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ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 1: From Grievance to Radicalization — Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 1: From Grievance to Radicalization — Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00149

 

This panel offered a concise yet conceptually rich account of how contemporary populism transforms diffuse grievances into structured political radicalization. Bridging discourse analysis, religious studies, international political economy, and historical sociology, the discussion illuminated the multi-layered processes through which democratic erosion unfolds. Rather than locating the problem solely within institutional decline, the panel foregrounded the interplay of rhetoric, identity, and emotional mobilization—particularly the roles of humiliation, status anxiety, and perceived loss of recognition. Contributions by Professors Ruth Wodak, Julie Ingersoll, Stephan Klingebiel, and Benjamin Carter Hett collectively demonstrated that populist dynamics are sustained by both narrative construction and structural change. The session thus advanced a nuanced analytical framework for understanding how anti-pluralist politics emerge, normalize, and gain legitimacy across diverse contexts.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel 1 of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, titled “From Grievance to Radicalization: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism,” offered a rich and interdisciplinary examination of how discontent is translated into exclusionary politics, institutional erosion, and authoritarian opportunity. Bringing together perspectives from discourse studies, religious studies, development policy, and modern history, the panel explored the pathways through which grievance is narrated, organized, and mobilized across national and transnational contexts. Although the presentations addressed distinct empirical terrains—from far-right rhetoric in Europe and Christian nationalism in the United States to multilateral institutions and the lessons of Weimar Germany—they converged around a shared concern: democratic decline rarely emerges suddenly, but is prepared through the cumulative interaction of ideas, identities, institutions, and political strategies.

Moderated by Professor Ibrahim Ozturk, the session unfolded as a tightly connected conversation on the mechanisms through which populist and far-right forces gain traction in moments of social unease and political dislocation. A central strength of the panel lay in its refusal to treat populism as a singular or self-explanatory phenomenon. Instead, the speakers unpacked the rhetorical, ideological, emotional, and institutional infrastructures that enable anti-pluralist politics to flourish. 

Professor Ruth Wodak showed how democratic norms are eroded through discourse, provocation, and the normalization of exclusionary language. Professor Julie Ingersoll demonstrated how theocratic and anti-democratic religious movements, though internally diverse, have strategically converged to influence contemporary American politics. Professor Stephan Klingebiel widened the frame to the international level, showing how populist governance affects not only domestic politics but also the normative foundations of multilateral cooperation. Professor Benjamin Carter Hett, drawing on the history of late Weimar Germany, highlighted humiliation and status anxiety as powerful emotional drivers of anti-system politics, offering a historically grounded lens for understanding present-day grievance mobilization.

Taken together, the panel made clear that contemporary democratic crises cannot be understood through institutional analysis alone. What emerged instead was a layered account in which fear, humiliation, identity, ideology, and strategic communication are inseparable from formal political change. The subsequent discussion deepened these insights further, linking personal experience, comparative reflection, and normative concerns in ways that reinforced the panel’s interdisciplinary value.

In this sense, Panel 1 did more than diagnose the current moment. It established an intellectual framework for thinking about how democratic erosion is prepared, legitimized, and accelerated across multiple arenas. By tracing the movement from grievance to radicalization, the session illuminated not only the fragility of democratic norms, but also the urgency of confronting the political, cultural, and institutional conditions that allow authoritarian and exclusionary projects to take root.

 

Professor Ruth Wodak: ‘Driving On the Right’: Analyzing Far-Right Rhetoric.

Professor Ruth Wodak is Emerita Distinguished Professor of Discourse Studies at Lancaster University, affiliated with the University of Vienna, and a member of the ECPS Advisory Board.

Professor Ruth Wodak’s presentation offered a theoretically grounded and empirically attentive exploration of how democratic erosion unfolds through discourse, rhetoric, and the gradual normalization of exclusionary politics. As the first speaker of the panel, Professor Wodak set a reflective and analytically rigorous tone by anchoring her remarks in a historical insight from John Dewey. Quoting his 1931 warning that democracy becomes a farce when citizens are not equipped to think critically and recognize propaganda, she established a conceptual bridge between past and present. While acknowledging that historical analogies must be handled with caution, she argued that certain patterns—particularly the weakening of critical judgment and the manipulation of public discourse—remain deeply relevant for understanding contemporary political developments.

Building on this premise, Professor Wodak turned to the identification of observable criteria that signal when democracies are under threat. Drawing in part on recent analytical frameworks and public debates, she outlined a series of interrelated developments that characterize processes of autocratization. These included attacks on freedom of expression, the systematic defamation or marginalization of political opponents, pressures on judicial independence, and the potential use of emergency powers to bypass institutional constraints. Additional indicators encompassed the gradual discrimination of minorities, the erosion of press freedom, the undermining of academic and scientific autonomy, the emergence of personality cults, the spread of corruption and kleptocratic practices, and the strategic redesign of legal and electoral frameworks to consolidate power.

The Politics of Shameless Normalization

A central emphasis of her argument was that these developments rarely appear in their most extreme form at the outset. Rather, they emerge incrementally, as part of a cumulative and often normalized process. Each step, while perhaps appearing limited or defensible in isolation, contributes to a broader trajectory in which democratic norms are steadily weakened. This step-by-step dynamic, she suggested, is crucial for understanding why democratic backsliding can advance without triggering immediate resistance.

The core of Professor Wodak’s presentation focused on the linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms that facilitate this gradual transformation. At the center of her analysis was the concept of “shameless normalization,” which she has developed extensively in her work. This refers to a process through which the boundaries of what is publicly acceptable are progressively expanded. Statements, ideas, and attitudes that were previously considered taboo or beyond the limits of legitimate discourse are reintroduced, repeated, and ultimately rendered acceptable. Political actors present themselves as articulating what “ordinary people” supposedly think but have been unable or unwilling to express, thereby framing transgressive speech as a form of authenticity.

Professor Wodak highlighted that this process is often driven by continuous provocation. By deliberately testing and crossing normative boundaries, political actors can shift the parameters of public debate. Over time, what initially appears shocking or unacceptable becomes familiar and normalized. This strategy, she argued, is particularly effective when it is reinforced by broader political dynamics, including the willingness of mainstream actors to adopt or adapt elements of far-right discourse.

Importantly, she emphasized that normalization does not always take an overtly aggressive or confrontational form. Alongside provocation, one also encounters what she termed “coarse civility,” a mode of communication in which exclusionary or discriminatory ideas are presented in a seemingly moderate, polite, or technocratic language. This rhetorical softening allows such ideas to circulate more widely and gain legitimacy, especially when they are taken up by mainstream conservative parties. In this way, the normalization of far-right discourse often proceeds not only through radicalization at the margins, but through incorporation at the center.

To illustrate these dynamics, Professor Wodak drew on examples from Austrian politics. She traced the trajectory of a slogan originally used by a far-right politician in the 1980s, which emphasized speaking “the language of the people.” Over time, this slogan was adopted by a mainstream conservative leader and subsequently reappropriated by the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ). This example demonstrated how political language travels across ideological boundaries, shedding its original stigma and becoming part of a broader repertoire of acceptable discourse. Such processes, she argued, reveal how the mainstreaming of far-right ideas occurs through repetition, adaptation, and gradual legitimation.

Euphemism and Power: Sanitizing Coercion in Democratic Politics

In the final part of her presentation, Professor Wodak turned to the role of euphemism in shaping public perceptions of policy. Drawing on contemporary European debates on migration and asylum, she showed how practices such as detention are reframed through sanitized terminology, including phrases like “waiting zones” or “closed control access centers.” These linguistic choices, she argued, obscure the coercive nature of such measures and render them more palatable to the public. In this sense, language functions not merely as a descriptive tool, but as a mechanism that shapes what can be politically imagined and justified.

Professor Wodak concluded by synthesizing the broader implications of her analysis. Shameless normalization, she argued, performs multiple functions: it constructs a sense of authenticity, rejects the norms of rational deliberation, fosters identification between political leaders and “the people,” and diverts attention through provocation and scandalization. Most significantly, it facilitates the implementation of exclusionary and anti-democratic policies by embedding them within mainstream political discourse.

Her presentation thus underscored that democratic erosion is not only an institutional or legal process, but also a profoundly discursive one. The weakening of democracy occurs through shifts in language, norms, and public sensibilities, often long before formal institutional breakdown becomes visible. By foregrounding the role of rhetoric and normalization, Professor Wodak provided a compelling framework for understanding how contemporary democracies are challenged from within, and why resisting such processes requires not only institutional safeguards but also sustained critical engagement with political language and discourse.

 

Professor Julie Ingersoll: The Theocratic Blueprint of Christian Nationalism, Reconstructionism, the New Apostolic Reformation, and Catholic Integralism Behind Trump’s Agenda

Julie Ingersoll is Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies and Religious Studies Program Coordinator at the University of North Florida.

Professor Julie Ingersoll’s presentation offered a detailed and analytically nuanced account of the ideological and organizational foundations of contemporary Christian nationalism in the United States, situating it as a significant—though not singular—driver of democratic erosion. Her intervention moved beyond surface-level interpretations of religion in politics, instead tracing the historical formation, internal diversity, and strategic convergence of several distinct religious currents that have, over time, coalesced into a politically influential coalition aligned with authoritarian and anti-pluralist tendencies.

Professor Ingersoll began by clarifying a crucial analytical point: Christian nationalism in the United States is not a monolithic or representative expression of Christianity as a whole. Rather, it is a minority movement whose political influence far exceeds its demographic weight. This disproportionate power, she argued, is the product of decades-long institutional work, coalition-building, and strategic positioning within key domains of political and cultural life. Understanding its impact, therefore, requires attention not only to its beliefs but to the mechanisms through which it has embedded itself within broader structures of authority.

Three Strands, One Project: The Convergence of Christian Nationalism

At the core of her analysis was the identification of three principal strands that together constitute contemporary Christian nationalism: a white conservative evangelical tradition rooted in Christian Reconstructionism, a Catholic integralist tradition, and a Pentecostal-charismatic current associated with the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR). Each of these strands, Professor Ingersoll demonstrated, has its own theological foundations, historical trajectories, and internal logics. Yet, despite significant doctrinal differences, they have converged around shared political objectives and a common perception of existential crisis.

The first strand, Christian Reconstructionism, was presented as a theocratic and patriarchal movement with origins in mid-twentieth-century American religious thought and deeper roots in earlier Southern Presbyterian traditions. Professor Ingersoll emphasized its rejection of pluralism and its insistence that biblical law should govern all aspects of social and political life. Central to this framework is the concept of “calling,” derived from Calvinist theology, which legitimizes hierarchical social arrangements and challenges the democratic principle that authority derives from popular consent. In this view, leadership is not conferred through elections but through divine designation, a premise that fundamentally undermines democratic legitimacy.

The second strand, Catholic integralism, similarly rejects the separation of church and state, advocating instead for a political order grounded in religious authority. Professor Ingersoll noted its growing influence within legal and judicial institutions, particularly through long-term efforts to shape the composition and orientation of the judiciary. Integralist thought, she argued, frames modern liberal institutions—especially those promoting equality—as sources of moral and social decay. Its critique of the administrative state and its support for a strong, centralized executive authority align closely with broader authoritarian tendencies.

The third strand, the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR), introduces a distinct but complementary dimension rooted in charismatic and Pentecostal traditions. This movement emphasizes ongoing revelation, spiritual warfare, and apocalyptic expectation. Its doctrine of the “Seven Mountains Mandate” envisions the systematic transformation of key societal domains—such as government, media, education, and culture—under Christian authority. Professor Ingersoll highlighted the movement’s belief in the active presence of spiritual forces in contemporary political life, a worldview that intensifies polarization and, in some cases, increases the potential for legitimizing conflict and even violence.

Political Convergence in Religious Movements

A central analytical contribution of the presentation lay in explaining how these three strands, despite profound theological disagreements, have formed a cohesive political alliance. Professor Ingersoll challenged the conventional “world religions” model, which treats religious traditions as internally coherent and mutually distinct systems. Instead, she proposed a more fluid understanding of religion as a set of practices and narratives that can be selectively combined to serve social and political purposes. In this framework, doctrinal inconsistencies are less significant than shared goals related to power, identity, and social ordering.

To illustrate this point, she examined differing approaches to biblical authority across the three traditions. While Catholic integralists rely on the interpretive authority of the Church, evangelicals emphasize direct textual interpretation, and Pentecostal-charismatic actors embrace ongoing revelation. These differences, while substantial, are subordinated in practice to a set of shared political commitments: the rejection of pluralism, the affirmation of hierarchical social structures, the belief in divinely ordained leadership, and the pursuit of a theocratic or quasi-theocratic order.

Professor Ingersoll further argued that these movements are united by a common narrative of civilizational crisis. Each interprets contemporary social and political developments—whether related to gender equality, racial justice, or secular governance—as evidence of moral decline. This sense of crisis provides both a justification for radical political intervention and a framework for mobilizing supporters. Within this narrative, democratic institutions are often portrayed not as safeguards of freedom, but as obstacles to the restoration of a divinely sanctioned social order.

Internal Tensions within Christian Nationalism

The presentation also addressed the strategic flexibility of this coalition. While its proponents may utilize democratic mechanisms to gain power, they do not view democracy as intrinsically valuable. Rather, democracy is treated instrumentally, as one possible means of achieving a broader objective. Authoritarian or hierarchical forms of governance are equally acceptable if they are perceived to align with divine authority. This instrumental view of democracy, Professor Ingersoll suggested, represents a fundamental challenge to liberal democratic norms.

In her concluding remarks, Professor Ingersoll pointed to emerging internal tensions within the movement. Differences in theological interpretation, strategic priorities, and leadership styles are beginning to generate visible fractures. For example, divergent understandings of apocalyptic timelines or the role of political violence create points of friction. Additionally, certain political developments—such as controversial leadership claims or symbolic actions—have alienated segments within the coalition. While these divisions do not currently outweigh the movement’s shared objectives, they may become more significant over time.

In sum, Professor Ingersoll’s presentation provided a comprehensive and deeply contextualized analysis of Christian nationalism as a complex, evolving, and strategically coordinated force. By highlighting its internal diversity, institutional entrenchment, and ideological coherence around anti-pluralist principles, she illuminated the ways in which religious narratives and political power intersect in contemporary democratic backsliding. Her analysis underscored that the challenge posed by such movements is not merely theological or cultural, but fundamentally political, with direct implications for the future of democratic governance.

 

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: International Organizations in Times of Populism

Professor Stephan Klingebiel is Head of the Department of Inter- and Transnational Cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Professor Stephan Klingebiel delivered a wide-ranging and analytically grounded presentation examining how the contemporary rise of populism—particularly under the second administration of Donald Trump—is reshaping international organizations, development cooperation, and the normative foundations of global governance. His intervention moved carefully between institutional analysis and broader systemic implications, offering both empirical observations and conceptual framing.

At the outset, Professor Klingebiel positioned his remarks at the intersection of two overlapping domains: the functioning of international organizations and the evolving discourse on development and sustainability. He focused especially on the United Nations Development System, the OECD, and multilateral development banks such as the World Bank. These institutions, he argued, serve not only operational roles in development assistance but also act as key norm-setters in shaping global cooperation. It is precisely these normative and institutional roles that have come under increasing pressure in the current political climate.

From Multilateralism to Uncertainty

Reflecting on developments since early 2025, Professor Klingebiel suggested that the treatment of development cooperation—particularly the dismantling of USAID—served as an early signal of broader patterns in the second Trump administration’s approach to international engagement. What initially appeared as a sector-specific shift quickly revealed itself as part of a more comprehensive reorientation affecting multilateralism as a whole.

To explain these dynamics, Professor Klingebiel identified four interrelated driving logics. First, he pointed to what he termed “crude transactionalism,” a form of foreign policy that reduces international cooperation to immediate, bilateral exchanges rather than long-term institutional commitments. While transactional approaches have long existed in development policy, he argued that the current form is qualitatively different in its intensity and scope, extending into areas such as conflict mediation and geopolitical bargaining.

Second, he highlighted the role of ideological motivations, particularly in relation to issues such as family planning, gender policy, and population governance. Certain international agencies, including those working on reproductive health, have become focal points of contestation, reflecting deeper ideological divides over the scope and purpose of development cooperation.

Third, Professor Klingebiel emphasized the element of institutional disruption driven not by coherent strategy but by what he described as systemic unpredictability. Drawing on insider accounts of the dismantling of USAID, he suggested that many policy decisions appear to lack a consistent strategic foundation, instead reflecting fragmented and reactive processes.

Finally, he identified an “obsession with disruption” as a defining feature of the current approach. This involves the deliberate use of abrupt and highly visible actions—such as withdrawal announcements or dramatic policy shifts—to reshape expectations and unsettle established practices within international cooperation.

Populism and the Fragmentation of Global Cooperation

These underlying logics have translated into a series of concrete policy outcomes. Among the most striking is the dramatic reduction in US foreign aid, which, according to recent OECD data, declined by approximately 57 percent within a single year. Such a contraction, Professor Klingebiel noted, has profound implications not only for recipient countries but also for the broader ecosystem of development actors, including civil society organizations and democracy-support initiatives.

Equally significant is the announced withdrawal from dozens of international bodies. While the practical implementation of these withdrawals remains uneven, their symbolic impact is considerable. They signal a retreat from multilateral engagement and contribute to an atmosphere of uncertainty regarding the future of global cooperation.

However, Professor Klingebiel’s central concern extended beyond these immediate policy shifts to their deeper normative consequences. He argued that the most consequential impact of contemporary populism lies in its erosion of shared frameworks that have historically underpinned international cooperation. These include not only formal institutions but also the implicit agreements on language, priorities, and goals that enable collective action.

This erosion was illustrated through the example of the United Nations 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Once widely accepted as a minimal global consensus on issues such as poverty reduction, inequality, and gender equality, this framework is now increasingly contested. Professor Klingebiel noted that it has been reframed by some political actors as a form of “soft global governance” incompatible with national sovereignty, leading to active efforts to undermine it.

Fragmented Vocabulary, Fragmented Order

A particularly revealing dimension of this shift is the politicization of language itself. Drawing on recent analyses, Professor Klingebiel described how specific terms—such as “gender,” “gender-based violence,” and “climate change”—have become sites of contestation within international forums. The rejection of these terms is not merely semantic; it reflects a broader attempt to reshape the normative boundaries of acceptable discourse. In practice, this has led to subtle but significant changes, with institutions adopting alternative terminology that dilutes or reframes established concepts.

This process, he argued, contributes to a broader fragmentation of normative consensus. Where international cooperation once relied on a shared vocabulary and a baseline agreement on goals, it now operates within an increasingly contested and politicized environment. This fragmentation is further intensified by the emergence of competing visions of world order, in which different actors promote alternative frameworks for development and governance.

At the same time, Professor Klingebiel cautioned against attributing these transformations solely to Western populism. He emphasized the growing agency of actors in what is often termed the Global South, including countries such as China and India, as well as smaller states that increasingly pursue multi-alignment strategies. These actors are not merely passive recipients of global norms but active participants in shaping them, contributing to a more complex and pluralistic international landscape.

Within this evolving context, development cooperation itself is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Rather than serving primarily as a tool for poverty reduction or social development, it is increasingly embedded within geopolitical and geo-economic competition. Institutions originally designed for development purposes are being repurposed to secure access to strategic resources or to advance national interests.

Pockets of Cooperation: Uneven Continuity in Global Governance

Despite this challenging environment, Professor Klingebiel identified areas of cautious optimism. He pointed to the emergence of what he termed “mixed coalitions”—alliances that bring together actors from both the Global North and South who remain committed to multilateralism. Additionally, he highlighted the existence of “pockets of effectiveness,” instances in which international cooperation continues to function successfully despite broader systemic pressures.

