Decison Making.

ECPS Virtual Workshop Series / Session 15 — From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, Crisis, and Democracy   

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Virtual Workshop Series / Session 15 — From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, Crisis, and Democracy.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 8, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00146

 

Session 15 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a timely and theoretically rich interrogation of how populism, personalized leadership, and systemic crisis are reshaping the horizons of democratic politics. Bringing cybernetics, political sociology, and democratic theory into productive dialogue, the session illuminated the deep entanglement between emotional mobilization, institutional fragility, and global governance under conditions of accelerating complexity. Dr. Robert R. Traill’s systems-theoretical analysis of “populist panic” and Professor Lorenzo Viviani’s political-sociological account of “manipulated resonance” together revealed populism not as a peripheral disruption, but as a central mode through which legitimacy, leadership, and “the people” are being redefined today. Enriched by incisive discussant interventions and a conceptually fertile Q&A, the session underscored the need for new democratic vocabularies capable of confronting both exclusionary affect and global instability.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, April 2, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened the fifteenth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” under the title “From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, War, and Democracy.” Bringing together perspectives from political sociology, economics, and cybernetics, the session explored the evolving relationship between populist leadership, systemic crisis, and the changing architecture of democratic governance in an increasingly complex and unstable global order.

The participants of the session were introduced by ECPS intern Reka Koleszar. Chaired by Dr. Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University), the session was framed around a central question of contemporary political life: how can democratic systems sustain legitimacy and effectiveness amid intensifying global pressures, including geopolitical conflict, economic uncertainty, climate crisis, and the rise of populist movements that challenge institutional mediation and pluralist norms? As Dr. Ali underscored in his opening remarks, the current conjuncture is marked not only by a crisis of representation but also by deeper transformations in how “the people” are constructed, mobilized, and governed across diverse political contexts.

The panel featured two analytically distinct yet conceptually complementary presentations. Dr. Robert R. Traill (Brunel University) offered a cybernetic and systems-theoretical intervention on the limits of democratic decision-making in the face of global-scale challenges. His presentation examined how complex adaptive systems—from individual cognition to national governance and global coordination—struggle to maintain stability when confronted with phenomena such as climate change and limits to economic growth. By introducing the notion of “populist panic” as a systemic response to perceived breakdown, Dr. Traill’s contribution invited participants to reconsider populism not merely as a political ideology, but as a symptom of deeper failures in collective decision-making.

In contrast, Professor Lorenzo Viviani (University of Pisa) advanced a political-sociological framework centered on the concept of “manipulated resonance” to analyze personalized leadership in populism. His presentation interrogated how populist leaders construct direct, emotionally charged relationships with “the people,” reconfiguring political representation through processes of identification, embodiment, and symbolic power. By foregrounding the role of emotions—particularly resentment—and the strategic bypassing of institutional intermediaries, Professor Viviani illuminated the cultural and affective foundations of contemporary populist mobilization.

The session was further enriched by the critical interventions of its discussants, Dr. Azize Sargin (ECPS) and Professor Ibrahim Ozturk (University of Duisburg-Essen), whose comments deepened the theoretical stakes of both presentations. Their reflections engaged key issues such as the distinction between democratic responsiveness and manipulated resonance, the tensions between technocratic solutions and populist distrust, and the broader challenges of governing complexity in a rapidly changing world.

Together, the contributions of chair, speakers, and discussants generated a rich interdisciplinary dialogue that bridged micro-level analyses of leadership and emotion with macro-level concerns about global governance and systemic stability. Session 15 thus provided a compelling exploration of how populism, far from being a peripheral phenomenon, is deeply embedded in the contemporary reconfiguration of democratic life and global political order.

Dr. Robert R. Traill: “Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing?”

Dr. Robert R. Traill.
Dr. Robert R. Traill is a researcher in Cybernetics and Psychology at Brunel University.

Dr. Robert R. Traill delivered a conceptually ambitious presentation titled “Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing?” Drawing on cybernetics, cognitive psychology, and systems theory, Dr. Traill advanced a multi-level framework for understanding the limitations of contemporary governance systems in addressing global crises.

At the core of Dr. Traill’s argument lies a diagnosis of what he terms a “problem landscape” defined by systemic challenges—most notably inequality and climate change—that demand coordinated global responses but remain resistant to consensus-based solutions. These structural issues, he argues, exceed the decision-making capacities of existing political systems, particularly when public discourse is distorted by populist dynamics that prioritize proximate symptoms—such as migration—over underlying causes.

To conceptualize governance under such conditions, Dr. Traill employs W. Ross Ashby’s cybernetic model of adaptive systems, notably the metaphor of the “clever thermostat.” In this framework, intelligence is structured hierarchically across meta-levels (MnL), where base-level actions (M0L) are monitored and adjusted by successive layers of oversight (M1L, M2L, M3L, etc.). Crucially, higher levels enable reflexivity: the capacity not merely to act, but to revise the rules governing action. When such adaptive mechanisms fail—due to insufficient options or cognitive limitations—systems may either stagnate or resort to arbitrary “panic” decisions, a dynamic Dr. Traill associates with contemporary political volatility.

Extending this model to political organization, Dr. Traill draws on Stafford Beer’s Brain of the Firm to argue that governments function as collective intelligence systems. Effective governance requires a balance between directive action (M1L), normative frameworks (M2L), and rational, analytical reasoning (M3L). However, he contends that modern political discourse is frequently “dragged downward” by powerful actors who instrumentalize fear-based narratives, thereby suppressing higher-level reasoning and fostering conditions conducive to populist mobilization.

The presentation offers a comparative analysis of democratic and autocratic systems through this lens. Democracies, Dr. Traill suggests, rely on voters as meta-level selectors among competing policy frameworks. Yet, when mainstream options appear inadequate, electorates may “panic,” turning to untested alternatives that can generate either innovation or instability. Autocracies, by contrast, simplify decision-making hierarchies by collapsing advisory functions into command structures. While this may yield short-term stability, it renders such systems brittle, as reform becomes politically dangerous and often triggers repression or systemic breakdown.

A particularly innovative dimension of Dr. Traill’s framework is his integration of three parallel “intelligence hierarchies”: individual cognitive development (via Piaget), organizational governance (via Beer), and global systemic coordination (via Aslaksen). This triadic model highlights a critical mismatch between the complexity of global challenges and the cognitive-institutional capacities available to address them. Dr. Traill argues that effective solutions to transnational problems require decision-making at higher meta-levels (at least M3L), implying the need for enhanced educational, institutional, and analytical capacities across societies.

The presentation identifies two “elephants in the room”—climate change and limits to economic growth—as paradigmatic MtopL (highest-level) challenges. These systemic pressures cascade downward into observable socio-political symptoms, including economic precarity, migration, and political polarization. However, populist movements frequently misattribute causality, focusing on these symptoms rather than the structural dynamics driving them. This misrecognition, Dr. Traill argues, not only exacerbates instability but also undermines democratic problem-solving capacity.

Dr. Traill further underscores the growing influence of transnational “mega-companies,” whose economic power rivals that of nation-states. Existing regulatory frameworks, he suggests, are inadequate for addressing their systemic impact, particularly given their ability to exploit global tax and governance asymmetries. As a provocative institutional innovation, he proposes the creation of a UN-adjacent “House of Mega-Companies” to enhance transparency and facilitate coordination between corporate and political actors.

In concluding, Dr. Traill outlines a series of reform proposals aimed at mitigating what he terms “populist panic.” These include expanding higher-order education, regulating misinformation, leveraging artificial intelligence for complex problem-solving, and introducing institutional reforms such as ranked-choice and compulsory voting. Ultimately, he argues that the survival of democratic governance—and potentially civilization itself—depends on the capacity to develop higher-level collective intelligence capable of adapting to an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world.

 

Professor Lorenzo Viviani:“The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalized Leadership in Populism” 

Professor Lorenzo Viviani .
Lorenzo Viviani is a Professor of Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy.

Professor Lorenzo Viviani (University of Pisa) presented a theoretically rich and analytically nuanced paper. His contribution advances a political-sociological framework that moves beyond descriptive accounts of personalization to interrogate the structural, symbolic, and affective mechanisms underpinning populist leadership.

Professor Viviani’s intervention is guided by three interrelated research questions: first, what distinguishes populist personalization from other forms of leader-centered politics; second, how the direct relationship between leader and people reshapes political representation through what he terms “manipulated resonance”; and third, how populist leadership constructs a hegemonic project by signifying “the people” in emotionally charged and politically consequential ways.

A central premise of the presentation is that political personalization is not a uniform phenomenon. While contemporary politics across democratic systems has undoubtedly become more leader-centered, Professor Viviani insists on differentiating between leader democracy and populist leader democracy. In the former, personalization remains compatible with liberal-democratic norms: leaders may become more visible and central, yet they operate within institutional constraints, pluralistic competition, and electoral accountability. Figures such as Barack Obama, Tony Blair, or Gerhard Schröder exemplify this model, where leadership personalization does not fundamentally disrupt representative mechanisms.

By contrast, populist personalization entails a qualitative transformation of political representation. Here, the leader is no longer merely a representative actor but becomes the symbolic locus of political belonging. Drawing on insights from Pierre Bourdieu, Professor Viviani conceptualizes representation as a performative and relational process of claim-making, through which leaders actively constitute the very collective they claim to represent. In populist contexts, this symbolic power is intensified: leaders such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, or Giorgia Meloni claim to embody the “authentic people,” often positioning themselves against liberal institutions, constitutional norms, and pluralist mediation.

This reconfiguration shifts the foundations of representation from delegation and authorization toward identification and embodiment. The leader does not simply “act for” or “stand for” a constituency but becomes the site through which “the people” are imagined, unified, and politically mobilized. As such, populist representation is not anti-representational; rather, it reconstructs representation as a morally charged, direct relationship between leader and people.

A key contribution of Professor Viviani’s framework lies in foregrounding the constitutive role of emotions in this process. Populist leadership, he argues, operates not primarily through programmatic coherence or rational persuasion but through the strategic mobilization of affect. Political emotions are not incidental but foundational to the construction of collective identities. In particular, Professor Viviani highlights resentment as the paradigmatic populist emotion—though he conceptualizes it not as a singular feeling but as a complex emotional cluster encompassing frustration, anger, humiliation, moral alienation, and perceived loss of agency.

This emotional structure is both retrospective and anticipatory. It reflects not only grievances rooted in past experiences of exclusion or injustice but also anxieties about future loss—of status, security, identity, or opportunity. Such dynamics help explain the broad resonance of populist mobilization across diverse contexts, from the American Midwest’s support for Trump’s “Make America Great Again (MAGA)” narrative to the backing of Brexit in deindustrialized regions or the electoral success of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in eastern Germany. In these cases, economic grievances are intertwined with deeper cultural and existential insecurities.

Professor Viviani further situates these dynamics within a broader cultural-sociological perspective, drawing implicitly on Jeffrey C. Alexander’s concept of cultural trauma. Populist leaders act as “entrepreneurs of emotion,” translating diffuse anxieties and fragmented experiences into coherent political narratives. These narratives not only articulate grievances but reorganize them into a shared interpretive framework that defines both collective identity and political antagonism.

It is within this context that Professor Viviani introduces his central concept of manipulated resonance. Resonance, in his formulation, refers to an affective mode of political connection that makes social reality appear responsive and meaningful to individuals’ lived experiences. However, in populist politics, this resonance is not spontaneous or organic; it is strategically constructed through media performance, symbolic codes, and carefully staged displays of proximity. Leaders present themselves as “one of us,” embodying ordinariness while simultaneously occupying positions of extraordinary power.

This performative proximity is often reinforced through the personification of victimhood. Populist leaders portray themselves as targets of elites, media, or judicial institutions, thereby aligning their personal struggles with those of “ordinary people.” In doing so, they transform individual or collective grievances into political capital. Shame, frustration, and perceived marginalization are rearticulated as sources of legitimacy and mobilization.

Professor Viviani emphasizes that this process operates across multiple registers—strategic, stylistic, and symbolic—but is ultimately anchored in the leader’s capacity to re-signify social reality. Drawing on Stuart Hall, he underscores that politics is fundamentally a struggle over meaning. Populist leadership intervenes at this level by detaching signifiers—such as “the people,” “sovereignty,” or “democracy”—from their established meanings and rearticulating them within new chains of equivalence. This re-signification process enables the construction of a hegemonic project that reorganizes political identities and boundaries.

Importantly, Professor Viviani argues that populism should not be understood as a coherent ideology but as an ongoing hegemonic project—a dynamic process of meaning-making, identity construction, and symbolic struggle. In this process, the leader’s role is pivotal: by naming and defining “the people,” the leader exercises symbolic power that reshapes the political field.

The implications of this framework are far-reaching. Populist resonance, Professor Viviani concludes, constitutes a profound transformation of political representation. The traditional distance between representatives and represented is compressed, replaced by a direct, affective, and symbolically mediated bond. This bond, however, is inherently exclusionary. By defining “the people” in morally homogeneous terms, populist leaders often exclude migrants, minorities, and other marginalized groups from the political community, advancing a form of differential nativism characteristic of contemporary sovereignist movements.

In sum, Professor Viviani’s presentation calls for a reorientation of analytical approaches to populism. Rather than focusing solely on institutional arrangements, party systems, or strategic behavior, he advocates for a political sociology that takes seriously the interplay of symbolic power, emotional dynamics, and performative representation. What is at stake, he suggests, is not merely who governs, but how “the people” are constructed, how political belonging is defined, and how legitimacy is produced in an era of increasingly personalized and affect-driven politics.


Discussants’ Feedback

Feedback by Dr. Azize Sarg
in

Dr. Azize Sargin.
Dr. Azize Sargin is Director for External Affairs at ECPS.

Dr. Azize Sargın offered an analytically rich set of remarks, engaging critically with both presentations while highlighting their broader theoretical implications for the study of populism, political representation, and governance under conditions of complexity.

Focusing first on Professor Lorenzo Viviani’s paper on “manipulated resonance,” Dr. Sargin commended the presentation for moving beyond conventional leader-centric explanations of populism. Rather than treating leadership as an individual attribute or charismatic essence, she underscored the value of conceptualizing it as a relational and symbolic mechanismthrough which “the people” are actively constructed. In this respect, she emphasized that Professor Viviani’s framework departs from the assumption that leaders merely represent pre-existing constituencies, instead positing that populist leadership continuously produces and redefines the collective subject it claims to embody.

Dr. Sargin identified the concept of resonance as a particularly significant contribution. By framing populist leadership as a process that amplifies lived anxieties, cultural codes, and affective experiences into politically meaningful narratives, the paper captures the dynamic interplay between emotional identification and political mobilization. However, she suggested that the notion of manipulated resonance would benefit from further theoretical clarification. Specifically, she called for a more precise distinction between manipulative resonance and democratic responsiveness, noting that resonance inherently implies a two-way relational process. This raises an important question: to what extent are “the people” passive recipients of elite-driven narratives, and to what extent do they actively shape and co-constitute the leader’s discourse?

In this regard, Dr. Sargin encouraged a deeper exploration of the reciprocal nature of the leader–people relationship. Clarifying whether populist resonance operates primarily as a top-down mechanism or as a mutually constitutive process would, in her view, significantly strengthen the analytical framework. Relatedly, she highlighted the importance of the concept of disintermediation, which in the context of populism extends beyond the mere bypassing of parties and media to encompass a broader redefinition of political legitimacy. Disintermediation, she argued, rests on the normative assumption that institutional mediation is inherently corrupting, while direct, unmediated connection is equated with authenticity—an insight that resonates strongly with contemporary populist leadership practices.

