political persona and strategic alliance building.
Prabowo’s Significant Political Transformation in the Recent Election
Past election campaigns witnessed Prabowo displaying ultra-nationalist, strongly chauvinist and Islamist populist characteristics (Yilmaz, et al., 2024). In the recent election however, Prabowo has re-emerged as a distinctly technocratic, gentler figure who continued to cultivate some populist tendencies – particularly his self-presentation as guardian of the people’s volonté générale, and a reliance on popular communication strategies that sought (and succeeded) in reaching out to Indonesia’s youth.
This transformation is indicative of his fluctuating populism, in which significant strategic adjustments have been made to Prabowo’s political messaging, motivated by his quest for power. This article aims to explore the rationale behind the fluctuating populism of Prabowo and to identify and analyze the different ways Prabowo’s populist messaging and strategies have evolved and been influenced by the exigencies of contemporary political realities.
Prabowo’s 2024 campaigning revealed a clear move away from the more antagonistic elements of populism. Most notably, he let go of chauvinistic messaging, which perpetuates religious-based tensions and hostilities, outrage against minorities, blaming foreign powers, and the scapegoating of elites to gain voters’ appeal (Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021). Prabowo diverted his attention from ideological issues that deepen social polarization (Yilmaz, 2023) and moved away from narratives and rhetoric against Western neo-liberalism and the perceived greed of Chinese corporations (Hadiz, 2017; Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021). Prabowo also distanced himself from religious right-wing groups, most notably the civilizational populist Defenders Front of Islam (the FPI), whom he had aligned himself with in varying manners in the 2019 election (Yilmaz, et al., 2022).
While he shed the exclusionary political messaging of past campaigns, Prabowo has continued to rely on a performative populism that seeks to gain the support of an electoral base via the simplification of his political expressions, his self-representation as one of ‘the people,’ and the use of communicative devices to foster a sense of closeness with his audience (Moffitt, 2016; Moffitt, 2020; Ostiguy, 2017).
For instance, Prabowo abandoned speaking in Sukarno’s (Indonesia’s founding father) rhetorical and commanding language (Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021), adopting instead a more conversational and relatable tone which portrayed a more intimate affinity with his audience. While both are flavors of populism, they seek a different type of connection with ‘the people.’ In the first instance, Prabowo was copying a style that speaks on behalf of the people (Mietzner, 2020) while in the second he focused more on cultivating a perception that he was in close proximity to ‘the people.’ It has also been noted that Indonesia’s new leader simplified complex political problems and their solutions, such as his focus on a program for free lunches and milk to tackle malnutrition and food scarcity – a program that has been criticized for being unrealistic and risks widening the country’s fiscal deficit (Tripathi, 2024; Susilo & Prana, 2024).
In an effort to appeal to youth and shake off his former aggressive persona, Prabowo and his campaign team employed various strategies including rebranding image to reflect a more modern and approachable vibe, engagement through social media, utilizing platforms popular among youth, and creating engaging content. In the most striking example of this rebranding exercise, Prabowo has been portrayed as an adorable, friendly grandpa (gemoy) with a strong presence on social media feeds, and whose online supporters and followers call him handsome (ganteng) or “gemes” which translates as “evocative of the sensation of squeezing the cheeks of a young child” or hugging a puppy (Cook, 2023). This strategy has particularly targeted online and youth communities, where Prabowo is represented in digital spaces with a cartoon photo generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Lamb et al., 2024), and has become known for dancing the Korean Oppa style to disco music and the super hit song “Oke Gas” by the famous rapper, Richard Jersey (Jersey, 2024). It is estimated that millennial and generation Z voters made up nearly 60% of the votes, representing as many as 114 million voters (Cook, 2023). A campaign geared towards attracting youth voters and adapting to the current digital culture was therefore a strong strategic move by Prabowo.
Weyland notes that social media is used by contemporary populist leaders to “create the impression of direct contact” with their followers, and “give the personalistic leader a daily presence in the lives of millions of followers” (Weyland, 2017: 74). He also points out the potency of this communication strategy if the leader “commands charisma” (Weyland, 2017). This charisma, Weyland argues, can help give form to the relationship between the leader and “the people” (Weyland, 2017: 66). Although Prabowo the dancing gemoy and his outspoken campaign rhetoric (which may appear to be unethically mocking his campaign opponents) might not be as immediately charismatic as other populist politicians such as the moralist style performed by Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo (CNN Indonesia, 2023; Tempodotco, 2023), he has succeeded in capturing the attentions and affections of many through performing a playful persona.
In the following four tables, we aim to visualize these fluctuations as clearly as possible. Each table provides valuable insights into different dimensions of his fluctuating populism, shedding light on key shifts over time.
Table 1 – Political Performance
2009
Constructed a political persona that was pro-‘the people’ and antagonistic towards ‘the elites’ (Sutopo, 2009: 20).A masculine stateman image (e.g. presenting himself like Napoleon, Soekarno, or Barrack Obama) (Tomsa, 2009).
2014
A political outsider heroically trying to save Indonesia from its decaying democracy (Mietzner, 2015: 17-18).Campaigned as a “strongman” e.g. by riding his horse around stadiums and promising a return to the authoritarian model of the New Order (Lindsey, 2024).Maintained his iron-fist image which is rooted in his former military career. Continuing his reputation as a strongman that would defend the nation.
2019
Claimed he was the only leader capable of fixing Indonesia’s many problems (Lam, 2024).Continued to favor large public rallies and protests (Lam, 2024).Perpetuated an image of piety and conservatism (Widian et al., 2023: 15).Maintained his iron-first image but the strongman orientation was to defend the believers (Muslims). Given the Ahok protests foreshadowed the elections.
2024
Adopted a “cuddly” and “avuncular” persona – particularly online (Strangio, 2024).TikTok videos of him petting his cats, performing dance routines at political rallies (Strangio, 2024).Positioned himself as a “patriot ready to serve his people” (pengabdi)/technocratic institutionalist (Lam, 2024).An observable fluidity in his masculinity which is oscillating between the former strongman and the friendly older figure.
Table 2 – Political Communication
2009
Anti-Elite (blaming elites for failure to improve public welfare) (Sutopo, 2009: 14).Anti-foreign powers (e.g. attacked the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonoleadership and his support for foreign economic interests) (Mujani & Liddle, 2010: 40).A supporter of the indigenous people (Prasetyawan, 2012: 321).A defender of “the interests of small farmers, fishermen, and petty traders” (Mujani & Liddle, 2010: 40)
2014
Anti-‘the Elite’ (condemnation of political elites and environment of corruption and money politics) (Aspinall, 2015: 1-2).Nationalist (describing Indonesia’s poor economic conditions as product of country’s exploitation by foreign powers (Aspinall, 2015: 1-2).Favored large public rallies during which he would refer to his audience as brothers (saudara) (Lam, 2024).
2019
Enhancement of Islamist narratives (Widian et al., 2023: 364).Aligning himself with Islamic figures and movements (Widian et al., 2023: 364).Used religious populist identity politics and civilizational narratives to create ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions. Narratives against the ‘corrupt elite’ and dangerous ‘others’ (minority religio-ethnic groups) were common.
2024
“Keen student and follower” of Jokowi’s leadership, and promotes himself as continuing Jokowi’s legacy, policies, and economic progress (Lam, 2024).Aside from promising continuity, he simplified other political solutions and their solutions (such as the free lunch program).Communication became far more inclusive and open – e.g. by making ‘political courtesy visits’ to rivals that were highly publicized (Lam, 2024).
Table 3 – Target Audience
2009
Mobilizing the poor and marginalized people “because they are fed up with all the lies” of the elites (Sutopo, 2009: 16).Indigenous entrepreneurs, farmers, fishermen (Mujani & Liddle, 2010; Prasetyawan, 2012).
2014
Focus on appealing to the rural poor and low-income workers (Mietzner, 2015: 17-18).Initial integration of Islamic rhetoric to appeal to conservative portion of population (Widian et al., 2023: 361).
2019
Significant signaling to Islamist and conservative figures and organizations.Attempts to mobilize the ‘ummah’ and the pious Muslims who felt threatened by social change.
2024
Prabowo sought to win over Jokowi’s significant support base. Reached out to moderate and mainstream Muslim voters and leaders. Used digital platforms to disseminate content that appeals to Indonesia’s youth and online audiences (Lam, 2024).
Table 4 – Narrative and Rhetoric
2009
Pro-‘the people’
“It is a great honor this afternoon to declare that I am ready to fight alongside Ibu Megawati. I am ready to fight for the people of Indonesia. I am ready to fight for justice and the greatness of the Indonesian nation. We are ready to bring great change for the people of Indonesia. We are ready to return the economy of Indonesia into the hands of the Indonesian people. We will fight for the people, with the people, for justice, for your greatness and welfare. … Do we want to continue the wrong system? Do we want to continue the economic system that has not succeeded in bringing prosperity to the people? Or do we change (the system), we return the Indonesian nation to the Indonesian people? … Let us together reclaim the sovereignty of the people (so that) it returns to the hands of the Indonesian people. … On the coming 8 July (2009), … let us unite, let us fight for the greatness of the nation and the justice of the people,” (Metro TV, 2023).
Pro-the marginalized and the poor
“Are we willing for Indonesia to become a nation of lackeys? A nation of laborers? Always have to be poor, always have to be left behind. Farmers need credit for small capital, not given. I am not advocating hatred for the rich,” (Metro TV, 2009).
Antagonism against the elites
“Our nation was colonized for hundreds of years. I think the influence on our culture is quite big. I see that this has resulted, especially in our elites, in a subconscious sense of inferiority complex. This has resulted in our elites often producing national policies that are detrimental to their own nation,” (Metro TV, 2023).
Condemning the foreign powers
“I think the challenge for both of us is that we do not want to see our nation continue to be a weak nation, a nation that is always subject to foreign powers, a nation that can only ask for foreign assistance, a nation that is always a sweet child in front of world powers. I think this is a cultural challenge for us, can we rise as a sovereign nation, an independent nation?” (Metro TV, 2023).
Anti-the foreign powers/external dangerous others
“We recognize that our culture is the result of influences from everywhere. We don’t need to be afraid; we don’t need to be inferior. We should enjoy that richness. But we should take the good from those foreign influences. … We are a very friendly nation, very open to these foreign influences. But in my opinion, in the competition between nations in this world, which is very hard and very cruel, sometimes that good nature can be abused by foreign powers. The essential nature of our tribes has always been to be hospitable to foreign influences. We always receive guests well. After a while, the guest is no longer a guest. First, he’s a guest, he wants to trade, then he wants to control everything. I think we must look in the mirror, that sometimes we must admit that we are also a naive nation, a nation that is too naive. We assume that other people’s intentions are always good intentions because we have good intentions. … To overcome these weaknesses, … through education. Education is the key to the revival of Indonesian culture and nation,” (Metro TV, 2023).
2014
Nationalism & anti-foreign powers
“We come from a nation that has honor, a nation that has ideals, a nation that wants to live like other nations, we do not want to be a nation of errand boys, we do not want to be a nation of lackeys, we do not want to be a nation that is trampled by other nations,” (Gerindra TV, 2014).
Masculinity
“After our fathers, our predecessors, we valiantly resisted being re-colonized,” (Gerindra TV, 2014).