These pockets, while limited, suggest that multilateralism is not uniformly in decline but rather unevenly contested. Understanding the conditions under which cooperation remains viable, Professor Klingebiel suggested, may offer valuable insights for sustaining and rebuilding international frameworks in the future.

In concluding, his presentation offered a sober but nuanced assessment. The current moment is marked not only by policy shifts but by a deeper transformation of the principles and assumptions that have long guided international cooperation. Yet within this transformation, there remain spaces for adaptation, coalition-building, and renewed engagement—provided that these efforts are grounded in a clear understanding of the changing landscape.

 

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett: Humiliation, Elite Impunity, and the Anti-System Gamble — Weimar-Type Mechanisms in Contemporary Grievance Politics

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett.
Professor Benjamin Carter Hett is a leading historian of Nazi Germany at Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY.

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett’s presentation offered a historically grounded and analytically provocative reflection on the political mechanisms that enabled the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism, while also considering the relevance of those mechanisms for contemporary grievance politics. Drawing on decades of research into late Weimar Germany, Professor Hett approached the subject with both scholarly caution and interpretive clarity. He was careful not to collapse historical contexts into one another, yet he argued that certain recurring dynamics—particularly humiliation, status anxiety, and the search for anti-system solutions—remain crucial for understanding how democratic orders become vulnerable to authoritarian appeals.

Professor Hett began by acknowledging the uneasy position of the historian in conversations about the present. Historians, he suggested, may at times reconstruct the past with care, but they are not necessarily the best guides to contemporary politics or future developments. Nonetheless, his long engagement with the final years of the Weimar Republic had led him to a set of conclusions about why that democracy failed, and these conclusions, he argued, may still offer insight into current political developments.

Humiliation and Status Anxiety

The core of Professor Hett’s argument was that the Nazi breakthrough in Germany cannot be fully understood simply through economic distress, institutional weakness, or generalized political radicalization. While all of these factors mattered, he emphasized that the message which most powerfully resonated with Nazi voters was a message organized around humiliation and its close companion, status anxiety. The emotional and symbolic dimensions of political life, in his reading, were central. What drove substantial sectors of the electorate toward the Nazis was not only hardship, but the belief that they had been dishonored, displaced, and stripped of their rightful standing.

To develop this claim, Professor Hett drew on voting studies, especially the work of German political scientist Jürgen W. Falter, whose statistical analyses remain among the most important accounts of Nazi electoral support. Since Germany in the late 1920s and early 1930s did not have opinion polling in the modern sense, scholars must reconstruct political behavior by examining constituency-level voting patterns and comparing them with the themes emphasized in Nazi campaigning. This allows one to identify which messages resonated with which groups, and why.

From this evidence, Professor Hett argued that Nazi appeals found their strongest reception among those constituencies most susceptible to humiliation and fears of status loss. These were particularly concentrated among Protestant middle-class voters, especially in rural northern and eastern Germany. The Nazi Party’s success, in his account, lay in its ability to transform diffuse anxieties into a coherent political narrative: Germany was being humiliated by external forces, weakened by internal enemies, and betrayed by a democratic system incapable of defending national dignity.

A major source of this humiliation, he suggested, was Germany’s place in the post-World War I international order. The Treaty of Versailles, reparations, the international oversight of German finance, and the constraints imposed on national sovereignty created a pervasive sense that Germany had lost control over its own destiny. Economic arrangements linked to reparations, including the role of international banking mechanisms and the subordination of German monetary policy to Allied preferences, reinforced this sense of national dependency. What later generations might describe as resentment toward globalization, Professor Hett argued, already had clear political expression in this period, even if the term itself was not yet available.

Seeds of Nazi Mobilization

This resentment was especially powerful in the countryside. Reduced tariffs and intensified agricultural competition placed heavy pressure on German farmers, especially in the north and east, where farm bankruptcies became common. At the same time, Germany’s limited ability to control its eastern border, particularly with newly established Poland, turned migration and refugee flows into volatile political issues. These developments fed the perception that the democratic state was either unwilling or unable to defend the nation’s interests. The Nazis capitalized on precisely these grievances, presenting themselves as nationalist champions against foreign domination, financial dependency, border insecurity, and economic dislocation.

Professor Hett also introduced a second, equally important dimension of humiliation: the perceived loss of religious and cultural status among German Protestants. Here his analysis intersected with broader questions of identity and belonging. Before World War I, Protestantism had enjoyed a privileged position within the German Empire. But the Weimar Republic, in the eyes of many Protestants, appeared to be politically shaped by forces outside that tradition. Its principal architects and defenders included Social Democrats, Catholics, and the Jewish legal scholar Hugo Preuss, who played a major role in drafting the constitution.

For many Protestants, Professor Hett argued, this generated a deep sense of displacement. They experienced the new order not merely as politically different, but as a system in which they had lost social and moral primacy. In electoral terms, this proved crucial. Catholics largely did not vote Nazi, in part because they had a confessional political home within the Center Party and did not feel comparably estranged from the Weimar system. Nor did the industrial working-class core of the Social Democrats move en masse toward the Nazis. The party that the Nazis most successfully destroyed, Professor Hett observed, was the Protestant middle class. In this sense, National Socialism became, to a significant degree, the party of aggrieved Protestant respectability.

This reading also enabled Professor Hett to place Weimar Germany within a broader comparative pattern. Across the authoritarian turn of the 1920s and 1930s, humiliation appeared repeatedly as a politically generative force. Citing the work of historian Robert Paxton, he noted that the rise of fascist or authoritarian systems correlated strongly with defeat in World War I—or, in some cases, with a perceived defeat. Italy, for example, had technically emerged from the war on the victorious side, yet many Italians experienced the outcome as a “mutilated victory,” a phrase that captured their sense of insult and dispossession. Authoritarian politics fed on that perception.

Global Echoes: From MAGA to European Anti-Globalization Movements

Having established these historical mechanisms, Professor Hett turned more tentatively to the present. Here he stressed again that analogies must remain cautious, yet he argued that the politics of humiliation and status anxiety are clearly visible in contemporary democracies, especially in the United States. In his view, these dynamics are among the strongest factors behind support for Donald Trump. Trump’s appeal, he suggested, has been rooted not simply in policy commitments or ideological clarity, but in the promise of retribution for those who feel displaced by social and demographic change.

The rhetoric of “I am your retribution,” which Trump used in the 2024 campaign, was especially telling in this regard. Retribution for what, Professor Hett asked implicitly, if not for a perceived historical loss of primacy? The contemporary politics of race, migration, and hostility to diversity initiatives were, in his interpretation, best understood as efforts to reassure a predominantly white constituency that feels that others have unjustly advanced at its expense. The appeal to a mythologized past—captured in slogans such as “Make America Great Again”—functions not simply as nostalgia, but as a restoration narrative aimed at those who believe they have been humiliated by modern equality.

Professor Hett then broadened the frame to Europe. Anti-globalization sentiment, he argued, has played a comparable role in the rise of populist and authoritarian parties across the continent. The Brexit vote, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and wider resentment toward migration all reflect forms of status anxiety tied to the belief that one’s country is becoming “someone else’s country.” In the German case, he pointed especially to eastern Germany, where support for the far right remains heavily concentrated. Drawing on personal observations as well as broader political patterns, he described a durable sense among many East Germans that they have been serially humiliated since reunification.

From Status Loss to Authoritarian Opportunity

These feelings, he suggested, are not reducible to economics alone. They involve wounded dignity, symbolic exclusion, and the perception that one’s world has been politically and culturally devalued. In this sense, grievance politics becomes especially potent when it can link structural change to a narrative of dishonor.

Professor Hett concluded by suggesting, modestly, that if humiliation and status anxiety are indeed major drivers of anti-system politics, then effective democratic responses must address the material and symbolic conditions that sustain them. He mentioned the idea of a kind of “Marshall Plan 2.0” as one possible way of mitigating some of the economic transformations that deepen discontent. Yet he remained cautious about prescribing solutions beyond his field of expertise.

What his presentation offered most powerfully was not a simple warning from history, but a historically informed framework for thinking about how democracies are undone. By centering humiliation, elite impunity, and status loss, Professor Hett illuminated the emotional structure of grievance politics and the ways in which anti-system actors transform wounded identities into authoritarian opportunity.

 

Discussions

The Q&A session following the first panel unfolded as a reflective and deeply engaged exchange, bringing together personal testimony, empirical insight, and conceptual debate. The discussion not only reinforced several core arguments presented earlier—particularly those concerning humiliation, status anxiety, and democratic erosion—but also broadened the analytical frame by introducing additional variables, including pandemic effects, structural inequality, and adaptive institutional responses.

Irina von Wiese opened the exchange with a personal intervention that lent lived texture to the abstract dynamics discussed by Professor Benjamin Carter Hett. Drawing on her own experience as a West German working in eastern Germany immediately after reunification, she offered a candid account of the asymmetries that characterized that moment. As a young legal advisor involved in constitutional development in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, she observed what she described as a pervasive arrogance among West German professionals toward their East German counterparts—many of whom had endured political repression but lacked formal credentials. This imbalance, she suggested, generated a reservoir of resentment that remained latent for decades before finding political expression.

Her reflections underscored a central theme in Professor Hett’s analysis: that humiliation is not always immediate in its political effects, but can endure, accumulate, and eventually crystallize into protest or support for anti-system actors. Von Wiese noted that the eventual rise of far-right mobilization in eastern Germany was not sudden, but rather the delayed outcome of long-standing grievances awaiting political articulation. In this sense, the emergence of parties such as the far right can be seen less as the origin of discontent than as its vehicle.

Extending her argument beyond Germany, von Wiese pointed to similar dynamics in other contexts, including her experiences in the United States and the United Kingdom. She recalled the stark social contrasts she encountered outside elite academic environments in the United States during the early 1990s, particularly in relation to poverty and racial segregation. These conditions, she argued, formed part of the underlying landscape that later enabled figures like Donald Trump to mobilize political support. Likewise, she interpreted the Brexit campaign as deeply rooted in narratives of national decline and loss of status, with appeals to a diminished imperial past serving as a powerful emotional driver.

While affirming the explanatory value of humiliation and status anxiety, von Wiese also raised a critical question regarding remedies. She expressed skepticism about whether economic interventions alone—such as a modern “Marshall Plan”—would suffice, suggesting that deeper systemic transformations may be required, particularly in relation to inequality and the structure of contemporary capitalism. Her intervention thus shifted the discussion from diagnosis to the more difficult terrain of response.

The Multi-Dimensional Nature of Democratic Backsliding

Professor Ruth Wodak followed by situating the panel within a broader interdisciplinary framework. She emphasized the importance of integrating multiple analytical perspectives in order to grasp the complexity of contemporary democratic challenges. While acknowledging the relevance of Professor Hett’s emphasis on humiliation and recognition, she cautioned against overly singular explanations. In her view, democratic backsliding and far-right mobilization are multi-causal phenomena that cannot be reduced to a single driver.

Professor Wodak introduced two additional factors that she argued deserve greater attention. The first was the long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. She suggested that the pandemic generated widespread fear and uncertainty on a global scale, creating fertile ground for both authoritarian narratives and renewed forms of religiosity. Drawing on sociological insights, she noted that periods of existential anxiety often lead individuals to seek stability in identity-based frameworks, including religion, while also increasing susceptibility to aggression and polarization. In this sense, the pandemic may have functioned as an accelerant in the latest phase of far-right mobilization.

The second factor she highlighted was what might be termed anticipatory anxiety. While Professor Hett’s framework emphasizes the experience of humiliation and loss, Professor Wodak pointed to cases where far-right support is strongest not among the most economically deprived, but in relatively affluent societies. Citing examples such as Austria, Switzerland, and Denmark, she observed that high levels of prosperity have not prevented the rise of far-right parties. Instead, she suggested, these contexts are characterized by a fear of losing existing advantages—a forward-looking anxiety rather than a retrospective grievance. This introduces a subtle but important distinction: the politics of resentment may be driven as much by perceived future decline as by past injustice.

Turning to the question of institutional response, Professor Wodak engaged with the earlier presentation by Professor Stephan Klingebiel on the politicization of development discourse. She noted that while certain policy areas—such as gender and climate—have become targets of political contestation, actors within international organizations have begun to develop adaptive strategies. One such strategy involves reframing or relabeling projects in order to avoid triggering ideological opposition, while continuing substantive work under different terminology. This form of quiet institutional resilience, she suggested, illustrates how bureaucratic actors may navigate hostile political environments without abandoning core objectives.

At the same time, Professor Wodak did not understate the severity of recent developments, particularly the dismantling of major development institutions and the reduction of aid flows. She highlighted the moral and human consequences of such policies, noting the stark contradiction between global wealth concentration and the withdrawal of support for the world’s most vulnerable populations. Her remarks conveyed both analytical concern and normative urgency.

Explaining Religious-Political Convergence

The Q&A session continued with a focused exchange between Dr. Bulent Kenes, and Professor Julie Ingersoll, centering on the timing and recent consolidation of religiously driven political movements in the United States. The question probed a central puzzle emerging from the panel: while religious actors have long played a role in American public life, why have certain strands of Christian nationalism reached a new peak of visibility and influence at this particular historical juncture?

In posing the question, Dr. Kenes framed the issue as one of convergence. He invited Professor Ingersoll to reflect on whether the current moment could be explained by the interaction of structural and contingent factors—demographic change, economic insecurity, intensifying political polarization, and the strategic mobilization of religious networks within populist movements. His formulation implicitly shifted the discussion from historical description to causal explanation, asking not simply what these movements are, but why their influence has crystallized now.

In her response, Professor Ingersoll offered a careful recalibration of the premise. She challenged the assumption that these religious formations have always existed in their present form, emphasizing instead their relatively recent consolidation. While acknowledging that certain traditions—particularly Catholic political engagement—have deep historical roots, she argued that the specific configurations associated with contemporary Christian nationalism represent a more recent development. These movements, in her account, should not be understood as continuous extensions of longstanding traditions, but as new iterations shaped by decades of strategic organization.

A central element of her explanation was the long-term institutional work undertaken by groups such as the Christian Reconstructionists. Over several decades, these actors invested in building parallel educational infrastructures, including private Christian school networks that later evolved into homeschooling systems. These institutions did more than provide alternative education; they cultivated generational continuity, transmitting a distinct worldview and historical narrative that diverged from mainstream interpretations. This process, Professor Ingersoll suggested, has created a durable social base capable of sustaining and amplifying political influence.

Importantly, she situated the expansion of these networks within a specific historical context: the desegregation of public schools. The timing was consequential. As integration policies reshaped the public education system, segments of white evangelical communities withdrew into private and religious schooling structures. While often framed in theological terms, this shift also intersected with broader social and racial dynamics, allowing communities to maintain separation while articulating their choices through religious language. Over time, these parallel institutions became key sites of ideological formation.

Professor Ingersoll also pointed to more recent catalysts, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic. Echoing earlier remarks in the panel, she argued that the pandemic functioned as a moment of intensified mobilization. Religious actors capitalized on widespread uncertainty and fear, framing public health measures—such as restrictions on gatherings—as threats to religious freedom. This narrative, she suggested, resonated strongly within conservative constituencies, reinforcing existing suspicions of state overreach and contributing to a broader sense of existential threat.

At the same time, Professor Ingersoll emphasized that no single factor can account for the current prominence of these movements. Rather, their rise reflects the cumulative effect of long-term organizational strategies interacting with more immediate political and social disruptions. What appears as a sudden surge is, in her formulation, the visible outcome of processes that have been unfolding over decades.

Secularization, Inequality, and Backlash

The exchange moved beyond diagnosis toward a more reflective interrogation of responsibility, causality, and the limits of existing analytical frameworks. Professor Jack A. Goldstone suggested that what is currently unfolding across multiple contexts is not merely the resurgence of religion or populism in isolation, but the normalization of an assertive and exclusionary ideological fusion—where perceived humiliation is channeled into aggressive identity-based politics. In this reading, religious nationalism operates not only as belief, but as a vehicle for reasserting dominance in response to status loss.

Professor Goldstone then turned a critical eye toward the role of social science itself, arguing that earlier intellectual assumptions may have inadvertently contributed to the present moment. The expectation that secularization would steadily marginalize religion, he suggested, proved deeply misleading. Instead, policies and discourses shaped by this assumption often alienated religious communities, creating fertile ground for backlash movements that now seek to reintegrate religion into the core of political authority. Parallel to this, he identified a second misjudgment in economic thinking: the prioritization of growth over distribution. While aggregate prosperity increased, the failure to address inequality produced widespread discontent, reinforcing perceptions of exclusion and injustice.

Extending this argument, Professor Goldstone highlighted a longer-term global transformation. Over the past half century, the relative dominance of Western societies has eroded, as economic and technological advancements in other regions have reshaped the global hierarchy. This shift, he argued, has unsettled previously taken-for-granted assumptions of superiority among segments of Western populations. The resulting nostalgia—rooted in a memory of unchallenged status—feeds contemporary grievance politics. His central question, directed to the panel, concerned how societies might address this structural recalibration without intensifying resentment, exclusion, and the normalization of antagonistic rhetoric.

The Deepening Impact of Populist Pressure

Responding to earlier interventions and this broader framing, Professor Stephan Klingebiel emphasized that the current transformations cannot be reduced to discursive shifts alone. While the strategic avoidance or substitution of politically sensitive terminology—such as replacing “climate change” or “gender” with more neutral language—may offer short-term tactical advantages, he cautioned that such practices risk deeper forms of self-censorship. This “self-policing,” as he described it, signals not adaptation but internalization of external pressure, ultimately weakening the normative foundations of international cooperation.

Professor Klingebiel further underscored that the stakes extend beyond language to the substance of policy and institutional priorities. Changes in funding allocations, the redirection of development agendas, and the politicization of multilateral institutions reflect a broader erosion of solidarity. He pointed to a shifting political climate in which engagement with development cooperation—once a source of professional and political legitimacy—has become increasingly stigmatized. This transformation, he suggested, illustrates how populist pressures reshape not only public discourse but also the incentives and self-perceptions of policymakers.

At the same time, Professor Klingebiel stressed the necessity of active resistance. Silence or strategic accommodation, in his view, risks accelerating the very dynamics it seeks to navigate. Instead, he advocated for the formation of new coalitions among actors committed to multilateralism and democratic norms. Crucially, he also called for a rethinking of how academic and policy communities communicate their work. Empirical evidence, while indispensable, is no longer sufficient in isolation. To counter populist narratives effectively, scholars must engage more directly with the emotional and symbolic dimensions of political life—crafting narratives that resonate beyond technocratic audiences.

In sum, this segment of the discussion highlighted a convergence around a central insight: contemporary democratic challenges are sustained by an interplay of structural change, emotional response, and discursive transformation. Addressing them requires not only institutional reform or policy adjustment, but also a deeper engagement with the narratives through which individuals interpret their place in a rapidly changing world.

 

Conclusion

Panel 1 of the symposium offered more than a set of parallel analyses; it articulated a coherent and multi-dimensional understanding of how contemporary democratic erosion takes shape. Across the presentations and subsequent discussion, a consistent insight emerged: populist radicalization is neither episodic nor accidental, but the outcome of long-term interactions between structural transformations, ideological projects, and affective dynamics. Grievance, as the panel demonstrated, does not automatically translate into anti-democratic politics. It becomes politically consequential when it is narrated, organized, and strategically mobilized through discursive, institutional, and symbolic means.

A central contribution of the panel lies in its insistence on integrating the emotional and the structural. Processes such as humiliation, status anxiety, and fear of future loss were shown to operate not as secondary effects, but as constitutive elements of political mobilization. At the same time, these affective dynamics are embedded within broader shifts – economic dislocation, geopolitical reordering, and the erosion of normative consensus in international cooperation. The convergence of these factors creates conditions under which exclusionary ideologies can gain legitimacy and resonance across diverse contexts.