Turning to Dr. Robert R. Traill’s presentation, Dr. Sargin praised its ambitious attempt to connect democracy, authoritarianism, and global governance challenges—particularly climate change and limits to growth—within a cybernetic framework of decision-making systems. She identified the notion of “decision-system breakdown” in a populist age as especially compelling, suggesting that the paper opens a productive line of inquiry into populism as not only a crisis of representation but also a crisis of cognitive governability.

At the same time, Dr. Sargin proposed several avenues for theoretical deepening. One key issue concerns the tension between complexity reduction and democratic legitimacy. While all political systems necessarily simplify complex realities to render them governable, she argued that not all forms of simplification are normatively equivalent. The critical question, therefore, is which modes of simplification remain democratically accountable, and which risk drifting toward authoritarian, technocratic, or populist distortions.

She also engaged critically with the reform proposals advanced in Dr. Traill’s paper, particularly the use of artificial intelligence and institutional innovations such as ranked-choice and compulsory voting. While recognizing their potential as responses to evolving decision environments, Dr. Sargin highlighted a fundamental tension: if populism is partly driven by distrust of mediation, the introduction of AI-assisted decision-making may exacerbate rather than alleviate public suspicion—unless embedded within robust frameworks of transparency, accountability, and contestability.

Finally, Dr. Sargin reflected on the paper’s broader theoretical ambition to extend models of individual cognition to collective and global decision-making. While acknowledging this as a bold and innovative move, she cautioned that collective actors cannot be treated simply as scaled-up cognitive systems. Instead, they are inherently asymmetrical and stratified, requiring more careful theorization of what is gained—and potentially lost—when translating cybernetic analogies into political theory.

Thus, Dr. Sargin underscored the shared contribution of both papers in advancing a more nuanced understanding of populism—not merely as rhetoric or ideology, but as a complex configuration of symbolic, emotional, and institutional processes. Her reflections and feedback thus highlighted the need for interdisciplinary approaches capable of grappling with the intertwined challenges of representation, legitimacy, and governance in an increasingly complex political landscape.

Feedback by Professor Ibrahim Ozturk

As discussant at the workshop, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk offered a concise yet incisive set of remarks, raising critical questions that probe the intersection of populism, technocratic governance, and institutional mediation. Framing his intervention as a preliminary engagement pending a full reading of the papers, Professor Ozturk focused on one key question for each presenter, thereby highlighting core tensions within both contributions.

Addressing Dr. Robert R. Traill’s presentation, Professor Ozturk expressed particular interest in the application of cybernetic models—especially the Ashby–Beer “collective brain” framework—to explain populist “panic” in response to structural crises such as climate change and limits to economic growth. From an economic perspective, he found the linkage between systemic instability and environmental constraints especially compelling. However, he raised a critical concern regarding the proposed institutional and technological remedies, including artificial intelligence and ranked-choice voting. Given that populism often emerges as a backlash against expert-led governance and technocracy, Professor Ozturk questioned whether such reforms might inadvertently intensify populist distrust. In a context marked by growing anxieties about “techno-feudalism” and the expanding influence of large digital corporations, he asked whether the integration of algorithmic decision-making risks deepening perceptions that democratic agency is being displaced. Crucially, he challenged Dr. Traill to account for the emotional and irrational resistance that may arise against ostensibly rational, technocratic solutions.

Turning to Professor Lorenzo Viviani’s presentation, Professor Ozturk engaged with the concept of disintermediation and the personalization of leadership in contemporary populism. While acknowledging the analytical strength of the argument that populist leaders construct direct, unmediated bonds with “the people,” he raised a fundamental question about the durability of institutional mediation. Specifically, he asked whether traditional intermediaries—such as the free press, independent judiciaries, and other liberal-democratic institutions—can regain their legitimacy once bypassed by populist leadership. Or, alternatively, whether the politics of proximity and performative identification has permanently reshaped citizens’ expectations toward a more direct, anti-institutional model of governance.

In sum, Professor Ozturk’s remarks foregrounded a shared concern across both papers: whether contemporary transformations in political representation and governance signal reversible disruptions or more enduring structural shifts in democratic life.

Response by Professor Lorenzo Viviani

In his response to the discussants, Professor Lorenzo Viviani offered a clarifying and theoretically grounded elaboration of his framework on populist personalization and “manipulated resonance.” Engaging directly with the comments of the discussants, Professor Viviani reaffirmed the relational and sociological foundations of his approach while addressing key concerns regarding agency, manipulation, and the role of institutions.

At the core of his response was a rejection of overly individualistic or essentialist interpretations of leadership. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, Professor Viviani emphasized that political representation and resonance necessarily emerge within a social field. Leadership, including charismatic leadership, cannot be understood as an intrinsic quality of the individual leader; rather, it depends on an interactive process of mutual recognition between leaders and followers. Even in populist contexts, resonance presupposes the existence of shared, albeit unstructured, social dispositions that leaders can activate and organize. Without such symbolic and cultural preconditions, the mechanisms of identification—whether authentic or manipulated—would fail.

Addressing the question of manipulation, Professor Viviani clarified that it does not primarily consist in offering concrete solutions to crises, but rather in framing and interpreting those crises in ways that resonate emotionally with individuals’ lived experiences. Populist leaders, he argued, construct narratives that position individuals as victims of systemic injustice, thereby fostering a sense of shared identity grounded in perceived grievance. In this context, “similarity” between leader and people functions as a substitute for traditional forms of representation. However, this similarity is largely performative rather than substantive, constituting what Professor Viviani described as a “functional equivalent” of representation.

Professor Viviani further acknowledged the discussants’ concerns regarding the reciprocal nature of resonance. While affirming that resonance involves mutual recognition, he noted that populist dynamics often weaken the demand for responsiveness. Unlike conventional representative systems, where social demands generate policy responses, populist resonance relies on emotional identification rather than programmatic accountability. This dynamic becomes particularly fragile during moments of acute crisis—such as the COVID-19 pandemic—when symbolic proximity alone proves insufficient, and the limits of disintermediated leadership are exposed.

Expanding on the concept of disintermediation, Professor Viviani situated it within broader processes of societal individualization and the erosion of traditional political cleavages, such as class and religion. In increasingly fragmented and competitive societies, the decline of collective identities creates a vacuum that populist leaders fill through emotionally charged, “catch-all” forms of representation. These bypass intermediary institutions and instead establish direct, affective bonds with individuals. Yet, Professor Viviani cautioned that such populist appeals are often defensive in nature, centered on identity and recognition rather than substantive socio-economic transformation.

Professor Viviani also distinguished populist leadership from classical Weberian notions of charisma. Whereas charismatic authority, in the Weberian sense, rests on the perceived superiority of the leader and their capacity to enact transformative change, populist leadership operates through a performative identification with “ordinary people.” It is, in his terms, a form of “servant leadership,” albeit a strategically constructed and manipulated one, in which the leader claims equality with followers while symbolically embodying them.

Moreover, Professor Viviani addressed the broader normative implications of his argument by contrasting populist resonance with what he termed democratic resonance. While populist resonance is often exclusionary—constructed “against” perceived enemies—democratic systems can also generate forms of resonance grounded in principles of freedom, equality, and pluralism. Institutions such as constitutional courts and the rule of law, he suggested, embody an alternative, “anti-populist” resonance that affirms equal rights and collective belonging within a pluralistic framework.

Thus, Professor Viviani’s response not only clarified the conceptual underpinnings of manipulated resonance but also opened a broader reflection on the possibility of reclaiming resonance as a democratic resource rather than a purely populist mechanism.

Q&A Session

The Q&A session evolved into a rich and multilayered discussion that brought into sharp focus the tensions between populist mobilization, constitutional democracy, and the evolving nature of political representation. Anchored by interventions from participants and responses by Professor Viviani, the exchange moved beyond clarification to engage foundational theoretical debates concerning ideology, emotional politics, mediation, and the future of democratic legitimacy.

The discussion was initiated by Dr. Amir Ali, who reflected on the applicability of constitutional patriotism—associated with Jürgen Habermas—in the context of contemporary populist governance, drawing on the case of India under Narendra Modi. Dr. Ali highlighted a striking contrast between the “sobriety” of constitutional patriotism and the emotionally charged, performative nationalism characteristic of populist politics. While constitutional patriotism relies on mediated institutional frameworks and normative commitments, populism thrives on what he described as a “raw,” unmediated construction of “the people,” often driven by urgency, anxiety, and affective intensity.

This contrast, Dr. Ali suggested, may help explain why constitutional patriotism has struggled to mobilize broad public support in contexts where populism has consolidated power. Invoking Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the alliance between elites and mass mobilization in The Origins of Totalitarianism, he further argued that populism often operates through a volatile fusion of elite strategy and popular sentiment, thereby destabilizing mediated forms of democratic representation.

Professor Viviani’s response acknowledged this asymmetry but sought to reframe constitutional patriotism as a potentially more dynamic and assertive project. Rather than viewing it as a purely procedural or technocratic model, he argued that constitutional patriotism embodies substantive cultural and normative values—freedom, equality, and pluralism—that can themselves generate forms of political resonance. In this sense, he suggested that constitutional democracy may evolve into a more “militant” form, capable of actively contesting populist narratives and reconstructing collective identities around inclusive principles.

Central to Professor Viviani’s intervention was a Gramscian understanding of politics as an ongoing struggle for hegemony, drawing on Antonio Gramsci. Populism, in this view, represents only one hegemonic project among others, rather than an inevitable or irreversible transformation. The contemporary populist moment, he argued, reflects not the end of democratic politics but the re-emergence of ideological contestation following decades marked by the assumption that liberal democracy constituted the “end of history.” The task, therefore, is not merely to defend existing institutions but to articulate alternative democratic projects capable of mobilizing both normative commitment and emotional identification.

The discussion then shifted toward the nature of populism itself, particularly in response to a comment by Dr. Amadeo Varriale regarding whether populism should be understood as an ideology. Drawing on the influential work of Cas Muddeand Michael Freeden, Dr. Varriale suggested that populism may be conceptualized as a “thin-centered ideology,” given its structured set of ideas about the primacy of “the people” and its normative critique of elites.

Professor Viviani, however, rejected this classification, offering a sociological reinterpretation. He argued that populism lacks the comprehensive normative and programmatic architecture characteristic of full-fledged ideologies such as liberalism or socialism. Rather than providing a structured vision of society, populism functions as a political logic or hegemonic project that simplifies social reality into antagonistic categories—“the people” versus “the elites.” While this simplification may resemble the mapping function of ideology, as described by Freeden, Professor Viviani maintained that it remains fundamentally limited: it organizes political perception without articulating a coherent model of social organization.

Importantly, he acknowledged that when populist movements enter government, they often incorporate elements from other ideological frameworks—such as nationalism, nativism, or sovereignism—thereby becoming more ideologically structured. In this sense, populism may serve as an entry point into broader ideological transformations rather than constituting an ideology in itself. His distinction between Donald Trump’s first and second presidencies illustrated this dynamic, suggesting a shift from a primarily populist mode of governance toward a more explicitly ideological, nationalist-authoritarian project.

A further line of discussion, raised by Dr. Azize Sargin, addressed the apparent paradox of populist leadership: namely, that many populist leaders emerge from elite backgrounds while claiming to represent “ordinary people.” Professor Viviani responded by emphasizing the centrality of emotional identification in populist politics. The bond between leader and followers is not grounded in objective socio-economic similarity but in the performative construction of shared victimhood. Leaders such as Trump or Silvio Berlusconi—despite their elite status—successfully position themselves as targets of cultural, political, or institutional elites, thereby aligning themselves symbolically with broader publics.

This dynamic, Professor Viviani argued, reveals a fundamental departure from rational models of political representation. Populist legitimacy is not derived from policy outcomes or material alignment but from affective resonance. Consequently, empirical contradictions—such as policies that disproportionately benefit economic elites—do not necessarily undermine populist support. The emotional bond between leader and followers operates independently of, and often in tension with, rational evaluation.

The discussion further explored alternative modes of political identification, particularly through Dr. Sargin’s suggestion that populist leaders may also be perceived as “heroes” rather than merely as “one of the people.” Professor Viviani acknowledged this possibility but introduced an important distinction between populist and authoritarian forms of personalization. While populist leadership emphasizes similarity and proximity, authoritarian leadership tends to elevate the leader into a superior, heroic figure. This transition, he argued, reflects a shift from populist to autocratic modes of governance.

Drawing on historical examples such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, Professor Viviani noted that authoritarian regimes often combine politics of fear with what he termed “dark hope”—a forward-looking, albeit exclusionary and often destructive, vision of collective renewal. In contemporary contexts, he suggested that some leaders initially emerging from populist movements may evolve toward more authoritarian forms of personalization, as illustrated by the trajectory from Hugo Chávez to Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.

A recurring theme throughout the Q&A was the role of emotion in structuring political allegiance. Professor Viviani contrasted the “politics of fear,” which underpins much populist mobilization, with the potential for a “politics of hope” capable of fostering inclusive forms of identification. Drawing on examples such as Barack Obama’s rhetoric of unity, he argued that democratic politics must also engage affective dimensions if it is to counter populist narratives effectively. Hope, as a positive and inclusive emotion, offers an alternative basis for political belonging that does not rely on the construction of enemies or exclusionary identities.

At the same time, the discussion highlighted the challenges inherent in such an endeavor. As Dr. Sargin observed, many supporters of populist leaders may perceive their alignment not as a choice but as a necessity, shaped by structural conditions and limited alternatives. This raises important questions about agency, constraint, and the socio-political contexts that sustain populist appeal.

Overall, the Q&A session underscored the need for a multidimensional approach to populism—one that integrates insights from political sociology, political theory, and cultural analysis. It revealed populism not merely as a set of political strategies or ideological claims, but as a complex process involving the construction of collective identities, the mobilization of emotions, and the reconfiguration of institutional relationships.

In doing so, the exchange also pointed toward a broader normative challenge: how democratic systems can reconstruct forms of political resonance that are both emotionally compelling and normatively inclusive. As the discussion suggested, the future of democracy may depend not only on institutional resilience but also on the capacity to articulate alternative narratives of belonging, identity, and political community in an increasingly fragmented and contested political landscape.

Conclusion

Session 15 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series demonstrated with particular clarity that contemporary populism must be understood not as an episodic disturbance of democratic normalcy, but as a revealing expression of deeper transformations in political representation, collective identity, and the governance of complexity. Across the two presentations, the discussant interventions, and the extended Q&A, the session illuminated how populism operates at the intersection of affect, symbolism, institutional erosion, and systemic instability.

Dr. Robert R. Traill’s contribution situated populism within a wider crisis of cognitive and political governability, showing how democratic systems struggle to respond adequately to global problems whose scale exceeds inherited frameworks of decision-making. Professor Lorenzo Viviani, by contrast, traced the micro-foundations of populist leadership, emphasizing how “manipulated resonance” reconfigures representation through emotional identification, symbolic power, and the performative construction of “the people.” Taken together, these perspectives offered a valuable synthesis: populism emerges both from failures of institutional adaptation and from the affective reorganization of political belonging.

The discussants’ critiques and the subsequent discussion further sharpened the normative and theoretical stakes of the session. Questions concerning the democratic limits of simplification, the ambivalent promise of technocratic remedies, the durability of institutional mediation, and the distinction between populist and democratic forms of resonance revealed the analytical richness of the session’s interdisciplinary approach. Particularly significant was the recurring recognition that democracy cannot be defended through procedure alone. If populism succeeds in mobilizing fear, resentment, and immediacy, democratic actors must also grapple with the emotional and cultural dimensions of legitimacy.