Anti-elites
“Now the Indonesian nation remains under threat of being re-colonized, … they are smarter, they don’t send soldiers, they just buy and bribe our leaders … our money every year is lost 1000 trillion Rupiah,” (Gerindra TV, 2014).
Populist promise: Change
“… do you want change, or do you want the situation we have now? … it can only come if we eradicate corruption to its roots,” (Gerindra TV, 2014).
2019
Pro-the people
“Thousands of people depend on us, people we never knew… but what we do now will determine what happens to them… perhaps tens of millions of our people, connected to this room with communication technology, because for the next 92 nights will determine the future of Indonesia, this is an election for the entire nation of Indonesia,” (Gerindra TV, 2019).
Pro-the marginalized and the poor & nationalism
“… in Klaten, farmers are sad, because during the rice harvest, rice from foreign countries is flooded. In East Java, sugar farmers are sad, because during the harvest, sugar is flooded from foreign countries. … mothers complain, where prices are already unaffordable, … when salt farmers are also experiencing difficulties, a flood of salt from foreign countries… Is this the country we want? … this is an insult to the founders of our nation,” (Gerindra TV, 2019).
Anti-the elites and foreign powers
“… what we will do is reorient development … from the wrong direction to the right one, which defends the interests of the Indonesian nation, … stop the leakage of money to foreign countries. … infrastructure projects should not be the preserve of certain elite groups,” (Gerindra TV, 2019). “You are the people’s army, you are the people’s police, you cannot defend a handful of people, let alone defend foreign stooges (while banging on the table),” (Gerindra TV, 2019).
Nationalism, element of motherhood, populist promise
“I quote Bung Karno’s speech… the movement was born because of the unbearable suffering of the people… you are here because you understand, you understand because this country is not right, mothers know better this country is sick, there has been a very severe injustice in this republic. … a handful of people control the wealth of hundreds of millions of Indonesians. … the problem is that Indonesia’s wealth is being robbed, stolen, we need to elect a government that can stop this robbery. You vote for 02 to save your children and grandchildren,” (Gerindra TV, 2019).
“Prabowo-Gibran for an advanced Indonesia fights to eliminate poverty from the earth of Indonesia. We fight to bring prosperity to all Indonesians. We continue what the previous presidents have built. We are grateful for all the presidents who have worked for the people of Indonesia. We thank all the fighters, all the patriots, we thank Bung Karno, Bung Hatta, Bung Sjahrir… we thank Presidents Soeharto, BJ Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and we thank President Joko Widodo as well,” (Gerindra TV, 2024).
Pro-the people, populist promise, nationalism
“If Prabowo-Gibran receive the mandate from the people, we will lead the people of Indonesia… I have said many times, that our future is bright, we are now the 16th richest country in the world… we can even become the 5th in the world. The condition is that we must be harmonious, united, peaceful, we must not be pitted again, we must not be divided… Our children are important, isn’t it important to be able to eat and drink milk? Those who say it is not important are not sane people, not people who love the country. Prabowo-Gibran will not hesitate, we will feed the children of Indonesia,” (Gerindra TV, 2024).
Contributing Factors to Prabowo’s Fluctuating Populism
Billboards depicting presidential candidates Prabowo Subianto and Gibran have gone viral on social media because the visuals made by artificial intelligence (AI) in Jakarta, Indonesia. on December 23, 2023. Photo: Toto Santiko Budi.
Several influences likely played a role in the fluctuations observed in campaigns. One significant aspect is Prabowo’s ability to learn from past experiences and adapt his strategies accordingly. Over the years, Prabowo has gained valuable insights into the political landscape and has honed his approach based on lessons learned from previous election cycles. Moreover, Prabowo has demonstrated a keen awareness of evolving societal norms and values, strategically aligning himself with prevailing sentiments and ideologies that resonate with the electorate. Furthermore, Prabowo has made strategic alliances with key political actors, groups, and movements that hold sway in different election cycles. By forging alliances with influential figures and tapping into networks of support, Prabowo has been able to garner broader political relevance and leverage the strength of collective mobilization.
Learning from his past defeats
First, he learned from his defeats in the 2009, 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. In all of his political battles, he operationalized a populist performance, presenting himself as a charismatic leader who was pro-indigenous, defending Islam in Indonesia, and standing up against the corrupt and Westernized elite, and foreign powers and influence (Mietzner, 2020).
Furthermore, in both unsuccessful campaigns, Prabowo proved eager to win the support of various nativist, racist, and hardline groups. For instance, in 2017, hoping to gain Islamist support in the elections two years later, he eagerly supported Anies Baswedan in the quest to defeat Ahok (Basuki Tjahaya Purnama), the incumbent Chinese and Christian governor of Jakarta, in the gubernatorial election. In the process, he went as far as encouraging a severe and dramatic process of minority criminalization and discrimination (Bachtiar, 2023). However, despite receiving the support of civilizational populist leader Rizieq Shihab, the FPI, and other Islamist groups, and despite coming within “striking distance of the presidency” in both elections (Jaffrey & Warburton, 2024), Prabowo faced defeat. The strategic politician is likely to have taken stock and understood he needed a new political strategy to win the 2024 election.
Stepping away from polarizing religious populism
Second, Prabowo did not instrumentalize religion in his recent campaign. In previous elections – particularly the 2019 election – Prabowo attempted to gain popularity by weighing in on the ideological division between Islamist and pluralist worldviews in Indonesian society (Mietzner, 2020). He did this by aligning himself with Islamist groups and movements, performing piety, and using religion to create distinctions between ‘the people’ and the ‘elites’ and ‘others’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2021; Yabanci, 2020). Yet although Islamist identity politics and civilizational populism significantly intensified the people’s emotions and populist demands (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023), it also inspired a wave of resistance from the silent majority: pluralist Muslims. Identity politics succeeded in forming cross-class alliances – evident in the mass rallies against Ahok – but they also provoked resentment, including from leaders of the consequential mainstream Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both organizations maintain a sharp focus on diversity and national integration (Burhani, 2018; Bruinessen, 2021). By not appealing to – and actively repelling – the pluralist and mainstream Muslims, Prabowo learnt in hindsight that his chances of success had been considerably hindered.
Becoming a technocratic figure and ally of his former opposition
Third, Prabowo went through the important process of becoming a technocrat when he agreed to join the Jokowi cabinet and accepted the role of Indonesia’s Defense Minister. In this context, he built his image as a big-hearted knight with a more inclusive outlook, and this role helped him signal “to both domestic and international audiences that he was fit for high office” and could put aside his own ambition to care for Indonesia (Jaffrey & Warburton, 2024). In taking this role, and in refashioning his political branding, he betrayed his coalition with the previous alliances such as the civilizational populist group, the FPI, who were consequently banned by Jokowi, leading to their dissolution (Power, 2018). Abandoning previous right-wing and Islamist allies, Prabowo was able to focus attention on “aligning with status nationalists who wield control over the state bureaucracy,” (Gultasli, 2024).
Prabowo’s closer affinity with Jokowi also allowed him to enact another key strategy in his 2024 campaign: Winning Jokowi’s support and endorsement. In favorable circumstances for Prabowo, Jokowi had come to a head with Megawati, Soekarno’s daughter, in the camp of his party in power (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle – PDIP). Megawati had insulted Jokowi when she suggested he should submit to party leadership (as a worker/petugas partai), despite his status as President of Indonesia. As a result, Jokowi withdrew his support for Ganjar Pranowo, the governor of Central Java, who had been endorsed by the PDIP as its presidential candidate (Bachtiar, 2023). Aware of Jokowi’s popularity, particularly because of his strong economic performance, Prabowo keenly promoted himself as the candidate who would carry on this legacy (Strangio, 2024).
No longer in coalition with Anies Baswedan – who used to support him but became his rival in the 2024 election, having distanced himself from Islamist civilizational populism and its proponents, and seeing an opportunity in the PDIP’s internal conflict, made joining forces with Gibran a strategic move. Additionally, by forsaking the chauvinistic and polarizing style of political campaigning, eschewing the politics of identity, rebranding himself as a competent technocrat, amping up the duo’s youth appeal, and securing the backing of the ruling elite, (in this case Jokowi et al.), Prabowo-Gibran succeeding in winning the election in the first round.
Responding to changing perceptions of masculinity in society
Prabowo is still seen by many as an authoritarian strongman, which is linked to his background as Suharto’s son-in-law and most loyal elite soldier (Slater, 2023). Suharto himself was a military general who ruled Indonesia in an almost entirely autocratic manner for more than 30 years. Prabowo’s experience in military leadership continued to play a central role; some voters are still likely drawn to an assertive style of leadership and see him as a proficient leader who can effectively attend to the welfare of everyday Indonesians (Gilang & Almubaroq, 2022). Soon after the 2024 election, Prabowo was awarded the four-star general status by the outgoing President (Haizan, 2024). Prabowo likely continued to benefit from the strongman portrayal among segments of the Indonesian society. However, he also succeeded in gaining wider support by outwardly shedding the more hardened and aggressive parts of his image, particularly in communications that would reach younger generations of Indonesians.
The performative public transformation of the former military man speaks volumes about the changing hues of masculinity in Indonesian society. Connell’s work on gender discusses the idea of hegemonic masculinities (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) and this can be applied to the fluctuating ideals of masculinity Prabowo has responded to in his political campaigning. For decades, the President-elect of Indonesia maintained a reputation as a classic ‘strongman’ image as an ex-military high-ranking official and also as the son-in-law of a former dictator. However, as discussed, the most recent elections witnessed him performing the role of the ‘cool uncle’ or ‘friendly grandpa’ who plays into more contemporary masculinity norms among Indonesia’s many youth voters (The Economist, 2024).
While various definitions contest what is the ‘ideal’ or ‘the hegemon’ masculinity, there is a clear indication that amongst Indonesian millennials and Gen-Zs, the traditional ideal of a ‘strongman,’ as Prabowo was formerly and widely known as being, does not attract their support. Prabowo’s sensitivity to this change led him to modify his masculinity to become more acceptable in society. A friendlier, gemoy persona has gained him the acceptance of youth in a way that the highly composed military man or conservative religious figure of his past would have been unable to.
Conclusion
Some continue to regard Prabowo as a right-wing populist with an authoritarian agenda detrimental to democracy (Susilo & Prana, 2024; Nurdiansyah, 2024; Testriono & Auliya, 2024; Wejak, 2024; Ramadhani, 2024). Prabowo’s past from the 1990s is tarnished by a legacy of violence against socially marginalized groups in society. Concerns about Prabowo often relate to his record as a special forces officer, a role in which he was accused of involvement in several cases of gross human rights violations, particularly during the democratic transition process (Tan, 2015; Suh, 2016).
There are trepidations about the authenticity of Prabowo’s shift in rhetorical and ideological messaging, and what lies underneath Prabowo’s successful attempt at gaining power and wielding control in Indonesia. How far removed is this softer and more inclusive gemoy character from the strong and masculine, ultra-nationalist and chauvinist described by scholars previously (Hadiz, 2017; Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021). After all, it was only recently that American Indonesianist Slater argued Prabowo is “the sort of ethnonationalist, polarizing, strongman who would scapegoat minorities and ride roughshod to power, as other world leaders recently had,” (Slater, 2023: 103-104). These concerns were also highlighted by The Guardian writers, who claimed that Prabowo’s victory in 2024 was a sign that “winter is coming” for Indonesian democracy (Ratcliffe & Richaldo, 2024). Similarly, Kurlantzick argues that democracy is truly lost with Prabowo’s victory (Kurlantzick, 2024).