Equally important was the panel’s attention to the role of agency – both in the emergence of populist forces and in the responses available to democratic actors. The discussions highlighted how political entrepreneurs, religious movements, and institutional actors actively construct narratives that transform diffuse unease into coherent political projects. Yet they also pointed to the adaptive capacities within democratic systems, including the formation of new coalitions, the persistence of institutional “pockets of effectiveness,” and the possibility of recalibrating political communication to address not only facts, but meanings and emotions.

The implications of these insights are both analytical and normative. If democratic erosion is prepared through gradual normalization, discursive shifts, and the instrumentalization of identity, then its counter requires equally sustained and multidimensional responses. Institutional reforms, while necessary, are insufficient in isolation. What is required is a renewed engagement with the cultural, social, and emotional foundations of democratic life – an effort to reconstruct not only policies, but also the narratives and forms of recognition that underpin democratic legitimacy.

In sum, the panel underscored that the trajectory from grievance to radicalization is not predetermined. It remains contingent on how societies interpret, articulate, and respond to the pressures they face. Understanding this contingency is essential not only for diagnosing democratic decline, but for imagining pathways of resilience and renewal in an increasingly unsettled global order.

Bulgarian President Rumen Radev.

Assoc. Prof. Otova: Under Radev, the Path to Autocracy in Bulgaria Becomes All Too Easy

Associate Professor Ildiko Otova, in an interview with the ECPS, offers a compelling analysis of Bulgaria’s post-election trajectory under Rumen Radev. Following a landslide victory driven by anti-corruption sentiment and political fatigue, Radev has consolidated power in a system marked by institutional fragility. Assoc. Prof. Otova argues that his success reflects not a new geopolitical shift, but a strategic exploitation of existing cleavages, enabled by a “specific discursive situation” of empty rhetoric and symbolic politics. While his ambiguity has mobilized a broad electorate, it also masks deeper risks. As populism transitions from protest to governance, Assoc. Prof. Otova warns that, under conditions of concentrated power and weak safeguards, “the path to autocracy becomes all too easy.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the aftermath of Bulgaria’s April 2026 parliamentary elections, the country has entered a new and uncertain political phase marked by both the promise of stability and the risk of accelerated democratic erosion. Rumen Radev’s newly formed Progressive Bulgaria party secured a decisive majority after years of political fragmentation, capitalizing on widespread anti-corruption sentiment, voter fatigue with repeated elections, and growing socioeconomic anxieties following eurozone accession. While his victory ended a prolonged cycle of unstable coalition governments, it also raised urgent questions about the future trajectory of Bulgarian democracy, particularly given Radev’s ambivalent positioning between the European Union and Russia.

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Ildiko Otova, Head of Political Science Department at New Bulgarian University, offers a nuanced and analytically rigorous assessment of the structural and discursive dynamics underpinning Radev’s rise. As she argues, his victory “should not be attributed solely to Russia or to the broader Europe-Russia divide”; rather, it reflects a more complex political environment in which he has “skillfully exploited” existing cleavages, often “using minimal words and gestures to convey what different audiences want to hear.” This strategic ambiguity has allowed him to mobilize a remarkably heterogeneous electorate, ranging from pro-European reformists to nationalist and pro-Russian constituencies.

Assoc. Prof. Otova situates this development within a broader pattern of normalized populism in Bulgaria, where “what was once an episodic phenomenon has become a structural feature of the system.” In such a context, Radev’s success appears less as an anomaly than as the predictable result of a political order shaped by institutional distrust, party-system exhaustion, and what she terms a “specific discursive situation” characterized by cycles of “empty rhetoric” and symbolic politics. His campaign slogan, “We are ready, we can do it, and we will succeed,” captured this dynamic, offering not policy substance but an affective promise of exit from political stagnation.

At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Otova underscores the deeper identity tensions that continue to shape Bulgarian politics. Euroscepticism, she notes, is structured by enduring paradoxes, including the perception of the EU as an external imposition, contrasted with the framing of Russia as culturally “internal.” This ambivalence has enabled Radev to navigate competing geopolitical imaginaries while maintaining what she describes as a dual discourse, one directed at domestic audiences, another at Brussels.

Yet the central concern animating Assoc. Prof. Otova’s analysis is the transformation of populism from oppositional rhetoric into governing practice. With a consolidated parliamentary majority and limited institutional constraints, “concrete actions and policies are required,” and it is precisely under these conditions, she warns, that “the path to autocracy becomes all too easy.” In a system already marked by weak institutional safeguards and vulnerability to state capture, the concentration of executive power risks reproducing, rather than dismantling, entrenched oligarchic networks.

This interview with ECPS situates Bulgaria at a critical juncture. While Radev’s rise reflects broader global trends of democratic backsliding and populist normalization, Assoc. Prof. Otova’s insights highlight the contingent nature of political outcomes, shaped not only by leadership, but by institutional resilience, societal mobilization, and the unresolved tensions at the heart of Bulgaria’s democratic and European identity.

Ildiko Otova, an Associate Professor of Political Science and the Head of Political Science Department at New Bulgarian University.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Ildiko Otova, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Not a New Cleavage, but a Strategic Exploitation of Old Divides

Professor Otova, given your argument that Bulgarian Euroscepticism must be read through the historically embedded Europe–Russia axis, does Rumen Radev’s victory mark a new phase in this cleavage, or merely its latest institutional expression?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Relations with Russia have long been central to Bulgarian politics, shaped by shared history, culture, personal connections, economic ties, and geopolitical factors. A widely circulated photo of Radev with Putin drew significant attention, prompting international media to describe him as “Russia’s new Trojan horse in Europe.” Experts have rightly pointed to Russia’s involvement in Radev’s political rise and raised concerns about campaign interference, online influence operations, and opaque funding sources suggesting substantial investment.

However, Radev’s victory should not be attributed solely to Russia or to the broader Europe–Russia divide. His win does not mark a new phase in this cleavage; rather, he has skillfully exploited it, using minimal words and gestures to convey what different audiences want to hear. In a campaign—and a political environment—often full of empty rhetoric, Radev has become adept at using silence, paradoxically communicating exactly what various constituencies seek.

In practice, little is known about the figures in his party, but among those who have become visible, we observe both openly provocative pro-Russian positions and the exact opposite. This is not to downplay Russia’s role; instead, it underscores the need for more comprehensive explanations.

Euroscepticism Built on Cultural Paradoxes and Identity Tensions

To what extent does Radev’s rise reflect not only geopolitical ambivalence but also a deeper identity crisis in post-communist Bulgaria, where competing civilizational imaginaries—Europeanization, Slavic-Orthodox affinity, and post-socialist nostalgia—intersect? In your framework, how does this identity fragmentation reshape the nature of Bulgarian Euroscepticism?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Bulgarian Euroscepticism rests on several paradoxes. The first is that the EU and “Europe” are frequently depicted as external to Bulgaria and Bulgarians—as actors that impose unacceptable values and adopt a lecturing posture. Yet this hostility toward external influence does not extend to all external actors. Russia, for example, is often not perceived as foreign in the same way; rather, it is framed as culturally “internal” due to a presumed Slavic-Orthodox affinity.

The second paradox is temporal. Resistance to the EU did not precede Bulgaria’s accession but developed alongside it. Until the early 2000s, Bulgaria was characterized by a broad pro-European consensus. 

Third, although Bulgaria has been an EU member state for years, European issues remain weakly embedded in its domestic political agenda. This does not mean that anti-EU narratives are absent. On the contrary, they are visible in discourses about massive migration allegedly changing the national gene pool, “stealing” the pensions of the elderly because EU policies and values are too liberal, and attacks on so-called “gender ideology,” among other themes.

Fourth, the deeper Bulgaria’s European integration becomes, the more its political elites tend to adopt anti-European positions. This shift occurs primarily through the normalization of populism. In this sense, within the Bulgarian context, the relationship between Euroscepticism and populism is particularly important—though not predetermined. There are also examples of populist, anti-establishment projects that remain pro-European. Among voters, too, there are those who are anti-establishment and anti-corruption yet remain pro-European. Notably, Radev has managed to mobilize them as well, including a significant portion of the so-called Generation Z.

There is also one more factor that should not be overlooked: his flirtation with the idea of a potential referendum on the euro. People do not necessarily need a rational explanation for why food is expensive; they need someone or something to blame. Prices do not even have to rise in reality—it is enough to sustain a narrative of rising costs. In this sense, the timing and the overall situation played perfectly into Radev’s hands.

Exhaustion, Silence, and the Power of Narrative Control

Bulgaria protests.
Protesters chant anti-government slogans during a demonstration in central Sofia, Bulgaria on July 26, 2013. Photo: Anton Chalakov / Dreamstime.

Should Radev’s success be understood primarily as anti-establishment populism, geopolitical revisionism, or a hybrid formation in which anti-corruption discourse masks a deeper pro-Russian reorientation?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Any of these three explanations is valid, yet even taken together, they remain too simplistic. As a citizen, I find it increasingly difficult to remain silent about the pervasive corruption in Bulgaria and the broader condition of the country, or to withhold my solidarity with the despair my fellow citizens feel toward the political elite. After the events of recent years, and the evident futility of going to the polls for an eighth time, there is a sense of collective exhaustion. Nevertheless, I will attempt an answer within an academic framework.

In my view, the main reason for his victory lies in what I would describe as a specific discursive situation. Since 2020, Bulgaria has been caught not only in a cycle of repeated elections but also in a cycle of empty rhetoric. Radev has managed to control the narrative so effectively that he appears to tell everyone what they want to hear—largely through silence. This is neither classic anti-elitist rhetoric built on the populist trope of the corrupt elite versus the honest, long-suffering people nor a standard expression of movements grounded in a thin-centred ideology.

“We are ready, we can do it, and we will succeed”—the words with which he announced his departure from the presidency, later adopted as his campaign slogan—projected a sense of purpose. They offered not concrete details, but hope for an exit from a cycle of meaningless repetition. In a political environment where emotions and symbolic gestures carry greater weight than rational argument, and where both traditional and digital media amplify urgency and a pervasive sense of crisis, this has proven sufficient. For citizens who are exhausted and perceive threats as omnipresent, such messaging resonates deeply.

Populism as the New Normal in Bulgarian Politics

In your work with Evelina Staykova, you argue that populism in Bulgaria has become normalized through party-system exhaustion, state–economy fusion, institutional distrust, and the digital turn. Does the 2026 election represent the culmination of this normalization?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Since 2001, Bulgaria has experienced several so-called waves of populism: the return of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the rise of GERB, and the emergence of post-2020, protest-driven, short-lived “pop-up” political projects. Taken together, these developments illustrate how what was once an episodic phenomenon has become a structural feature of the system. Paradoxically, the populist wave has itself become a constant.

Populism is now the defining characteristic of Bulgaria’s political order—the norm rather than the exception—making it unrealistic to expect fundamentally different outcomes. Radev fits squarely within this pattern: his victory represents not an unexpected populist surge, but the predictable result of a persistently populist political environment, shaped by the specific discursive situation I mentioned.

If this moment does represent a culmination, one might expect either a subsequent decline in populism or a reversion to pre-populist politics. However, such a scenario currently appears unlikely.

Radev has long combined anti-corruption, nationalist, and anti-establishment rhetoric from within one of the state’s highest institutions. Does his transition from the presidency to executive power illustrate the transformation of populism from protest discourse into governing logic?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: This is the greatest challenge he faces. The presidency, even though he ultimately governed alone through caretaker governments and later during the pre-election period, gave him the opportunity to craft narratives. However, when one commands such a majority and holds executive power, concrete actions and policies are required.

We have had populists in power before—the GERB administration is one such example—but the dynamics were different. The coalition nature of those governments, especially the most recent one, created room to maneuver. Under Radev, there will be no such leeway. And that is the greatest challenge we face. Under these conditions, the path to autocracy becomes all too easy.

Limits of the Orbán Analogy

Editorial illustration: Rumen Radev and Viktor Orbán depicted against national flags, symbolizing political tensions between Bulgaria and Hungary. Photo: Dreamstime.

How should we assess the analogy between Radev and Orbán? Does Radev possess the ideological coherence and institutional ambition required for Orbán-style illiberal state-building, or is Bulgaria’s EU dependency likely to constrain him?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Let us begin with the obvious: Orbán is an experienced politician with a long, well-documented, and easily traceable career. Radev, by contrast, was effectively parachuted from the military into the presidency—a role he has never fully mastered. He entered politics without a solid ideological, political, or broader conceptual foundation, essentially as an empty vessel into which almost anything could be poured.

Another obvious point is that Bulgaria is not Hungary. Radev lacks ideological consistency and has no substantial political background or prior experience; he is, to a large extent, a product of the circumstances that enabled his rise—a product of the status quo, the absence of alternatives, and the prevailing populist momentum. Looking back, we also cannot entirely rule out the possibility that his ascent was shaped by external forces. What is beyond doubt, however, is the presence of clear ambition.

In this sense, the emergence of a non-liberal form of democracy in Bulgaria cannot be ruled out. The European Union, having learned from its experience with Hungary, is likely to be far more cautious. Against this backdrop, Radev’s first major test will be the so-called judicial reform.

Is Radev better understood as an Orbán-type system builder, a Fico-type pragmatic Eurosceptic, or a specifically Bulgarian figure shaped by Russophile memory, anti-corruption politics, and institutional volatility?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: I do not think these comparisons meaningfully deepen our understanding of Radev or improve our ability to predict future developments. There are simply too many specific factors at play, and the international landscape is in constant flux. What existed elsewhere yesterday may not necessarily apply here tomorrow.

The Politics of Dual Discourse

Your research suggests that Bulgarian populism often blurs ideological distinctions. How should we classify Progressive Bulgaria: left-conservative, national-populist, technocratic-populist, or post-ideological?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Yes, populism undoubtedly blurs ideological distinctions; this is intrinsic to its nature. Consider Progressive Bulgaria’s program: despite the label “progressive,” its economic agenda is largely far right, even though some members of its expert economic team previously worked on more left-leaning projects. This example alone illustrates the extent to which ideological lines are being blurred.

For this reason, I see the party as best fitting within a post-ideological framework. Populism can be understood as a de-ideologized ideology. It incorporates elements from other ideologies, yet remains neither left nor right, and this is precisely one of the greatest dangers it poses—the de-ideologization, and consequently the depoliticization, of the political. Progressive Bulgaria, at least for now, aligns well with this understanding.

Does Radev’s discourse of “pragmatism” toward Russia and “critical thinking” toward Europe signal a strategic foreign policy stance, or does it reveal a more profound ontological insecurity in Bulgaria’s self-understanding as both a European and historically Russia-linked polity? How does identity anxiety translate into political legitimacy for such leaders?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: I believe these statements by Radev are part of a broader strategy to tell each audience what it wants to hear. It is highly likely that he will continue to use one discourse in Bulgaria and another in Brussels. This is nothing new; Bulgarian politicians have long maintained such a dual discourse. In Radev’s case, however, it will be especially evident, likely conveyed through various spokespersons as well.

At the same time, Radev will have to speak not only to pro-Russian citizens at home. The EU still enjoys the support of more than half of Bulgarians, and some of those who backed Radev did so not because of his pro-Russian stance, but because of his anti-corruption declarations. He will have to meet their expectations with tangible actions, as narrative alone will no longer suffice.

Strategic Ambiguity Between Brussels and Moscow

Radev’s Ukraine stance appears to combine opposition to military aid with reluctance to openly block EU decisions. Is this strategic ambiguity a governing necessity, or a sign of deeper tension between his electorate’s geopolitical pluralism and his own Russophile instincts?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: I cannot say whether Radev holds Russophile instincts. If he does, it would be rather ironic given his background in American military academies. Joking aside, there is a Russian saying: “We will live and we will see”—time will tell. However, I would assume that Radev will not openly oppose EU decisions.

To what extent did Radev absorb the political space of openly pro-Russian and nationalist parties such as Revival, and does this suggest moderation of the far right or mainstreaming of its core themes?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: The myth of moderation is remarkably persistent, but I do not find it convincing. For years, analysts have claimed that once the far right gains power, it will be tamed. The opposite has happened: instead, far-right views have steadily become the norm. One need only look across the EU to observe this trend.

When it comes to Revival, Radev succeeded in attracting a significant portion of its electorate. As I have already noted, he now faces the difficult task of continuing to speak to multiple constituencies at once—and to do so convincingly through his actions. This will determine whether he fully absorbs the Revival electorate or, conversely, whether that electorate becomes further radicalized and shifts into opposition. I would not underestimate the leader of Revival, who is a seasoned political actor.

Given Bulgaria’s captured institutions, weak trust, and repeated anti-corruption mobilizations, can Radev realistically dismantle oligarchic networks, or does his concentration of power risk reproducing the same state-capture logic under a new banner?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: This issue is extremely important. The resignation of the acting chief prosecutor, coming just days after Radev’s victory, was among the first signs of a new arrangement and already signals a realignment within oligarchic networks. I would also return to the question of how Radev’s seemingly expensive campaign was funded. Where did that money come from? Even these few points leave little room for optimism.

Radev’s regime is likely to reconstitute a state-capture model—perhaps initially in a more covert and less overtly assertive form—but such a configuration is unlikely to remain restrained over time.

From Anti-Elite Narrative to Elite Reality

Anti-government protests against corruption intensified across Sofia, Bulgaria on July 15, 2020. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have argued that anti-establishment populists in power may themselves become the new elite. How quickly might this paradox confront Radev once he assumes responsibility for inflation, eurozone adjustment, corruption reform, and EU funding?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Radev has long belonged to the elite. After all, he has been the sitting president for nearly nine years. His seemingly modest gestures—driving his own car, grumbling about the lack of parking spaces in Sofia, and publicly paying his parking tickets—are mostly for show, part of the narrative drafting.  

That said, I understand the core of the question. Given the international environment and the many urgent issues awaiting resolution, the risk that mounting challenges will overwhelm the new status quo is very real. Radev’s victory will ultimately need to be substantiated through concrete actions. Let us return to the notion of a “de-ideologized ideology” and the broader process of depoliticizing politics. How can genuinely sustainable policies be designed when they are no longer anchored in a clear and coherent vision?

My concern is that the emerging political reality is stripping politics of its very essence: not only the capacity to deliver immediate solutions, but also the obligation to develop policies grounded in a substantive vision of the world and its internal order. Returning to Radev, it is entirely possible that the failure of the new elite could trigger a fresh wave of protests. The key questions are whether such protests would be strong enough and, more importantly, what kind of new political configuration they might produce.

A new, powerful actor—a new master of the narrative who can and will succeed—will not emerge overnight. The possibility that, if Radev fails, Bulgaria could enter yet another cycle of instability cannot be ruled out. Even so, I am inclined to believe that Radev and those around him will, at least for a while, remain in power.

Diaspora Divides and the Limits of Democratic Agency

In your work on contestatory citizenship, you highlight the transformative potential of civic agency. In the current context, can civic mobilization and diaspora engagement mitigate what appears to be an emerging crisis of democratic and European identity, or are these forms of participation themselves being reshaped by populist narratives of belonging and exclusion?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Let me begin by noting that the diaspora is not necessarily pro-European—quite the contrary. While some are pro-European, others are anti-European, including Bulgarian emigrants in other EU member states. I continue to believe in the power of contestatory citizenship. However, as I have already noted, the key question is what exactly a new wave of protests might bring about.

Looking ahead, do you expect Radev’s Bulgaria to become a pragmatic EU-anchored government with Russophile rhetoric, a soft illiberal regime inside the EU, or an unstable populist experiment likely to fracture under the burdens of governance?

Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: I do not think these three options are mutually exclusive.