In this sense, the session pointed toward a broader conclusion: the future of democracy depends not only on preserving institutions, but on renewing the social, symbolic, and normative bonds that make democratic life meaningful. To confront populism effectively, democratic politics must offer more than resistance; it must articulate compelling alternatives capable of reconnecting freedom, equality, pluralism, and collective agency under conditions of global uncertainty. Session 15 thus made a significant contribution to ongoing debates on how democracy might still be reimagined—and sustained—in an age of crisis, personalization, and escalating power struggles.

Associate Professor Attila Antal.

Assoc. Prof. Antal: Orbán’s Election Project Seeks Public Backing for Dictatorial Turn, Not Democratic Legitimacy

As Hungary approaches the April 12 elections, Viktor Orbán’s long-standing rule faces a critical test shaped by both domestic discontent and geopolitical realignments. In this interview, Associate Professor Attila Antal characterizes the regime as a “constitutional dictatorship,” arguing that the election is not about democratic legitimacy but about securing “public support for its own dictatorial turn.” He highlights how authoritarian legality, sustained through a “dual state” and permanent emergency governance, has hollowed out democratic competition. At the same time, the rise of Péter Magyar and mounting generational and material grievances signal growing resistance. Situated within broader transnational authoritarian networks, Hungary’s election emerges as both a domestic referendum and a geopolitical fault line for European democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Hungary approaches its pivotal parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a defining juncture in the trajectory of European populism. After more than a decade and a half of rule by Viktor Orbán, the electoral contest no longer centers merely on party competition, but on whether an entrenched authoritarian-populist regime—characterized by institutional asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and the continuous production of political enemies—can still be meaningfully challenged through democratic means. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced new uncertainty into a system long sustained by what Attila Antal describes as a “hegemonic power bloc,” raising the stakes of what increasingly resembles a systemic referendum.

In this context, Attila Antal, Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University, offers a sobering interpretation of the current moment. In his view, the Orbán regime has evolved beyond conventional electoral authoritarianism into what he terms a “constitutional dictatorship,” where formal legality coexists with substantive domination. Most strikingly, Assoc. Prof. Antal argues that “the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn.” This diagnosis reframes the election not as a mechanism of accountability, but as a plebiscitary instrument designed to consolidate power under conditions of managed legality.

Crucially, Assoc. Prof. Antal situates Hungary’s electoral moment within a broader geopolitical reconfiguration. He underscores that Orbán has increasingly treated foreign and European policy “as a kind of geopolitical playing field,” cultivating alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian actors. The alignment with figures such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin reflects not only ideological affinity but also strategic positioning within an emerging transnational authoritarian network. As Assoc. Prof. Antal notes, Hungary has come to function as a “Trojan horse” for Putinist influence within the European Union, transforming the election into “a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest.” This external dimension is mirrored internally by a deepening social cleavage, as segments of Hungarian society remain firmly oriented toward the West while the regime consolidates a pro-Russian political base.

This external dimension intersects with internal tensions, including growing social discontent and a generational divide that reflects what Assoc. Prof. Antal describes as “a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism.”

At the core of Assoc. Prof. Antal’s analysis is the concept of authoritarian law and the “dual state,” where a formally normative legal order coexists with a politically driven prerogative structure. Under prolonged states of emergency and rule by decree, Hungary has become, in his words, “a contemporary example of dual state,” raising profound questions about whether elections can still function as instruments of democratic alternation. The opposition’s strategy of contesting the regime “by its own rules” thus reflects a deeper dilemma: whether authoritarian systems can be dismantled through participation in the very institutional frameworks they have reshaped.

Assoc. Prof. Antal’s assessment is stark. The durability of Orbánism, he suggests, lies in its capacity to adapt, radicalize, and survive through escalating authoritarianism. As he warns, the regime “can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial,” a trajectory that poses not only a domestic challenge but “a grave danger to both Hungarian and European societies as a whole.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Attila Antal, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Associate Professor Attila Antal.

Assoc. Prof. Antal: Orbán’s Election Project Seeks Public Backing for Dictatorial Turn, Not Democratic Legitimacy

As Hungary approaches the April 12 elections, Viktor Orbán’s long-standing rule faces a critical test shaped by both domestic discontent and geopolitical realignments. In this interview, Associate Professor Attila Antal characterizes the regime as a “constitutional dictatorship,” arguing that the election is not about democratic legitimacy but about securing “public support for its own dictatorial turn.” He highlights how authoritarian legality, sustained through a “dual state” and permanent emergency governance, has hollowed out democratic competition. At the same time, the rise of Péter Magyar and mounting generational and material grievances signal growing resistance. Situated within broader transnational authoritarian networks, Hungary’s election emerges as both a domestic referendum and a geopolitical fault line for European democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Hungary approaches its pivotal parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a defining juncture in the trajectory of European populism. After more than a decade and a half of rule by Viktor Orbán, the electoral contest no longer centers merely on party competition, but on whether an entrenched authoritarian-populist regime—characterized by institutional asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and the continuous production of political enemies—can still be meaningfully challenged through democratic means. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced new uncertainty into a system long sustained by what Attila Antal describes as a “hegemonic power bloc,” raising the stakes of what increasingly resembles a systemic referendum.

In this context, Attila Antal, Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University, offers a sobering interpretation of the current moment. In his view, the Orbán regime has evolved beyond conventional electoral authoritarianism into what he terms a “constitutional dictatorship,” where formal legality coexists with substantive domination. Most strikingly, Assoc. Prof. Antal argues that “the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn.” This diagnosis reframes the election not as a mechanism of accountability, but as a plebiscitary instrument designed to consolidate power under conditions of managed legality.

Crucially, Assoc. Prof. Antal situates Hungary’s electoral moment within a broader geopolitical reconfiguration. He underscores that Orbán has increasingly treated foreign and European policy “as a kind of geopolitical playing field,” cultivating alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian actors. The alignment with figures such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin reflects not only ideological affinity but also strategic positioning within an emerging transnational authoritarian network. As Assoc. Prof. Antal notes, Hungary has come to function as a “Trojan horse” for Putinist influence within the European Union, transforming the election into “a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest.” This external dimension is mirrored internally by a deepening social cleavage, as segments of Hungarian society remain firmly oriented toward the West while the regime consolidates a pro-Russian political base.

This external dimension intersects with internal tensions, including growing social discontent and a generational divide that reflects what Assoc. Prof. Antal describes as “a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism.”

At the core of Assoc. Prof. Antal’s analysis is the concept of authoritarian law and the “dual state,” where a formally normative legal order coexists with a politically driven prerogative structure. Under prolonged states of emergency and rule by decree, Hungary has become, in his words, “a contemporary example of dual state,” raising profound questions about whether elections can still function as instruments of democratic alternation. The opposition’s strategy of contesting the regime “by its own rules” thus reflects a deeper dilemma: whether authoritarian systems can be dismantled through participation in the very institutional frameworks they have reshaped.

Assoc. Prof. Antal’s assessment is stark. The durability of Orbánism, he suggests, lies in its capacity to adapt, radicalize, and survive through escalating authoritarianism. As he warns, the regime “can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial,” a trajectory that poses not only a domestic challenge but “a grave danger to both Hungarian and European societies as a whole.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Attila Antal, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Geopolitics and Domestic Change Reshape Orbánism

From Left: Hungary PM Viktor Orban, Poland PM Beata Szydlo, Czech PM Bohuslav Sobotka and Slovakia PM Robert Fico pose prior their meeting in Prague on February 15, 2016.

Professor Antal, in your work you describe Hungarian authoritarian populism as a system that fuses political identity construction, executive aggrandizement, and the legal-institutional reorganization of power. In the 2026 campaign, do you see Orbánism still functioning as a hegemonic political project, or has it entered a phase of ideological exhaustion in which its capacity to define “the people” and monopolize popular sovereignty is beginning to weaken?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is a key issue for understanding the Orbán regime as a whole and the current situation. Indeed, Orbán has built an authoritarian regime in which the ruling parties have reigned as a kind of hegemonic center—or, to use Antonio Gramsci’s terminology, as a hegemonic power bloc. However, the transformation of the opposition has changed the situation and shaken this hegemonic project. This is, however, a complex situation: in recent years, Orbán had become so confident that he increasingly focused on geopolitics; more precisely, he treated foreign policy and European policy as a kind of geopolitical playing field, where he built power and political alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian regimes. It is no coincidence that the two most significant imperialist powers, Trump and Putin, have both assured Orbán of their support. So, I see the collapse of Orbán’s hegemonic project as only partially attributable to domestic political factors: we are witnessing that Orbán’s downfall has become a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest, and this resonates with the anger of Hungarian society, which, for the most part, remains oriented toward the West.

Enemy Narratives Persist but Face Social Limits

You have argued that authoritarian populism in Hungary relies on permanent enemy-production. In the current election, where Kyiv, Brussels, liberal elites, and domestic opponents are again being woven into a single antagonistic narrative, how should we understand this strategy: as a sign of discursive resilience, or as evidence that the regime has become trapped in repetitive forms of mobilization?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: The enemy creation of the Orbán regime is a highly complex story. There is no doubt that the constant creation of enemy images is one of the most prominent components of the authoritarian populist toolkit. Since 2010, the Orbán regime has operated with the following main enemy images: migrants, George Soros, civil society, Brussels, the gender politics, and the domestic political opposition. 

From this perspective, 2022 marks a turning point, as Putin’s aggression required the construction of a new enemy image – an incredibly difficult task, given that the attacked Ukraine must be transformed into the new enemy. All of this is connected to the “Putinization” that has taken place within the Orbán regime. The propaganda and discursive framework are thus in place, yet creating this new enemy image also means that Orbán and his allies face the reality that a significant portion of Hungarian society is quite averse to Russians due to Hungarian history. At the same time, Orbán and his allies have succeeded in turning their own camp into a pro-Russian faction, which has resulted in an incredibly deep social cleavage.

Anti-Orbánism Unites a Fragmented Opposition

Tisza leader Péter Magyar
Tisza leader Péter Magyar begins a symbolic “one million steps” march to Nagyvárad, Romania, addressing reporters with supporters in Budapest, Hungary on May 14, 2025. Photo: Istvan Balogh / Dreamstime.

To what extent should the April 12 vote be interpreted not simply as a contest between Fidesz and Tisza, but as a referendum on whether a mature authoritarian-populist regime can still be electorally displaced despite media asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and patronage entrenchment?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: As I mentioned earlier, the Orbán regime itself and the new opposition forming against it can be understood within a geopolitical context. One could also say that, in many respects, the European Union has had enough of the Putinist influence that the Orbán regime represents as a “Trojan horse.” At the same time, this dissatisfaction is just as true of Hungarian society: at the moment, the opposition is held together by anti-Orbánism and the fact that the Orbán regime has seriously neglected governance and the basic needs of the Hungarian people. In this sense, the Hungarian election can indeed be interpreted as a referendum on the political system.

Dual State Logic Structures Political Competition

Your recent work on authoritarian law suggests that contemporary autocratic projects do not abolish legality so much as repurpose it. In the Hungarian case, how should we conceptualize the election itself: as a democratic mechanism still capable of producing alternation, or as a legally managed arena whose formal openness coexists with substantive authoritarian constraint?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I think this is a very important question. When I analyzed the legal system of the Orbán regime, I drew on the “dual state” approach developed by Ernst Fraenkel, who studied the nature of National Socialist law in the interwar period. In this authoritarian state, there exists a legal system that is totally influenced by politics (which Fraenkel calls the Prerogative State), while at the same time there is the Normative State, which is less defined by political influence. 

The Orbán regime has effectively been operating under a state of emergency since 2015, and since 2022, the prime minister has essentially been governing by decree. So, we are facing a contemporary example of dual state.

In my view, there is a very strong dilemma: can this system be overthrown by accepting its rules of the game and participating in the election, or can we overthrow the system as a result of a collective popular decision and establish new democratic electoral rules? It now appears that the opposition side of Hungarian society is choosing the former solution, that is, it wants to defeat the authoritarian system by its own rules. At the same time, it is certain that in the event of a possible change of government, we will have to face the problem posed by authoritarian law.

Enemy Logic Embedded in Governance Structures

Campaign poster of Viktor Orbán ahead of the April 12, 2026, parliamentary elections. Photo: Bettina Wagner / Dreamstime.

You have written about the “Constitutionalized Image of Enemy” embedded in the Hungarian Fundamental Law. How central is this constitutionalized enemy logic to the present campaign, especially in Orbán’s efforts to portray Tisza, Brussels, and Ukraine not as legitimate competitors, but as existential threats to the political community?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: The most recent amendment to the Fundamental Law took place in April 2025. The Hungarian Fundamental Law has indeed been used to create the prevailing political enemy images: certainly, with regard to migration and gender politics. I have termed this as the “Constitutionalized Image of the Enemy.” In this sense, therefore, the image of the enemy enshrined in the constitution did not play a role in the current campaign. At the same time, the 12th Amendment to the Fundamental Law established the Office for the Protection of National Sovereignty in December 2023, which played a very significant role in enabling the Orbán regime to essentially begin using state and bureaucratic tools against its political opponents and Hungarian society. In other words, the “dual state” mentioned earlier operates at the constitutional level as well.

Geopolitical Counterweight Shapes Opposition Rise

From the standpoint of your theory of authoritarian populism, is Péter Magyar best understood as a democratic challenger to Orbánism, or as a post-Fidesz corrective emerging from within the same political and ideological ecosystem?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is a very difficult question, and it would be too early to give any definitive answer at this stage. I would rather point out that the Hungarian election has a very strong geopolitical context. The Péter Magyar phenomenon and the European support structure behind it can also be understood as a geopolitical counterweight to Hungary’s shift toward Orbán and Putin. At the same time, there is no doubt that Orbán’s challenger was socialized within the Orbán regime and, in many respects, is attempting to correct the right-wing conservative politics that Orbán has betrayed. Here, however, it is worth noting once again that the vast camp behind the Tisza Party is far more complex and is currently held together by the constraints of the electoral system and anti-Orbánism.

Youth Revolt Meets Rural Entrenchment

Independent polling and current reporting suggest that younger voters are disproportionately aligning with Tisza, while Fidesz retains stronger support among older and more rural constituencies. Do you interpret this as a generational realignment against authoritarian populism, or merely as a contingent reaction to economic stagnation and elite scandal?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is also a key issue. There is no doubt that the authoritarian populism of the Orbán regime has, intentionally or not, created a generational and regional divide. A significant portion of rural and elderly Hungarian voters is far more susceptible to the enemy stereotypes and messages manufactured by the regime’s propaganda. Thus, there is a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism, particularly because Orbán is effectively blackmailing not only the EU but also Hungarian society: the former with constant vetoes, and the latter with constant threats of leaving the EU.

Middle-Class Erosion Fuels Political Backlash

Given your emphasis on the relationship between neoliberal restructuring and authoritarian populism, how important are material grievances—stagnant growth, inflation, deteriorating public services, and corruption fatigue—in weakening the regime’s capacity to maintain consent? Can economic deterioration disrupt a system whose legitimacy has long depended on symbolic conflict rather than policy performance?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: From a political-economic perspective, the Orbán regime was based on a class consensus in which the (upper) middle class and national big business formed an alliance. This was underpinned by pre-COVID-19 economic prosperity and massive amounts of EU funding. During this period of economic prosperity, however, a neoliberal state emerged that systematically dismantled public services, particularly in the healthcare and education sectors. When the polycrisis emerged (EU crises, pandemic, war), the dismantled Orbán state proved unable to handle the crisis: alongside the groups in the worst situations, the declining Hungarian middle class is the biggest loser of the Orbán regime. In other words, the rebellion against the Orbán regime is, in many respects, also of a material nature.