Given all these, Prabowo is a crucial political figure to test the concept of fluctuating populism. His transformations across various presidential elections are notable: From 2014 to 2024 he has refashioned his public image from a classic populist ‘strongman’ with authoritarian tendencies and polarizing rhetoric to adopting a strongly conservative and pious Islamist persona and most recently, a soft, cuddly grandpa who attracts youth through TikTok dances and photos with his cats. Along the way he has renewed and shifted his policy promises, political allegiances, public image, and the support bases he appeals to.
A valid question that remains is if the ‘happy grandpa’ now metamorphoses back into the iron-fisted strong man. His pattern of fluctuations suggests he could, although we need to keep in mind that Prabowo is a patient, tactful and pragmatic populist, who adapts in accordance with the expectations of voters and constantly changing socio-political trends. What fluctuating populism does tell us, is that Prabowo is likely be remain an ever-changing mosaic of performances, views, persons, and policies.
Introducing the concept of fluctuating populism prompts further investigations into other case studies. Identifying and analyzing the political maneuvers of other populist actors provides an opportunity to develop and test this concept further in both country-level and comparative studies. Furthermore, this study firmly rooted populism in the recent socio-political history of Indonesia and allowed the authors to examine not only the fluctuating populism of a leader but the fluctuating demands of the electorate.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation.
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Professor Luke March, from the University of Edinburgh, underscores that any surprises or intrigues in the upcoming Russian presidential elections are minor curiosities rather than significant events. He argues that these elections will further consolidate Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule, possibly securing up to 80% of the vote. According to March, Putin’s underlying message is clear: his dominance remains unassailable in the foreseeable future; any attempt at opposition will be swiftly quashed. March emphasizes his expectation that this pattern will persist without significant deviation.
Professor Luke March, holding a Personal Chair of Post-Soviet and Comparative Politics at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, emphasizes that any surprises or intrigues in the upcoming Russian presidential elections are more akin to minor curiosities rather than significant events. He argues that this election will serve as another milestone in the consolidation of Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule, potentially securing as much as 80% of the vote.
The presidential election in Russia is scheduled to take place from March 15-17, 2024, marking the eighth such election in the country’s history. The winner is set to be inaugurated on May 7, 2024. In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) prior to the election, Professor March commented, “Should Putin secure 80% or 85% of the vote, it wouldn’t be unexpected, as it effectively leaves no space for opposition. Once again, these elections are poised to reinforce Putin’s status as a central figure and patron of the elite. The message he seeks to convey is one of unchallengeable authority in the foreseeable future; while individuals may attempt to challenge him, they will inevitably face suppression. I foresee no significant deviation from this established pattern.”
By delving into the Kremlin’s tactics in manipulating the opposition, both systemic and non-systemic, Professor March draw attention to the marginalization of dissenting voices, the crackdown on protests, and the co-option of certain figures to maintain control over the political landscape. March addressed the complexities surrounding the conceptualization of Putin’s politics, particularly the existence of a coherent ‘Putinism’ and its ideological syncretism. He highlighted Putin’s employment of paradigmatic pluralism to bridge various ideologies, ultimately fostering a sense of cohesion within his regime.
Assessing the role of populism and nationalism within Putin’s regime, both domestically and internationally, Prof. March discussed how Putin strategically employs populist rhetoric and nationalist sentiments to garner support and suppress dissent, particularly in the context of events like the invasion of Ukraine. However, March acknowledged the vulnerabilities within the Russian political system, such as economic challenges, casualties in warfare, and inflation. Despite these pressures, he noted that current measures are aimed at ensuring that no political entity can capitalize on these grievances, highlighting the Kremlin’s success in maintaining control thus far.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Luke March with some edits.
Putin Tends to Employ Populism in External Contexts
How do you see the complexities surrounding the conceptualization of Putin’s politics, particularly regarding the existence of a coherent ‘Putinism’ and its ideological syncretism? Does populism play a role in Putin’s regime, particularly in light of its presence within Russian politics and state media environment? What are the main weaknesses and challenges encountered when attempting to classify Putin as either an elitist or a populist leader?
Luke March: Putin employs a form of paradigmatic pluralism in an effort to bridge various ideologies, aiming to foster a sense of cohesion within his regime. However, there exists a notable dichotomy between Putin himself and the overarching ideology of Putinism, which has evolved into an increasingly monolithic entity. While Putin embodies certain principles, they are subject to interpretation by the media and various politicians. This inherent flexibility allows for creative interpretation within certain boundaries, as long as the fundamental nature of the state is not challenged.
This approach presents challenges, as the regime embraces a diverse range of ideologies, albeit with a growing coherence around right-wing nationalism. Populism also plays a significant role, utilized more prominently by opposition figures and the media rather than by Putin personally. Furthermore, Putin tends to employ populism more frequently in external contexts rather than domestically.
One fundamental challenge lies in grasping the implicit rules governing Russian politics, which have become increasingly elusive and difficult to research. This difficulty stems from the tight control exerted over politics, particularly by the security services, despite the facade of diverse ideologies. Any discussion of these ideologies must acknowledge the reality of mounting state control.
When analyzing how Putin utilizes specific ideologies, it’s crucial to consider his leadership within a controlled state apparatus, backed by increasingly repressive measures. Despite espousing rhetoric that may seem populist, such as emphasizing the importance of the Russian people and their values, Putin simultaneously employs coded language emphasizing loyalty, respect for national interests and unity around state objectives. This duality underscores a reciprocal relationship where the state serves the people, but the people are also expected to serve the state.
The characterization of Putin’s approach as merely elitist falls short of capturing its full complexity. While there is an elitist aspect, it differs from historical models like the Bolshevik period, where the party claimed a leading role. Instead, Putin’s elitism operates more subtly, emphasizing the state as the unifier of both elite and populace, with obedience to the elite representing obedience to the state. These messages, conveyed through both overt and coded means, allow authorities to maneuver and adapt as needed. Populism, when applied to Putin’s regime, fails to fully encapsulate this nuanced dynamic, as it operates in distinct ways within the Russian context.
Putin Allows Others to Depict Him as a Superman
Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a virtual interview from Moscow with news agency Press Trust of India (PTI) on June 5, 2021, addressed a number of pressing issues. Photo: Nick Raille.
In terms of leadership style, Putin has usually been described as exhibiting a “bad boy” populist persona. How does this persona align with or diverge from traditional populist leadership styles, and what are its implications for understanding his political strategy? Moreover, how does Putin’s leadership fit into charismatic leadership framework, considering his reliance on incumbency advantages, control of mobilization, and aversion to popular spontaneity?
Luke March: It’s a complex element once again. At first glance, Putin shares numerous commonalities with other infamous figures dubbed “bad boys” or disruptive populist leaders such as Trump, Bolsonaro, and others, particularly those on the right-wing spectrum. His persona revolves around a macho, strongman image—someone who can be crude, cracks sexist jokes, and strongly advocates patriarchal politics and superhuman feats. However, this depiction only partially captures Putin’s actions. In the West, we often focus on these facets, sometimes even finding amusement in them, especially in the UK where our view of leadership differs significantly.
Yet, there’s far more complexity at play. Putin frequently exhibits sober, restrained behavior, akin to a military or business leader, adopting a CEO-like demeanor. While he occasionally indulges in the pomp and ceremony associated with a Tsar-like figure, much of the time he presents himself in a business suit, embodying a less emotive, more calculated style, devoid of the outbursts seen in populist leaders. He can slip into the populist role when necessary, but also assumes a more nuanced persona. It’s crucial to recognize his background as a representative of the security services in the Soviet state. Thus, when he employs macho language and threats, there’s a subtext pointing to his underlying authority and the genuine menace behind his words. Although Putin’s character has evolved over the past couple of decades, the increasing severity of his repressive actions is becoming more apparent.
In terms of charisma, he undeniably exudes a certain charismatic authority, largely rooted in his widespread popularity. Much of this popularity stems from his portrayal as someone above the party system, viewed as essential to the discourse surrounding the creation of the Russian State. However, it’s worth noting that much of this narrative isn’t directly promoted by Putin himself, but rather by individuals acting on his behalf, who assert, “We need Putin, and we can’t envision the Russian State without him.” Even the head of the Russian Orthodox Church has referred to him as “a miracle of God.” This has fostered a sort of mini personality cult around him, despite his tendency to downplay such notions and present himself in a sober, teetotal, and non-drinker persona. He allows others to depict him as a superman, adding further layers of complexity to his image—partially populist, yet encompassing many other facets as well.
The Space for Ideological and Rhetorical Opposition Has Shrunk
Riot police officers detain a participant of an unsanctioned rally urging fair elections at Pushkinskaya Square in Moscow, Russia on August 3, 2019. Photo: Elena Rostunova.
In one of your articles, you discuss the impact of Putin’s intervention in Crimea (and of course intervention in Ukraine now) on the domestic political situation in Russia, particularly regarding the marginalization of non-systemic opposition groups. Could you elaborate on how this crisis has affected the dynamics between the Kremlin and both systemic and non-systemic opposition movements in Russia?
Luke March: In a nutshell, it’scontributed to the crushing of the opposition, erasing any coherent dissenting voices. While individuals remain, they lack the organizational structure to pose a significant challenge. Many prominent figures of the non-systemic opposition have either been forced into exile, imprisoned, or, in tragic cases like Navalny’s, silenced permanently. A significant outcome has been the bolstering of Putin’s popularity. This strategy also succeeded in co-opting Russian nationalist sentiments. Putin has strategically portrayed himself as a nationalist leader, emphasizing his role as a guardian of Russian territories and heritage, positioning himself as a historical figure who is making Russia great again.
He made it exceedingly challenging for people to criticize him, fostering a rally-round-the-flag effect that portrays critics as traitors. This tactic has exacerbated tensions internationally, allowing him to label domestic opposition as traitorous or pro-Western fifth column. Simultaneously, there’s been a conservative shift in Russian politics, with Putin aligning more closely with conservative nationalist ideals. This shift has effectively silenced dissent, bolstered by legal restrictions on opposition that intensified after February 2022, particularly regarding criticism of so-called “military operation.” The space for ideological and rhetorical opposition has shrunk alongside legal avenues, buoying Putin’s popularity while increasing repression. Consequently, genuine opposition voices are scarce, evident in the upcoming elections where systemic opposition refrain from critiquing Putin’s regime.
Putin’s Core Strategy Is Top-Down Control Aimed at Maintaining Authority
In your article “Putin: Populist, Anti-populist, or Pseudo-populist?”, you argue that Putin’s ideology subverts populism, using populist ideas and rhetoric in service of the authoritarian state. Also, you argue against characterizing Putin as substantively populist. Could you elaborate on why you do not see Putin as a populist leader, particularly in terms of his approach to people-centrism, anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty?
Luke March: On one hand, those elements are present, and Putin can adopt a populist approach when it suits his purposes. On the other hand, while my previous responses touch upon certain aspects, they only scratch the surface of Putin’s comprehensive rhetoric. Ideologies such as statism and conservatism play equally crucial roles. Putin’s aversion to popular mobilization is deeply ingrained, likely stemming from his background as a security service agent in the GDR during the fall of the Berlin Wall. This suspicion extends beyond just the elite to encompass all forms of mass mobilization.