Jordan Bardella and Princess Maria Carolina of Bourbon-Two Sicilies captured in a staged, paparazzi-style moment—where romance, image, and political branding converge on the cover of Paris Match.

‘Ugly, Badly Groomed, and Bitter’: Gendered Delegitimation and Aesthetic Politics 

In this incisive analysis, Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois interrogates how contemporary far-right discourse mobilizes gendered and aesthetic hierarchies to structure political legitimacy. Focusing on the controversy surrounding Rassemblement National (RN) leader Jordan Bardella’s relationship with Princess Maria Carolina of Bourbon-Two Sicilies, Dr. Bauvois demonstrates how misogynistic rhetoric operates through a dual mechanism of delegitimation and idealization. The stigmatized figure of the female sociologist—constructed as intellectually suspect and aesthetically deficient—is juxtaposed with the idealized “princess” archetype, embodying socially sanctioned femininity. This contrast reveals how populist communication instrumentalizes gendered imagery, transforming private relationships into symbolic resources that reinforce political narratives, hierarchies of visibility, and claims to cultural legitimacy.

 

By Gwenaëlle Bauvois

Controversy Around a Romance 

The relationship between Jordan Bardella, president of the National Rally / Rassemblement National (RN), and Princess Maria Carolina of Bourbon-Two Sicilies has recently attracted significant media attention in France and abroad, particularly after their romance was featured on the cover of a gossip magazine and circulated widely across both political and lifestyle media outlets. 

During a televised exchange on this subject, Sébastien Chenu, a leading figure of the Rassemblement National, stated: “I am delighted that [Bardella] is in love, I am delighted that his partner, who could possibly become First Lady, is a young lady who speaks six languages.” Interpelled by the journalist who noted that Maria Carolina is a “luxury influencer,” he responded: “Why not!” He then added: “Not everyone is destined to be a sociology lecturer,” “ugly, badly groomed, and bitter,” (Chenu, n.d.).

Chenu’s remarks triggered significant backlash across political, media, and academic circles.As a national spokesperson for the Rassemblement National, Chenu is already recognized for his provocative communication style, which was especially apparent in this instance. The French National Union of Researchers, for instance, stated that these comments reflect the Rassemblement National’s anti-feminist positioning, which regularly targets women’s rights and reproduces outdated gender stereotypes. 

The Sociologist: Failed Femininity

At the center of Chenu’s remark lies the figure of the Sociologist, a familiar symbolic target in far-right discourse. In France, sociology occupies a particularly visible position within broader “culture wars” dynamics, where academic disciplines become entangled in political and ideological conflicts over questions of identity, inequality, and gender. Within this context, sociology is often framed by some right-wing and far-right political actors as emblematic of a politicized or ideologically biased academia. 

Crucially, however, the figure used by Chenu is here implicitly gendered: it is not a neutral academic subject that is evoked, but specifically the female sociology lecturer, whose presence is central to the rhetorical effect of the statement rather than incidental to it. The emphasis on a woman in an academic position is significant because it enables the statement to operate simultaneously through professional and gendered delegitimation, thereby amplifying its symbolic effect. 

This framing reflects three intersecting discursive logics. First, populist anti-intellectualism constructs experts and academics, more often in social science, as ideologically driven rather than legitimate producers of knowledge. Second, it specifically frames female academics as socially deviant and suspect. Third, misogynistic aesthetic stereotyping delegitimizes women through appearance and affect, casting them as Chenu describes as “ugly” and “bitter.” Together, these patterns construct the figure of the female social sciences academic as a rhetorically productive figure within far-right discourse, whose authority is simultaneously undermined along epistemic, social, and gendered lines. 

Female academics and public intellectuals are disproportionately targeted through appearance-based insults and narratives of emotional instability, particularly when they are associated with feminist or progressive positions. Within this frame, the figure of the female sociology lecturer mobilized by Chenu is used as an instance of failed femininity, insofar as she is represented as failing to conform to normative expectations of feminine appearance, emotional disposition, respectability and desirability. 

The Princess: Worthy Femininity

In contrast to the representation of the female sociologist as ugly and bitter, Maria Carolina of Bourbon-Two Sicilies is implicitly constructed through a combination of aristocratic lineage and conventional markers of attractiveness—youth, blonde hair, and normative beauty—alongside her prestige and glamour. The opposition between these stereotypes reflects two radically different regimes of femininity within far-right populist discourse, structured around processes of delegitimation and idealization.  

Within this configuration, the figure of the Princess does not merely function as an aesthetic ideal, but also as a form of symbolic validation. It produces a culturally legible ideal of femininity in which aesthetic conformity and social status reinforce one another. It illustrates how visibility and worth are distributed unevenly, rendering certain bodies desirable and socially legitimate, while others are marked as deviant or unworthy —an opposition explicitly echoed in Chenu’s references to ugliness and bodily neglect. 

More than a static ideal, the Princess figure operates as a normative reference point for acceptable and desirable femininity, where beauty, refinement, and social legitimacy are tightly aligned. Taken together, these contrasting constructions of femininity serve a broader populist logic of image-making, in which gendered archetypes are mobilized to organize hierarchies of legitimacy, visibility, and credibility. In this sense, the Princess archetype embodies the “right” kind of femininity and womanhood within this symbolic economy—one that is aesthetically intelligible, socially valorized, and politically functional. 

The Princess figure also works particularly well in the context of Bardella’s electoral positioning ahead of the 2027 presidential race, especially given the timing and circulation of the orchestrated, paparazzi-style photographs of the couple. The Princess figure is highly media-friendly and easily integrated into simplified narrative formats, including “fairy-tale” framings that translate personal relationships into emotionally resonant political stories. In this sense, rather than functioning as a private individual, the Princess operates as a branding resource.

The Populist Leader and the Princess: Romance as Political Resource?

This romance between the young, ambitious populist leader of the French far right and the glamorous jet-setter princess can indeed be seen as part of a wider strategy of political communication and personal branding, contributing to the construction of Bardella’s profile as a prospective presidential candidate.

It also reinforces a narrative of upward social mobility, in which Bardella’s self-presentation as emerging from a modest, working-class background is juxtaposed with his growing proximity to aristocratic lineage and inherited forms of cultural and social capital. 

However, this construction is also potentially ambivalent. Bardella has long cultivated an image as a politician who speaks for ordinary people against the elites, a figure of social ascent from below. Yet his relationship with a luxury influencer, jetsetter and heir to a fortune worth several hundred million euros—risks complicating that populist narrative of proximity to these “ordinary people” he claims to represent.

References

Chenu, S. [@sebchenu]. (n.d.). “Je suis ravi de voir @J_Bardella amoureux et que tous les deux soient épanouis ! N’en déplaise à certains, tout le monde n’a pas vocation à finir comme une prof de sociologie à Nanterre, moche, mal coiffée et aigrie ! @franceinfo” [Post]. X. https://x.com/sebchenu/status/2045028471185821837

La Provence. (2026, April 17). “Une prof à Nanterre, moche et aigrie” : Chenu défend la vie amoureuse de Bardella et s’attire les foudres de la gauche. https://www.laprovence.com/article/politique/1346683888928215/une-prof-a-nanterre-moche-et-aigrie-chenu-defend-la-vie-amoureuse-de-bardella-et-sattire-les-foudres-de-la-gauche

Caulcutt, Clea. (2026, April 9). “Jordan Bardella: France romance with Italian royal heiress goes public.” Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/jordan-bardella-france-romance-italian-royal-heiress-goes-public/

SNCS-FSU. (2026, April 20). “Le SNCS-FSU dénonce les propos diffamatoires et misogynes de Sébastien Chenu.”https://sncs.fr/2026/04/21/le-sncs-fsu-denonce-les-propos-diffamatoires-et-misogynes-de-sebastien-chenu/

Disposal site in Lagos.

From Waste to Political Weapon: Informal Recycling and Survivalist Populism in Urban Nigeria

Urban waste governance in Nigeria reveals a critical yet overlooked nexus between environmental management, informality, and political legitimacy. This policy brief introduces the concept of survivalist populism to capture how structural exclusion within the informal waste economy generates distinct political subjectivities rooted in precarity, distrust, and disengagement. Despite underpinning material recovery and urban sustainability, informal waste workers remain marginalized, stigmatized, and criminalized—exposing a contradiction at the heart of state governance. The analysis demonstrates that exclusionary environmental regimes not only produce inefficiencies but also erode democratic legitimacy and risk fostering grievance-driven political mobilization. By advocating inclusive, circular governance frameworks, the brief positions environmental policy as a key site for democratic renewal, social inclusion, and the mitigation of emerging populist discontent.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja*

Policy Problem

In Nigeria, urban waste governance has remained an under-researched domain where the intersection of political contention, social marginalization, and emerging populist subjectivities can be observed. It is estimated that more than 32 million tons of solid waste are produced annually across the country, with approximately 13,000–15,000 tons generated daily by metropolitan Lagos alone, of which less than 40% is managed by formal waste collection systems (World Bank, 2020). This structural deficit has given rise to a vast informal waste sector, including scavengers, mobile waste traders, and community-based collectors, who constitute the backbone of material recovery systems—particularly for plastics and metals—thereby contributing to urban environmental sustainability.

Despite their indispensability for material recovery, the sector remains largely institutionally marginalized, socially stigmatized, and increasingly criminalized. This apparent contradiction—the necessity of these informal actors for material recovery alongside their political exclusion—points to a broader challenge in environmental governance at the nexus of urban informality and state legitimacy. Building on an urban political sociology perspective, alongside environmental governance scholarship, this policy brief argues that waste governance in Nigeria is fundamentally an issue of political legitimacy and citizenship at the urban level (Migdal, 2001; Davis, 2006).

Survivalist Populism and Urban Exclusion

This policy brief proposes the term survivalist populism to capture the emergence of political consciousness driven by structural exclusion in the informal economy. Survivalist populism describes a political orientation shaped by a lack of material security, institutional exclusion, and the daily struggle for urban survival. Distinct from programmatically oriented ideological populism and electorally driven populism, survivalist populism is affective, experience-driven, and rooted in the everyday conditions of survival.

In the informal waste economy, this type of political consciousness typically manifests through: (1) deep and entrenched distrust in state institutions; (2) narratives of neglect and exclusion; and (3) pragmatic avoidance of formal politics. This orientation signals a weakening of state legitimacy, as governance is often perceived as coercive rather than as a mechanism for welfare delivery. 

As Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue, such dynamics often reflect a sustained political backlash rooted in prolonged social insecurity and inequality affecting marginalized populations. Phrases such as “we are unseen by government,” commonly used by actors in the informal waste sector, convey a sense of injustice and represent a redefinition of political identity beyond formal politics. This aligns with studies of informality demonstrating how marginalized groups often construct their own systems of governance in the absence of adequate state engagement (Hart, 1973; Migdal, 2001).

Informality, Labor and Urban Survival

Nigeria’s informal waste sector provides employment for millions and is a cornerstone of the wider informal economy, which supports more than 60 percent of national employment. The sector comprises a diverse group of predominantly young, often vulnerable and economically deprived individuals excluded from the formal economy. Their employment conditions are characterized by extreme income volatility, with earnings frequently falling below minimum wage benchmarks. At the same time, work is marked by precarious health and safety conditions, as it is typically carried out without personal protective equipment and often involves encounters with state agents, leading to harassment, evictions, and displacement.

Paradoxically, these informal workers are integral to urban environmental governance processes, recovering well over 50 percent of plastics across several Nigerian cities, reducing pressure on landfills, and supporting local manufacturing value chains. This situation exemplifies what Davis (2006) describes as the “structural indispensability of the urban poor within systems that simultaneously exclude them,” reflecting a persistent, state-induced failure to integrate informal labor, even as it continues to be tolerated and relied upon.

Governance Failures and Democratic Risks

The systemic exclusion of informal waste workers results in significant governance and democratic risks. 

First, it reinforces the state’s dominant reliance on punitive, rather than inclusive, approaches to environmental governance by criminalizing participation in the sector. Informal waste picking is often banned or tightly regulated at the state level without providing viable livelihood alternatives. 

Second, enforcement-led approaches to environmental regulation erode state legitimacy, as interventions are primarily experienced as coercive rather than enabling, particularly among excluded groups (Migdal, 2001). 

Third, there are emerging signs of the political instrumentalization of exclusion and grievance, whereby marginalized groups are invoked in electoral rhetoric but excluded from substantive policymaking—a pattern that may transform social and environmental exclusion into a tool for political leverage. 

Finally, these dynamics generate environmental inefficiencies, as the marginalization of recyclers weakens waste sorting and recovery systems, thereby increasing pressure on landfills. Collectively, these processes risk fostering long-term political disillusionment and undermining stability in urban governance.

Policy Recommendations: Toward Inclusive Circular Governance

Achieving effective environmental governance requires a critical shift toward inclusive, circular economy frameworks that recognize informal labor as essential to urban environmental sustainability.

Formal Integration and Recognition: Relevant environmental agencies at both state and national levels should take measures to formally recognize and register workers in the informal waste economy and ensure their inclusion in urban waste management systems through collaborative arrangements and partnerships among the state, the formal sector, and informal waste actors.

Circular Economy Integration: Circular economy strategies at both subnational and national levels must clearly identify and define informal waste workers as central participants in sustainable waste management, with targeted incentive packages to support small recycling enterprises and strengthen informal material recovery value chains.

Social Protection Measures: Support for these workers should be complemented by a targeted system of social protection that provides access to essential services such as microcredit and health insurance, as well as structured livelihood development and transition support programs.

Participatory Governance Structures: Urban waste management authorities should develop and operationalize structured participatory mechanisms that provide informal waste workers with a platform for engagement and a voice in decision-making processes affecting their livelihoods and the environment.

Narrative Reframing and Public Recognition: The persistent social stigmatization of informal waste workers should be actively challenged through reframing their roles as valuable contributors to urban environmental sustainability, rather than as nuisances within the cityscape, by both state institutions and the media.

Policy Implications for Europe and the Global South

The findings from Nigeria’s informal waste sector offer important lessons for European policymakers transitioning toward a circular economy, as well as for cities in the Global South undergoing rapid urbanization, where informality remains integral to urban service provision, but policy responses often oscillate between marginalization and criminalization. In Nigeria, neglecting informal environmental actors not only undermines the efficiency of environmental systems but can also lead to significant political consequences, including alienation, disengagement, and the emergence of populist responses.

This case underscores for European actors—particularly in contexts of increasing migration, urban informalization, and the shift toward circular economy models—the imperative of designing inclusive governance mechanisms that integrate vulnerable labor into formal systems rather than pushing it to the margins. More broadly, the findings highlight the need to conceptualize environmental governance as a tool of social inclusion and political consolidation, not merely technical efficiency. Failure to implement such reforms is likely to deepen urban political disaffection and accelerate the rise of grievance-driven populist mobilization.

Conclusion

The crisis of waste management in Nigeria is a manifestation of the structural tension between environmental governance and democratic inclusion. The persistence of exclusionary waste regimes reinforces a survivalist populist orientation grounded in precarity and institutional marginality, which may contribute to political instability. Conversely, the inclusion of marginalized informal waste collectors in formal policymaking processes offers mutually beneficial outcomes in terms of environmental efficiency and democratic legitimacy, thereby repositioning waste governance beyond a purely environmental imperative toward a nexus for inclusive urban democracy.


 

(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Nigeria and Nonresident Research Fellow at the ECPS. 


 

References 

Davis, M. (2006). Planet of slums. Verso. London

Hart, K. (1973). “Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 11(1), 61–89. 

Migdal, J. S. (2001). State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another. Cambridge University Press. 

Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. 

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press. 

World Bank. (2020). Nigeria: Enhancing solid waste management for sustainable urban development.

Iran & US.

The Ongoing War Between Iran, the US, and Israel: A Brief Analytical Assessment

This commentary by Professor Majid Bozorgmehri situates the 2026 confrontation within a broader matrix of regional rivalry, nuclear deterrence, and asymmetric warfare. He argues that the conflict reflects not an isolated escalation but the deepening of a long-standing security dilemma, driven by both material power asymmetries and ideational forces. Drawing on a synthesis of realism and constructivism, Professor Bozorgmehri demonstrates how strategic calculation, identity, and normative commitments interact in shaping state behavior. As the war expands across multiple domains—from proxy networks to maritime chokepoints—it highlights the limits of conventional military superiority and points toward a likely trajectory of managed escalation, coercive diplomacy, and negotiated equilibrium.

By Majid Bozorgmehri*

The ongoing war involving Iran, the United States, and Israel in 2026 can be interpreted as a complex interstate conflict situated within a broader matrix of regional rivalry, nuclear deterrence concerns, and asymmetric warfare dynamics. Rather than constituting an isolated confrontation, the war reflects an intensification of long-standing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, generating wide-ranging humanitarian, economic, infrastructural, political, and environmental consequences. For Iran, which has already experienced prolonged exposure to international sanctions, economic stagnation, and domestic socio-political pressures, the war has exacerbated existing structural vulnerabilities while introducing new dimensions of humanitarian strain and systemic instability (Akhigbodemhe & Azubuike, 2025: 300). At the same time, this confrontation appears to be entering a qualitatively new phase with the potential to reshape the regional geopolitical order (Alobeid, 2025: 8).

From the standpoint of international relations theory, and particularly within the framework of structural realism, the conflict can be conceptualized as a manifestation of the security dilemma, whereby defensive measures undertaken by one actor are interpreted as offensive threats by others, thereby producing a self-reinforcing cycle of escalation (Waltz, 1979; Jervis, 1978; Baltaci, 2022: 2241). However, a single theoretical lens is insufficient to fully explain the dynamics of this war. A more comprehensive analytical framework emerges from the integration of realism and constructivism, as proposed in the concept of “realist constructivism” (Barkin, 2003: 338). Within this hybrid framework, the policies of the United States and Israel can be interpreted primarily through realist assumptions emphasizing power, security, and strategic calculation, whereas Iran’s behavior reflects a stronger influence of ideational factors, including identity, revolutionary ideology, and normative commitments. This theoretical synthesis enables a more nuanced understanding of how material power and normative structures interact in shaping state behavior.

Historically, the strategic rivalry between Israel and Iran has evolved over several decades, particularly since the late 1990s, into a multidimensional confrontation encompassing direct and indirect forms of conflict. Iran has consistently supported a network of non-state actors positioned along Israel’s periphery, while Israel has responded through a combination of military deterrence, intelligence operations, and targeted strikes aimed at constraining Iran’s regional influence (Dryden, 2023: 84; Tanios, 2020). The escalation observed in 2026, including coordinated military actions by the United States and Israel against Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure, represents the culmination of these long-term antagonisms. Such actions have been interpreted by analysts as preventive or preemptive strategies designed to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities and weaken its deterrence posture.

The military balance within this conflict is characterized by a pronounced asymmetry. The United States and Israel possess significant advantages in terms of conventional military capabilities, including advanced airpower, intelligence systems, and precision-strike technologies. In contrast, Iran has developed an asymmetric warfare doctrine intended to mitigate these disadvantages. This doctrine relies on ballistic missile systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and decentralized proxy networks capable of operating across multiple theaters (Cordesman, 2007). Furthermore, Israel has intensified its military activities in Syria and expanded covert security cooperation with several Arab states, particularly in response to perceived Iranian entrenchment in the region (Furlan, 2022: 178). Consequently, the conflict cannot be reduced to a simple balance-of-power equation but should instead be understood as a confrontation between divergent strategic paradigms.