War Narrative Enables Democratic Suspension

How do you interpret Orbán’s continued “peace versus war” framing in light of your broader work on the politics of exception? Is this campaign discourse best seen as a contemporary form of emergency politics—one that converts geopolitical uncertainty into a justification for executive concentration and democratic suspension?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: As I mentioned, since 2022 the prime minister has essentially been governing by decree, encroaching even on areas of public policy where a state of emergency has no place. Meanwhile, political propaganda has constantly claimed that the Orbán regime is the only guarantee of peace. This has come to a head in the current campaign, with the Orbán machine conveying the message that the opposition is on the side of the Ukrainians and is dragging Hungary into the war. Governing through extraordinary measures is thus a political and communicative reframing: the Orbán regime has essentially suspended parliamentary democracy and portrayed the Ukrainian side (including the EU and the Hungarian opposition) as wanting war. I believe that this is not just some kind of fake news campaign, but the pure and frightening manifestation of an authoritarian state.

Sovereigntist Rhetoric Masks Strategic Dependence

Hungary’s pro-Russian posture has become a major campaign fault line. In your view, does Orbán’s Moscow-friendly stance still function as a coherent ideological expression of sovereigntist anti-liberalism, or is it increasingly becoming a liability as the war in Ukraine reshapes the moral and geopolitical boundaries of European politics?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: Orbán’s pro-Russian policy is a complex phenomenon. At least three aspects are worth highlighting. On the one hand, there is no doubt that, with regard to the international authoritarian right, there exists a kind of ideological coalition whose political-theoretical foundation is an anti-liberal conservative approach dating back to Carl Schmitt. Second, the Orbán regime has radically relinquished energy sovereignty in favor of Putinism. Third, there is also no doubt that Orbán and his regime are personally dependent on Putin’s system. Here, then, lies a radical contradiction: the Orbán regime, which is sovereignist at the level of propaganda, has deliberately renounced the sovereignty of the Hungarian state and is weakening European sovereignty in favor of Russia. The deeper implications of this can only be revealed after the election.

Militant Democracy as a Possible Path

You have shown how exceptional governance can become normalized. If Tisza were to win without a constitutional supermajority, would Hungary enter a phase of partial alternation without regime transformation—in other words, a situation in which a new government governs through institutions still structured by the old exception-centered order?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I believe this is one of the main consequences of the dilemma I mentioned earlier: namely, how to dismantle an authoritarian system – either by adhering to its own rules or through more revolutionary means. If there is a change of government and a two-thirds majority is achieved, dismantling the authoritarian power of the Orbán regime will be a challenge. If, however, the change of government occurs with a simple majority, it may become inevitable to consider how the authoritarian system can be dismantled using the tools of militant democracy.

EU Influence and Domestic Revolt Intersect

Tisza Party volunteer collecting signatures in Mosonmagyaróvár, Hungary on June 5, 2024 during a nationwide campaign tour ahead of the European Parliament elections. Photo: Sarkadi Roland / Dreamstime.

What would a Tisza victory actually reveal about the Orbán system: that authoritarian-populist rule remains vulnerable to democratic challenge, or that only an insider-led revolt from within the regime’s broader political class can break such a system electorally?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: Based on what we’ve seen so far, I believe a potential victory for Tisza would have two implications. On the one hand, it would signal that the EU has had enough of Putinism directly influencing European politics. On the other hand, it would mean that authoritarian populism has become completely detached from social reality, and that Hungarian society has had enough of a political agenda built on constant hatemongering and the suspension of normality.

Authoritarian Consolidation Beyond Legitimacy

Conversely, if Fidesz were to retain power despite signs of economic strain, ideological repetition, corruption exposure, and opposition momentum, what would that tell us about the resilience of contemporary populist rule in Europe? Would it suggest that once authoritarian populism successfully constitutionalizes its power, elections alone become insufficient to dislodge it?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: I believe this is the most important issue of our time. Unfortunately, my grim assessment is that the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn. I have long regarded the Orbán regime as a constitutional dictatorship, which means, on the one hand, that contemporary autocracies have a constitutional framework, and on the other hand, that certain segments of society have renounced democracy and accept the exercise of authoritarian power. Overall, therefore, the Orbán regime can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial, a trend that poses a grave danger to both Hungarian and European society as a whole.

Competing Visions of European Sovereignty

From the perspective of European integration, do you see this election as a struggle between two models of sovereignty: Orbán’s confrontational, anti-imperial, anti-Brussels sovereigntism and a more cooperative, rule-of-law-based claim to national interest that Tisza is trying to articulate? Or is that dichotomy too neat for the political realities of contemporary Hungary?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: First of all, the Orbán regime is indeed imperialist, and it pursues policies that serve Russian imperialist interests. The Hungarian election is crucial from the perspective of European integration, as the dilemma is whether there exists a European sovereignty that can be relied upon to stand up against authoritarian tendencies such as Trumpism and Putinism. I am committed to the idea, as Karl Loewenstein put it, that democracy must develop its own self-defense mechanisms and fight back – in our case, at both the member state and EU levels.

External Validation Meets Internal Resistance

Matryoshka dolls featuring images of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump displayed at a souvenir counter in Moscow on March 16, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

Hungary has become a reference point within transnational right-wing networks, and Orbán continues to attract symbolic support from US and European conservative actors. In analytical terms, how much does this external validation matter domestically? Does it strengthen the regime’s legitimacy, or does it mainly reinforce Orbán’s self-image as a global ideological entrepreneur?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: From the perspective of ideological and political networking, the Orbán regime truly acts as a mediator between Western and Eastern authoritarian tendencies. This is why organizing the European far right is of key importance to Orbán. All of this undoubtedly has an impact on his own camp. At the same time, Orbán’s status as a “global ideological entrepreneur” represents the very project against which the Hungarian opposition has been able to unite and become committed to a change of government.

De-capture vs. Persistence of Orbánism

Finally, through the lens of your work on authoritarian law and exceptional governance, what would be the most theoretically significant post-election question for scholars to watch: whether electoral alternation occurs, whether institutional de-capture proves possible, or whether the deeper legacy of Orbánism survives regardless of who forms the next government?

Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is also one of the most important dilemmas of our era from both a Hungarian and a European perspective, as the political and legal consequences of the Orbán regime are toxic to European integration as a whole. On the one hand, just as happened after World War II, we must once again grapple with the question of how to take democratic action against authoritarian legal and political systems. On the other hand, and even more importantly: we must finally prevent the distortion of liberal democracies toward authoritarianism not only through constitutional institutions but also through effective economic and cultural means. In my view, it is crucial to examine how global capitalism and neoliberalism have distorted liberal constitutionalism and how they have eroded the social foundations of democracies through austerity measures and the dismantling of welfare systems.

Lagos, Waste, Nigeria.

Survival Populism: How Environmental Crisis Fuels Democratic Distrust in the Global South

In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja introduces the notion of “survival populism” to capture how environmental crisis and material insecurity are reshaping democratic politics in the Global South. Moving beyond conventional ideational approaches, the article foregrounds lived experiences of hardship—linking fuel price shocks, flooding, energy insecurity, and inflation to moral claims about fairness, state responsibility, and distributive justice. Through the case of Nigeria, Dr. Solaja demonstrates how climate-related disruptions and policy reforms converge to erode institutional trust and reconfigure political contestation. Rather than rejecting climate policy per se, citizens contest its unequal burdens. The article thus reframes democratic distress as rooted in distributive conflict, offering a compelling framework for understanding how ecological crisis fuels new forms of populist mobilization and legitimacy crises.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja*

In much of the Global South, the politics of survival and the politics of environmental crisis have become deeply intertwined. What were once distinct policy domains—the politics of fuel prices, flood mitigation, food inflation, waste accumulation, and energy insecurity—have converged into a single, lived experience of persistent hardship. For millions of citizens, the environmental crisis is not primarily defined by climate reports, international negotiations, or adaptation frameworks, but by submerged homes, rising transport costs, prolonged electricity outages, disrupted livelihoods, and escalating prices for basic goods.

Within such contexts of livelihood insecurity, ecological degradation takes on political meaning. Citizens come to see hardship not just as the result of misfortune or climatic fluctuation, but as an instance of unequal protection, institutional neglect and democratic distance. Under such conditions, public politics enters a new phase: a populism of survival emerges.

“Populism of survival” names a distinct mode of political interpretation that links environmental and economic distress to moral claims about state responsibility, fairness, and sacrifice. It departs from classical theories of populism by foregrounding the lived experience of hardship. Unlike the variants often associated with populist mobilizations in the Global North and East—typically structured around a binary opposition between “the people” and “the elite”—populism of survival is rooted in citizens’ experiences of material insecurity. Fuel becomes political when rising prices constrain mobility and limit access to basic goods; flooding becomes political when relief is inadequate or unevenly distributed; waste becomes political when its unequal management deepens social inequalities and disproportionately endangers already vulnerable populations.

In such contexts, public anger arises not only from opposition to environmental policy reforms but also from citizens’ everyday moral intuitions about who bears the costs of environmental disruption, who is required to pay, and who is protected. The relationship between climate policy and democratic legitimacy begins to erode when policies are perceived as non-distributive or unfair. Increasingly, the roots of climate populism lie in conflicts over how the costs and benefits of environmental transition are allocated. As Harrison (2025) observes, “across many settings, opposition to environmental reforms may stem not from a rejection of climate policies per se, but from opposition to the inequities of how their costs are distributed.”

An illustrative example of these dynamics can be found in Nigeria, where the government removed fuel subsidies in May 2023 and framed the resulting increase in fuel prices as a necessary macroeconomic adjustment. Public discourse surrounding the policy quickly became highly politicized, as rising fuel costs contributed to significant inflation and tightened household budgets. While state officials justified the reform in terms of fiscal discipline and economic rationalization, many citizens interpreted it through a moral lens: why should those at the bottom struggle to make ends meet while those with access to power remain insulated from such burdens? As Gbadebo (2025) argues, public responses to subsidy removal were shaped not only by the material consequences of economic hardship but also by concerns over governmental credibility and the plausibility of promised developmental outcomes.

These processes were intensified by other long-standing environmental and structural vulnerabilities and crises that now affected a wider portion of society than in past years. Following the floods that devastated numerous states—destroying livelihoods, homes, and arable lands—rising costs merged with food insecurity and frequent blackouts to form an inseparable social and ecological predicament. The state could no longer frame this predicament as exclusively “natural” or solely as the outcome of a natural disaster or poor market conditions. The experience was one of combined, cumulative crisis, and the credibility of the state in addressing such predicaments is tied to its performance on both fronts.

Flooding has, in particular, emerged as a major site of citizen dissatisfaction and a potent factor driving democratic distress. Displaced communities that have lost homes and productive capacity immediately feel cheated when the amount or distribution of government aid seems to reproduce and reinforce existing patterns of social inequality, and they begin to ask why state assistance appears uneven across communities and is not delivered to them preferentially. Climate policy has entered a phase in which state legitimacy is judged not solely in terms of its objectives or rationale, but also in terms of the effectiveness and fairness of its management of combined environmental and social threats.

Studies such as those by Okonkwo and Ezenwegbu (2024), which find that subsidy removal in Nigeria sparked significant concern among citizens who lacked a clear understanding of mitigation strategies or social protection, as well as analyses of the success and failure of fossil-fuel subsidy reform across various settings by Droste et al (2024), indicate that, when it comes to distributing the burdens of adjustment policies effectively, “technical argumentation alone has rarely been able to overcome such deeply seated mistrust.” The need for state institutions to earn citizens’ confidence through fairness, reciprocity, and demonstrable competence is therefore crucial in contexts with lower levels of public trust.

These issues are exacerbated in countries such as Nigeria, which suffer from chronic failures in infrastructure provision. Hussainzad and Gou (2024) show, for instance, that informality places the burden of adapting to ecological threats onto already existing socio-ecological inequalities. The populism of survival therefore cannot be interpreted solely as a product of irrational or ideological anti-state discourse, but as a request for a visible display of state competence. It requires public recognition from the state that it is aware of how these crises disproportionately affect ordinary citizens and is therefore prepared to demonstrate fairness and protection when such crises occur. 

It may or may not amount to explicitly anti-government discourse; but at its core, it expresses a demand for visibility. What citizens seek is not just state intervention, but a demonstration of its commitment to justice when addressing both economic pressures and the demands of adapting to the climate crisis. These developments are interpreted by populists as a crucial and opening field of study centered on real, survival-oriented daily experiences, rather than on the ideologies and leaders of state actors. The main dilemma for democratic governments in the coming decade will be less about acknowledging that an environmental crisis is underway than about fairly distributing the costs of confronting it.


 

References

Droste, N.; Chatterton, B. & Skovgaard, J. (2024). “A political economy theory of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in OECD countries.” Nature Communications, 15, 5452. 

Gbadebo, A. D. (2025). “The political economy of fuel subsidy removal: Governance and sustainable development in Nigeria.” Journal of Governance and Administrative Reform, 6(1), 1–18. 

Harrison, L. (2025). “Climate populism: the limits of the ideational and discursive approaches.” Environmental Politics, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2025.2591469

Hussainzad, E. A., & Gou, Z. (2024). “Climate risk and vulnerability assessment in informal settlements of the Global South: A critical review.” Land, 13(9), 1357. 

Okonkwo, A. E., & Ezenwegbu, J. C. (2024). “Removal of petrol subsidies and its impact for democratic governance in Nigeria.” Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science, 9(3), 38–47.

Professor Robert Csehi.

Assoc. Prof. Csehi: Hungary’s Election to Test the Resilience and Limits of Populist Rule in Europe

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi argues that Hungary’s April 12 election represents a critical test of whether entrenched populist rule can be electorally challenged. While he notes that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” he emphasizes that deeper dynamics—“ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control”—remain decisive. Assoc. Prof. Csehi highlights growing limits in Orbán’s populist discourse, which “has lost its novelty,” alongside shifting political conditions marked by economic grievances and the rise of the Tisza Party as a credible challenger. Yet, even in the event of electoral turnover, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, potentially leading to “a prolonged struggle over state capacity.” Hungary thus offers a crucial case for assessing the resilience and limits of populist governance in Europe.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Robert Csehi, Associate Professor and Program Director of the Political Science Doctoral Program at the Corvinus University of Budapest, offers a nuanced and theoretically grounded assessment of Hungary’s evolving political landscape on the eve of a pivotal electoral contest.

As Hungary approaches its parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a critical juncture. After sixteen years of rule under Viktor Orbán, the election has come to signify more than routine democratic competition. It represents a broader test of whether entrenched populist governance—characterized by institutional consolidation, discursive dominance, and asymmetrical resource control—can be meaningfully challenged through electoral mechanisms. The campaign unfolds amid deep polarization, intensifying geopolitical tensions, and mounting concerns over democratic resilience, media pluralism, and institutional fairness. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced a new dynamic into Hungary’s political competition.

Against this backdrop, Assoc. Prof. Csehi underscores that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” while emphasizing that the stakes extend beyond electoral turnover to questions of “ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control.” In his view, the durability of Hungary’s populist system is no longer assured. He identifies emerging cracks within the governing discourse, noting that “the supply of the populist worldview… has become less creative” and “has lost its novelty,” with the government increasingly relying on repetitive narratives—particularly around the war in Ukraine—to sustain mobilization.

At the same time, structural shifts on both the supply and demand sides of politics are reshaping the electoral terrain. The rise of the Tisza Party, Assoc. Prof. Csehi observes, has created “a new channel for people to express their grievances,”while also reactivating political engagement at the grassroots level. Concurrently, worsening economic conditions have intensified public discontent, as “people’s everyday grievances are rising,” and the government finds it increasingly difficult to externalize responsibility for inflation, corruption, and declining public services.