So where does he incorporate elements of populism? They seem rather disconnected. When he focuses on people’s centrism, it doesn’t necessarily align with anti-elitism. When he does emphasize anti-elitism, it’s often rooted in historical references, such as his rhetoric regarding Ukraine, where he highlights how the Bolsheviks drew up Ukraine against the wishes of the Russian people. However, his critique extends beyond internal elites to include Ukrainian and Western elites. Yet, this critique of Western elites doesn’t seem to be tied to a broader vision of popular sovereignty. So, these elements aren’t interwoven in the fundamental way one might expect from a populist leader. He doesn’t consistently advocate for people’s power everywhere. While he may speak vaguely about fighting for the underdog globally and criticize Western elites, it’s more of a horizontal critique against outsiders rather than a vertical critique advocating for the people against the elite.
That’s also evident in his approach to the situation in Ukraine, where he criticizes what he terms the “coup” but doesn’t advocate for empowering the Ukrainian people in response to the power shift. Instead, he calls for Ukrainians to seek protection from the West by aligning with the Russian people. Thus, his use of populism serves more as an anti-Western critique rather than a genuine appeal to populism. While there may be individuals within the Kremlin who employ a more populist rhetoric, Putin’s core strategy revolves around top-down control and centralization, aimed at maintaining authority rather than empowering the people.
You discuss the concept of “official nationality” in Russia, emphasizing its moderate conservatism and promotion of civic nationalism. How does the Kremlin balance the promotion of this ideology with the need to control more extreme forms of nationalism, particularly those that may challenge its authority? Can you elaborate on how the Kremlin strategically employs nationalism to garner support and suppress dissent, and how effective has this approach been in preserving elite power?
Luke March: It’s a delicate balance that they have often shifted between. When examining the rhetoric coming from the Kremlin, particularly figures like Foreign Minister Lavrov and those surrounding Putin, it has typically been characterized as sober, realist, and rooted in state interests, at least until the past decade. However, over time, this balance has become more porous, especially with the onset of the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The Kremlin has increasingly drawn upon a domestic nationalist consensus. About 15 years ago, Putin may have been more inclined towards a pro-European stance, perhaps critical of the US. However, in the last decade, his rhetoric has shifted significantly towards anti-Western sentiment, coupled with critiques of Western liberalism and so-called “woke politics.”
To a certain extent, I believe the official stance on nationality has grown increasingly nationalistic, with Putin aligning himself with some domestic nationalists, such as Alexander Dugin, who were previously viewed as extremists. Their ideologies have now permeated into the mainstream, particularly evident within the media landscape and amidst the ongoing conflict. Many commentators on Russian television espouse overtly nationalistic views, including discussions about the potential obliteration of Ukraine as a nation. Comparatively, Putin’s rhetoric appears more measured, often emphasizing the pursuit of peace deals. However, the Kremlin’s allowance for nationalist voices to dominate the political discourse underscores a shift towards framing official nationality as a clash of civilizations between Russia and the West. While it may still retain some semblance of moderation, this stance has undeniably veered towards extremism over time.
Rather Than Crudely Rigging Elections, Kremlin Prefers to Shape Electorate’s Choices in Advance
In one of your articles, you draw parallels between the dystopian depiction of political control in “The Hunger Games” and the situation in Russia, where opposition parties are manipulated to reinforce the Kremlin’s authority. How do these manipulations manifest in the political landscape, and what strategies does the Kremlin employ to maintain control over opposition activities? Furthermore, what factors could undermine Putin’s support in the long term, and how might the opposition capitalize on the systemic vulnerabilities to challenge Putin’s regime?
Luke March: There exists a complex network of control within the party system, often channeled through figures like Sergei Kiriyenko and the Presidential administration, previously led by Vladislav Surkov. Understanding this network is exceptionally challenging, given its informal nature, relying heavily on circumstantial accounts from Russian political scientists and media sources, which are not as transparent as they once were. The significant caveat in addressing this issue is that ultimately, the full extent of this control remains elusive and uncertain.
However, information occasionally seeps out, as was the case a couple of weeks ago when a consortium of Western media released a report called “Kremlin Leaks.” This report detailed the informal methods through which the Kremlin channels funds into propaganda, media, and education spheres, as well as its strategies concerning the opposition. Rather than overtly and crudely rigging elections, the Kremlin prefers to shape the electorate’s choices in advance. This is not to suggest that Putin couldn’t win a free and fair election, but such an election would have a vastly different dynamic. To control the narrative, pressure is exerted on political parties to pre-select candidates aligned with the Kremlin’s interests. A notable example is the case of the Communists in the 2018 election, who fielded a businessman named Pavel Grudinin, garnering 11% of the vote. While not particularly impressive, Grudinin began gaining traction as a national-scale political figure and potential future leader of the Communist Party. However, through various subterfuges, including attacks on his business and family disputes, he was eventually ousted from politics. This illustrates one of the ways in which such manipulation occurs.
As I’ve mentioned, there’s been a significant increase in regulation and restrictions on street protests, especially regarding demonstrations concerning the war. This is one aspect. Additionally, the Kremlin’s message, exemplified by the assassination of Navalny, serves to delineate the boundaries of what can be achieved. Consequently, opposition politicians and protestors who persist must display immense bravery and commitment. Many politicians opt for self-censorship or refrain from challenging fundamental issues altogether. For a considerable duration, no opposition figure of substantial influence has dared to criticize Russian foreign policy in a fundamental manner. For instance, during the original annexation of Crimea, the Russian Parliament approved it with a vote of 449 to 1, with the lone dissenting voice being Ilya Ponomarev, who had to flee into exile in Ukraine. This prevailing trend, facilitated through both formal and informal means, underscores the extreme difficulty faced by the opposition in expressing dissent.
Russia Has Positioned Itself as a ‘Muslim Power’
The CEO of Rostec Corporation Sergey Chemezov, President Vladimir Putin and head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov at the International Aviation and Space salon MAKS-2015 in Zhukovsky, Russia on August 25, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.
Referring to one of your surveys, how do Russian policy-making and academic elites conceptualize the idea of ‘radicalization’ within the context of Islam, and what are the key factors they identify as contributing to this phenomenon? How does Russia’s approach to combating radicalization domestically influence its foreign policy towards the Muslim world?
Luke March: The concept of radicalization finds more resonance in Western and UK circles than in Russia, although it has been referenced to some extent. However, over time, the notion of radicalization has often been overshadowed by that of extremism, which has been wielded rather heavy-handedly to suppress alternative or inconvenient viewpoints contrary to the state’s narrative. State policymakers in Russia have typically categorized Islam into what they perceive as traditional, domestic Islam, and the more radical or extremist variant, often associated with foreign influences. This distinction aligns with the broader trend of re-traditionalization and reconservatism in Russian politics, where the state favors a plurality of traditions as long as they are domestically rooted. Consequently, there’s been a concerted effort to support domestic Islamic leaders and restrict foreign engagements, particularly with countries like Saudi Arabia, in efforts to combat what is perceived as Wahhabism.
On another note, regarding the critique of radicalization processes, the Russian discourse on Islam tends to emphasize socioeconomic factors such as poverty and youth unemployment as primary drivers of Islamic radicalization, rather than delving into the political motivations behind the rise of more radical forms of Islam. This stands in contrast to Western perspectives, which often highlight issues of corruption, governance, and centralization, and acknowledge Islam as an ideology of opposition through which disaffected youth express radical dissent against the state. From the official Russian standpoint, such political aspects are often avoided or considered taboo. Instead, their focus lies on addressing poverty, youth unemployment, and implementing policies aimed at bolstering socioeconomic conditions, typically through investment in regions to mitigate vulnerability to radicalization. This approach underscores the significance of socioeconomic improvement as a crucial aspect of addressing the issue.
Simultaneously, there are policies of co-option, involving the allocation of funds and support to loyalist supporters. The prime example of this strategy is evident in Chechnya, where Ramzan Kadyrov champions a syncretic form of domestic Islam, albeit one with questionable historical roots. Nevertheless, Kadyrov is perceived as successfully co-opting elements within the region. In terms of foreign policy, Russia has positioned itself as a Muslim power and a friend to the Arab world, particularly after addressing issues in Chechnya and positioning it as a genuine home to Muslims. This shift can also be seen as part of a broader pivot away from Western politics towards a more multipolar approach. As domestic control strengthens, Russia becomes increasingly comfortable presenting itself as a friendly ally to the Arab world.
Russia’s Relations with External Forces Appear More Opportunistic
There’s a widely observed trend of support from Putin’s Russia towards populist, extreme-right-wing parties globally. How do you explain this relationship, and what factors drive Putin to support these parties? Are these connections primarily ideational or opportunistic in nature? Moreover, how has this relationship been influenced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?
Luke March: Overall, Russia’s relations with external forces appear more opportunistic than driven by any consistent ideology. It forms alliances with various groups and individuals for a multitude of reasons, spanning from the radical left to mainstream politicians. Essentially, Russia adapts its messaging to cater to the desires and interests of its audience. However, with the populist right, there’s a discernible ideological component, which has strengthened over time, reflecting Putin’s domestic conservatism. This ideology centers around traditional values, family, church, and robust leadership. In terms of common enemies, the populist right aligns against American hegemony, postmodern liberalism, and views the EU as a supranational actor. This amalgamation of opportunism and ideology is particularly evident in the relationship between Russia and the radical right, where ties are often stronger compared to the radical left. While both may share anti-American and anti-imperialist sentiments, the radical left tends to be more critical of Russia’s domestic model. Conversely, many in the radical right perceive Putin as a symbol of strong, masculine leadership.
The Ukraine war has undoubtedly complicated matters, particularly within Western Europe, making overt support for Russia somewhat taboo. As a result, the stance of the radical right in Europe towards Russia has become geographically divided. For instance, the Finns Party has never been pro-Putin, and now others like the French National Rally have had to reassess their pro-Putin positions, taking a step back and re-evaluating their stance. However, these dynamics are still very much in flux. The war in Ukraine is far from over, and its outcome remains uncertain. This uncertainty means that final alignments are far from settled.
As events unfold, those who have been cautious about openly supporting Putin may gradually shift back towards that position. They may support peace deals while implicitly or explicitly criticizing Western policies such as arming Ukraine and imposing sanctions. Moreover, if Trump secures victory in November, it could significantly bolster the populist right, especially if he follows through on his anti-NATO policies and reduces support for Ukraine. In such a scenario, the radical right may realign towards Russia and begin echoing certain talking points. Overall, these dynamics are still very much in motion and subject to change.
Death of Navalny Sends Message: ‘Imprisonment Is Not the Ultimate Punishment”
People mourn for Alexei Navalny in Budapest, Hungary on February 16, 2024. Photo: Alexey Gorovoi.
What is your interpretation of the recent death of Alexei Navalny in prison, and how does it reflect on the nature of Putin’s regime?
Luke March: There remains a significant amount that we are uncertain about and may never fully understand. The circumstances surrounding Navalny’s death, for instance, remain shrouded in mystery. We cannot definitively determine whether it was orchestrated by someone high up, possibly even Putin himself, or if it resulted from sustained maltreatment during his time in prison, where he faced increasingly harsh conditions endangering his health.