The persistence of Iran’s retaliatory capabilities despite sustained military pressure underscores a central finding in strategic studies: the superiority of conventional force does not necessarily guarantee decisive political outcomes when confronting a resilient and adaptive adversary (Arreguín-Toft, 2005). In this regard, the conflict demonstrates key features of hybrid warfare, combining direct interstate confrontation with proxy engagements, cyber operations, and economic coercion. Iranian-aligned groups operating across the Middle East and extending in some cases toward the Red Sea and parts of Eastern Africa, have contributed to broadening the geographical scope of the conflict (Bazoobandi & Talebian, 2023). This expansion complicates the strategic environment for both the United States and Israel, increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and unintended escalation (Byman, 2018).

One of the most critical dimensions of this escalation concerns maritime security, particularly in relation to the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately one-fifth (20.9 %) of global oil supply transits (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2026). Any disruption in this chokepoint would have profound implications for the global economy, potentially triggering inflationary shocks, financial instability, and broader systemic risks (World Bank, 2025: 81–82). Additionally, the strategic positioning of external powers such as Russia and China suggests that their policies toward the conflict are likely to be shaped by broader geopolitical calculations, which may not fully align with Iranian expectations (Rasanah, 2024: 4).

Despite the scale and intensity of military operations, several structural constraints limit the likelihood of a decisive outcome. Iran’s territorial size, population base, and institutional resilience render the prospect of externally imposed regime change highly uncertain without large-scale ground operations. Historical precedents, including the interventions in Iraq and Libya, have demonstrated the risks associated with state collapse and regional fragmentation. In the Iranian context, such a scenario could invite intervention by neighboring powers—including Turkey, Pakistan, and Gulf states—while also potentially intensifying subnational movements, such as Kurdish aspirations for autonomy or independence. These risks significantly raise the potential costs of escalation for external actors.

At the same time, the United States faces considerable constraints related to resource allocation, domestic political considerations, and strategic prioritization, all of which reduce its willingness to engage in a prolonged and large-scale military campaign. Israel, despite its advanced military capabilities, remains constrained by its limited strategic depth and exposure to missile and drone attacks. These factors collectively suggest that the conflict is unlikely to culminate in a decisive military victory and is instead evolving toward a phase characterized by coercive diplomacy and strategic bargaining.

Recent developments in the diplomatic arena reinforce this interpretation. Indirect negotiations, temporary ceasefire arrangements, and discussions concerning limitations on Iran’s nuclear program indicate a gradual shift toward a mixed strategy that combines military pressure with diplomatic engagement (International Crisis Group, 2026). From a theoretical perspective, this transition is consistent with game-theoretic models in which rational actors seek to optimize outcomes under conditions of uncertainty while avoiding mutually destructive escalation.

A scenario-based assessment of the conflict suggests that the most probable outcome, with an estimated likelihood of approximately 45–55 percent, is a negotiated settlement involving partial de-escalation, limited restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities, and some degree of sanctions relief. A second scenario, with a probability of approximately 25–30 percent, envisions the continuation of a low-intensity conflict characterized by intermittent military engagements and persistent proxy activity. Less probable scenarios include broader regional escalation (10–15 percent) and internal regime collapse in Iran (5–10 percent), the latter being constrained by the resilience of existing political and security structures.

Overall, the available evidence indicates that the conflict is unlikely to produce a decisive military resolution. Instead, it is more likely to evolve into a managed confrontation or a negotiated equilibrium shaped by structural constraints, strategic interdependence, and the limits of military power. Within this context, some analysts argue that the survival of a contained but adversarial Iranian posture may serve the strategic interests of the United States and its regional allies by reinforcing security dependencies among Persian Gulf states and facilitating incremental normalization between Israel and certain Arab countries. While this interpretation remains subject to debate, it highlights the broader geopolitical implications of the conflict and its potential to reshape regional alignments over the long term.


 

(*) Majid Bozorgmehri is a Professor at Imam Khomeini International University, Iran, and a Visiting Scholar at York University, Toronto, Canada.


 

References

Akhigbodemhe, E.J. & Azubuike, G.I. (2025). “A 12-day war with long-term collateral consequences: A multi-dimensional analysis of the Israel-Iran war.” IJPSG 2025; 7(9): 300-309, E-ISSN: 2664-603X DOI: https://www.doi.org/10.33545/26646021.2025.v7.i9d.694

Alobeid, A. (2025) “The Israeli Strikes on Iranian Targets and Its Geopolitical Repercussions.” Center of Strategic Studies:1-41:8 June 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393122276_ISRAEL_IRAN_WAR_AND_ITS_GLOBAL_IMPLICATIONS

Arreguín-T. I.  (2005). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge University Press. https://archive.org/details/howweakwinwarsth0000arre/page/n9/mode/2up

Baltacı, A. (2022). “Iran Israel Conflict: An Overview of The Situation After the Iran Islamic Revolution from The Framework of Security Theories.” International Social Sciences Studies Journal, (e-ISSN:2587- 1587) Vol:8, Issue:100; pp:2239-2245. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362270158_Iran_Israel_Conflict_An_Overview_of_the_Situation_after_the_Iran_Islamic_Revolution_from_the_Framework_of_Security_Theories

Barkin, J. S. (2003, Sep.) “Realist Constructivism.” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association: 325-342. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3186573

Bazoobandi, S. & Talebian, H. (2023). “The Evolvement of Iran–Israel’s Rivalry in the Red Sea and Eastern Africa,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies,
17:4, 341-355. DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2023.2299076, https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2023.2299076

Byman, D. L. (2018, Jan.03). “Iran’s foreign policy weaknesses, and opportunities to exploit them.” https://www.brookings.edu/articles/irans-foreign-policy-weaknesses-and-opportunities-to-exploit-them/

Campa, K.; Rezaei, B.; Moorman ,C.; Wells, K.; Morrison N.; Grace M. & Annika G. (2026). “Iran Update Special Report, March 27, 2026. “ Analyst Notes: Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET, The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP),

Cordesman, A. H. & Kleiber, M. (2007, January). “Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf.” DOI: 10.5040/9798400672521 ISBN: 9780313346125 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381088434_Iran’s_Military_Forces_and_Warfighting_Capabilities_The_Threat_in_the_Northern_Gulf

DryDen, J. (2023, Spring). “IRAN, ISRAEL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SKIES OVER THE MIDDLE EAST” ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER, VOL. 2, NO. 1, :84-95

Furlan, M. (2022). “Israeli Iranian relations: past friendship, current hostility.” Israel Affairs, 28:2, 170-183, DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2022.2041304 https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2022.2041304

International Crisis Group (2026). “With a Fragile Ceasefire under Threat, What Future for the Strait of Hormuz?”https://www.crisisgroup.org/qna/global/iran-israelpalestine-united-states/fragile-ceasefire-under-threat-what-future-strait-hormuz

Jervis, R. (1978) “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan., 1978), pp. 167-214, The Johns Hopkins University. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958

Rasanah.  (2024). “IRAN, ISRAEL, AND STRATEGIC CHOICES: NAVIGATING A NEW ERA OF CONFLICT.” International Institute for Iranian Studies. October 29, 2024,  www.Rasanah.iiis.org :1-7, https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/10/Iran-Israel-and-Strategic-Choices-Navigating-a-New-Era-of-Conflict.pdf

Tanios,  S. (2020, January). “Iran, Israel, the Persian Gulf, and the United States: A Conflict Resolution Perspective.” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352546074_Iran_Israel_the_Persian_Gulf_and_the_United_States_A_Conflict_Resolution_Perspective

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2026). “World Oil Transit Chokepoints.” March 3, 202 https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints

Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. McGraw-Hill., Addison-Wesly Publishing Company. ISBN : J-201-08349-3 https://www.academia.edu/28686609/_WALTZ_KENNETH_Theory_of_International_Politics

World Bank Group. (2025, June). “Global Economic Prospect.” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.Doi: 10.1596/978-1-4648-2193-6).025  https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099108406102514189/pdf/IDU-b105e4ed-305f-421f-aa25-861e41a4ab44.pdf

Mark Corner

Ten Years on with Brexit / Prof. Corner: With Brexit, the UK Has Lost More Than It Has Gained

As the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum approaches, debate has shifted from slogans to evidence. In this interview, Professor Mark Corner offers a measured but clear conclusion: “the UK has lost more than it has gained.” Drawing on political economy, constitutional analysis, and historical perspective, he revisits Brexit not as a singular rupture but as a dual crisis affecting both the European Union and the internal cohesion of the United Kingdom. Professor Corner highlights the paradox at the heart of Brexit—“taking back control” did not strengthen parliamentary sovereignty, but instead elevated popular sovereignty. At the same time, expectations of global economic freedom have given way to the enduring realities of geography and interdependence. His reflections situate Brexit as a revealing case of the gap between political promise and institutional consequence.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum approaches, public debate has moved decisively beyond the binary language of Leave and Remain toward a more empirically grounded reckoning with Brexit’s long-term political and economic consequences. In this context, Professor Mark Corner, Emeritus Professor at the University of Leuven, offers a particularly valuable perspective. His work situates Brexit not simply as a rupture in Britain’s relationship with the European Union, but as a dual constitutional and political crisis—one affecting both the European project and the internal cohesion of the United Kingdom. Bringing together political economy, constitutional analysis, historical memory, and populist mobilization, his reflections illuminate how Brexit has reshaped not only policy but also political imagination.

In his interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Corner advances a sober conclusion captured in the headline of this conversation: “With Brexit, the UK has lost more than it has gained.” That judgment is not presented as a dramatic slogan, but as the outcome of a broader reassessment now taking place in British public life. As he puts it, “most economists would agree that the UK has lost more than it has gained,” and if that were not so, “the present government would [not] be trying so hard to move back toward a closer economic relationship with the EU.” In this sense, Brexit appears less as a fulfilled promise of renewed sovereignty than as a strategic rupture whose costs have become increasingly difficult to deny.

Yet Professor Corner’s account is more layered than a narrow economic audit. He draws attention to one of the central ironies of Brexit politics: that a project framed around “taking back control” did not, in fact, restore parliamentary sovereignty. On the contrary, he argues, the referendum “assert[ed] popular sovereignty over parliamentary sovereignty,”since most MPs would have preferred to remain. Similarly, the promise that Britain could flourish once “freed from the shackles of the EU” has, in his view, been undermined by the enduring reality of geography, interdependence, and trade. The fantasy of becoming “Singapore-on-Thames” has largely faded, replaced by the quieter recognition that “a very large share of our trade is conducted with Europe.”

The interview also places Brexit within a broader political and historical frame. Professor Corner shows how populist and radical-right actors have successfully shifted the argument away from economic performance toward sovereignty, border control, and cultural identity. In doing so, they have helped transform British political conflict from an older class-based divide into a more complex terrain shaped by “social and cultural division alongside economic division.” At the same time, he warns that Brexit’s most profound destabilizing effects may ultimately be domestic rather than European. While the feared cascade of exits from the EU never materialized, the United Kingdom itself remains vulnerable to centrifugal pressures, particularly in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In his words, “in the long run, [these] may prove more troubling than the difficulties in the EU.”

In sum, Professor Corner’s reflections offer a penetrating and historically informed account of Brexit’s legacy. Far from vindicating the claims of its proponents, Brexit emerges here as a case study in the gap between populist promise and institutional consequence—one that continues to shape the future of Britain, Europe, and the politics of sovereignty itself.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Mark Corner, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Brexit Strains Britain More Than Europe

Professor Corner, welcome. In A Tale of Two Unions, you argue that Brexit must be understood simultaneously as a crisis of both the European Union and the British Union. Ten years on, how would you assess the relative degree of strain placed on each union, and has Brexit ultimately proven more destabilizing domestically than internationally?

Professor Mark Corner: I think it has. When the UK left in 2016, I remember seeing a book titled The EU: An Obituary.A lot of people thought that the UK’s departure would trigger a stampede. People began to talk about Nexit or Swexit after Brexit. But it didn’t happen. 

It is important to note that, despite all the recent difficulties with Hungary, it did not leave the EU. It was not expelled from the EU. Yes, pressure was brought upon it, and in the recent election, it got rid of Orbán. But all this has happened with Hungary remaining a member of the EU.

In the case of the UK, there is an instability built into the fact that it is effectively a multinational state: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. It seems to me that the UK has done very little to develop some kind of stable constitutional structure around which these different nations can coalesce. I think there are difficulties. The forthcoming elections next month will show that there are difficulties. In fact, there will quite possibly be a nationalist first minister in Scotland, similarly in Wales, and there already is Michelle O’Neill in Northern Ireland. So, there will be difficulties in the UK, and in the long run, they may prove more troubling than the difficulties in the EU.

Economic Reality Undercuts Sovereignty Claims

Your work highlights the tension between parliamentary sovereignty and supranational governance. To what extent does the post-Brexit economic record—particularly reduced trade and investment—challenge the political narrative that “taking back control” enhances state capacity?

Professor Mark Corner: There are certain ironies here. There was a great deal of talk about taking back parliamentary control in 2016. But in fact, the Brexit vote did the very opposite. If Parliament had had the authority to decide on Brexit, a majority of MPs were against it. Effectively, what the referendum did was to assert popular sovereignty over parliamentary sovereignty. Members of Parliament—most of whom would have preferred to remain—accepted that this popular vote must be binding. I think that was the correct decision. But it hardly amounted to strengthening parliamentary sovereignty. So, I am not sure Brexit really led to that. It strengthened an idea of popular sovereignty, and that is something about which there can be a number of questions. But I do not think it strengthened parliamentary sovereignty.

As for the trade arguments, the general view in the UK now is that Brexit has not been beneficial to trade. In 2016, many people had the idea that, freed from the shackles of the EU, we could go out and strike ambitious trade deals with the far corners of the world—a deal with Japan, a deal with India—we would be free, no longer moored to Europe. But the reality is that, even in the 21st century, geographical proximity remains crucial, and a very large share of our trade is conducted with Europe. You can see the present government trying, as far as it can, to nudge itself back toward a closer economic relationship with the EU. This is quite different from the atmosphere under Boris Johnson, with all the talk of becoming “Singapore-on-Thames”—the idea that Britain could roam the world and secure major trade deals simply by freeing itself from Europe. That notion has largely disappeared.

Policy Shifts Signal Economic Costs

If we move beyond rhetoric to measurable indicators—GDP performance, trade volumes, FDI, labor market shifts—how would you construct a balanced “Brexit scorecard”? Does the empirical record validate or undermine the core claims of Brexit proponents?

Professor Mark Corner: Scorecards differ, and economists always arrive at different figures. You know the saying that an economist is someone who, if you ask for a phone number, gives you an estimate.

I would have to speak in general terms: most economists would agree that the UK has lost more than it has gained. If that were not the case, I do not think the present government would be trying so hard to move back toward a closer economic relationship with the EU.

In the last few days, there has been discussion of whether the UK could align with EU rules without having to secure a vote in Parliament on every measure. That is, in political terms, a dangerous way to proceed, but it is being considered because, economically, the government perceives the scorecard as pointing toward as close an alignment as possible for the UK’s benefit. I do not think it would pursue this course otherwise.

Populists Shift Debate to Identity

How has populist discourse, particularly on the radical and far right, managed to reinterpret or neutralize the economic costs of Brexit by shifting emphasis toward sovereignty, identity, and cultural autonomy?

Professor Mark Corner: That is an important point to make: the arguments are not simply about whether Brexit is economically beneficial. They also involve these other questions, and even during the 2016 campaign there were people on the Remain side who said, look, we are talking too much in terms of economics alone—we should think more broadly.

There is no doubt that issues like immigration were a very important factor in precipitating the Brexit vote. The idea that the UK could take back control of its borders, decide who was going to come in if it left the EU, and thereby maintain its cultural identity and its sovereignty was a very powerful argument at the time, and that has to be recognized. At the same time, there are some very powerful arguments against that position. There is a strong case in favor of multicultural and multinational society that has been built up in the UK over the last 50 years, and I do not think that is emphasized enough.

Because I am old, I can go back to the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, there were arguments about admitting members of the former British Empire, and there was talk of an “Asian” or “Black” invasion—the language was very racist. Yet at that time there was actually net emigration from the UK, so there was no real issue of rising numbers. The only objection could have been that people did not like those who were not white coming in.

I do not see that in the 21st century. There is still racism, of course, but it is not like it was in the 1960s or 1970s. People generally accept that society is made up of many different cultural backgrounds, and that this is worthwhile—that it is a benefit.

There is, however, a different kind of problem, which is that overall numbers—irrespective of color or ethnic background—have been rising very quickly. Any country whose population is increasing rapidly year by year is going to face difficulties adapting to that, whether or not it is beneficial in the long run. So, the nature of the argument is different from that of the 1960s or 1970s.

I also think it is rather unfortunate that even in 2016, when David Cameron tried to renegotiate terms with the EU, he did not say that we need a period in which to stabilize the numbers coming into the UK, regardless of their background. Within the EU, there are countries like Bulgaria, whose population fell from 9 million to 7 million and which face the opposite problem—they cannot stabilize their numbers because too many people have been leaving.

So, there might have been an opportunity to say that, yes, there is the principle of the four freedoms, but there are also moments when it is reasonable to argue that we need to stabilize population flows.

It has all become rather ironic, because the main issue over the last five or ten years since Brexit has not been large numbers of people coming from other parts of the EU, but from outside the EU. That is not in itself a problem, but rapid shifts in numbers, whether upward or downward, can create difficulties.

I find the idea of identity quite interesting. If you look at London, it has a Muslim mayor, Sadiq Khan. He has won three times and may win a fourth in 2028. He is very keen on rejoining the EU. He is 100 percent a Londoner, but also 100 percent a Muslim. It seems to me that there is a very positive sense of a multinational, multicultural identity—certainly in cities like London, but also in other parts of the UK—which should not be underestimated.

Identity Politics Deepens Divisions

Brexit
Photo: Lucian Milasan / Dreamstime.

Recent research suggests Brexit has produced enduring identity-based polarization (“Leavers” vs. “Remainers”). How does this align with your analysis of narrative construction and “historical arcs” in British political consciousness?

Professor Mark Corner: There is no doubt that there is a divide between Leavers and Remainers—you are right about that. It is reflected, for example, in the fact that the Reform Party at present shows a strong degree of continuity with UKIP and the Brexiteers of ten years ago. So, there is certainly a divide in the country.

But, of course, there has always been a political divide in the UK; it has simply been understood in different terms. Traditionally, people spoke of UK politics in terms of a strong class divide between the middle class and the working class, with Labour representing the working class and the Conservatives the middle class. That has largely broken down.

To some extent, this kind of division—once seen primarily in economic terms—has not been replaced but rather supplemented by a division in more cultural and identity-based terms: between those who are comfortable living in a multinational society and those who are not, and who feel that they are losing their identity.

Of course, the question then becomes: within the UK, do we mean identity as English, Welsh, Scottish, Irish, or British? There are all sorts of questions about which identity we are referring to. So, there has always been division, but it has perhaps become more complex—combining social and cultural divisions alongside economic ones.

You can now see people who might traditionally have voted Labour, who are working class, choosing instead to vote Reform because they feel their identity is under threat, and that this matters more than protecting their economic livelihood. It has become a more complicated picture.

Narratives Replace Clear Policy

You warn against selective historical narratives that privilege moments of “splendid isolation.” To what extent has the far right—particularly figures like Nigel Farage and his UK Reform—successfully mobilized such narratives to legitimize Brexit and its aftermath?

Professor Mark Corner: The key point about the far right is that it largely consists of people who feel fed up with the way things are but do not have a very clear idea of how they could be better. My idea of what a populist is—though this may be a definition open to question—is someone who does not actually have a very clear idea of what they believe in. For them, politics becomes something like a sport. They latch onto people’s resentments and think about how to express them more effectively, how to take them further, and how to turn them into a real political campaign. I do not think they necessarily have a clear policy agenda. You may disagree with this, but I think for many people populism is a kind of sport—a very dangerous one—in which they do not generate ideas themselves but instead observe what people are saying and try to express those views even more forcefully.