Assoc. Prof. Csehi’s analysis situates Hungary within a broader comparative framework, highlighting the uncertain trajectory of mature populist regimes. While electoral defeat could mark “the end of the Orbán regime” in formal terms, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, generating “a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture.” Conversely, a renewed victory for Fidesz would signal that such regimes retain significant resilience, even under conditions of economic strain and ideological fatigue.

Ultimately, as Assoc. Prof. Csehi concludes, the Hungarian case offers a critical empirical test: whether “a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed… in an electoral process.” In this sense, Hungary’s 2026 election stands as a defining moment not only for the country itself, but for understanding the resilience—and limits—of populist rule across Europe.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Robert Csehi, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Dr. Thomas Carothers.

Dr. Carothers: When Institutions Fail, Protest Becomes the Last Line of Democratic Defense

In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Thomas Carothers offers a nuanced reassessment of contemporary democratic backsliding, challenging dominant explanations that prioritize socioeconomic grievances over political agency. He argues that elite opportunism and institutional permissiveness are central drivers of democratic erosion, cautioning against overgeneralizing from Western experiences. Emphasizing that “when institutions fail, protest becomes the last line of democratic defense,” Dr. Carothers highlights the enduring role of civic mobilization in constraining authoritarian drift. At the same time, he resists declinist narratives, noting that democratic “guardrails” continue to hold in many contexts. The interview ultimately frames global democracy as entering a new phase of contested resilience, shaped by the dynamic interplay of elites, institutions, and citizen action.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a time when democracies across the globe face mounting pressures—from intensifying polarization in the United States and Europe to the growing assertiveness of authoritarian powers—the question of how democratic systems erode, endure, and renew themselves has taken on renewed urgency. In this context, Dr. Thomas Carothers, Director of the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program and Harvey V. Fineberg Chair for Democracy Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offers a timely and nuanced intervention. Speaking to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Carothers challenges prevailing explanatory frameworks and calls for a more differentiated understanding of democratic backsliding and resilience.

Central to his analysis is a critique of the widely invoked “democracy-not-delivering” thesis. As he observes,“democratic backsliding has been spreading around the world for over 20 years, but we’re still struggling to figure out why it’s occurring,” urging “a bit of humility” from both scholars and policymakers. Rather than attributing democratic erosion primarily to socioeconomic grievances, Dr. Carothers emphasizes the role of “power holders—elites and elite agency” in actively constraining democratic choice. He cautions against generalizing from the American and European experience, noting that in many contexts, citizens are not opting for extremist alternatives but are instead “not being allowed to make those choices” due to authoritarian interventions.

This analytical shift foregrounds the importance of political agency and institutional dynamics over structural determinism. Dr. Carothers expresses skepticism toward rigid dichotomies, arguing that the “structure-versus-agency framework… is not a particularly useful way” to understand contemporary democratic crises. Instead, he advocates for context-sensitive analysis that recognizes the interplay between institutional vulnerabilities and strategic elite behavior.

It is within this framework that Dr. Carothers advances one of his most compelling claims: “When institutions fail, protest becomes the last line of democratic defense.” In settings where courts, media, and civil society are systematically undermined, public protest emerges as a residual yet powerful mechanism of accountability. While acknowledging that even protest can be violently suppressed—as in cases like Tanzania or Nicaragua—he underscores that, in many democracies, mass mobilization continues to function as a critical constraint on executive overreach.

At the same time, Dr. Carothers resists overly pessimistic narratives. While democratic backsliding persists, he notes that “the rapid wave of backsliding has slowed somewhat,” and that in numerous cases institutional “guardrails have been holding up.” Drawing on comparative examples from Brazil, Senegal, and beyond, he highlights the capacity of civic mobilization and institutional resilience to counteract authoritarian drift.

Taken together, this interview situates contemporary democratic challenges within a broader landscape of contestation, adaptation, and uneven resilience. Rather than signaling an inevitable decline, Dr. Carothers suggests the emergence of a more complex equilibrium—one in which democratic erosion and renewal coexist, and where the future of democracy will depend on the dynamic interaction between elites, institutions, and citizens.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Thomas Carothers, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Professor Tomaž Deželan

Prof. Deželan: Democratic Forces in Slovenia Are Fighting Populism with Populism and Losing Ground

In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Tomaž Deželan offers a sobering assessment of Slovenia’s post-2026 electoral landscape, portraying it as a microcosm of broader European democratic tensions. While the election outcome reflects a degree of democratic resilience, it simultaneously reveals deepening fragmentation, rising anti-establishment mobilization, and the normalization of populist political styles. Professor Deželan argues that Slovenia is undergoing a structural transformation in political competition, marked by leader-centric mobilization, evolving campaign strategies, and the growing influence of digital communication. Most strikingly, he contends that mainstream and center-left actors are increasingly adopting populist tactics themselves, thereby weakening their normative advantage. In this sense, Slovenia exemplifies a wider trend in which democratic actors risk eroding liberal-democratic standards while attempting to counter populism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the aftermath of Slovenia’s closely contested 2026 parliamentary elections, the country has emerged as a revealing case for scholars of democratic resilience, party-system transformation, and the adaptive capacity of populism in contemporary Europe. Long regarded as one of the more stable and institutionally consolidated post-socialist democracies, Slovenia now appears to be entering a more uncertain phase marked by electoral fragmentation, ideological polarization, and the growing normalization of political styles once associated primarily with the populist radical right. The narrow result of the election may have prevented an outright illiberal breakthrough, yet it also exposed how fragile the liberal-democratic center has become under mounting domestic and transnational pressures.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Tomaž Deželan, Chair of Policy Analysis and Public Administration at the University of Ljubljana, offers a nuanced and sobering interpretation of Slovenia’s evolving political landscape. Rejecting simplistic binaries, he argues that the current moment reflects both “a sign of democratic resilience” and the simultaneous emergence of “competitive illiberalism” within a formally democratic order. In his account, the 2026 election did not simply confirm the endurance of liberal democratic forces; it also revealed the strengthening of alternative actors and strategies that challenge the older political equilibrium from multiple directions.

A central theme of Professor Deželan’s analysis is the structural transformation of political competition itself. Slovenia’s fragmented party system, he suggests, can no longer be understood merely through the lens of episodic volatility. Instead, it points toward a deeper reconfiguration in which traditional party collusion, leader-centered organization, new gray zones of funding, and increasingly unregulated campaign practices coexist with novel forms of mobilization through civil society, digital platforms, and technocratic-populist appeals. Particularly striking is his observation that “we are bringing the messy world into Slovenia,” as strategies pioneered elsewhere in Europe and beyond increasingly shape domestic political behavior.

The interview’s central insight emerges most sharply in Professor Deželan’s comparative reflection on the changing repertoire of democratic actors themselves. As right-wing populists gain confidence, sophistication, and digital reach, he argues, mainstream and center-left forces have struggled to articulate a compelling non-populist response. Instead, they have increasingly adopted emotional and adversarial tactics of their own. Hence his stark conclusion: “democratic forces have, to some extent, responded to populism with populism,” and in doing so, they risk ceding further ground rather than reclaiming democratic initiative. This diagnosis is especially important because it shifts attention away from populist actors alone and toward the strategic exhaustion of those who claim to defend liberal democracy.

Professor Deželan also situates Slovenia’s trajectory within a broader European and transatlantic context. He traces the reconceptualization of Europe in more sovereigntist and ethno-national terms, the continued resilience of Janez Janša’s SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party) through leader-centric and affective mobilization, and the rise of anti-establishment formations such as Resnica as symptoms of deeper crises of trust and representation. 

Taken together, Professor Deželan’s reflections suggest that Slovenia is not an outlier but a condensed laboratory of wider democratic tensions. This interview therefore offers not only an interpretation of one national election, but also a timely warning about how liberal-democratic systems may erode when their defenders begin to mirror the very logics they seek to resist.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Tomaž Deželan, revised so slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Johannes Andersen

Prof. Andersen: Danish Democracy Grows More Volatile as Voters Drift and Parties Chase Them

In this insightful ECPS interview, Professor Johannes Andersen offers a sobering diagnosis of Denmark’s evolving political landscape following the 2026 general election. He argues that the country is undergoing a profound structural transformation marked by voter de-alignment, declining trust, and increasingly fragmented party competition.  While voters remain loosely anchored within traditional blocs, many no longer feel represented by specific parties, resulting in growing electoral volatility. At the same time, political parties are shifting from long-term representation toward short-term, issue-driven strategies. As Professor Andersen warns, this dynamic creates a paradox: expanded democratic choice coexists with rising confusion and distrust—pointing to a more unstable, yet still functioning, democratic system.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Johannes Andersen, Professor of Political Science at Aalborg University, offers a sobering and analytically rich assessment of Denmark’s evolving political landscape in the aftermath of the 2026 general election. Professor Andersen’s diagnosis captures a deeper structural transformation unfolding beneath the surface of what has long been considered one of Europe’s most stable democratic systems.

In the wake of Denmark’s closely contested 2026 general election, the country stands at a pivotal political moment—marked by fragmentation, the resurgence of the populist radical right, and renewed geopolitical tensions over Greenland. While the campaign was driven largely by domestic concerns such as the cost-of-living crisis and migration, the results also point to deeper shifts in political trust, voter alignments, and the structure of democratic competition. Professor Andersen’s analysis situates these developments within a broader transformation of democratic politics, emphasizing that Denmark is no longer experiencing episodic volatility but a sustained process of structural change.

At the core of his argument lies the claim that both voters and political parties are undergoing simultaneous and mutually reinforcing transformations. As he underscores, “we are witnessing really fundamental changes in this system,” driven by evolving voter attitudes and shifting party strategies. Voters, while still loosely anchored within traditional bloc structures, are increasingly detached from specific party identities – “voters no longer feel represented by a political party”—resulting in unprecedented levels of electoral fluidity. The fact that roughly half of the electorate has changed party allegiance in recent elections, with even higher volatility anticipated, illustrates the depth of this de-alignment.

At the same time, political parties have adapted by moving away from long-term representational commitments toward short-term, issue-driven competition. Rather than defending stable constituencies, they increasingly seek to maximize electoral appeal through targeted policy responses – “we are the best at solving this problem”—thereby reinforcing a political logic in which responsiveness replaces representation. This transformation is particularly visible in the growing centrality of migration politics, which now structures competition across both left and right.

Professor Andersen also highlights the gradual erosion of the welfare state as a unifying political project. Once the cornerstone of Danish social democracy, it has receded from the center of political discourse, replaced by fragmented issue politics and competing populist narratives. In this context, even strong executive performance does not necessarily translate into electoral gains, as demonstrated by the limited political returns from Denmark’s handling of the Greenland crisis.

Taken together, these dynamics point to what Professor Andersen describes as a new and inherently unstable political equilibrium—one defined by expanded voter choice but declining trust. As he cautions, “we are developing a new political culture based on growing confusion among voters,” where democratic dynamism coexists with increasing alienation. 

The interview that follows explores these tensions in depth, beginning with the question of whether Denmark’s fragmentation reflects a temporary fluctuation or a more profound transformation of democratic politics.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Johannes Andersen, revised so slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Associate Professor Robert Csehi.

Assoc. Prof. Csehi: Hungary’s Election to Test the Resilience and Limits of Populist Rule in Europe

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi argues that Hungary’s April 12 election represents a critical test of whether entrenched populist rule can be electorally challenged. While he notes that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” he emphasizes that deeper dynamics—“ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control”—remain decisive. Assoc. Prof. Csehi highlights growing limits in Orbán’s populist discourse, which “has lost its novelty,” alongside shifting political conditions marked by economic grievances and the rise of the Tisza Party as a credible challenger. Yet, even in the event of electoral turnover, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, potentially leading to “a prolonged struggle over state capacity.” Hungary thus offers a crucial case for assessing the resilience and limits of populist governance in Europe.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Robert Csehi, Associate Professor and Program Director of the Political Science Doctoral Program at the Corvinus University of Budapest, offers a nuanced and theoretically grounded assessment of Hungary’s evolving political landscape on the eve of a pivotal electoral contest.

As Hungary approaches its parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a critical juncture. After sixteen years of rule under Viktor Orbán, the election has come to signify more than routine democratic competition. It represents a broader test of whether entrenched populist governance—characterized by institutional consolidation, discursive dominance, and asymmetrical resource control—can be meaningfully challenged through electoral mechanisms. The campaign unfolds amid deep polarization, intensifying geopolitical tensions, and mounting concerns over democratic resilience, media pluralism, and institutional fairness. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced a new dynamic into Hungary’s political competition.

Against this backdrop, Assoc. Prof. Csehi underscores that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” while emphasizing that the stakes extend beyond electoral turnover to questions of “ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control.” In his view, the durability of Hungary’s populist system is no longer assured. He identifies emerging cracks within the governing discourse, noting that “the supply of the populist worldview… has become less creative” and “has lost its novelty,” with the government increasingly relying on repetitive narratives—particularly around the war in Ukraine—to sustain mobilization.

At the same time, structural shifts on both the supply and demand sides of politics are reshaping the electoral terrain. The rise of the Tisza Party, Assoc. Prof. Csehi observes, has created “a new channel for people to express their grievances,”while also reactivating political engagement at the grassroots level. Concurrently, worsening economic conditions have intensified public discontent, as “people’s everyday grievances are rising,” and the government finds it increasingly difficult to externalize responsibility for inflation, corruption, and declining public services.

Assoc. Prof. Csehi’s analysis situates Hungary within a broader comparative framework, highlighting the uncertain trajectory of mature populist regimes. While electoral defeat could mark “the end of the Orbán regime” in formal terms, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, generating “a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture.” Conversely, a renewed victory for Fidesz would signal that such regimes retain significant resilience, even under conditions of economic strain and ideological fatigue.

Ultimately, as Assoc. Prof. Csehi concludes, the Hungarian case offers a critical empirical test: whether “a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed… in an electoral process.” In this sense, Hungary’s 2026 election stands as a defining moment not only for the country itself, but for understanding the resilience—and limits—of populist rule across Europe.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Robert Csehi, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Populist Discourse Losing Creativity

Fidesz, Soros.
Poster from political party Fidesz showing the opponents of Hungarian PM Viktor Orban surrounding billionaire philanthropist George Soros, Budapest, April 8, 2017.

Professor Csehi, welcome. Let me begin with the broader picture: In your scholarship, you argue that Hungarian populism has endured through the continuous reconstruction of “the people,” the redefinition of “the elite,” and the rearticulation of popular sovereignty. In the current campaign, do you still see this triadic logic operating effectively, or are its mobilizational limits beginning to emerge?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: I don’t think we do see some limitations to the effectiveness of this renewed populist discourse in Hungary. I think there are fundamentally three changes that actually challenge Orban’s effective populist discourse.

The first one is, in essence, that the supply of the populist worldview in the discourse has become less creative. It has lost its novelty. There were references to the war, for example, in Ukraine already in the 2022 elections—so four years ago. I mean, the war had just broken out, and they already used warmongering during that period. They pushed the campaign to the extreme in 2024 during the European parliamentary elections. They used essentially the same narrative, the same discourse. And they haven’t managed to really renew this discourse, and they keep talking about the same thing. They keep appealing to people’s fear of the war now. So, in comparison to previous elections, where every four years you had a new enemy and a new elite that was conspiring against Hungary and the government, we don’t really see that in 2026 compared to 2022 or 2024. So that’s one major change.