There’s speculation circulating, although its veracity is uncertain, suggesting that Navalny was due for a prisoner exchange, which may have served as a catalyst for his demise. It’s suggested that individuals within the Kremlin deemed such an exchange untenable and thus opted to remove him from the equation. However, these are merely speculative theories, and the truth remains elusive.
However, I believe Navalny’s fate serves as a pivotal indication of the evolving landscape of Russian politics. Just a little over a decade ago, Navalny enjoyed relatively unrestricted freedom to voice his ideas. While he lacked access to state-controlled media, he operated within certain boundaries. Despite occasional arrests or warnings, he even ran in the Moscow mayoral elections in 2013, securing a notable 29% of the vote. At that time, the Kremlin likely perceived him as manageable, perhaps even co-optable, with little cause for concern.
As time progressed, the political climate in Russia grew increasingly restrictive. Navalny was barred from running in the 2018 elections, and he became the target of an assassination attempt, ultimately leading to his imprisonment. This trajectory reflects a trend towards heightened repression and a diminishing tolerance for even limited opposition. While it’s difficult to gauge the extent of Navalny’s potential threat, he never achieved widespread popularity or won a significant election. His influence remained largely potential rather than realized.
By arresting and ultimately leading to Navalny’s death, the Russian government not only displayed its repressive tendencies but also conveyed a message of despair. Navalny, despite his somewhat controversial politics, symbolized a defiance against the Kremlin, a belief that one could stand up to it and even ridicule it without dire consequences. His focus on critical issues like corruption challenged the status quo. However, his demise crushes this sense of hope, suggesting that opposition carries severe consequences. It underscores the message that imprisonment is not the ultimate punishment; there are worse fates awaiting dissenters.
This harsh crackdown also sends a clear message to the West: “We don’t care about your opinions. We disregard Nobel prizes, prominent opposition figures, and any other forms of international recognition.”
Some people have suggested that Navalny’s fate indicates Putin’s fear of him. However, I disagree. Putin likely viewed Navalny as an irritant, with those around him perhaps considering him a potential threat if left unchecked. Personally, Putin likely saw Navalny as someone to be crushed without much concern. This illustrates the impunity of power within the Russian political landscape. As seen throughout my earlier responses, a key trend in Russian politics over the past decade and a half has been the increasing dominance of state power and the utilization of state violence.
Elections Serve to Reinforce Putin’s Position
Regarding the upcoming Russian presidential elections next week, do you anticipate any surprises, or do you view it as another milestone in the consolidation of Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule?
Luke March: It’s definitely the latter. It seems that any surprises or intrigues in this election are more like minor curiosities rather than significant events. One potential point of interest could be whether the Liberal candidate, Vladislav Davankov, manages to secure second place ahead of the Communists. However, even if this were to happen, it’s likely to represent only a small percentage, perhaps 7, 8, or 9 percent, if even that much. This election appears to be even less competitive than the previous one, which featured three candidates alongside Putin, compared to eight candidates six years ago. None of the candidates seem to advocate for anything particularly substantive. For instance, the Communists have nominated a secondary candidate who also ran 20 years ago and was considered weak even then. Moreover, there are concerns about the fairness of the election process, with indications that it’s pre-rigged. The Kremlin appears to be increasingly relying on Internet and electronic voting methods, which lack proper scrutiny, thereby enabling it to achieve the desired outcome. There’s speculation that Putin could secure as much as 80% of the vote, with purported leaks from within the Kremlin supporting this notion.
If Putin were to secure 80% or 85% of the vote, it wouldn’t come as a surprise, as it leaves virtually no room for opposition. Once again, these elections serve to reinforce Putin’s position as a pivotal figure and patron of the elite. The underlying message he aims to convey is that he is not challengeable in the foreseeable future; while individuals may challenge him, they will inevitably be suppressed. I anticipate no significant deviation from this pattern. Regarding your earlier query about potential weaknesses in the future, it’s crucial to acknowledge that the Russian political system faces vulnerabilities stemming from economic challenges, casualties in warfare, inflation, and other pressures, all of which are unpredictable. However, current measures are aimed at ensuring that no political entity can capitalize on these grievances. Thus far, the Kremlin has been largely successful in this endeavor.
Chega, a populist radical right-wing party known for its anti-systemic, morally conservative, and securitarian rhetoric, secured 48 MPs, solidifying its position as the most influential third force ever in the Parliament. This marks a substantial transformation in Portuguese politics. Despite warnings from the Left about the imminent threat of fascism, voters persist in seeking straightforward solutions and placing blame on elites and immigrants. Now, the pivotal question arises: “Will the Democratic Alliance break its cordon sanitaire with Chega?”
Portuguese legislative elections have ushered in a new era in parliament, potentially marking the end of the historical bipartisanship between the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social-Democratic (PSD) side. While failing to secure a majority, the Democratic Alliance (AD) emerged as the electoral victor on March 10. Led by the PSD with the participation of CDS (the democratic-Christians) and PPM (the monarchic party), the AD capitalized on widespread dissatisfaction stemming from the Socialist Party’s eight-year tenure marred by numerous scandals and political turmoil.
Initially positioned advantageously, the AD sought to harness widespread dissatisfaction for electoral success. However, as we know, championing dissatisfaction is often the terrain of radical right-wing populist parties (as summarized by Kaltwasser et al., 2017). Despite this, the AD encountered significant hurdles: lingering memories of austerity measures imposed by the troika, which had become internalized as ideology, were deeply felt by pensioners and public sector workers—key segments of Portugal’s electorate. Additionally, the leader faced challenges in rallying public support. Despite vulnerabilities within the Socialist Party, exacerbated by a leadership change following murky allegations of corruption involving Prime Minister António Costa, the AD’s victory remained tenuous, narrowly avoiding a stalemate.
The Portuguese parliament consists of 230 members, requiring 116 MPs for a majority. With 99 percent of the votes counted (pending results from 31 consulates), the AD secured 79 MPs, while the Socialists claimed 76. Meanwhile, Chega, a populist radical right-wing party, obtained 48 MPs, establishing itself as the most formidable third force ever in the Parliament. This signals a significant shift in Portuguese politics.
Chega is a quintessential populist radical right party known for its anti-systemic, morally conservative, and securitarian rhetoric (see Marchi 2020, 2022), coupled with fluid economic ideas, as suggested by feedback from its potential electors. However, its illiberal positions and involvement in culture wars, such as its opposition to the so-called “gender ideology” and stance on immigration control, have led to substantial public disapproval of the Chega party.
In the 2022 elections, the Socialist Party (PS) secured an absolute majority, partly because the then-leader of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) was ambiguous about potential collaborations with Chega. Consequently, the current PSD leader, Luís Montenegro, felt compelled to state unequivocally that he would never form alliances with Chega. This clear stance was crucial to reassure the moderate electorate and ensure their confidence in voting for the Democratic Alliance (AD). At this juncture, any negotiation with Chega would be perceived as a betrayal to the center and center-right voters who supported the AD based on a firm “no means no” commitment. Nevertheless, Chega’s leader, André Ventura, has advocated for an outright majority of the right altogether, applying pressure on AD to negotiate and, ultimately, gain a position in a future government, which is his fundamental ambition.
Chega’s success can be attributed to multiple factors, including a culture that craves a messianic leader, as outlined by Ferreira Dias (2022). Additionally, widespread political disengagement among the population, coupled with significant political illiteracy, has played a role. Moreover, feelings of neglect among rural communities, demographic shifts marked by a rapid increase in immigrants in previously unaffected areas, and a perception of corruption among political elites have contributed to Chega’s rise. These phenomena are not unique to Portugal but are common hallmarks of populist movements worldwide.
The 22-catch question is: Will the Democratic Alliance abandon its cordon sanitaire of Chega? Despite Chega’s populist aspirations, its leader, André Ventura, has expressed readiness to form a government with the DA. This lends credence to the view, shared by many including myself, that Chega was primarily a vehicle for gaining swift access to power. As mentioned, Luís Montenegro, leader of the DA, has firmly rejected any alliances with Chega. However, the practicalities of governance could potentially challenge this principled stance. If such negotiations become necessary, we might witness Luís Montenegro being replaced by a new leader willing to engage in discussions with Chega.
Just as André Ventura intended, Chega (or rather, he himself) has become a crucial player in the national political landscape and has the potential to disrupt the entire system. The ability of the Portuguese Right to function cohesively without Chega is dwindling, as it now primarily relies on the Democratic Alliance (DA), with the Liberal Initiative as the only other significant force, commanding just eight seats in parliament. Despite Montenegro’s best efforts, breaking free from Chega’s influence appears increasingly challenging. It’s likely that André Ventura’s party will allow government programs to pass, preferring to evade responsibility for any national political deadlock in order to gain political leverage in future elections, potentially bolstering its parliamentary presence to around 70/80 MPs and positioning itself for a shot at forming a government.
It appears evident that the Left’s narrative of “fascism is coming” has failed to resonate. Instead, people continue to gravitate toward simplistic solutions and identifiable scapegoats, such as elites and immigrants. This trend is not confined to Portugal but reflects a global phenomenon, highlighting a troubling divergence between democracy and liberalism, which resonates particularly with the younger generation. The strain on the system is further exacerbated by excessive bureaucracy, a sense of detachment from decision-making processes, a perception that legislators do not adequately represent the people’s interests, widespread distrust due to corruption, and a fading collective memory of the authoritarian regimes of the 20th century (Mounk, 2018).
References
Ferreira Dias, J. (2022). “Political Messianism in Portugal, the Case of André Ventura.” Slovenská politologická revue, 22(1), 79-107.
Kaltwasser, C. R.; Taggart, P.; Espejo, P. O. & Ostiguy, P. (2017). “Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art.” In: Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P. A., Espejo, P. O. and Ostiguy, P. eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism. pp. 1-24. Marchi, R. (2020). A nova direita anti-sistema-O caso do Chega. Leya. Marchi, R. (2022). Portugal y la derecha radical: otra «excepción» que cae. Nueva Sociedad, (300), 14-24.
Mounk, Y. (2018). “The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it.” In: The People vs. Democracy. Harvard University Press.
Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo is the anticipated victor of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, boasting a political career spanning more than three decades in the country. Over the course of the past decade alone, Prabowo has undergone significant shifts in ideological stances, rhetorical appeals, and electoral strategies. He has transformed from an ultra-nationalist, chauvinist, and Islamist populist into a technocratic figure with a more approachable demeanor, strategically forming and changing alliances in his efforts to secure electoral success.
Following Indonesia’s tumultuous transition to independence, the early period of the country’s history, which has been called the years of “Guided Democracy,” was led by two successive authoritarian regimes (Barton et al, 2021a; 2021b). It was during this period that Indonesia’s new leader cut his teeth in his former role as a general of the special forces (Kopassus). Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo has emerged as a pivotal figure in contemporary Indonesian electoral politics. Simply known as Prabowo, he is a highly controversial former military officer with a past tarnished by a legacy of human rights abuses, the son-in-law of former dictator Suharto, and a prominent political actor and Presidential candidate over the past decade.
Since 2009, Prabowo has consistently participated in general elections, engaging in consecutive races during each electoral cycle (2009, 2014, 2019 and 2024) and ultimately achieving victory in the most recent elections. Throughout the years, his image, stances, and narratives have undergone notable transformations, showcasing a fascinating political fluidity and adaptivity.