So, it is often very difficult to pin things down exactly. Who, for example, can say precisely what the economic program of Nigel Farage is? This is partly a reaction to the fact that it is also quite difficult to say what the economic program of Keir Starmer is. There is a kind of vacuum in the center of British politics as well. To that extent, the rise of the Green Party is rather significant, because it does appear to be offering—at some risk to itself—some very clear ideas about what it would like to see happen. I do not see that coming from any other part of the British political spectrum.

Reform UK Channels Public Discontent

A placard urging voters to support Richard Pearse, the Reform UK candidate at the general election in Weston-super-Mare, UK on July 4, 2024. Photo: Keith Ramsey / Dreamstime.

How do you interpret the rise of Reform UK within the broader trajectory of populist radical right (PRR) politics in Britain? Is it a continuation of Brexit-era mobilization or a transformation into a more permanent political force?

Professor Mark Corner: It is certainly linked to the Brexiteers, but it is more a reflection of feelings of resentment and of being left out on the part of a significant minority of the population—people who feel they have been bypassed and ignored by the mainstream parties. To some extent, I think that is true. The Labour Party has notoriously taken for granted the support of people in poorer areas of the country and has not paid sufficient attention to their needs. That is perfectly true.

But, as I said, the idea that the Reform Party has really developed a clear program that attracts some and rejects others, beyond its hostility to immigration, is questionable. If you take the other side of the political spectrum, one may disagree with what the Greens propose, but it comes down to some very concrete proposals. For example, a 2% tax on the very rich—one may think this would lead to them all running off to the Bahamas and be economically catastrophic, or one may think it is a very good way of raising money—but it is at least clear. I do not see that sort of clarity from Reform, and I therefore wonder whether it is more than an expression of disaffection.

Populists Turn EU Skepticism into Power

Before 2016, Euroscepticism was not a dominant voter concern. In your view, how did it become the central axis of political mobilization, and what role did populist entrepreneurs play in this transformation?

Professor Mark Corner: Oh, gosh—there is a long answer to that. There has always been a problem in the UK in seeing EU membership as being in its economic interest. It is partly because of when we joined in 1973, after dealing with a couple of vetoes from de Gaulle in the 1960s—we first applied in 1961. We got in at the very moment when the post-war boom collapsed. There was an oil crisis, a little bit similar to today, and this precipitated very difficult economic circumstances in the 1970s. So, it was very easy for people in the UK to say that it was when we joined that economic community that all our troubles began. The 1960s were good years economically, and then we joined at the moment of crisis.

We also joined when there were the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy, which, whether good or bad, did not particularly benefit the UK, given its relatively small agricultural sector. Then there were all those arguments in the 1980s, when it was said that Britain was paying too much into the EU budget, and Mrs. Thatcher was running around saying, “we want our money back.” In that situation, it was very difficult to argue that, overall, EU membership was economically beneficial.

Then, of course, you had the campaign in 2016, with Nigel Farage and his big red bus, saying this is what we pay into the EU, and that we would get all our money back and invest it instead in the National Health Service, as he wrote on the side of the bus—totally ignoring all the money that came the other way. But he got away with it, because there was a fairly widespread feeling in the UK that it had not done well economically from being in the EU, and had not from the beginning. There is more of a sense now that the UK would do well economically by being part of the EU than there was for a long time when we were inside it.

Brexit Accelerates Culture Wars

Protest
XR protest in solidarity with refugees and climate migrants in Westminster, London, April 23, 2023. Photo: Jessica Girvan / Dreamstime.

To what extent has Brexit accelerated the shift from class-based politics to culture-war polarization, and how has this benefited Populist Radical Right (PRR) actors in structuring political competition?

Professor Mark Corner: I think it has. If you leave a group of 28 and say, no, we want to be on our own—we had too much cooperation, we were too close to you, and we want to get further away—then it does rather support the idea that people want to shut themselves up within their own separate identity.

But at the same time, there is perhaps a greater awareness now that we benefit more by working together. That includes cooperation with other EU countries. If you think of how vulnerable the UK feels at the moment—in terms of everything happening in Ukraine and the perceived unreliability of Trump—there is a growing sense that we really do need to work together with the EU, because otherwise we could be picked off separately. Then, that you can see, in political as well as economic terms, a strong incentive to engage with European countries, for instance in sharing the defense burden. Every week, I read articles about how the UK needs to spend more money on defense, warning that otherwise we are going to be attacked at dawn.

One of the things to note is that there is a great deal of wasted spending in defense, partly because different European countries do not cooperate. Eight years ago, President Macron suggested a common European army, but you do not hear much about that when UK defense chiefs argue that we must increase defense spending.

So, there is a strong case—not just in the economic sphere but also in the defense sphere—for taking a much more serious European approach. That may be one of the most important factors in the years ahead, because there is no doubt that we are in a very dangerous and vulnerable situation, and in such circumstances, people naturally think we should come together with those who are our friends—and that is, obviously, the other European countries.

Brexit Costs Fail to Shift Votes

Given the documented decline in trade integration and investment, why has this not translated into a sustained electoral backlash against Brexit-aligned parties? Does this reflect the resilience of populist framing?

Professor Mark Corner: I do not think it is simply a matter of populist framing. Getting back into the EU would not be easy, and one cannot simply assume that 27 countries would welcome the UK with open arms. The UK has caused a good deal of difficulty by leaving, and people might reasonably ask whether it would create further complications by returning. So, I do not think there is an easy path back in.

We might also have to accept certain conditions if we were to rejoin—things that have not been popular in the past. For instance, the EU might say that, as a new applicant, the UK would have to join the Eurozone. One could easily imagine political arguments arising from that. So, it is not a straightforward route.

In some ways, it might be preferable for the UK to approach the question more along the lines of Norway. Norway voted not to join the EU, partly because of the Common Fisheries Policy and its 2,000 miles of coastline. At the same time, however, it is part of the single market and contributes financially in order to participate. It may be that something along these lines would be a better option for the UK.

There is a genuine debate about how the UK should move closer to Europe. There is, however, a growing sense that it should be closer—not only for economic reasons, but also for political ones. When one considers the current geopolitical context—one superpower pressing in from the east, as in Ukraine, and another expressing interest in places such as Greenland in the west—it may be sensible to work more closely with allies in between.

I do not want to see this only in economic terms. Cultural considerations matter as well, and one of those is the defense of democracy. Whatever our ethnic backgrounds, we are part of democratic societies, and on either side, there are powerful, sometimes autocratic states. So democratic values are something we may wish to emphasize when thinking about cultural identity—values that are shared with the rest of Europe, including Hungary, I am glad to say.

Brexit Fuels UK Fragmentation Risks

UK Map
Photo: Michele Ursi / Dreamstime.

Your book raises the possibility that Brexit could trigger centrifugal pressures within the UK itself. Ten years on, how do you assess the risks of fragmentation—particularly in Scotland and Northern Ireland—and their connection to Brexit politics?

Professor Mark Corner: I think it could happen. Imagine yourself as a Scotsman for a moment. You had a vote in 2014 on whether to stay inside the UK, and David Cameron argued that leaving the UK would mean finding yourself outside the EU—and that this was not desirable. The Scots were quite influenced by this and voted to remain in the UK. Two years later, in the Brexit vote, the Scots voted to stay in the EU, yet the rest of the UK—England and Wales, at any rate—dragged them out. They may well feel that they were misled two years earlier. It is not surprising that many Scots feel betrayed. Another referendum is hardly impossible. At the time, it was described as a once-in-a-generation event. Well, fine—once in a generation—that was 2014. 2039 is not that far away; it is just over a decade from now. So, I would not be surprised if there were another referendum in the 2030s.

What has the UK done about this? It could have taken steps, and perhaps still could. It might say: look, we have this House of Lords—what is it actually doing? It is appointed, not democratic. It is, in effect, “North Korea on Thames.” It could be transformed into a second chamber in which the different nations and regions are represented, rather like the Bundesrat in Germany. This is especially relevant now, because it has often been argued that the imbalance in population—3 million Welsh, 5 million Scots, and 60 million English—makes such a structure unworkable. But the 60 million English can now be broken down: there is Andy Burnham in Manchester, a mayor of Liverpool, a mayor of the Northeast Combined Authority, and a mayor of London. They could form part of a second chamber with real powers, including, arguably, some veto authority. If that kind of constitutional reform were seriously developed in the UK—it has been suggested but never pursued very far—that is what is needed.

Without real constitutional reform, such as a powerful second chamber in which the nations and regions are represented, the centrifugal forces you mention are likely to prove too strong. It is not enough simply to talk about devolving more powers to Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland; they need to be brought into a genuinely national second chamber where they can exercise central authority.

Pressures Grow Within States, Not Between Them

Finally, do you see Brexit as a unique case, or as a broader “laboratory” illustrating the structural tension between globalization and national sovereignty—one that continues to fuel populist radical right movements across Europe?

Professor Mark Corner: There are obviously other dimensions to this. There are really two questions: do I think that other countries, or other member states, will try to leave the EU? In the short to medium term, I do not see that happening. There are, however, movements within member states—one might think, for example, of Catalonia—where there are quite powerful pressures, and it is possible that these will create certain difficulties in the years ahead. But they may not.

If nation-states are prepared to share power internally, in the same way that, as members of the EU, they share power externally, then such outcomes can be avoided. Of course, I cannot predict the future. But what I do not see is the kind of queue of member states leaving the EU that was once suggested  — John Gillingham wrote The EU: An Obituary ten years ago. That scenario is not materializing. The pressure to leave exists primarily within nation-states rather than between them.

Professor Jonathan Portes

Ten Years on with Brexit / Prof. Portes: Brexit Has Not Solved Britain’s Problems; It Made Them Worse

As the United Kingdom nears the tenth anniversary of the 2016 Brexit referendum, Professor Jonathan Portes offers a sober, evidence-based reassessment of its economic and political legacy. In this ECPS interview, Professor Portes argues that Brexit did not resolve the structural problems it promised to overcome; rather, “the UK still confronts the same fundamental problems it did 10 years ago,” and, in key respects, they have worsened. Drawing on a decade of research on trade, migration, labor markets, and policy autonomy, he shows how weakened investment, reduced integration, and persistent political tensions have defined the post-Brexit settlement. Moving beyond slogans, Professor Portes situates Brexit within broader debates on sovereignty, interdependence, and populist politics in an increasingly unstable international order.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the United Kingdom approaches the tenth anniversary of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the debate has moved decisively from slogan to scrutiny, from promises of restored sovereignty to the measurable consequences of economic and political separation. In this context, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) is pleased to host Professor Jonathan Portes, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the School of Politics & Economics, King’s College London, whose extensive scholarship has been central to understanding the economic and labor-market consequences of Brexit. Throughout the past decade, Professor Portes has offered one of the most rigorous and evidence-based assessments of how trade, migration, policy autonomy, and public expectations have evolved under the post-Brexit settlement.

This interview is framed by a stark and sobering conclusion that runs through Professor Portes’s reflections: Brexit did not resolve the structural dilemmas it claimed it would overcome. Rather, as he puts it, “the UK still confronts the same fundamental problems it did 10 years ago.” The core promise of Brexit, he argues, was that it would allow Britain to escape the constraints associated with globalization, immigration, and post-2008 economic stagnation. Yet the reality has been quite different. “Rather than solving those problems,” he observes, Brexit “has probably made them worse.” In Professor Portes’s analysis, the UK remains what it always was: “a middle-sized, advanced Western European economy,”still grappling with familiar pressures, but now doing so from a more exposed and less advantageous position.

The interview explores this argument across several interrelated domains. On the economic front, Professor Portes notes that the evidence on growth, trade, productivity, and investment has broadly confirmed the mainstream pre-referendum consensus: Brexit was never likely to produce collapse, but it would impose “significant and material long-term damage”on British economic prospects. Trade, especially goods trade, emerges in his account as the most enduring site of disruption, while weakened investment and reduced integration with the European market suggest an adaptation process that may culminate in a “permanent loss of integration.”

On migration, Professor Portes offers an especially illuminating account of Brexit’s unintended consequences. Rather than simply reducing immigration, Brexit reconfigured it, replacing free movement from within the EU with larger-than-expected inflows from outside it. That outcome, he suggests, exposed a contradiction at the heart of the Leave campaign: the demand for both lower migration and greater economic flexibility under national control. More broadly, the interview shows how the promise of sovereignty often failed to produce meaningful control in practice. As Professor Portes cautions, sovereignty “in the abstract legal and political sense does not necessarily translate into having control.”

Taken together, Professor Portes’s reflections offer a penetrating assessment of Brexit not as a completed nationalist correction, but as a prolonged and costly reconfiguration of Britain’s political economy. His analysis challenges triumphalist narratives from both the sovereigntist and populist right, while posing deeper questions about the limits of national autonomy in an interdependent world.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Jonathan Portes, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Brexit Has Intensified, Not Resolved, Structural Economic Pressures

A Brexit Day ‘Independence’ parade was held at Whitehall and on Parliament Square in London to celebrate the UK leaving the European Union on January 31, 2020.

Professor Portes, welcome. You have been among the most careful and empirically grounded observers of Brexit’s economic and political consequences over the past decade. As we approach the ten-year mark since the 2016 referendum, how would you characterize the overall trajectory of the UK economy and policy landscape under Brexit? What stands out most when you step back and take a long view?

Professor Jonathan Portes: I think what stands out most, perhaps, is that the UK still confronts the same fundamental problems it did 10 years ago. The UK remains very much a middle-sized, advanced Western European economy, with many of the same issues and problems as other such economies. The difference, however, is that Brexit was, in some ways, touted as a means for the UK to escape some of those problems, issues, and constraints relating to globalization, immigration, and economic stagnation since 2008, as well as a range of political problems within the UK that arose from those economic challenges.

But rather than solving those problems, as Brexit was presented as doing by some of its proponents, it has probably made them worse. This is partly because it led, obviously, to a period of political chaos in the UK. Even after that, and despite a degree of relative stability being restored, it has possibly caused some damage to the UK’s political institutions. At the same time, rather than resolving any of these political economy problems, it has arguably exacerbated them.

In other words, the difficulties of managing globalization and its impacts were already very apparent when the UK was a member of the EU. They manifested themselves partly through EU membership and partly outside it. However, outside the EU, these difficulties have become even starker. Rather than being resolved by Brexit, as was hoped, they have become more visible and more difficult. This is partly due to the structural contradiction of Brexit itself. It is also, of course, partly the result of global developments since then—most notably the election of Trump—which have made the UK’s position outside the EU more difficult for fairly obvious reasons.

Growth, Trade, and Investment Have Weakened as Expected

Much of your work highlights the gap between political expectations and economic outcomes—particularly in areas like growth, trade, and migration. Looking across the evidence now available, how should we understand the real costs of Brexit compared to what was anticipated or promised at the time?

Professor Jonathan Portes: Of course, politicians on both sides said a lot about Brexit. In terms of the economic impacts of Brexit on things like growth, trade, and investment, this is one area where we economists can actually be rather pleased with ourselves. Economic forecasts rarely turn out to be accurate, and of course there is still quite a lot of debate about the precise impacts of Brexit. But we now have a wide range of economic evidence on the impact on growth, trade, and investment, and it is pretty much entirely consistent with the mainstream economic consensus that I and others formed part of, before Brexit: that Brexit would not be a complete catastrophe for the UK economy, but it would do significant and material long-term damage to our economic prospects by reducing growth, productivity growth, trade, and investment. And all of those have been fairly clearly borne out.

The interesting difference is on migration, where both I and others thought that Brexit would reduce migration through the free movement channel within the EU, which would only be partly offset by increased inflows from outside the EU. In fact, it has turned out that the direction for both of those numbers has been correct. But the relative magnitudes were wrong, and the increase in migration from outside the EU has more than offset the reduction in flows within the EU. As a result, the UK population and labor force are actually larger than they would have been without Brexit, not smaller. That provides, not a small, offset to the negative impacts of Brexit, although it has also generated a great deal of political backlash. From an economic point of view, however, this is a positive—though certainly not by anywhere near enough to offset the negative impacts of Brexit on trade and investment.

Trade Took the Hardest Hit, While Services Showed Resilience

If we think of Brexit as a large, multi-dimensional economic shock, where do you see its most significant and lasting effects—across trade, investment, labor markets, and productivity—and which of these have proven more resilient than many expected?

Professor Jonathan Portes: The biggest persistent shock has been to trade, particularly trade in goods. The UK did quite well out of EU membership in terms of being integrated into pan-European and hence pan-global supply chains for goods. We have seen that small and medium-sized exporters benefited from being able to export to the EU without regulation or red tape. And, of course, British consumers benefited from frictionless imports from within the EU. None of that has disappeared completely—you still have trade under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and the EU remains by far our largest trading partner. But nonetheless, there has been a significant impact, particularly for those manufacturers integrated into global supply chains, who have faced increased costs as a result, and also for some of those small and medium-sized businesses that benefited from frictionless trade within the single market.

On the more resilient side, there has also been some damage to the financial services sector, which, of course, was a major issue in the run-up to Brexit. Again, the UK’s financial services sector is large and resilient, and London remains by far the largest financial center in Europe, but it is nonetheless somewhat smaller than it would have been without Brexit. There has been some damage there, but the sector is not going anywhere and will continue to be an important part of the UK economy.

There has been more resilience in other areas of the high-productivity tradable services sector—things like consultancy, legal services, and accountancy—where trade barriers were never that large, because there are no tariffs and there is less in the way of regulation than in financial services. Hence, the UK has actually done pretty well; it has not just been resilient but has also seen very fast growth in those sectors. This has helped preserve the overall picture and means that the economic impacts have not been as clear, as severe, or as visible as they might have been, as some people at one end of the spectrum feared.

And then on the labor market, there was considerable concern that the end of free movement would do quite a bit of damage to sectors that relied on European migration. While migration from outside the EU is not a perfect substitute—because it involves different types of people in different sectors with different skills and so on— overall, the rather large increase in non-EU migration has done a lot to cushion the UK labor market and sectors that are dependent on migrant labor from what the impacts would otherwise have been. So, it has been a mixed picture.

Short-Term Adjustment, Long-Term Disintegration

Brexit.
Photo: Dreamstime.

There is now substantial evidence that UK trade with the EU has underperformed relative to its pre-Brexit trajectory, alongside signs of weakened investment. How should we interpret these developments in structural terms—do they reflect a permanent loss of integration, or an ongoing process of economic adaptation?

Professor Jonathan Portes: I think the answer is, in some ways, both. It is an ongoing process of adaptation that, eventually, leads to a permanent loss of integration, assuming that the new situation continues as it is. Of course, because this has done significant damage to the UK economy, both politicians and the public are now trying to think of ways to reverse that damage, at least in part. So, we do not know exactly where we will be in five or ten years. But if the current status quo continues, then you have, as you suggest, a process of adaptation that has partly happened but still has some way to run, leading to a permanent loss of integration.

On the other hand, as I said, there are now active discussions acknowledging that this is a bad outcome—recognized as such from an economic perspective by the UK public and policy establishment—and efforts are being made to think of ways to reverse it, at least to some extent.

Migration Fell from the EU, Rose from Elsewhere

Your research shows that Brexit fundamentally reshaped the composition of migration rather than reducing it overall, with declines in EU-origin workers offset by increases from non-EU countries. How should we interpret this outcome in relation to the central political promise of “taking back control”?

Professor Jonathan Portes: This is absolutely fascinating, because there was a very large implicit contradiction in some of the arguments made by pro-Brexit campaigners, which sought to present it both as a way of substantially reducing immigration overall and, by taking back control, ensuring that migration policy would be tailored to the needs of the UK economy or labor market, rather than dictated by EU rules.