The second one obviously also affects, or concerns, the supply side of politics, and you already mentioned the rise of the opposition Tisza Party, which means there is actually a new channel for people to express their grievances and to mobilize their political demands behind a party which seems to have more legitimacy. It’s probably not the right word, but it resonates with people much better than the old opposition parties, which, on many grounds, have lost the trust of the people over the years—not only because they were ineffective, but also because they were involved in all sorts of scandals throughout the years. And now there is a new party which actually effectively challenges the government on a lot of issues and calls attention to many things that previously the old opposition, as we refer to it now, had not done. Plus, they really go down to the countryside, and they really do talk to people. They are engaging with the people and the electorate, and that makes a huge difference. So these are on the supply side, which are extremely relevant.

And then there is one demand-side feature which really has had a great effect. Since 2022, the Hungarian economy has not been doing very well. So, this has put a lot of things on the political agenda. People’s everyday grievances are rising, from inflation to public services, corruption, etc. It is not like Fidesz or Orban is able to cover these up anymore. We had skyrocketing inflation in the past few years, and it has become extremely difficult for the government to externalize these kinds of problems. And so people don’t shove it off anymore, like, “Oh, well, we’re still doing better no matter what the government does.” “Yeah, they might be corrupt, they might be wrong on certain policy issues, et cetera, et cetera, but we’re still better off than we were four years ago.” They don’t say that anymore. So, effectively, the economy plays a huge role in this entire story as well.

Election Tests Incumbency Survival

To what extent should the April 12 election be understood not merely as a contest between Fidesz and Tisza, but as a broader test of whether long-term populist incumbency can withstand mounting economic pressures, corruption fatigue, and shifting voter expectations?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: That’s a good question. It will definitely be a test of incumbency survival, in a sense, but, in the background, it is really about ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control—namely, the extent to which these can still be maintained and used to hold power. I’m not sure to what extent these can actually withstand all the structural- and agency-based challenges that I’ve mentioned previously. So, it is going to be an interesting test from a political science perspective as well, to see whether they actually manage to survive or not, and to what extent a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed or won over in an electoral process. The jury is still out, and I’m really looking forward to seeing what happens afterwards.

EU Framed As Background Enemy

Viktor Orban
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives for a meeting with European Union leaders in Brussels, Belgium on Dec. 13, 2019. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

You have shown that Orbán’s Eurosceptic populism often adopts an anti-imperialist framing, portraying Brussels as an external elite constraining Hungarian sovereignty. How central is this narrative in the current campaign, and does it retain its resonance in a context where access to EU funds and economic stability are increasingly salient concerns?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: It’s a very important point in the elections. Not in terms of the EU being a central topic—by all means, that’s not the case. Really, Orbán’s campaign is focusing on the war in Ukraine. Still, they have managed to somehow link this up with the EU. They have had billboard campaigns showing Ursula von der Leyen and Manfred Weber together with Volodymyr Zelensky, suggesting that the EU is taking the money of Hungarians and channeling it to Ukraine and to President Zelensky. So, they try to mingle these things together, mix them, and bring in the EU as, again, this sort of background power that is mistaken and on the side of war.

They have populist, moralist, discursive division, where Orbán portrays himself as a pro-peace political actor, whereas everybody else who does not agree with him, by definition, becomes pro-war, even if it does not really make sense.

So, in a sense, the EU is still there; it is referenced as, once again, occupying a pro-war position. As I said previously, they try to repeat the same claims as they did in the 2024 European parliamentary elections—drawing these very fine lines between who is on the side of peace and who is on the side of war, and they clearly place Brussels and the EU on the side of the war. And as I said, it is not only about the war per se. They also try to refer to the financial side of it, bringing this back repeatedly—claiming that the EU is taking your money, holding back funds, and channeling them to Ukraine. So, they frame it as financing the war instead of supporting Hungarian people, etc.

So, it is not center stage—I would say it is still the sort of antagonistic relationship between Ukraine and Hungary at the moment—but they do try to bring this into the discussion: that the EU is somewhere in the background, conspiring and doing all sorts of shady and harmful things. And the reason why they do that is that over the past years they have managed to convert their electorate into the most Eurosceptic segment of the population. In comparison to all other party supporters—with the exception of Our Homeland, the far-right party—probably the most Eurosceptic electorate is behind Fidesz at the moment. So it is just natural that they also play those tunes for their voters.

Tisza Promises Policy Reset

Tisza leader Péter Magyar
Tisza leader Péter Magyar begins a symbolic “one million steps” march to Nagyvárad, Romania, addressing reporters with supporters in Budapest, Hungary on May 14, 2025. Photo: Istvan Balogh / Dreamstime.

From the perspective of European integration, do you interpret this election as a confrontation between two competing models of EU membership—one sovereigntist and illiberal, the other oriented toward re-integration through rule-of-law compliance and institutional alignment?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: Yes and no. On the one hand, I would agree that Orban has had a very particular idea of defending sovereignty in the EU. He has thought that the defense of national sovereignty and national interest could only be pursued in a confrontational way. You have to use the channels of the European Council or the Council itself to block things and not really participate in negotiations and deliberations.

There have been multiple occasions where Orban was not present—they sent him out to have a coffee. From research, we know that Council negotiations have shifted somewhat in recent years. What we would describe as a kind of de-Europeanization in the Hungarian approach to EU affairs is what has occurred on multiple fronts.

Compared to that, Tisza and Magyar’s approach are definitely different from Orban’s on some issues. You mentioned the rule of law. Tisza claims that it will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as soon as it is in government. It also promises to resolve some of these rule-of-law issues and to bring back the funds that have been frozen under Orban’s regime. So, we can expect a return to more normal relations with the EU. This promise is also supported by the personnel envisioned to lead foreign and European affairs within the party.

That said, I say yes and no because I do think that Tisza also supports a model of European integration based on strengthening intergovernmental relations, as opposed to a supranational takeover in multiple areas. We have seen this time and again. They have run into conflicts on different policy measures, even within the European Parliament and within their own faction in the European People’s Party.

So, on the one hand, there is likely to be an effort to restore relations and the credibility of Hungary as a partner within the EU. On the other hand, there will be areas where they confront and challenge the direction of European policy. It is not going to be a return to the old days where Hungarian representatives simply nodded to everything the European Union demanded from the government. Rather, it will involve a stronger representation of national interests, but in a more cooperative—as opposed to confrontational—manner than Orban has pursued.

Turnover Won’t End Orbánism

If Péter Magyar and the Tisza party were to win, would that necessarily signify the end of the Orbán era, or has Orbánism become sufficiently institutionalized within the state, the media landscape, and patronage networks to persist beyond electoral turnover?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: The easy answer, obviously, is that electorally this would be the end of the Orbán regime, at least temporarily. But when we really look into the structural features, I would say no. This will, in fact, be a very interesting period to study, to see how deep the roots of the regime actually went and grew, and how these roots actually act and behave under a new government. I would say there is fundamentally a deeper institutional structure here, which could make the life of the new government miserable on multiple accounts—from financial oversight to judicial oversight, etc. There are many aspects where the government has to govern effectively with its hands tied behind its back. So it is going to be difficult.

I would imagine that this will be something like a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture. They will try to take back some of these institutions with whatever legal means there are. Nevertheless, the government will have greater room for maneuver in terms of policies in many areas, and I do think that they can make changes that could have a positive outcome or resonance with the public.

And one thing we cannot really exclude as a possibility—again, the poll numbers are all over the place—but most independent pollsters show a 15 to even 20 percentage point lead for the opposition party, which could effectively also mean that Tisza would gain a two-thirds, or constitutional, majority. That would be a completely different ballgame, because with that, they could de-capture those institutions more easily. To what extent this would be done in a democratic way, or whether they would repeat something similar to what we have seen during the Fidesz era, I am not sure. I am just saying that there might be an opportunity for the new government to actually de-root the system, provided that they have a constitutional majority.

No Majority, No Regime Change

Some observers suggest that even a Tisza-led government could face significant institutional constraints stemming from constitutional engineering and entrenched loyalist networks. How should we conceptualize the possibility of electoral alternation without substantive regime transformation?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: This goes in line with my previous answer. Without a constitutional majority, what you will see is that there is likely to be governmental turnover, but there is not going to be a regime transformation. And then, there are different scenarios as to what will happen. If there is a constitutional majority, then we see a re-orientation or a re-democratization. If there is only governmental turnover without real regime transformation, what kind of room for maneuver does the new government have?

How do we conceptualize this? So this is definitely going to be an interesting case to analyze in terms of re-democratization attempts—whether they actually go deep or whether they are just going to hover at the surface, which we have seen before. We even had a study on this, on local governments, examining how they try to re-democratize even under a populist authoritarian regime. We might actually see something of this sort at the national level. But once again, the possible measures might be more confined if there is only a simple majority in Parliament, and that would definitely limit the options of the next government.

Loyalty And Shielding Protect Fidesz

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán gives a speech to convince his respondents in Szeged on March 4, 2014.

Your work on populist resilience to corruption highlights how such regimes adapt to and withstand scandal. In Hungary today, which mechanisms—discursive reframing, institutional shielding, or partisan loyalty—appear most crucial in sustaining support for Fidesz?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: Given that the regime has reached its peak and is really a mature system, from a populist regime perspective, I would say, in line with our theoretical frame, that it is mostly the institutional shielding and the partisan loyalty that dominate at the moment. Let me give you an example, which is essentially a reflection of both. There is this huge scandal about the former governor of the National Bank (György Matolcsy) and his son. There is a scandal going around that hundreds of billions of forints were actually channeled out into private funds—essentially, they were just paid out to… we do not even necessarily know whom. We do know that the governor’s son really benefited from this. And what is happening now is that there is practically no police investigation going on, or, if there is, it is extremely slow. We do not really know what is happening. In the meantime, we already know that, for example, the governor’s son has tried to, or has already started to, ship his luxury car collection to Dubai, and these kinds of things.

So wealth is going out, and in the meantime, nothing is really happening. And nobody is really talking about the Matolcsy family, etc. So there is this partisan loyalty going on, and there is this institutional shielding, which does not allow these institutions to actually do anything about it. There is no prosecution going on. There might be some prosecution, but we do not really know why it is so limited, why it is so slow, why it is kept secret, and why they basically let the governor’s son do anything he pleases, given the fact that we know that hundreds of billions of forints were, in a sense, privatized. So, I do think that these two mechanisms are the most dominant ones.

Discursively, they do not even really try anymore. It is more like, “Well, we have nothing to do with the issue—let the institutions run their course,” but the institutions are not doing anything. So, it is just a sort of bogus narrative behind it.

What has really changed, on the other hand, is Péter Magyar’s rise in politics, because he is essentially an insider. And when he appeared, that was one of his biggest assets in politics, since this insider status was extremely relevant. When he talks about corruption claims against the government, it seems to mobilize anger much more effectively. This is what really matters here, because, on many issues, anger is a very strong motivational factor in politics, including in unseating incumbent governments. This is absolutely not a good feeling, I have to say, but it does trigger mobilization, and mobilization is key, obviously.

Peace Narrative Masks Polarization

The campaign has been strongly shaped by geopolitical narratives, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine. Has Orbán’s positioning as a “peace-oriented” leader maintained its electoral appeal, or is his perceived proximity to Moscow becoming a source of political vulnerability?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: That’s not an easy question to answer. First of all, his portrayal of himself as “peace-oriented” is really just buying into his populist discourse of being a pro-peace person, while everybody else who does not agree with him is, by definition, pro-war. So, once again, you have this Manichean, moralistic kind of division within politics that populists are very fond of. Essentially, this type of division turns every political discussion and agenda point into a life-or-death situation. Here, it is literally portrayed as such: if we do not want this, then the next day, everybody is sent to the Ukrainian front and people will die there.

But I would not buy into this “peace-oriented leader” narrative at all. There is a columnist in one of the Hungarian weeklies who consistently describes Orbán as aggressor-oriented, and I think that is probably a better portrayal of what he actually is—without taking any normative position. If you ask what he means by peace, the government does not really have a clear idea of what peace would entail or how it should be achieved. In that sense, the aggressor-oriented description may be more accurate.

As for whether this narrative still works, I think it holds up quite well among the core electorate. We know from sociological and political studies that most of Orbán’s supporters come from the countryside, with lower levels of education and generally more limited economic means. Among these groups, the message still resonates. Talking about the war—through fearmongering, warmongering, and similar appeals—continues to be effective.

What they have also done quite effectively, and this is why they remain competitive, is to turn uncertainty around the war into anger. Studies on populism show that fear is not the main driver; anger is. Fear reflects uncertainty, whereas anger is directed—it needs a target. They have managed to convert uncertainty and fear into anger.

To some extent, President Zelensky also inadvertently contributed to this dynamic. A particular quote was picked up and amplified by pro-government media, portraying it as a threat to Orbán. This helped channel anger toward Zelensky and Ukraine.

They also continue to layer in additional discursive elements, such as claims that “they are taking your money.” Recently, the prime minister held town hall meetings across the country, where he accused protesters of siding with Ukraine and attempting to divert Hungarian resources there. This reflects a level of political rhetoric that is, frankly, quite unprecedented. Similarly, incidents such as damage to the Druzhba gas pipeline have been reframed as evidence that Ukraine is withholding Hungary’s energy supplies and weaponizing resources. This contributes to a constant, artificially orchestrated sense of anger directed at Ukraine. In that sense, the narrative still resonates with certain segments. There is some degree of creativity, but in terms of the broader narrative, they have not significantly shifted away from the war-centered discourse seen in 2022 and 2024.

Regarding Trump and Moscow, the situation is more complicated. Trump’s own actions—particularly the wars associated with his leadership—no longer support the earlier framing of him as a “pro-peace” figure. As a result, the government has largely stopped emphasizing this aspect and instead downplays it. Attempts to reinterpret such developments rhetorically have not been particularly convincing.

As for relations with Moscow, recent leaks concerning communications between Hungarian and Russian officials have raised questions. Depending on interpretation, these either reflect pragmatic diplomacy or suggest alignment with Russian interests, including the sharing of sensitive information.

Overall, both the Trump factor and the Russian connection appear to increase the government’s political vulnerability.

Trump Effect Mostly Symbolic

US President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrive for a working dinner at the NATO Summit in Brussels, Belgium on July 11, 2018. Photo: Gints Ivuskans / Dreamstime.

Hungary has long been embedded in a broader transnational network of right-wing populist actors. How significant is the “Trump effect” and Musk’s influence in this election, both in terms of symbolic validation and in reinforcing Orbán’s model of governance?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: I think it is really symbolic. I am not sure that, in terms of governance features, there is much there. Quite the reverse, I would say. It is really some American governors and high-ranking politicians who keep talking about copying this or that from Orbán, when it comes to, for example, dealing with LGBTQ issues in their states, etc. So, Orbán tries to position himself—and to some extent successfully—as a governance genius who should and could be copied by some of these international partners.

On the other hand, the extent to which they actually contribute to Orbán’s success is largely symbolic. As I said, the campaign is mainly about the war at this moment, so it is not really a question of whether there is transnational conservative endorsement or not—it does not matter that much. I do not see it that way. We had CPAC (the Conservative Political Action Conference) Hungary, which is a sort of mimic meeting of CPAC in the US where they invite right-wing politicians and intellectuals. It is a significant event. Just a couple of days ago, they announced that J.D. Vance, the US Vice President, is coming next Tuesday to Hungary. They probably wanted Trump to come but could not manage it, so it will be J.D. Vance. And the American government has already signaled that it supports Orbán’s re-election.

But, what matters most, once again, for the future—or for the short-term political room for maneuver of the government—is really the European partners. The EU and other European right-wing leaders are closely watching the election, because it could fundamentally change dynamics within the European Council and more generally within the integration process in the EU.