Prabowo’s journey includes experiencing defeat as a vice presidential candidate alongside Megawati and against retired four-star general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009. Their ticket received only 26.79% of the total votes, while other candidates received 12.41% and 60.08% respectively (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2009).
Subsequently, he faced defeat twice in presidential elections against the popular technocrat Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in 2014 and 2019. In 2014, Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa received 46.85% of the total votes, while Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla garnered 53.15% (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2014). Similarly, in 2019, Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin secured 55.32% of the votes compared to Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno’s 44.68% (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2019).
However, in the latest demonstration of realpolitik, Prabowo has refined and redefined his political messaging, ultimately claiming victory. He formed an alliance with his former opposition in the 2024 elections by choosing Jokowi’s son as his running mate, a strategic move that secured his electoral triumph.
In past election campaigns, Prabowo was noted for exhibiting ultra-nationalist, strongly chauvinist, and Islamist populist characteristics, as observed by Yilmaz et al. (2024). However, in the recent election, Prabowo has transformed, re-emerging as a distinctly technocratic figure while still retaining some classic populist tendencies. This shift in his political persona reflects significant strategic considerations, intending to further his quest for power.
Specifically, Prabowo now presents himself as the guardian of the people’s volonté générale (general will) and employs popular communication strategies that effectively engage Indonesia’s youth. It has also been noted that his campaigning involved simplifying complex political problems and their solutions – such as his focus on a program for free lunches and milk to tackle malnutrition and food scarcity – a program that has been criticized for being unrealistic (Susilo & Prana, 2024).
Prabowo’s campaigning in 2024 also marked a notable departure from the more antagonistic aspects of populism. Particularly significant was his abandonment of chauvinistic messaging, which had previously fueled religious-based hostilities, incited outrage against minorities, directed blame against foreign powers, and scapegoated oligarchic elites to appeal to voters (Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021).
In this campaign, Prabowo refrained from emphasizing ideological issues that deepen social polarization (Yilmaz, 2023) and steered clear of his past narratives and rhetoric against Western neo-liberalism and the perceived greed of Chinese corporations (Hadiz, 2017; Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021). Additionally, he distanced himself from religious right-wing groups, notably the civilizational populist Defenders Front of Islam (FPI), with whom he had previously aligned himself in varying capacities during the 2019 election (Yilmaz et al., 2022).
Prabowo and his political campaign team also used digital culture and technologies to both appeal to Indonesia’s youth and shake off his formerly aggressive and militant reputation. This involved various strategies including rebranding to reflect a more modern and approachable vibe, engagement through social media, utilizing platforms popular among youth, and creating appealing content.
Prabowo has been newly portrayed as an adorable, friendly grandpa (gemoy). This rebranding exercise has been particularly effective among online and youth communities – Prabowo is represented in digital spaces with a cartoon photo generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Citizen Digital, 2024), and has become known for dancing the Korean Oppa style to disco music and the super hit song “Oke Gas” by the famous rapper, Richard Jersey (Jersey, 2024)
“More than half of Indonesia’s 204 million voters are millennials or younger” and Prabowo’s use of social media has proved immensely popular amongst these voters (Economist, 2024). This is a strong strategic move and reflects an understanding of the type of leader Indonesian youth are looking for. While various definitions contest what is the ‘ideal’ or ‘the hegemon’ masculinity, there is a clear indication that amongst Indonesian millennials and Gen-Zs, the traditional ideal of a ‘strongman,’ as Prabowo was formerly and widely known as being, does not attract their support. Prabowo’s sensitivity to this change led him to modify his masculinity to become more acceptable in society. Being a dancing, friendly older man has gained him the acceptance of youth – unlike the highly composed military man or conservative religious figure he has occupied in past election campaigns.
There are several other explanations which can account for his change of tactics. First, he learned from his defeats in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. In both political battles, he operationalized a populist performance, presenting himself as a charismatic leader who was pro-indigenous, defending Islam in Indonesia, and standing up against a) the corrupt and Westernized elite, and b) foreign powers and influence (Mietzner, 2020). Furthermore, in both unsuccessful campaigns, Prabowo proved eager to win the support of various nativist, racist, and hardline groups. For instance, in 2017, hoping to gain Islamist support in the elections two years later, he eagerly supported Anies Baswedan in the quest to defeat Ahok (Basuki Tjahaya Purnama), the incumbent Chinese and Christian governor of Jakarta, in the lead-up to the gubernatorial election. In the process, he went as far as encouraging a severe and dramatic process of minority criminalization and discrimination (Bachtiar, 2023). However, despite receiving the support of civilizational populist leader Rizieq Shihab, the FPI, and other Islamist groups, it did not win the votes he needed, and Prabowo likely realized he needed a new political strategy to win the 2024 election.
While he did not otherize minority groups or form an alliance with hardline Islamists in the current elections, Prabowo continued to cast ‘Europe’ as an enemy. For instance, late last year while election campaigning, he accused Europe of treating Indonesia ‘unfairly’ when discussing exports of goods such as palm oil to the EU market (Yuniar, 2023). Narratives vilifying Europe have been a regular fixture in Prabowo’s political discourse, particularly in discussions surrounding national sovereignty and international relations. This reflects Indonesia’s troubled history with colonial powers from Europe, particularly the Dutch colonizers. Although Europe has been consistently positioned as an enemy elite, Prabowo’s messaging about China and the United States has shifted according to different political tides (Reuters, 2023).
Second, while the amplification of Islamist identity politics and civilizational populism significantly intensified the people’s emotions and populist demands (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023), it also inspired a wave of resistance from the silent majority: pluralist Muslims. Identity politics succeeded in forming cross-class alliances – evident in the mass rallies against Ahok – but they also provoked resentment, including from leaders of the consequential mainstream Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both organizations maintain a sharp focus on diversity and national integration (Burhani, 2018; Bruinessen, 2021). By not appealing to – and actively repelling – the pluralist and mainstream Muslims, Prabowo learnt in hindsight that his chances of success had been considerably hindered.
Third, Prabowo went through the important process of becoming a technocrat when he agreed to join the Jokowi cabinet and accepted the role of Indonesia’s Defense Minister. In this context, he built his image as a big-hearted knight with a more inclusive outlook. In taking this role, and in refashioning his political branding, he betrayed his coalition with the civilizational populist group, the FPI, who were consequently banned by Jokowi, leading to their dissolution (Power, 2018).
Prabowo’s closer affinity with Jokowi also allowed him to enact another key strategy in his 2024 campaign: Winning Jokowi’s support and endorsement. This was partly achieved by his decision to make Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming, the vice-presidential candidate – a decision which required manipulation of the law and the Constitutional Court (Wilson, 2024). In favorable circumstances for Probowo, Jokowi had come to a head with Megawati, Soekarno’s daughter, in the camp of his party in power (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle – PDIP). Megawati had insulted Jokowi when she suggested he should submit to party leadership (as a worker/petugas partai), despite his status as President of Indonesia. As a result, Jokowi withdrew his support for Ganjar Pranowo, the governor of Central Java, who had been endorsed by the PDIP as its presidential candidate (Bachtiar, 2023). Aware of Jokowi’s popularity, particularly because of his strong economic performance, Prabowo keenly promoted himself as the candidate who would carry on this legacy (Strangio, 2024).
In conclusion, Prabowo’s transformations throughout various presidential elections have been remarkable. From 2014 to 2024, he has undergone a significant evolution in his public image, shifting from a classical populist ‘strongman’ with authoritarian tendencies and polarizing rhetoric to adopting an ultra-conservative and pious Islamist persona, and most recently, presenting himself as a soft, affable grandpa who engages with youth through TikTok dances and photos with his cats.
Even though he has outwardly shed the more hardened and aggressive parts of his persona, Prabowo’s experience in military leadership will have still played a central role; some voters are still likely drawn to an assertive style of leadership and see him as a proficient leader who can effectively attend to the welfare of everyday Indonesians (Gilang & Almubaroq, 2022), while younger voters might have felt a connection with the softer and approachable ‘grandpa’ figure they saw on the internet (The Economist, 2024).
Throughout this journey, Prabowo has continually renewed and adjusted his policy promises, political allegiances, public image, and the support bases he appeals to. Concerns remain about the authenticity of Prabowo’s shift in rhetorical and ideological messaging, and what lies underneath Prabowo’s successful attempt at gaining power and control in Indonesia. How far removed is this softer and more inclusive gemoy character from the strong and masculine, ultra-nationalist and chauvinist described by scholars previously (Hadiz, 2017; Mietzner, 2020; Yilmaz & Barton, 2021)? After all, it was only recently that American Indonesianist, Slater argued Prabowo is “the sort of ethnonationalist, polarizing, strongman who would scapegoat minorities and ride roughshod to power, as other world leaders recently had” (Slater, 2023: 103-104). These concerns were also highlighted by The Guardian writers, who claimed that Prabowo’s victory in 2024 was a sign that “winter is coming” for Indonesian democracy (Ratcliffe & Richaldo, 2024). Similarly, Kurlantzick (2024) argues that democracy is truly lost with Prabowo’s victory.
The question also arises whether the current ‘happy grandpa’ persona will eventually revert to the iron-fisted strongman? While his pattern of changing ideologies and political messaging may suggest such a possibility, Prabowo has demonstrated patience and tactical acumen as a populist leader. He adapts to the expectations of voters, which are shaped by constantly changing socio-political trends. Therefore, while a metamorphosis back to his former persona cannot be ruled out, Prabowo’s ability to navigate shifting political landscapes makes his future trajectory uncertain yet intriguing.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation.
References
Bachtiar, Hasnan. (2023). “Ganjar Pranowo’s Quest: Resisting Islamist Civilizational Populism in Indonesia.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 19, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0028
Barton, G.; I. Yilmaz and N. Morieson. (2021a). “Authoritarianism, Democracy, Islamic Movements and Contestations of Islamic Religious Ideas in Indonesia.” Religions. 2021, 12, 641. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12080641
Barton, G.; I. Yilmaz and N. Morieson. (2021b). “Religious and Pro-Violence Populism in Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of a Far-Right Islamist Civilisationist Movement.” Religions, 12(6), 397. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12060397
Bruinessen, M. V. (2021). “Traditionalist Muslims and Populism in Indonesia and Turkey.” Tashwirul Afkar, 40(2), pp. 1-27.
Burhani, A. N. (2018). “Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in Indonesia.” In: N. Saat, ed. Islam in Southeast Asia Negotiating Modernity. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, pp. 140-163.
Gilang, P. L. & Almubaroq, Z. H. (2022). “Leadership Style of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto.” International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 6(3), pp. 617-621.
Hadiz, V. R. (2017). “Indonesia’s year of democratic setbacks: Towards a new phase of deepening illiberalism?” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 53(3), pp. 261-278.
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (2014). Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum No. 535/Kpts/KPU/Tahun 2014 tentang Penetapan Rekapitulasi Hasil Penghitungan Perolehan Suara dan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Presiden dan Wakil Presiden tahun 2014. https://jdih.kpu.go.id/data/data_kepkpu/535_PENETAPAN_REKAP_PILPRES.pdf
Mietzner, M. (2020). “Rival populisms and the democratic crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and technocrat.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 74(4), pp. 420-438.
Power, T. P. (2018). “Jokowi’s authoritarian turn and Indonesia’s democratic decline.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3), pp. 307-338.