But it turned out that, particularly at the time of Brexit and in the aftermath of the pandemic, the interpretation of the then-government—which was the government that delivered Brexit—was that what the UK economy needed was a significant increase in migration, and that is what we got. So, you had people within the Brexit movement saying, “We have been betrayed, immigration is going up,” and others saying, “No, we have control—yes, immigration is going up, but it is immigration that is entirely under our control and dictated by the needs of the UK economy and labor market.”

That contradiction was always implicit in some of the claims made by Brexit proponents at the time of the referendum, when it was never entirely clear whether they were making a concrete pledge to reduce immigration or not. But nobody, certainly not me, expected that contradiction to become so obvious and so large as it did in the post-pandemic period, because of the significant labor shortages that emerged post-Brexit and post-pandemic in the UK, and, to some extent, in other countries as well. 

The result is that the UK political system has not really been able to cope with this. It has done a great deal of damage to the Conservative Party and has been one of the significant factors behind the rise of the Reform Party, contributing to divisions within the Conservative Party. Despite the fact that the Labour Party opposed Brexit but is now having to manage this new post-Brexit immigration system, it is also leading to very severe tensions within the Labour Party and the current government between those who believe that immigration needs to be reduced regardless of the needs of the economy, and those who, for economic or broader political reasons, think that, on the whole, a relatively liberal and open immigration system is a good thing.

Migration Policy Reveals the Limits of Political Steering

In your analysis, the UK has moved from a largely automatic free-movement regime to a highly managed, points-based system—yet with outcomes still strongly shaped by labor demand and external shocks. Does this suggest limits to how far governments can actually steer migration and labor markets?

Professor Jonathan Portes: It illustrates the difficulties and contradictions in having control. One of the perceived disadvantages, from a political point of view, of free movement was that we could not say who could come. People would simply come and go as they wished, and we had no control over that because of EU rules. But the upside, of course, was that this had two advantages. From an economic perspective, it meant that these flows were, to a significant extent, determined by the market. Labor demand led to people coming in, a weak labor market led to people leaving, and these things happened more or less automatically. From an economic perspective, that, on the whole, is a good thing.

But the second advantage was political, and I think people did not fully appreciate it. Governments could largely sit back and say, “well, these are market decisions, and we do not have the remit to interfere with them,” so migration could be somewhat removed from the political process. The disadvantage of the current system, as it has turned out, is that having control means there is a great deal of political pressure on governments to do something about migration, regardless of whether it is actually a problem in economic terms.

That leads to sharp swings in policy, and often, as we are seeing at the moment, swings that are somewhat counter cyclical. This reflects an old problem that we used to discuss as macroeconomists with demand management through fiscal policy in a Keynesian framework: in principle, it is good to cut taxes when the economy is weak and increase taxes when the economy is strong. But in practice, because governments react slowly and economic data comes through with delays, it often turns out that policies are implemented at the wrong time—by the time you cut taxes, the economy is already recovering, or by the time you raise taxes, the economy is already weakening.

We seem to be seeing something similar with migration. The government was panicked by the large rise in migration in 2022 and 2023 and has now put in place very draconian measures to reduce migration at exactly the time when migration to the UK was already falling very sharply. That is a very bad way of making policy. We have control—this is all entirely under government control—but we have ended up with policy where that control is being exercised in a way that is quite damaging economically and does not really convince the public that we actually have control. To the public, it looks as though the government is just flailing around and does not really know what it is doing. To be honest, they are not wrong about that.

Mismanaged Migration Policy Fuels Shortages and Bottlenecks

Air Travellers Proceed to Passport Control at a British Airport. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have described post-Brexit migration patterns as producing “unintended consequences,” particularly in terms of scale and sectoral distribution. To what extent do these dynamics help explain persistent labor shortages, sectoral imbalances, and broader economic bottlenecks?

Professor Jonathan Portes: I think it goes back to what I just said, which is that, as in many other things, a relatively free market is the worst possible way of managing the matching of supply and demand, except for all the other ways of doing it. So, when you have a government that is trying, in some way, to use the migration system to match supply and demand and is also doing so in an environment where it faces all these political constraints, real or imagined, it ends up getting things wrong.

Partly this is because you simply cannot manage an economy or a labor market in that way, and partly it is due to politics. Once you have said you are in control, and that everything is under control, you face pressure to make policy changes that are not necessarily justified by anything in particular, except perceived political pressures. As a result, the government ends up getting a number of things wrong.

This has been particularly evident in the health and care sector, where the government liberalized probably too much, too quickly, in a way that did not take account of the dynamics of the immigration system or the labor market, and has now tightened up too much, too quickly, again without taking those dynamics into account, or considering how the labor market works or its own role in shaping pay and conditions in this workforce.

The result is both poor policymaking and poor political outcomes—shortages, bottlenecks, and broader imbalances. It also causes significant harm to individuals caught up in this system, including migrants, who can find the rug pulled out from under them and are sometimes treated very badly, both by their employers and by the government, as well as the people who depend on care—the consumers of these services—who ultimately should be our primary concern.

Widespread Impact Undermines Claims of Uneven Gains

Brexit’s economic consequences have not been evenly distributed. How important are these distributional effects—for workers, firms, and regions—in shaping both the economic outcomes and the political sustainability of Brexit?

Professor Jonathan Portes: In one sense, there has been a great deal of work on the regional impacts of Brexit, and I am not sure it has demonstrated that they are as differential as one might expect. You can, of course, point to very specific examples, such as the loss of European regional funding in some disadvantaged areas. There has also been a particularly negative impact on parts of the food and agriculture sector. I mentioned the City of London and the financial services sector, but overall, the impact has been quite diffuse across the economy as a whole.

So, you can point to individuals or particular businesses that have been put out of business by Brexit, and there are people who are especially dependent on certain sectors. But beyond that, there has mostly been a general pattern of lower growth, lower trade, and lower investment, affecting pretty much the entire UK economy to a greater or lesser extent.

You can see that in the opinion polling. The view that Brexit has been an economic failure is very widely shared across UK society. It is very hard to find a section or interest group that says Brexit was great for them, even if it was bad for others. Rather, there is a broad consensus that, from an economic point of view, Brexit has been a failure across the board. So, while you can identify individuals or businesses that have suffered much more than someone like me, for the most part it has been a broadly shared, generalized negative impact.

Formal Sovereignty Cannot Override Economic Realities

Your work suggests that while Brexit restored formal policy autonomy, outcomes have remained difficult to control in practice. Does this point to a deeper structural tension between political sovereignty and economic interdependence in advanced economies?

Professor Jonathan Portes: Yes, and I think that goes back to what I was saying before. You may or may not have thought it was plausible for the UK to argue, in 2016, that as a middle-sized, advanced economy—like other European countries—dependent on global trade and investment, there were nonetheless various structural, political, and economic reasons why it should not be part of the EU. Partly political—we have a different political tradition—and partly structural and economic. We are much more dependent on services trade, particularly high-value services, and while we are economically integrated with the EU, it is not to the same extent as countries like Germany or France. So, the UK could, and should, for this combination of reasons, be independent, make its own trade policy, and make its own, to some extent, foreign policy, retain close economic links with the EU, but not subordinate its political, economic, or trade decision-making to the EU. And we could make a success of it as a global economy, just as some other countries—whether Singapore or Australia, or to some extent Switzerland—have done. That case was always flawed, and most economists thought it was flawed, but it was not obviously unreasonable.

But it is now pretty clear that geopolitical developments over the last ten years have been very unfavorable to that strategy. It is much easier to pursue such a strategy when there is a benign, liberal hegemon—or perhaps two hegemonic powers, the US and China—both with a strong interest in a stable, liberal international trading order that accommodates countries in the position I have just described. You can argue about what might have happened without Trump. I think it is plausible that even without Trump, we would have been moving, to some extent, in the direction we are already going, which would have made that strategy increasingly implausible. But it is clear that Trump has accelerated this trajectory, to the point where that strategy now looks unrealistic.

That is where we are now, unfortunately. Even if Trump himself were reversed, it is very hard to see a return to the sort of benign, liberal international trading order I described—one in which a middle-sized power like the UK can comfortably pursue an independent path while still participating fully in global trade.

Brexit Reconfigures Long-Standing Migration Debates

In your work on free movement and the UK, you situate Brexit within a longer trajectory of labor mobility and political contestation. From that perspective, does Brexit represent a rupture, or a reconfiguration of deeper structural tensions within the British political economy?

Professor Jonathan Portes: It is very much the latter. Immigration—both its political, economic, and social consequences—has been an issue in British politics that has gone up and down in prominence for a very long time, certainly in the post-war era, from the mid-1950s to now, over the last 70 years. Brexit has clearly changed things. It has changed the system, as we have just discussed, and it has changed the environment. But many of the issues being contested now are very much the same as those that were contested in the 1960s, in the Powell era, were contested again in the 2000s immediately after enlargement, and are being contested today.

These include questions such as: to what extent is the UK—like other European countries, albeit in a different context—a country shaped by migration? What is the role of migration in a modern economy and labor market? What is its role given the demographic challenges and ageing that all our countries face? And what are the implications of migration for a country’s national and cultural identity?

We are not, for the most part, countries of immigration in the same way as the US, but equally, certainly in the UK—and in most of Europe—we are no longer monocultural or ethnically homogeneous societies either. Those who seek to take us back to that are very dangerous. So, the question becomes: what is the model of a multi-ethnic European democracy? That is something we are all struggling with. The UK was struggling with it before Brexit, and it is struggling with it now.

Brexit Pushed the Far Right Toward a European Strategy

Brexit was widely seen as a landmark moment for populist and sovereigntist politics, including the rise of far right and populist radical right mobilization around migration and national control. Looking back, how do you assess the relationship between Brexit and these broader political currents—both at the time and in their evolution over the past decade?

Professor Jonathan Portes: It has been quite interesting in that Brexit has, in a sense, forced European far-right movements to reconfigure their offer. What most of them seem to have recognized is that Brexit is neither a success nor is it perceived as a success, either domestically in the UK or in their own countries. So, you have far-right movements that were, at the time and immediately afterwards, flirting with their own ideas of exit from the European Union, but have now reconfigured themselves to retain the same focus on migration issues while embedding those concerns within a European frame rather than a purely domestic one.

This has, if anything, been bolstered by what we see from across the Atlantic, with figures such as J.D. Vance talking about European culture or European Christian values, rather than Italian or French values. So, you have this form of ethnically based, anti-immigrant nationalism that has, in a sense, shifted toward a European-level identity, alongside a domestic one.

In that respect, these movements have been, whether one likes it or not, quite effective in adapting. When you look at figures like Le Pen and Meloni, they have pivoted away from overt anti-Europeanism toward a form of European white nationalism.

Populist Right Is Here to Stay—but Its Shape Is Uncertain

Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party UKIP. Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party, speaking at Chatham House in London on March 31, 2014. Photo: Dominic Dudley / Dreamstim.

In the same context, how do you interpret the continued prominence of Nigel Farage and the rise of Reform UK within the UK’s political landscape? Does their trajectory suggest that Brexit has consolidated a durable populist radical right (PRR) and far-right constituency, or are we witnessing a more fluid and contingent phase of political realignment?

Professor Jonathan Portes: I hesitate to make predictions on this. But the obvious answer is a bit of both. The presence of Farage and the populist right in the UK is now well established; it is no longer a flash in the pan. We now have some years of it, so I think it is not going away. But how the current political shake-up in the UK plays out is very difficult to assess.

Structurally, our political system is configured around a two or two-and-a-half-party system. We have a roughly 50–50 division between right and left blocs, with a group of voters in the middle who are willing to support either side on occasion. That is a reasonably stable political configuration. But when you have four or five parties, the system becomes much more unstable, especially when these cleavages cut across both economic and socio-cultural dimensions.

It is not clear that the current first-past-the-post system is well suited to this new context. Whatever one thinks in the abstract about first-past-the-post versus different forms of proportional representation, the dynamics look very different in a two or two-and-a-half-party system than in a four or five-party system, where instability increases significantly.

So, it is very unclear how this will shake out. Populism—and in particular far-right populism—is certainly not going away in the UK. But how it will reconfigure the right of the UK political spectrum, and to what extent the more traditional conservative right, which still has a constituency in the UK, can reassert itself and regain control, remains very uncertain at the moment.

Economic Reality Challenges Populist Narratives

To what extent do the economic and migration outcomes of Brexit challenge or reinforce the core claims of populist narratives about globalization, elites, and national sovereignty?

Professor Jonathan Portes: As discussed, they illustrate some of the limitations of national sovereignty and the fact that sovereignty in the abstract legal and political sense does not necessarily translate into having control. There is a fundamental issue here: people felt that they wanted more control over their lives, and Brexit was sold to them as a way of achieving that, yet they certainly do not feel that this has been delivered. That is a fundamental problem.

It is also a fundamental problem for politicians, because it is very difficult to explain to people that, on the one hand, politicians need to demonstrate concretely that they have given people back some control over their lives, while on the other hand they must also be honest about the fact that there are areas where national governments simply cannot exercise control and must be realistic about those limits.

We are seeing this right now with oil and gas prices. The UK government cannot stop global oil and gas prices from rising. At some point, politicians have to be honest and say that we can try to protect the most vulnerable households and mitigate the impact of this economic shock, but it remains an economic shock, and that means the country as a whole is poorer, and we have to live with that.

Populists Shift Strategy as Exit Loses Appeal

Finally, for other sovereigntist or “exit” movements across Europe that have looked to Brexit as a model, what lessons—economic, political, or institutional—should be drawn from the UK’s experience over the past decade?

Professor Jonathan Portes: As I said, populists have correctly learned that Brexit, or its equivalent, is largely going to be a political loser, and they have pivoted away from that. They have shifted towards a more pan-European, ethnically based opposition to immigration—a form of pan-European white nationalism that mirrors some of what is going on in the US at the moment. To some extent, they have done this quite successfully in countries such as France and Italy.

To my mind, the challenge is for those of us who are not part of these movements and do not want to see them succeed: what is the narrative—economic, political, and cultural—that we use to push back against this and say that this is not the sort of Europe we want? The kind of Europe we seek to build is not one that will be economically successful, nor one that most people would want to live in. That is the challenge, and frankly, I do not think we have met it yet.

Ecuador Police

Security at What Cost? Punitive Populism and Democratic Trade-offs in Ecuador

In this commentary, Emilio Hernández examines Ecuador’s recent security crisis through the lens of punitive populism, offering a nuanced account of how crime control becomes intertwined with political legitimacy. Moving beyond conventional policy analysis, he demonstrates how states mobilize insecurity not only to justify coercive measures but to reshape the very logic of governance. By situating Ecuador’s militarized response within broader theoretical debates—from Bottoms and Garland to Simon’s “governing through crime”—the piece highlights how emergency discourse, symbolic action, and the construction of internal enemies converge to produce authority. Hernández’s analysis ultimately raises a critical question: when security becomes a political performance, what are the long-term costs for democratic institutions, rights, and accountability?

By Emilio Hernandez*

Security crises are rarely only about security. They are moments in which states redefine the boundaries of authority, recalibrate the balance between coercion and rights, and reconstruct their relationship with the public. In such contexts, crime ceases to be treated solely as a policy problem and becomes instead a central organizing principle of political action. The language of emergency, the visibility of force, and the promise of immediate control begin to shape not only how governments respond to violence, but also how they seek to be perceived. What emerges is not simply a shift in security policy, but a transformation in the political logic through which legitimacy is produced.

Ecuador provides a particularly illustrative case of these dynamics. Following a rapid deterioration of security conditions and the onset of a major crisis in early 2024, the government adopted a series of highly visible and coercive measures, including the militarization of public security, the expansion of punitive legal frameworks, and the articulation of a confrontational discourse centered on the identification of an internal enemy, often labeled as “terrorists” (Voss, 2024). 

These responses, while framed as necessary to restore order, also reconfigured the relationship between crime control and political authority. Rather than operating solely as instruments of crime control, these measures point toward a broader shift in governance, where punishment, coercion, and political communication converge. In this sense, Ecuador’s response can be understood as part of a wider turn toward punitive populism, in which the management of insecurity becomes inseparable from the construction of political legitimacy.

Punishment, Power, and the Politics of Insecurity

Moments of acute insecurity tend to reorganize the relationship between crime, politics, and state authority. In such contexts, criminality is no longer framed exclusively as a social problem to be addressed through technical or institutional responses. Instead, it becomes a central axis of political articulation, around which governments construct narratives of crisis, order, and control. As Jonathan Simon (2007) argues in his notion of “governing through crime,” crime increasingly operates as a framework through which political authority is exercised and communicated. A key feature of this transformation lies in the growing importance of visibility and immediacy. 

Political responses to insecurity are evaluated not only in terms of their effectiveness, but also in terms of their capacity to signal action, decisiveness, and control. As David Garland (2001) notes, contemporary crime control strategies are deeply embedded in a political logic that prioritizes responsiveness to public anxieties, often privileging symbolic action over expert-driven policy. In this sense, punitive measures acquire a dual function: they operate both as instruments of policy and as mechanisms of political communication.

It is at the intersection of crime control and political communication that the concept of punitive populism becomes analytically useful. Originally conceptualized by Anthony Bottoms (1995) and further developed by David Garland (2001) and John Pratt (2007), punitive populism refers to the political mobilization of crime and punishment in ways that appeal to public sentiment while expanding the scope and severity of penal intervention.

Crucially, as Elena Larrauri (2006) suggests, these dynamics are not merely a response to public demand but are actively shaped and amplified by political actors themselves. Under these conditions, the appeal of punitive action lies less in its long-term effectiveness than in its capacity to provide immediate reassurance and to align political authority with perceived public expectations. Punishment, in this sense, becomes not only a tool of control, but a central mechanism in the construction of political legitimacy.

From Crisis to Exception

Ecuador’s recent security crisis emerged from a rapid and profound transformation in patterns of violence, driven by the expansion and fragmentation of organized criminal groups, as well as the erosion of state control over key territories and prison systems. After years of relatively low levels of violence, homicide rates increased dramatically between 2020 and 2023, positioning the country among the most violent in the region (UNODC, 2023; Voss, 2024). This escalation culminated in early 2024 with a series of highly visible and coordinated events, including prison uprisings, attacks on public institutions, and the escape of a high-profile criminal leader, Adolfo Macías from a maximum-security prison, which exposed the limits of state capacity and intensified public perceptions of insecurity. 

The government’s response took the form of a series of exceptional measures that went beyond conventional crime control strategies. These included the formal declaration of an internal armed conflict, the expanded use of the military in domestic security roles, and the legal reclassification of criminal groups as terrorist organizations (International Crisis Group, 2025). 

At the same time, these policies were embedded within a broader transformation of legal frameworks and political discourse, in which insecurity was increasingly portrayed as an existential threat demanding immediate and decisive action. This approach has also relied heavily on the sustained use of emergency powers. According to the Ecuadorian Conflict Observatory (2025) some key provinces, including Guayas, Los Ríos, Manabí, and El Oro remained under states of exception for approximately 82% of the first two years of President Daniel Noboa’s administration, allowing the military to support policing functions while suspending certain constitutional protections.

Although these measures initially received broad public support and were associated with short-term reductions in violence, their longer-term impact has been more ambiguous. Levels of insecurity have remained persistently high, and in some cases have intensified, raising questions about the sustainability of this approach (International Crisis Group, 2025; Voss, 2026).

Reframing Crime as War

Crucially, these developments did not simply transform Ecuador’s security landscape; they redefined the political meaning of crime. The government’s framing of the crisis as an “internal armed conflict” marked a decisive shift from a criminal justice approach to a war-based logic of governance, in which crime is no longer treated as a social phenomenon but as an existential threat. This reframing enabled the expansion of executive power and the normalization of exceptional measures, while simultaneously constructing a clear moral boundary between “law-abiding citizens” and criminal actors, portrayed as enemies of the state. 