Hungary Tests Populism’s Limits

Finally, Professor Csehi, from a comparative perspective, what would each plausible outcome—a renewed Fidesz victory, a Tisza-led breakthrough, or a contested post-election scenario—tell us about the broader trajectory of populist rule in Europe and the capacity of democratic systems to dislodge entrenched illiberal incumbents?

Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: If Fidesz wins, this is still going to be an interesting scenario and an interesting political experience, which would tell us that, despite economic strains and despite the ideological fatigue that the government shows, and despite a strong challenger—a new challenger party emerging—the system still has some resilience. Then we would need to find out what actually triggered this resilience, or what made this resilience possible.

Now, this resilience, obviously, would send a message that electoral challenge is still possible, even with a populist regime that is extremely mature in its institutional design and structural features, etc. Therefore, none of these populist regimes are actually immune to a more systemic fatigue, and, if they want to survive, they need to be more creative in how they maintain the system.

But definitely, with a Tisza win, we would get very good information on how much democratic backsliding there actually was in the system, across different aspects. Most likely, this would generate immense knowledge that we could gain, and that would be extremely valuable for future studies. So I am very much looking forward to seeing what will happen. Those are my two cents on this point.

Dr. Thomas Carothers.

Dr. Carothers: When Institutions Fail, Protest Becomes the Last Line of Democratic Defense

In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Thomas Carothers offers a nuanced reassessment of contemporary democratic backsliding, challenging dominant explanations that prioritize socioeconomic grievances over political agency. He argues that elite opportunism and institutional permissiveness are central drivers of democratic erosion, cautioning against overgeneralizing from Western experiences. Emphasizing that “when institutions fail, protest becomes the last line of democratic defense,” Dr. Carothers highlights the enduring role of civic mobilization in constraining authoritarian drift. At the same time, he resists declinist narratives, noting that democratic “guardrails” continue to hold in many contexts. The interview ultimately frames global democracy as entering a new phase of contested resilience, shaped by the dynamic interplay of elites, institutions, and citizen action.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a time when democracies across the globe face mounting pressures—from intensifying polarization in the United States and Europe to the growing assertiveness of authoritarian powers—the question of how democratic systems erode, endure, and renew themselves has taken on renewed urgency. In this context, Dr. Thomas Carothers, Director of the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program and Harvey V. Fineberg Chair for Democracy Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offers a timely and nuanced intervention. Speaking to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Carothers challenges prevailing explanatory frameworks and calls for a more differentiated understanding of democratic backsliding and resilience.

Central to his analysis is a critique of the widely invoked “democracy-not-delivering” thesis. As he observes,“democratic backsliding has been spreading around the world for over 20 years, but we’re still struggling to figure out why it’s occurring,” urging “a bit of humility” from both scholars and policymakers. Rather than attributing democratic erosion primarily to socioeconomic grievances, Dr. Carothers emphasizes the role of “power holders—elites and elite agency” in actively constraining democratic choice. He cautions against generalizing from the American and European experience, noting that in many contexts, citizens are not opting for extremist alternatives but are instead “not being allowed to make those choices” due to authoritarian interventions.

This analytical shift foregrounds the importance of political agency and institutional dynamics over structural determinism. Dr. Carothers expresses skepticism toward rigid dichotomies, arguing that the “structure-versus-agency framework… is not a particularly useful way” to understand contemporary democratic crises. Instead, he advocates for context-sensitive analysis that recognizes the interplay between institutional vulnerabilities and strategic elite behavior.

It is within this framework that Dr. Carothers advances one of his most compelling claims: “When institutions fail, protest becomes the last line of democratic defense.” In settings where courts, media, and civil society are systematically undermined, public protest emerges as a residual yet powerful mechanism of accountability. While acknowledging that even protest can be violently suppressed—as in cases like Tanzania or Nicaragua—he underscores that, in many democracies, mass mobilization continues to function as a critical constraint on executive overreach.

At the same time, Dr. Carothers resists overly pessimistic narratives. While democratic backsliding persists, he notes that “the rapid wave of backsliding has slowed somewhat,” and that in numerous cases institutional “guardrails have been holding up.” Drawing on comparative examples from Brazil, Senegal, and beyond, he highlights the capacity of civic mobilization and institutional resilience to counteract authoritarian drift.

Taken together, this interview situates contemporary democratic challenges within a broader landscape of contestation, adaptation, and uneven resilience. Rather than signaling an inevitable decline, Dr. Carothers suggests the emergence of a more complex equilibrium—one in which democratic erosion and renewal coexist, and where the future of democracy will depend on the dynamic interaction between elites, institutions, and citizens.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Thomas Carothers, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

We Still Don’t Fully Understand Democratic Backsliding

Figure from the V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.
Figure from the V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.

Dr. Carothers, welcome. Let me begin with the broader picture: In your recent work, you challenge the “democracy-not-delivering” thesis by emphasizing elite opportunism and institutional permissiveness over socioeconomic failure. In light of current developments—from democratic strain in the United States to governance crises elsewhere—how does this shift reshape dominant explanatory frameworks, and what does it imply for the balance between structural and agency-based accounts?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: I appreciate this broad question. It’s surprising if we step back. Democratic backsliding has been spreading around the world for over 20 years, but we’re still struggling to figure out why it’s occurring. It’s interesting, and in a way surprising, that we haven’t really figured it out yet, and that there isn’t as much consensus as you might think there would be. I start with that. I think a bit of humility for all of us is in order here. If the policy community is looking to experts and saying, “Give us some answers,” I’m not sure the expert community is doing all that well, and I count myself in that.

But I would start by saying that, in a broad sense, Americans and Europeans—who have been experiencing a lot of democratic uncertainty and tremors, and in the case of the United States, some real backsliding in the last 5–10 years—are tending to take a pattern of events in their own countries and turn that into a very general explanation that I don’t think works very well in many places. What do I mean by that?

In the United States and Europe, broadly speaking, what you have seen over the last 20 years are societies where economic growth has slowed. A lot of people are angry about that, especially middle classes who don’t feel they are doing very well. At the same time, there has been significant sociocultural change in the form of immigration and broader progressive shifts across these societies. It turns out that many people are uncomfortable with that. So, many people are not happy economically, they feel quite unsettled socio-culturally, and in some cases they are opting for politicians or parties outside the mainstream, on both the right and the left. They are moving away from conventional center-left and center-right parties toward alternatives at the extremes, and that is unsettling for democracy.

But this is not a good explanation for what is happening with democratic backsliding in many other parts of the world. Let me take one case: Tanzania. Tanzania was a kind of so-so democracy in Africa—not very democratic, but not very autocratic—for a fairly long time.

Western Explanations Misread Global Democratic Decline

In the last year, however, it has undergone severe backsliding. There was an election, and people challenged the president, seeking some change. The president and her team essentially stole the election. When people protested, she cracked down in an unprecedented way. Hundreds of people were killed by security services. That is democratic backsliding. It had nothing to do with the Tanzanian middle class choosing alternatives at the extremes. They simply wanted decent reform and governance. What we see instead is a predatory power holder hanging onto power and violently suppressing dissent.

This is similar to what we see in Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega, over the last 10 years, has been challenged because he governs for the benefit of himself, his family, and a small circle of allies. When large-scale protests erupted in 2018, there was a severe crackdown—violence, repression, and more.

So, taking the American-European experience and assuming that this must be what is happening everywhere—that people are choosing the “wrong” politicians because they are unhappy with democracies not delivering—is misleading. Yes, people are unhappy in many countries, but in large parts of the world they are not choosing extremes; rather, they are choosing democratic alternatives and are not being allowed to make those choices because power holders—elites and elite agency—block them.

For this reason, I am very uncomfortable with the structure-versus-agency distinction. If we come in as analysts and say, “I think it’s mostly structure” or “I think it’s mostly agency,” we risk oversimplifying. Instead, we should take each case on its own terms, try to understand what is happening, and relax the insistence on categorizing it as one or the other. It is usually a combination of both.

Moreover, the concept of “structure” often covers a range of analytic ambiguities. Do we mean religious divisions? Immigration patterns? Social class structures? The term itself is quite vague.

In short—though I realize this is a long opening—the American-European experience is quite different from that of many other parts of the world. In those contexts, democratic backsliding often involves predatory power holders cracking down and steamrolling countervailing institutions and public protests. And the structure-versus-agency framework, in my view, is not a particularly useful way to approach such situations.

Public Protest Remains the Hardest Constraint on Elite Power

No Kings Protests.
No Kings protest in New York City, USA, October 18, 2025—demonstrators rally against authoritarian policies and corruption in Donald Trump’s administration. Photo: Dreamstime.

If democratic erosion is primarily elite-driven, how should we reconceptualize citizen agency today—especially in highly polarized societies like the US and parts of Europe—where publics may appear simultaneously mobilized, constrained, and politically fragmented?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: If we recognize the power of elites to overturn constraints on their power—which is what’s happening in a lot of places, and it startles us when it happens, say, in India—we had tended to think that the rule of law in India was pretty well established. India had a very good court system for a long time. It had a high degree of judicial independence and a judicial excellence. Of course, there is a lot at the lower levels, a lot of backlogs, and all that kind of stuff, but India was a country with pretty solid rule of law in certain ways.

However, Modi has been able to undercut that in ways that have really unsettled people in India and that they did not expect. That’s through elite agency—through structure, it’s through his determined decision-making to think, I can say this, I can do that, I can put these people here, I can defy this—that’s elite agency in action.

Given that, what we have to think is: wow, the power of elite agency in many cases is formidable. And what can stop that? What can stop that is a very strong fortification of those norms, and also people protesting when that is happening, and people saying, we won’t take this. That’s why I focus so much on protests, because when elites steamroller the different institutions, they undercut the courts, they close down the media, they strangle civil society, they go through all the independent sources of power, strangle them one by one, asphyxiate them, cut them off.

The one thing they have trouble overcoming is public protest, because it’s not really an institution they can just undercut. Now, they can, once it happens, as in Tanzania or Nicaragua, get police and security services of different types to come out, detain people, arrest them, beat them up, and kill them. Unfortunately, they can override public protest. But that is, fortunately, at least in some democracies, a line that leaders don’t cross. They don’t go that far, and protests therefore have a really powerful effect, as in Nepal or Bangladesh, where protesters were able to overcome attempts to stop them, and they pushed for some really democratic change. So elite agency—the power of it—should make us think hard about what powers can stop it, and what we can do, if we care about democracy, to try to fortify those things that can limit elite agency.

Economic Development Still Stabilizes Democracy

To what extent does ongoing backsliding in relatively affluent democracies challenge modernization theory’s assumption that economic development stabilizes democracy, particularly under conditions of cultural backlash and identity-driven politics?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: It has certainly been a surprise for many political scientists that the United States is experiencing significant backsliding. The recent V-Dem report on democracy in the world charted an 18-point decline for the United States, which is a very large drop in the last year. The Freedom House report shows only a 3-point decline, but even 3 points is quite significant in the Freedom House methodology. So, we do have the case of the United States, which raises questions about the crucial work that Adam Przeworski did—showing the relationship between the level of economic development and the absence of democratic breakdown—but I think we need to be very careful.

The United States is the only wealthy established democracy—other than perhaps Israel. By “established,” I mean a pre-1989 democracy. I am not including Hungary and Poland in that category, as they are post-1989. Among long-established democracies at a certain level of wealth, it is the only one that has experienced significant backsliding in the last 10 to 15 years.

It is true that many Europeans feel unsettled by the rise of illiberal political forces in their societies, but none of those countries is experiencing significant backsliding yet. Now, it may come—there is no question that it might. So, I do not think modernization theory, or the idea that once you reach a certain level of economic development you are bound to be more stable democratically, has been overturned by events. Rather, I think the United States is a head-scratching case as to why this is happening there. What is more interesting analytically is not to discard modernization theory, but instead to ask: what is it about the United States that is so different from all the other wealthy established democracies—Canada, Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and so on—that makes it so democratically fragile at this moment?

So, modernization theory, or at least the theory about the relationship between economic development and democracy, is still holding. However, we do have this powerful and unusual case of the United States, which requires very careful thought.

Executive Aggrandizement, Not Populism, Drives Backsliding

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

How can we analytically disentangle populism as a discursive logic from executive aggrandizement as an institutional process, especially when contemporary leaders employ formally legal mechanisms to incrementally erode democratic norms?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: Wow, there are a lot of questions here; they’re very compact. Executive aggrandizement, which is the core pattern of backsliding that we see in many places, is where an executive amasses overweening power that is able to subvert the rest of the democratic system. Executive aggrandizement is the tool by which de-democratization and greater autocratization are occurring in a whole bunch of countries. But that’s not the same as populism, and we have to be really careful here. Some of these leaders who are carrying out executive aggrandizement are populists. Hugo Chávez was such a leader—he was elected, dismantled democracy, and engaged in executive aggrandizement; he was populist to the core.

Vladimir Putin has been aggrandizing the power of the executive in Russia over the last 25 years. In my view, he is not a populist. President Putin came from within the system. A populist is someone who comes from outside the system, divides, and says, “I’m going to attack the elite; I represent the people.” President Putin was not about the people versus the elite. He was the security service rising back up and asserting its power over Russian life—hardly a populist. He rode around on a horse once with his shirt off and had a picture taken, which some Russians felt made him look pretty good. I guess you could call that a populist technique. But I hardly think of him as a populist.

President Xi in China has been carrying out executive aggrandizement by removing term limits and by attempting, for example, to bring the military under greater political control. It is classic executive aggrandizement. Again, President Xi is not someone from outside the system who is dividing the country into old elites and the new people. He is the system. He rose up—his father was a grandee—he is a very well-integrated, well-embedded part of the system.

Therefore, executive aggrandizement is a process that leaders are using, both elected leaders and non-elected leaders, as in the case of President Xi. It is a form of taking over systems that is different from military coups and from state collapse, and so forth. It is the process that is defining democratic backsliding and autocratization in many countries. It is not the same thing as populism. Some populists engage in executive aggrandizement, not all. Some figures who engage in executive aggrandizement are populist, not all. So, it is very important to keep these concepts fairly clearly separate from each other.

Deep Structural Divides Drive America’s Polarization

In the current US context—marked by renewed Trumpism, institutional contestation, and electoral polarization—should we interpret developments as a case of “backsliding from within,” or as the exposure of long-standing structural vulnerabilities in American democracy?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: That gets to the question of what constitutes a structural vulnerability. The United States has some very basic fissures in society that have long been at the root of severe episodes of polarization in American life. The country has experienced waves of extreme polarization throughout its history. The Civil War was a period of intense polarization, and the country later moved beyond it. There was less polarization afterwards. The 1930s and the New Deal were also tremendously polarizing, followed by a period of lower polarization through World War II. In the 1960s and 1970s, polarization began increasing again and has reached very high levels over the past 10 to 20 years. So, the United States has this recurrent pattern of extreme polarization.

These waves tend to be rooted in the same underlying fissures—three in particular. One is a racial divide, which has been deeply divisive, not only in Black-white terms but also in a broader sense between those who support a more inclusive society and those who prefer a less inclusive one.

Second, religion in politics. The United States is, in many ways, a fairly religious society, and there has long been debate over the role of religion in public and political life. This debate continues today and remains highly divisive. Some believe religion should play a greater role, while others advocate for a clearer separation between religion and the state.

Third, the question of federal versus state control. Should the country have a strong federal government, or should power reside primarily with the states? This debate goes back to the founding of the Republic and was deeply embedded in the Civil War. It has remained a persistent and contested issue.