Yilmaz, I. (2023). Civilizational Populism in Democratic Nation-States. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Yilmaz, I. & Barton, G. (2021). “Political Mobilisation of Religious, Chauvinist, and Technocratic Populists in Indonesia and Their Activities in Cyberspace.” Religions, 12(10), p. 822.
Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2023). Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
Yilmaz, I.; Morieson, N. & Bachtiar, H. (2022). “Civilizational Populism in Indonesia: The Case of Front Pembela Islam (FPI).” Religions, 13(12), p. 1208.
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Triwibowo, Whisnu; Bachtiar, Hasnan & Barton, Greg. (2024). “Competing Populisms, Digital Technologies and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 2, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0029
Activist movements such as Black Lives Matter (BLM), MeToo, Fridays for Future (FFF), Extinction Rebellion (XR) and many more use populist frameworks and rhetoric elements that contest the elites and claim the general will of the people. We see BLM standing up against the racist system of white elites. We look at #MeToo fighting against the patriarchal system of male elites. And we watch FFF and XR challenging the neoliberal, capitalist system of big corporate elites. All of these activist movements are supposedly fighting for the general will of the people, similar to populism. But how much of activist rhetoric is coopted from populist ideology, movements, and parties? And how much did populism copy from activist movements in their approach? This is what this article will try answer.
2024 is already polluted and flooded with political protests, actions and political discourses about intensifying conflicts around the world and upcoming elections as this year constitutes a very strong voting year (Buchholz, 2024). Characterized by pro-Palestine and anti-genocide actions around the world under several social and political movements including the BDS-movement (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions-Movement) and farmers protests by the agricultural sector and right-wing parties, 2024 already offers a lot of activism and political engagement (Lesnes, 2024; Tanno & Liakos, 2024). However, such political activism and engagement often comes hand in hand with polarization and populism (Sawyer, 2023).
Before we dive into the connection between activism and populism, we first need to establish working frameworks for both terms. Firstly, activism can be identified as a tool to express ideology and identity and is closely linked with protests and civil participation (Siim et al., 2018). It includes citizens voicing critical opinions through strikes, boycotts, petitions, the occupation of buildings, mass demonstrations and acts of political violence (Norris, 2004) directed against political institutions, but also public actors and figures. Political activism can play out on the local, national, or transnational level through everyday activities and political actions. It includes diverse solidarity and resistance movements and pro-diversity and pro-equality agency (Siim et al., 2018).
Secondly, populism can be defined as thin ideology, as it is flexible to be used in conjunction with other ideologies, such as environmentalism, feminism, socialism and communism, and other systems of knowledge (Stanley, 2008; Mudde, 2004). Three main components of populism can be characterized based on this approach: (1) the people, challenging (2) the corrupt elite and claiming that politics should be the expression of the (3) general will of the people (Mudde, 2004).
Connections between Activism and Populism
We can already assume that activist movements, that use ideology to justify their political agenda and motives can use their leading ideology in conjunction with populism as a means to convey their message and transform discontent through collective cognitive processes into action (Aslanidis, 2017). For example, BLM fights for racial equality as their ideology and contests the white elites, constituting a populist element (Campbell, 2021). Specifically, people of color and marginalized groups affected by white supremacy are the “people” BLM fights for. ‘The general will’ is guided by the principles of anti-discrimination and racial equality (Campbell, 2021).
Additionally, MeToo is advocating for feminism as their ideology, by criticizing the male elites, manifesting a populist element (MeToo Mvmt, 2023). MeToo fights especially for FLINTA (female, lesbian, intergender, non-binary, transgender and agender persons), for the “people” marginalized by the patriarchy. MeToo fights especially as general will for gender equality.
Moreover, FFF and XR use environmentalism as their ideology by raising awareness for sustainability and environmental protection. Thus, they challenge the capitalistic elites, forming an element of populism (Extinction Rebellion NL, 2024; Fridays for Future, 2021). FFF and XR fight specifically for people affected by the climate crisis such as climate refugees and small-scale farmers as well as people that are subject to colonialism and exploitation, which ties back to everyone to some extent as we are all affected by climate change. The general will is based on climate justice. Thus, populist elements in activist movements can be characterized.
Circling back from activist movements to the literature, different connections between activism and populism based on research can be characterized. On the one hand, Zaslove et al. (2020) suggest that people who vote for populist parties and are discontent with democracy, are, however, still supportive of the overall democratic system compared to individuals with weaker populist attitudes. Thus, people who vote for populist parties are less inclined to protest and participate in protest marches, demonstrations, or protest action (Zaslove et al. 2020). On the other hand, Karlson (2024) found that demands made by BLM and MeToo for equal recognition of marginalized groups that are being oppressed in societies, can be coopted from activism and translated into populism. Often described as populist leader is Donald Trump for example. He uses frequently the framing of “the marginalized” to attract working-class supporters that feel disregarded by national elites. Trump uses this rhetoric to incorporate “political correctness” in his agenda and attract new potential voters (Karlson, 2024).
Populism and Activism on Social Media
Moving from general relations between activism and populism to digitalization and social media, Gustafsson and Weinryb (2019) show that individualized social media activism has affinities to populism and could have serious effects on democratic procedures and bureaucratic structures. This indicates that social media activism reinforces individualized forms of charismatic authority, which refers to the collective excitement produced by external events that form a type of heroism (Weber, 1978). In the following, charismatic authority can be characterized as a form of digital enthusiasm of a collective mass, that feels interconnected and engaged as well as in a position of possibilities to challenge the political system and the status quo, which translates into digital activism (Gustafsson & Weinryb, 2019). This may have large-scale implications how populism is understood and plays out in societies.
Furthermore, research by Mazzoleni & Bracciale (2018) found that populist leaders, such as Berlusconi, Di Maio, Salvini, and Melini, prominent figures in Italy, utilize social media more extensively than mainstream party figures to counteract negative coverage by traditional media outlets. Apart from their appearances on TV shows and news broadcasts, social media platforms provide direct channels for these populist leaders to engage with their constituents (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018). This direct interaction between populist leaders and their followers can amplify social media activism and political engagement among their supporters (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018).
From these examples we can see that activism uses actively populist rhetoric. However, the narratives created by activism can be then coopted by populist leaders. Moreover, we can recognize that even though activism and populism can increase trust in democracy leading to less protests, the majority of research clearly indicates that in multiple cases activism is the accelerator nourishing populist ideology that motivates the people to act and speak up. From this we can investigate how populist parties use and affect activism.
Activism Used and Affected by Populist Parties
To make sense of populist parties infringing and utilizing activism, authoritarian and democratic populism should be distinguished. Authoritarian populist parties are anti-democratic and attack policies and the rule of law which are based on core institutional pillars of the state order (Bugarič, 2019). On the contrary, democratic populism focuses on the emancipation of voters, and the protection and defense of democracy by making institutions and the system more accountable, equitable and inclusive (Bugarič, 2019).
Research by Whiteley et al. (2019) indicates that activists are more important in populist right-wing parties, than in traditional parties, as they move the party forward and act as key roles and figures for campaigning and organizing as well as funding since they are the most committed members. Furthermore, activism can be used by right-wing populist parties and leaders to mobilize for mass demonstrations and even occupations in conjunction with social media advertisement. For example, populist radical right-wing parties such as the British Independence Party (UKIP), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) engage with activism through petitions, participation and organization of demonstrations and marches, especially in recent years against Covid19-restrictions and currently farmers protests (Whiteley et al., 2019; Euronews, 2021; Hämmerle, 2024; Neuerer, 2024). Another notable example is Donald Trump and the storming of the Capitol, where he rallied his supporters through populist rhetoric, encouraging their participation in the event (Barry et al., 2021).
Although right wing populist parties can use activism to their advantage, activism that works in their disadvantage can be also shut down by right-wing populist parties in power. Poland and Hungary oppress and silence activists through new legislation and regulations, especially anti-abortion, women’s and LGBTIQ+ activists as well as anti-fascist activists and protestors. The populist parties in Hungary (Fidesz) and Poland (Law and Justice Party) restrict and limit civil participation further and further through prohibiting strikes (Gwiazda, 2020; Winfield, 2024).
In contrast to authoritarian populist parties, democratic populist parties like the Spanish left-wing Podemos or the Dutch left-wing BIJ1 originated from activist groups (De Nadal, 2020; Ornstein, 2023). In Spain, this evolution stemmed from the Indignados movement (De Nadal, 2020). In the Netherlands, the party was formed by activists from XR and other related anti-discrimination and anti-racism movements (Ornstein, 2023; NL Times, 2023). Moreover, Podemos and BIJ1 actively participate in mass protests, demonstrations, and petition campaigns (De Nadal, 2020; Gerbaudo, 2021). Additionally, the Greek left-wing populist party Syriza and its activists engage in activism by establishing food banks, known as Solidarity Clubs, where they encourage farmers to donate food to support impoverished families and neighborhoods, often requesting items like bags of potatoes or oranges (Mason, 2017).
Activism as Antidote to Populism
As the last part of this analysis, it should be mentioned that activism can also serve as a tool to counteract anti-democratic populism. Particularly, activism aimed at combating othering and exclusion is utilized to push back against right-wing populist parties, which purport to address issues concerning European integration, multiculturalism, globalization, and migration (Siim et al., 2018). This solidarity-based activism can be specifically employed to combat hate speech and hate crimes prevalent in ostensibly tolerant and inclusive systems that are, in reality, not as tolerant as they appear. Activism against right-wing populist parties serves to bring populism to light and prompts critical reflection on concepts such as citizenship, democracy, social movements, and conflicts and cooperation around race/ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class (Siim et al., 2018). Additionally, activism can be directed against populist leaders, such as Donald Trump in the US, by supporting women’s rights, LGBTIQ+ rights, and fundamental human rights activists, who in turn amplify criticism against Trump (Žarkov, 2017).
Conclusion
To conclude, populism is neither good nor bad. It is a powerful tool especially in conjunction with activism and mass mobilization. Although we are thankful for our freedom, political engagement and connectedness through social media and digital platforms, populism and activism combined can lead to an acceleration of uncontrollable mass action completely isolated from reality and realistic political approaches.
While we are praising democratic populism that can be used through activism to make our society more inclusive, accountable, and equal, we should be cautious and careful to not let this development translate into an increase of right-wing populism. We should also keep always in mind that populist parties especially when in government positions have the power and authority to often shut down and repress activism, public participation, and criticism against their regime.
To follow-up on the examples of activist movements mentioned at the beginning of this article, it can be concluded, that populism indeed has the possibility to reinforce and support democratic, inclusive activism. However, we should not forget that populism also is used as a tool to create enemies and friends, shaping the world into a binary of good and evil. Those generalizations of “the people” and “the elite” can be indeed also harmful for our society and any political participation.
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This report offers a summary of the tenth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series, titled “Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan,” which took place online on February 29, 2024. Dr. Dachi Liao moderated the panel, featuring insights from four distinguished panelists.
Report by Philip Christo Pretorius & Neo Sithole
This report provides a brief overview of the tenth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping European Populism (MEP) panel series, titled “Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan” held online on February 29, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Dachi Liao, Emeritus Professor at the Institute of Political Science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan, the panel featured speakers Dr. Toru Yoshida, Full Professor of Comparative Politics at Doshisha University in Japan, Dr. Airo Hino, Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu, Assistant Professor, Political Science, McMaster University,Dr. Jiun-Chi Lin, Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Marketing Communication, National Sun Yat-sen University.
Panel moderator Dr. Dachi Liao began the panel with an overall assessment on the various facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan. In this assessment, she identified four populist figures, two from each country, before going on to define “populism” to allow for a mutually clear and understood definition to be used throughout the panel session.
According to Dr. Liao, the underlying assumption/common understanding of populism and populist studies globally is based on the permanent division between the ‘elite’ and the common people. She highlighted three important facets for her conceptualization of the populist phenomenon: the provocation of a “social cleavage,” charismatic leaders that can stir anxious moods towards the social cleavage, and the use of an emotional and colloquial communication style.
Next, Dr. Liao provided various factors that he believes to be causing the populist trend, including economic, political, cultural, institutional and technological, while from the drawing scholarly works of Michael J. Sandel’s The Tyranny of Merit, and Ernesto Laclau’s Populism: What’s in a Name?
Ending this opening presentation, she highlighted that although the populist trend has a positive effect on policy change and power restructuring, it has also caused a political breakdown and polarization within society. With the definition of populism established, Dr. Liao made a preliminary comparison between Japanese and Taiwanese populist trends indicating that in her research she found that economic factors were a stronger driving factor for Japanese populism, compared to the political nationalism found in Taiwan, and that she found Japanese institutions were more authoritarian in design compared to Taiwan’s Liberal Democratic institutions.
Dr. Toru Yoshida: “The State of Populism in Japan: A Comparative Perspective”
Dr. Yoshida highlights the distinction between Japanese populism and its Western counterpart, emphasizing that the Japanese national government already leans towards social conservatism and economic protectionism, unlike many Western governments. However, Dr. Toru’s research reveals that ‘populists’ in Japan tend to adopt a more politically moderate stance compared to Western standards. Rather than embracing authoritarian or hardline views typical of Western populism, they often take a centrist approach to political issues.
Dr. Toru Yoshida’s presentation focused on a comparative perspective between the state of populism in Japan and other countries, especially those of the West. He highlighted that in Western politics the key difference between right-wing and left-wing populism, these being that right-wing populism presents itself as politically nationalistic/nativist, socially conservative and authoritarian while left-wing populism is more politically cosmopolitan/progressive and socially inclusive. However, Dr. Yoshida commented on how both share the common trait of being economically protectionist.
In his analysis of populism in Japan Dr. Yoshida highlighted that although populists in Japan practice the ‘good people’ versus the ‘evil elite’ discourse used in Western settings, they are usually elected through local-level politically reformist campaigns that have a pro-market stance. As these findings contrast what is found in the West, Dr. Yoshida investigated this further through two research questions: Why are Japanese populists mainly regional politicians; and why are they politically reformist and economically liberal?
As an answer to both questions, Dr. Yoshida hypothesizes that populist politicians are elected on a local level due to the proportional representative electoral system and that local governments are seen as “protectors of the people” against the “corrupt elite” of the national government. This is the result of local politicians seeking institutional reform as a strategically rational way of trying to win the vote of independent voters who often support neo-liberal reform policies and have low confidence in politicians and national institutions.
Dr. Yoshida highlights the distinction between Japanese populism and its Western counterpart, emphasizing that the Japanese national government already leans towards social conservatism and economic protectionism, unlike many Western governments. However, Dr. Yoshida’s research reveals that ‘populists’ in Japan tend to adopt a more politically moderate stance compared to Western standards. Rather than embracing authoritarian or hard-line views typical of Western populism, they often take a centrist approach to political issues.
Dr. Airo Hino: “The Nature of Populism in Japan – Japan as an Uncharted Territory of Global Populism?”
‘Populism’ in Japan has often been connected to ideas and policies which are seen as pandering to the electorate with short-term benefits, and is reflected in the language where ‘populism’ appears together with ‘taishū-geigō’ (literally meaning ‘pandering to the masses’) in more than half the articles published since the 1990’s. As a result, ordinary people have become accustomed to seeing the two ideas used together, thus resulting in an overall negative connotation of ‘populism’ today.
In his presentation Dr. Airo Hino looked to disprove the underlying assumption that Japan is free from populism and immune to the spread of it. By using historical examples, Dr. Hino highlighted that Japan has not only experienced populism before but suggests that these experiences have prevented the surge of fully-fledged populism.
Following defining how populism is analytically perceived within the country, Dr. Hino unpacked how populists in Japan reduce politics to common populist tropes of the ‘ordinary people’ versus the ‘elite,’ the morally good versus evil, and friends versus enemies, and in the process exploiting the mass media using this dramatic ‘theatrical style’ of rhetoric. Using this analytical framework as a basis, Dr. Hino displayed how certain populist politicians have used this theatrical rhetoric in campaigns both in the past and continue to do so now.
Continuing his presentation, he argued that populism is not only an analytical concept, but a frame which has shaped Japanese politics since the 1990’s. To do so, Dr. Hino graphed references to “populism” and “populists” in Japanese newspapers and academic journals that indicated four waves of populism first emerging during the 1990’s in the era of “reform politics.”
‘Populism’ in Japan has often been connected to ideas and policies which are seen as pandering to the electorate with short-term benefits, and is reflected in the language where ‘populism’ appears together with ‘taishū-geigō’ (literally meaning ‘pandering to the masses’) in more than half the articles published since the 1990’s. As a result, ordinary people have become accustomed to seeing the two ideas used together, thus resulting in an overall negative connotation of ‘populism’ today.
Continuing this line of argument, Dr. Hino brough up that due to a series of scandals in the 1990s, criticism and attacks of the central government increased in parallel with anti-elite sentiments, all resulted in the positive perception of populism, leading into the Koizumi era of neo-liberal reforms where Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi presented himself theatrically as a hero batting entrenched interests.
Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu: “Populism in Taiwan, Rethinking the Neoliberalism-Populism Nexus”
Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu contends that Taiwan provides a notable example of the integral state, established by the KMT regime following World War II. Initially, Taiwan operated under a developmental model that significantly boosted its economic growth. However, come the 1980s, the state faced dual crises: economic stagnation and challenges to political legitimacy, prompting the need for extensive restructuring. This effort entailed the adoption of neoliberal reforms aimed at rejuvenating the economy while concurrently aiming to uphold political control and social stability.
Based off her most recent article on the neoliberalism-populism nexus, Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu’s presentation looked at finding the correlation between economic liberal globalization and rise of populism, especially amongst the working class who are more inclined to elect populist leaders. Here Dr. Hsu begun by explaining what she conceptualizes as the ‘neoliberalism-populism nexus’ which is explained to be the popular view that contemporary populist is an outcome of neoliberal globalization and the economic grievances attached to it (which then creates the inclination towards populist leaders for the working-class).
However, Taiwan’s experience complicates this narrative, something that prompted Dr. Hsu to reevaluate the relationship between neoliberalism and populism by asking “can neo-liberalism rise from populism?” and is populism a consequence, counterforce, or constitutive component of neo-liberalism?
Turning to East Asian cases of populism, Dr. Hsu highlights that experiences are diverse in East Asia because there are indeed elected neo-liberal populist leaders, but also anti-neoliberal popular movements such as the Candlelight Movement in South Korea and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, which highlights that the connection between neo-liberalism and populism isn’t as clear cut as one would believe.
In analyzing these dynamics, Dr. Hsu utilizes the integral state concept and non-reductionist class analysis derived from Gramscian and Marxist theories. The Gramscian integral state emphasizes the dual objectives of facilitating capitalist economic accumulation and securing political legitimacy for the governing authority. It contends that capitalist accumulation and political hegemony are interlinked, and crises in one domain often trigger disruptions in the other, leading to volatile socio-political relations.
According to Dr. Hsu, the manifestation of the integral state is most evident in Taiwan, where it was established by the KMT regime in the aftermath of World War II. Initially, Taiwan operated under a developmental model that effectively propelled its economic growth. However, by the 1980s, the state encountered dual crises – economic stagnation and political legitimacy challenges – necessitating a comprehensive restructuring effort.
This restructuring endeavor involved the implementation of neoliberal reforms aimed at revitalizing the economy while simultaneously seeking to maintain political control and social stability.
Dr. Hsu also delved into the post-restructuring period that witnessed the emergence of two forms of populism in Taiwan: liberal populism and neoliberal populism. Liberal populism, exemplified by movements such as the 2006 “Red Shirt” movement and the 2013 “White Shirt” movement, focused on moral outrage and demands for political reform. However, it failed to address structural causes and ultimately reinforced the existing power structures.
Dr. Juin-Chi Lin – “How Professionalized Are Parties’ Populist Communication Strategies on Facebook? An Observation the 2024 Taiwan National Election”
Dr. Juin-Chi Lin and his colleagues have delineated populism within a communication framework, emphasizing core tenets such as people-centralism, anti-elitism, and the restoration of popular sovereignty. They assert that this ‘campaign professionalization’ is frequently associated with the involvement of experts during election cycles. However, Dr. Lin contends that such professionalization is more intricately tied to technological innovations. To effectively engage with voters on social media platforms, political parties must prioritize professionalizing their communication strategies.
Dr. Juin-Chi Lin’s talk focused on a practical approach of investigating populism, specifically the use of populist rhetoric in elections on social media, centrally in the increased interest overall in how parties communicate to their voters, and thus investigating the language used by mainstream parties in building a relationship with its voters on online platforms is an important starting point in investigating the professionalization of populist communication.
To do this Dr. Lin and his colleagues established populism through a communication framework with key ideas such as people-centralism, anti-elitism, and restoring popular sovereignty. This ‘campaign professionalization’ was explained to often be linked to the role of experts during the election cycle, but Dr. Lin argued that campaign professionalization is instead linked to the technological innovations, and to establish a good relationship with voters on social media, parties need to learn how to professionalize communication.
Therefore, through the integration of different communication styles, negative and emotional communication have been found to best reinforce populist messages. Using this framework, Dr. Lin’s team investigated if they could find certain trends in the communication styles used by parties during the 2024 Taiwan election. To do so, Facebook posts from December 2023 to Mid-January 2024 acted as the preliminary starting point for their investigation. Dr. Lin used key examples from his finding in the presentation to highlight his argument, starting with the DPP who’s first post featured gratitude for the people, and emphasizes personal characteristics of leaders. In the second example, the party used the negative style of communication, focusing on national sovereignty, and criticizing the KMT. The DPP particularly emphasized their opponents as the “elite” and as the enemy, using the corruption crisis to polarize the people against them. In a final example given during the presentation the DPP focus on one of their candidate’s charisma – emphasizing her positive features as ambassador to the United States.
Similarly, when investigating the KMT political party, Dr. Lin’s team also focused on people centrism, restoring popular sovereignty, and have a sociable style of communication. In a first example, Dr. Lin presents an advertisement where KMT emphasizes that they care about the people, specifically focusing on the anecdote that one of their leaders went to shake hands with everyone he met, looking after the people, and that KMT’s candidates are professional and seeks to improve people’s lives.
They also made anti-elite posts, strongly criticizing the DPP, asking voters to elect the KMT for the chance to change politics in the next four years. Dr. Lin concludes by giving attention the major communicative characteristics of mainstream parties including people-centrism, restoring popular sovereignty and anti-elitism.