So, the United States has these structures. You could describe racial realities as a structure. You could consider federal versus state power as a structure. Religion—can that be called a structure? In some sense, yes. These factors provide a foundation that is distinct from Europe, where all three are generally less pronounced as basic fissures. They help explain why the United States, unlike many European countries, has experienced recurring waves of polarization.

I think what we are seeing in the United States today is the product of the latest episode of extreme polarization. Is this due to structure or agency? As I noted, there are underlying structural features of American society that contribute to the current divisions. At the same time, elite agency is clearly playing a role. When people discuss polarization in the United States, they often point to specific political actors—this politician did this, that politician did that—as polarizing forces. So, elite agency is also part of the picture.

When Politics Turns Tribal, Democracy Suffers

To what degree does affective polarization—visible in both US and European politics—function as a permissive condition for democratic erosion, enabling citizens to tolerate or justify norm violations by co-partisan leaders?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: Affective polarization—when one side basically hates the other, doesn’t trust it, and doesn’t think it should be allowed to come to power—is no longer just “I don’t like their tax policy.” Instead, it becomes, “I think they are bad Americans and would do terrible things to the country if they came to power, and I don’t want my daughter or son marrying one of them.” Affective polarization of that type is incredibly corrosive.

Because if it is based on the idea that the people on the other side—I hate them, I don’t trust them, and I think they are going to do harm to the country if they run it—then, when an election comes along, I may say: well, the choice is between a leader who is tidy-whitey and is going to follow every democratic norm but might let the other side in, versus someone who is really strong and willing to break the dishes needed to stay in power and keep those dangerous other people out. In that case, unfortunately, people trade off democratic norms for the sake of protecting their tribe, as people like to say.

In the United States, the very distinguished political scientist at Yale University, Milan Svolik, has done fundamental work showing that under conditions of extreme polarization, people are willing to trade away democratic norms for the sake of protecting their side.

Citizen Mobilization Can Halt Democratic Backsliding

Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.

Your work suggests that protests serve both as indicators of democratic strain and as potential agents of renewal. How should we theorize this dual role in light of recent protest waves in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: At Carnegie, we run something called the Global Protest Tracker, which tries to keep track of every major anti-government protest in the world. If you go to it, you’ll see a list, and you can click on a country, and it turns out, oh, look, the Philippines just had major protests last month. Why? What were they about? And so forth. So, we’ve been watching protests very closely for a while. We’ve been running the tracker for seven years, and you learn a lot just by reading it every month.

Our researchers produce—Judy Lee, who works with us, is our main researcher on this—a tremendous memo every month analyzing the latest protests around the world. And you see that a good share of protests is about democracy. They are about citizens responding to executive overreach, often in the form of a stolen or compromised election. Sometimes they respond to attempts by a leader to remove a constitutional limit on power – “I’m going to serve a third or fourth term, no matter what the Constitution says. My ally at the Supreme Court will say that’s perfectly fine.”

So, citizens are protesting a great deal about democratic backsliding. Those protests are a sign of democratic strain, as you put it in your question, or even a sign of democratic breakdown. In many cases, they are also a major source of hope for stopping that process. They have stopped a number of efforts to extend constitutional term limits and have blocked some attempts to manipulate elections, although unfortunately not in other cases, such as Georgia or Belarus.

Protests like these reflect democratic strain, but they are also an embodiment of hope for something better. In more extreme cases, such as Bangladesh—extreme in the sense that events went very far—protesters swept out an autocratic regime and called for a return to a period when the country was at least reasonably democratic. Protests are key here. 

Of course, many protests today are driven by economic grievances—fuel prices rise, people cannot afford to feed their families, and they protest about that, understandably. But there are linkages. In many places, protests are sparked by some kind of economic or governance trigger. In Serbia, for example, a specific incident occurred—a train station roof collapse, if I recall correctly. People then took to the streets and said, “This government stinks, it ought to go—I’ve had it with this regime.” A protest that begins over a particular trigger can then snowball into a broader anti-regime movement that pushes a government out or at least tries to.

Nepal was somewhat similar—an initial spark related to a government attempt to limit access to social media platforms. People began protesting, and one thing led to another, and soon the prime minister was out.

So, protests are critical in this age—particularly in an era of hard-headed leaders dismantling many of the institutions that might otherwise constrain them. As I said before, protests are critical here.

Some Movements Make Democracy More Exclusionary

In these contexts, how can we distinguish between mobilizations that deepen democratic accountability—such as rights-based or institutional reform protests—and those that instead amplify anti-system, populist, or illiberal dynamics?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: Be careful about that distinction. You can have an anti-system protest that is quite rights-based. For example, the Serbian protests have turned into anti-system protests, but they are also based on the idea that there should be greater rights. Nepal was similar – “Don’t take away our right to access this information”—and that, too, turned into an anti-system protest.

Now, as you are alluding to, there are protests that, if you look at their goals or the issues that have stirred them up, may be quite different. There might be an anti-immigrant protest—an immigrant is involved in a crime, and people go out and protest, saying, “We hate these people who look like this or talk like this.” That is not especially good for democracy; it could shrink democracy and make it more exclusive.

Or people may protest against efforts to make vaccines widely available, arguing that they are dangerous and opposing public health policies. That could be described as rights-based in some sense, but it is probably not going to do much to further democracy in that country.

There are certainly many protests that pursue goals other than what we would consider core democratic rights. It is more a matter of looking at the cause—what people are trying to advance through the protest—and then deciding whether it is pro-democratic or whether it is pushing democracy in a more exclusive or limited direction.

Decentralization Empowers Protest but Weakens Strategy

With the growing prevalence of decentralized, leaderless movements, does organizational horizontality enhance democratic inclusivity and resilience, or does it risk weakening strategic coherence and long-term political impact?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: A lot of protest movements are what analysts like to call leaderless protests these days, and leaderless protests are often a reality in countries that are fairly repressive, where people are afraid or unable to form leadership councils or to organize in a very visible way, and so they are leaderless by necessity. Some are more leaderless; others are leaderless simply because that is how they arose. They may begin with a group of students who are very unhappy about something, and someone texts, “Let’s all meet at the square at 9 p.m.,” and people surge out and start protesting. Then someone else says, “Tomorrow at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, let’s meet here,” and it starts to grow. The protest becomes a movement, but there was no real guiding council at any point.

Because of technology that facilitates organization in many countries, this encourages a decentralization of authority within protest movements, which can make for quick, unpredictable, and, in some cases, powerful protests. But as you suggest in your question, once a protest is successful, there comes a point when demands have to be formulated. There also comes a point when negotiations with those in power become necessary, or when something must happen to focalize the discontent into a platform for specific change.

I remember Tahrir Square during the protests in Egypt and the Arab Spring. It was a surge of people. There were many civic groups involved, so it was not entirely leaderless, but there were many different actors trying to mobilize. At a certain point, the military said to the protesters, “We need to talk seriously about what is going to happen with Mubarak—we are ready to talk. With whom do we talk?”

A group of people did emerge within the protest. One of them happened to be a friend of mine, an Egyptian. I remember being in my office in Washington, picking up the phone, and it was him calling me from Cairo. He said, “I’m with a group of protesters, and we’ve been asked to go talk to the military. What should we ask for? What is our demand with respect to Mubarak?” That was the moment when I thought that what had started as a kind of leaderless protest—or a protest with many different elements—was now focalizing. The military wanted to negotiate with someone and say, “If we agree that Mubarak is going to step down and go to Sharm el-Sheikh or somewhere else, will you leave Tahrir Square and go home?” They needed to negotiate with someone.

It is hard to negotiate with a leaderless octopus. So, there is a moment when these movements have to coalesce, and then, if they are successful—as in Nepal, where the government is out—who is in charge? Something has to happen. Leaderlessness can be beneficial for a while, but then things need to move forward, and there needs to be a concretization of the movement into some form of institutionalized action and development.

How States Respond to Protest Defines Democracy

‘March for Europe’ demonstrations in support of EU integration and membership at Liberty Square in Tbilisi, Georgia, on October 20, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic.

How do different state responses—from accommodation and co-optation in liberal democracies to repression in more authoritarian settings—shape protest trajectories, and what do these patterns reveal about regime adaptability?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: There is a pretty sharp line. A protest occurs in a country; it is large, it challenges the system, and it asks for fundamental change. And here is the line: do you turn the security services on the protest and say, “We are going to detain you, arrest you, beat you up, and kill you”? Or do you say, “We are a democracy, people have rights here, and you have the right to protest, and we will talk with you and try to address your concerns so that you will go away?” At that moment, when the regime really has its back to the wall and protests are surging, do they respond with repression, or do they respond through negotiation, patience, or some other non-repressive approach? That is a defining test of whether you are in a democracy or not.

In Georgia—Georgia was a democracy for a while—protests emerged and were then fueled by the alleged stealing of elections by Georgian Dream. The political system, or the regime, began cracking down on this protest movement, detaining and arresting people and allowing a certain degree of violence. That is a sign that Georgia was moving off the democratic path and into a more repressive direction.

This is a defining moment—how protests are treated—and I pay very close attention to it. There is not always a clear threshold: sometimes three protesters are killed—is that enough? But in extreme cases like Iran, where tens of thousands appear to have been killed by security services, that is a clear sign of a profoundly repressive, anti-democratic regime in which democracy has been entirely suffocated. Georgia is suffocating its democracy. Belarus has asphyxiated and suffocated its democracy.

Whereas other countries have remained on the other side of that line. Hungary, for example, has had significant protests over the last 5–10 years. Many people are unhappy with the Fidesz government, but it has not responded with outright repression. It has taken many steps to undercut civic groups, tilt the playing field, and use state resources for party purposes. These are anti-democratic actions, but it has not turned the guns on protesters, because Hungary is still on this side of that repressive line. So that line is very fundamental to understanding the overall trajectory of a country.

Broad Mobilization Creates a Firewall Against Authoritarianism

Your research highlights the importance of civil society mobilization and opposition coordination in reversing backsliding. How do these factors interact with institutional legacies in determining whether democratic erosion can be halted or reversed?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: It relates to what I’m saying. Civil society mobilization is critical in many places, such as Brazil in 2022. Bolsonaro had been in power for four years; he was an anti-democratic leader, disrespectful of democratic norms. He sought to undercut the courts, and there were real doubts about whether he would respect an electoral outcome. Later evidence suggested that he was trying to overturn the electoral result through coup planning and so forth.

In early 2022, as elections were on the horizon, there was very broad-scale citizen mobilization. It was civic mobilization, which included a political role for established political actors, but it was civic in the sense that it brought together a broad tent of people with many different views, united around the idea that Brazil should reject an undemocratic path and pursue a democratic one. Most of those involved believed this meant voting for Lula da Silva, but it was nonetheless a civic mobilization that proved quite effective in creating a firewall against the de-democratization of Brazil.

Poland was somewhat similar before the 2023 elections. There was extensive civic mobilization, with people frustrated by the PiS government and its anti-democratic characteristics.

Civic mobilization in cases of significant backsliding is very important. In the United States, you are seeing an increasing number of protests. Recently, there was another round of the “No Kings” protests; I think up to 8 million people were involved last time. That is a significant number—about 2–3 percent of the US population—engaged in protest activity. This kind of broad-based civic mobilization is often a critical element in pushing back against democratic erosion.

Democracy Support Faces a Moment of Profound Rethink

In an international environment shaped by intensifying great-power competition, declining Western commitment, rising authoritarian influence, and intensifying geopolitical competition and conflicts such as the Iran crisis, and the global diffusion of authoritarian practices, how should democracy promotion be reimagined—does it require normative re-legitimation, institutional reinvention, or a fundamentally new model of transnational democratic support?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: International democracy support needs a lot of things. International democracy support had been struggling for 10 or 15 years in the face of democratic backsliding in the world. Backsliding was happening, and people were saying that whatever amount of democracy support we were giving—both the amount and the nature of it—was not solving the problem. Backsliding was still spreading. What we were doing was not enough, and maybe it was also not the right thing.

There was already a lot of questioning of international democracy support and then came the arrival to power of Donald Trump in January 2025. He and his team rapidly put an end to almost all US democracy aid that was directly sponsored by the government. The United States had been, by far, the largest funder of such aid in the world. It simply walked away from that field and said: no election monitoring support—we do not do that anymore; support to civic groups—we do not do that anymore; we are going to close down our public broadcasting in other places; human rights support—no, we do not do that anymore. So that was a tremendous blow to the field of international democracy support.

Unfortunately, in that same year, a number of European governments, for different reasons, also faced significant pressure on their aid budgets. There was a great deal of strain on those budgets, partly because of the need to allocate resources to support Ukraine in its war against Russia. As a result, aid budgets in Europe were tight, and 2025 was a bad year for international democracy support.

Now the field, a year on, is in a period of reassessment. My colleague Richard Youngs and I, together with Rachel Kleinfeld, are working on this issue. We published a paper last year titled What Future for International Democracy Support?, and we are preparing an updated version later this year to assess how the field is evolving.

What we are finding so far is that there is a great deal of ferment. You mentioned the need for institutional rejuvenation, normative re-legitimation, and new methods. People are actively asking these questions: what narratives should we use to describe democracy more effectively? Given the sharp decline in available aid dollars and euros, we need new forms of engagement that are more localized and more network-oriented. We need to move away from the traditional model of “the West has the answers, and the rest of the world has the problems.” Today, everyone faces challenges. How can we work on a more horizontal basis? How can we move beyond the notion of aid as a one-way process and instead recognize that we are all confronting shared difficulties?

There is a great deal happening in the field, but it is constrained by limited resources. It is on the back foot and still in a state of shock after developments over the past year or two. Many people are out of work, many are frustrated, and many are disappointed. The field is therefore in a period of reconsolidation.

At the same time, it is not disappearing. Many organizations and democratic governments still want to support democracy beyond their borders. There are also regional organizations in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and elsewhere that maintain pro-democratic norms. There are multilateral institutions at the global level that remain engaged, as well as numerous international non-governmental organizations. So, there is still a substantial international democracy support community, but it is undergoing a profound process of rethinking and reorientation.

Democratic Backsliding Has Slowed—but Risks Remain

Protesters protest for the freedom of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, Brazil on April 7, 2019. Photo: Cris Faga.

And lastly, Dr. Carothers, looking ahead, given the coexistence of democratic erosion, persistent polarization, and emerging forms of resistance, do you foresee a trajectory of continued democratic decline, adaptive resilience, or the emergence of a new equilibrium of “contested democracy” in the coming decade?

Dr. Thomas Carothers: That last question of yours is common in the final questions that I get, which are basically, you’re walking across a bridge as a democracy specialist—do you jump off into the river in despair, or do you keep walking and think, we’ll probably come through this? But you put it much more elegantly than I just did.

I think over the last 5 to 7 years, the rapid wave of backsliding has slowed somewhat. There is still a lot of backsliding occurring, but there are also a number of countries where guardrails have been holding up. Brazil was an important case of that in 2022–23. One could name many others. Senegal managed to withstand a fairly concerted attack on its democratic institutions by its president in the last couple of years. The Philippines came out of the Duterte period. The successor leader is not the world’s most democratic leader, but he is not Duterte. Bangladesh is undergoing some kind of renovation. Bolivia came through a period in which the government was trying to undercut democratic norms and institutions. So, there are many countries where democracy is holding up.

I was in a conversation the other day with the research director at Freedom House, who made the important observation that about three-quarters of the countries in the world do not change their democratic status year in, year out. We tend to think, it’s like our phone, where every app is jiggling and moving around. The world is not really like that. There is actually a fair amount of stability, and the number of cases that are moving rapidly in one direction or the other is quite small. So, I’m walking across the bridge—I’m not jumping off—but, it’s going to be difficult.