In this context, security policy became not only a tool for controlling violence but also a central mechanism for demonstrating political authority. The visibility of coercive action, including military deployment, mass arrests, and punitive reforms, served to signal decisiveness and control, reinforcing the government’s claim to legitimacy. Rather than being evaluated solely in terms of effectiveness, these measures functioned as political performances, aligning state authority with public demands for order and protection. As recent analyses suggest, the government’s “war on gangs” has struggled to produce sustained control, instead contributing to cycles of violence and instability (Dudley, 2025; Newton, 2026).

Mechanisms of Punitive Populism and Political Legitimacy

The Ecuadorian case shows that punitive populism operates through a set of mechanisms that translate insecurity into political authority. Rather than simply responding to crime, these mechanisms reshape how it is governed and communicated. First, crisis conditions enable the expansion of executive power. The declaration of an internal armed conflict facilitated the adoption of exceptional measures and the suspension of ordinary legal constraints, contributing to the normalization of emergency governance (Observatorio Ecuatoriano de Conflictos, 2025). 

Second, public security has become increasingly militarized. The deployment of the armed forces in domestic roles reinforces a war-based understanding of crime, privileging confrontation over institutional or preventive approaches. 

Third, political discourse constructs criminal actors as “internal enemies,” often labeled as terrorists. This framing simplifies complex dynamics into a moral binary, legitimizing punitive responses and aligning political authority with public fears (Pratt, 2007). 

Finally, punishment functions as a form of political communication. Visible and immediate measures, such as mass arrests and harsher penalties, signal control and decisiveness, often prioritizing symbolic impact over long-term effectiveness (Garland, 2001). These dynamics also carry heavy electoral implications. President Daniel Noboa’s re-election in 2025 occurred in a context shaped by sustained militarization and emergency governance, suggesting that punitive strategies can generate political legitimacy through visibility and immediacy.

Normalization of Emergency and the Costs of Punitive Governance

However, the expansion of punitive populism raises important concerns for democratic governance. Measures initially justified as temporary responses to crisis, such as states of exception and military involvement in policing, risk becoming normalized, blurring the line between extraordinary and ordinary rule. This process reshapes the balance between security and rights. When insecurity is framed as an existential threat, restrictions on due process and legal safeguards are more easily justified and publicly accepted. Over time, this can weaken institutional oversight and reduce the capacity of democratic systems to limit executive power. 

At the same time, reliance on punitive strategies as a source of legitimacy may narrow the space for alternative responses. Governments become incentivized to prioritize visible and immediate action over long-term institutional solutions, reinforcing a cycle in which political authority depends on the continued performance of control.

Ecuador’s recent crisis illustrates how insecurity can be transformed into a central mechanism of political governance. Punitive populism operates not only through policy, but through the visible exercise of authority and the construction of legitimacy. As similar dynamics emerge elsewhere, understanding how crime is politically mobilized becomes essential for assessing the future of democratic governance.


 

(*) Emilio Hernández is an Ecuadorian lawyer and PhD candidate in Criminology at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona). His research focuses on punitive populism, criminal policy, and the relationship between security crises, political narratives, and justice systems.


 

References

Bottoms, A. (1995). “The philosophy and politics of punishment and sentencing.” In: C. Clarkson & R. Morgan (Eds.), The politics of sentencing reform (pp. 17–50). Clarendon Press.

Dudley, Steven. (2025). How organized crime shaped the agenda of Ecuador’s presidential elections.” InSight Crime. February 5, 2025. https://insightcrime.org/news/organized-crime-agenda-ecuadors-presidential-elections/

Garland, D. (2001). The culture of control: Crime and social order in contemporary society. University of Chicago Press.

Newton, Christopher; Manjarrés, Juliana; Cavalari, Marina and Macías, Luis Felipe Villota. (2026). 2025 homicide round-up.” InSight Crime. March 11, 2026. https://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crime-2025-homicide-round-up/

International Crisis Group. (2025, November 12). Paradise lost? Ecuador’s battle with organised crime (Latin America Report No. 109). https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/latin-america-caribbean/ecuador/109-paradise-lost-ecuadors-battle-organised-crime

Larrauri, E. (2006). Populismo punitivo… y cómo resistirlo. Jueces para la Democracia, (55), 15–22.

Observatorio Ecuatoriano de Conflictos. (2025). Ecuador en llamas: Conflictividad y seguridad en Ecuador[Report]. https://www.llamasuce.com/_files/ugd/7c86d8_532216924def4fb8a8d7845c0609cd1f.pdf

Pratt, J. (2007). Penal populism. Routledge.

Simon, J. (2007). Governing through crime: How the war on crime transformed American democracy and created a culture of fear. Oxford University Press.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2023). Global study on homicide 2023https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/Global_study_on_homicide_2023_web.pdf

Voss, Gavin. (2024) “Gamechangers 2024: Ecuador finds victory elusive in ‘war on gangs’.” InSight Crime.December 27, 2024. https://insightcrime.org/news/gamechangers-2024-ecuador-finds-victory-elusive-war-gangs/

Voss, Gavin. (2026). From airstrikes to cooperation: Will the “new phase” of Ecuador’s drug war deliver?”InSight Crime. March 31, 2026.  https://insightcrime.org/news/airstrikes-cooperation-will-the-new-phase-of-ecuadors-drug-war-deliver/

Marine Le Pen

What Orbán’s Defeat Changes—and Does Not Change—for France’s Far Right

In this incisive commentary, Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois examines the broader European implications of Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat, focusing on its strategic significance for France’s Rassemblement National (RN) ahead of the 2027 presidential race. Moving beyond surface-level interpretations, she argues that Orbán functioned as a crucial “proof of concept” for sovereigntist politics within the EU—an external validation that strengthened the RN’s claims to governability. His defeat, therefore, does not destabilize the party electorally but compels a recalibration of its narrative. By reframing the outcome as democratic alternation rather than ideological failure, the RN preserves its political coherence. The analysis offers a nuanced account of how transnational references shape—and are reshaped within—contemporary far-right strategy.

By Gwenaëlle Bauvois

The defeat of Viktor Orbán is not merely a Hungarian political event. It constitutes a broader stress test for the coherence of the European far right—and, more specifically, for the strategic positioning of the Rassemblement National (RN) ahead of the pivotal 2027 French presidential election. For years, Orbán was more than an ally for Marine Le Pen and her party; he served as a demonstration case—a tangible and living example that a sovereigntist, anti-liberal project could not only attain power within the European Union but sustain it over time.

Orbán as a ‘Proof’ That the Model Works

Hungary under Orbán has long served as a proof of governability, allowing the RN to argue that its political project is not theoretical but already implemented in another EU member state. Marine Le Pen’s participation in the Budapest rally on March 23, 2026, illustrated this alignment. During the event, she explicitly praised Viktor Orbán, describing him as “a visionary” and “a pioneer,” while also referring to him as her “friend” (Le Monde, 2026). This reflects a broader pattern in far-right politics: the use of cross-national examples as legitimacy tools, where foreign governments become narrative evidence of domestic feasibility. However, the RN’s strong endorsement of Orbán, followed by his significant electoral setback, forced the party to reinterpret the result in a way that preserves its own political narrative.

Reframing Defeat as Democratic Confirmation

The RN has strategically reframed the meaning of the defeat. Rather than appearing weakened by its strong support for a losing leader, it presents the outcome as evidence of normal democratic functioning. Orbán is depicted as a legitimate leader who, after a prolonged period in power, is simply being replaced through free elections. In this narrative, he is not discredited; instead, his defeat is recast as part of routine democratic alternation.

RN leading figure Jean-Philippe Tanguy stated: “We see that not only are voters free, but they are free to make a massive choice… After 16 years in power […] it is the desire for alternation expressed by a sovereign people,” (France Inter, April 13, 2026).

In this reading, Orbán’s defeat does not call his political model into question, because it is explained as the result of voters freely exercising their sovereignty. The RN therefore maintains a dual posture: continued political sympathy for Orbán’s project combined with respect for electoral sovereignty. This allows the party to neutralize any potential credibility costs associated with its earlier endorsement, while also reinforcing the idea that national political changes do not disrupt the broader continuity of sovereigntists politics across Europe.

No Electoral Spillover into France

Electorally, the impact on the RN in France is likely to be limited. Despite Orbán’s defeat, the RN remains one of the strongest political forces ahead of 2027 and is consistently ranked as the leading party in voting intention polls. Its support base continues to be shaped primarily by domestic factors, including immigration, cost-of-living pressures, and persistent dissatisfaction with traditional governing parties. Orbán’s setback does not significantly alter these underlying dynamics.

However, it does remove an important external reference point that the RN had used to demonstrate that its political model had already been successfully implemented elsewhere in Europe. Without this example, the argument shifts from demonstrative to more declarative, weakening the party’s comparative narrative without significantly affecting its core electorate.

Orbán’s weakening, therefore, does not destabilize the RN’s position in France, nor does it alter its trajectory toward the 2027 presidential election. What it does affect is a narrative structure—the party’s ability to rely on external validation as evidence of political feasibility. The key development, then, is not an ideological rupture but an interpretative adjustment.

References

Le Monde. (2026, March 23). “Marine Le Pen voices support for her ‘friend’ Viktor Orbán.”
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/03/23/marine-le-pen-voices-support-for-her-friend-viktor-orban_6751749_4.html

France Inter. (2026, April 13). “Interview with Jean-Philippe Tanguy. https://youtu.be/ZzXNS8REZH8?si=h_7Qj50qux6ldvsm

Associate Professor Jason Anastasopoulos.

Assoc. Prof. Anastasopoulos: AI May Transform Populism by Mobilizing Highly Skilled Workers

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos argues that AI is not merely a tool of efficiency, but a political force that may reconfigure both democratic governance and populist mobilization. In this ECPS interview, he warns that replacing bureaucrats with AI can erode “democratic legitimacy” and produce what he calls “automated majoritarianism,” where average cases are processed efficiently while minorities and outliers are disadvantaged. He also challenges the assumption that AI automatically strengthens authoritarian rule, showing instead how false positives, false negatives, and “threshold whiplash” can generate resistance within authoritarian systems. Most strikingly, he suggests that AI may transform populism itself: unlike earlier technological disruptions centered on manual labor, AI increasingly threatens “intellectual work and highly skilled labor,” potentially broadening the social base of anti-elite backlash and reshaping the future of political discontent.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when artificial intelligence is increasingly presented as a transformative force in governance, public administration, and political control, Jason Anastasopoulos, Associate Professor of Public Administration and Policy at the University of Georgia, offers a far more cautious and analytically nuanced perspective. In this ECPS interview, he argues that the effects of AI cannot be understood through simplistic assumptions of either technological salvation or authoritarian omnipotence. Instead, AI emerges in his account as a politically embedded system whose consequences depend on data quality, institutional incentives, and the broader regime context in which it operates.

A central theme running through the interview is the challenge AI poses to conventional understandings of democratic legitimacy and representation. Anastasopoulos warns that “replacing bureaucrats with AI has the potential to erode democratic legitimacy and decrease the extent to which people not only perceive the legitimacy of the system but also actually receive fair outcomes.” This concern is rooted in his broader claim that algorithmic governance does not merely automate decisions; it subtly transforms the normative foundations of administration itself. Because AI systems rely on “data from the past and on statistical averages,” whereas human officials can apply individualized judgment, the shift toward automation risks creating what he calls “automated majoritarianism,” in which average cases are processed efficiently while minorities and outliers are systematically disadvantaged.

At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Anastasopoulos highlights the political implications of AI beyond democratic administration, particularly in relation to populism and authoritarianism. Against the widespread belief that AI necessarily strengthens authoritarian rule, he emphasizes the “autocrat’s calibration dilemma,” showing how false positives and false negatives generate what he terms “threshold whiplash.” Far from ensuring seamless control, AI can create backlash, misclassification, and resistance, even within highly monitored societies. In this respect, the interview complicates dystopian assumptions about authoritarian omniscience by showing how predictive technologies can also destabilize the very regimes that rely on them.

Most strikingly, however, Assoc. Prof. Anastasopoulos suggests that AI may reshape populist politics in new ways. Whereas earlier waves of technological disruption primarily displaced manual and industrial labor, contemporary AI increasingly threatens “intellectual work and highly skilled labor.” This shift, he argues, may transform the social basis of political discontent. Populist mobilization, long rooted in anti-elite appeals to economically dislocated working-class constituencies, may now expand to incorporate professional and knowledge-sector groups who find themselves newly exposed to technological precarity. In that sense, AI may transform populism not only by intensifying backlash against opaque governance, but also by mobilizing constituencies that have not historically stood at the center of populist revolt.

In sum, Assoc. Prof. Anastasopoulos’s reflections offer a sophisticated intervention into contemporary debates on AI and politics. His analysis underscores that AI is neither politically neutral nor institutionally self-executing. Rather, it is a force that can unsettle democratic legitimacy, complicate authoritarian control, and reconfigure the social terrain of populist mobilization. Far from being merely a tool of efficiency, AI may become a catalyst for profound political realignment.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Jason Anastasopoulos, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

AI Doesn’t Simply Strengthen Authoritarian Control

AI generative technology, big data, globalization, and analytics management concepts. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Anastasopoulos, welcome. In “The Limits of Authoritarian AI,” you introduce the “autocrat’s calibration dilemma,” where predictive systems must tradeoff between false positives and false negatives. How does this structural constraint reshape prevailing assumptions that AI inherently strengthens authoritarian control?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: That’s a really good question. I think the common conception of AI is that it will strengthen authoritarian control in a linear fashion, and this makes sense to a certain extent. It is also true in the short run. One of the recurring themes in dystopian narratives is the emergence of a surveillance state in which authoritarian governments exert control over their populations through cameras, social credit systems, and similar technologies. To some extent, this does seem to be the case in the short term. In the long run, however, the use of AI is much more complicated.

This is because of the errors that it generates—namely, Type 1 and Type 2 errors. For readers who may not be familiar with these concepts, they refer to false positives and false negatives, respectively, and are commonly introduced in basic statistics. A Type 1 error occurs when someone is incorrectly identified as a positive case—for example, when a COVID test indicates that a person has the virus when they do not. A Type 2 error, by contrast, occurs when the test indicates that someone does not have the virus when they actually do.

All AI systems, as fundamentally predictive systems, operate under these same constraints. They can misclassify individuals—identifying someone as a threat to the regime when they are not or failing to identify someone who actually poses a risk. These errors carry political consequences, and managing those consequences becomes an inherent challenge for authoritarian regimes. Each type of error entails distinct political trade-offs, which I would be happy to elaborate on further.

Authoritarian Regimes Risk ‘Threshold Whiplash’ When Using AI for Control

Building on this dilemma, to what extent does the probabilistic nature of AI undermine the aspiration of authoritarian regimes to achieve total informational dominance and preemptive repression?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: This is where the political consequences of Type 1 and Type 2 errors come into play. This is where authoritarian regimes run into resistance when using AI in the long run, as opposed to the short run. In the short run, these tools are indeed tremendous for monitoring populations. Facial recognition systems can be linked to databases that identify people instantaneously. In China, for example, a social credit system is being developed that could potentially track movements and shape behaviors in ways consistent with regime preferences. But in the long run, the calibration dilemma that autocrats face becomes decisive.

This is something authoritarian regimes actually institutionalize. In China, bureaucracies exist to calibrate AI systems for these kinds of Type 1 and Type 2 errors. Let me outline the political issues that arise from these errors. For Type 1 errors, the biggest problem in an authoritarian context—where a leader is trying to predict who is risky—is that individuals are labeled as threats when they are not. When too many false positives are generated, opposition to the regime itself increases. In other words, you might have 100 individuals who are genuinely threatening, and the AI system identifies them—but it also identifies 100,000 others who are not. Those individuals, ironically, may become threats precisely because they are falsely labeled as such.

So, because of false positives, the regime creates more threats than it would have had otherwise. Authoritarian rule depends on a belief that compliance leads to tolerable outcomes—being left alone, not punished, not having one’s mobility restricted. Type 1 errors undermine this expectation, producing backlash and fueling social movements.

We have seen this in cases such as Zero-COVID policies and the Henan bank protests, which we discuss in the paper. Individuals were falsely labeled as COVID-positive to prevent them from protesting a banking scandal. This generated public outrage and forced the government to scale back. In other words, the use of AI produced the very instability it was meant to prevent.

For Type 2 errors, the problem is reversed. The regime faces real threats, and if AI systems fail to detect them, those threats can operate in the shadows. This dynamic produces what we call a cycle of “threshold whiplash.” Initially, regimes set thresholds low to maintain tight control, which increases Type 1 errors and triggers backlash. In response, they raise the threshold, which increases Type 2 errors, allowing real threats to go undetected.

At the same time, individuals alienated by false labeling may become politically active and organize against the regime. In this way, AI generates a cycle in which efforts at control inadvertently produce the very resistance the regime seeks to suppress.

Authoritarian Incentives to Report Stability Degrade AI from Within

Artificial Intelligence.
Artificial intelligence as a next-generation technology shaping the digital era. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your work suggests that prediction systems are not merely technical tools, but political instruments embedded in institutional incentives. How do bureaucratic and party-level incentives distort AI outputs in authoritarian settings?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: That’s a really good question. The focus here is primarily on China, where regional bureaucratic leaders have incentives to report stability metrics to Beijing. There is a strong desire for Beijing to see that, across all regions within China, things are looking good—that conditions are stable.

What happens with AI systems, then, is that officials tend to downplay any activity identified by these systems that might suggest instability in a region. As a result, when such distorted data is fed into the new AI systems being developed, it creates a significant gap between on-the-ground realities and what the AI system reports, ultimately degrading the quality of the system itself. In this way, bureaucratic incentives to report stability end up undermining AI performance over time, as these systems are trained on data that is simply of low quality.

AI Decision-Making Can Erode Both Perceived and Actual Fairness

In your research on democratic administration, you argue that replacing human discretion with AI risks eroding accountability and reason-giving. How should we theorize the relationship between algorithmic governance and democratic legitimacy?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: One of my papers on the problem of replacing bureaucratic discretion with AI identifies a recent trend in many places; some of it is aspirational, and some of it has actually been implemented. The trend is that many regimes, not just authoritarian regimes but democratic countries as well, are seeking to replace bureaucratic discretion, and bureaucrats more generally, with AI systems.

For example, Keir Starmer is one of the figures who is very interested in doing so in the UK. Widodo in Indonesia has actually replaced a few levels of the bureaucracy with AI systems. One of the problems that the paper identifies is that when you replace bureaucratic discretion with AI systems, you remove some of the important safeguards that exist for democratic governance.

Specifically, AI systems have this issue where they do not think like human beings—that is the fundamental problem. Democratic legitimacy, in many ways, is based on the idea that another human being will review your case and be able to reason through whatever decision needs to be made by the state in your particular situation. What I argue in that paper is that there are certain types of decisions—decisions relating to rights, and decisions involving very important issues where someone’s rights could be taken away—that should not be delegated to automated systems. This is because the idea of justice and democracy itself depends on a human being assessing your case at an individual level and applying human judgment in a way that would be deemed fair both theoretically, from a philosophical perspective, and in terms of the perceptions of those being judged.

So, a lot of it comes down to the fact that replacing bureaucrats with AI has the potential to erode democratic legitimacy and decrease the extent to which people not only perceive the legitimacy of the system but also actually receive fair outcomes.

Another problem I identify in that paper is a technical one. I have training in machine learning and statistics, as well as in political philosophy, and I try to understand how these systems work and what their technical implications are. One of the problems with AI, and with any prediction system, is that it does a very good job of assessing the average case, but a very poor job of assessing cases that would be considered edge cases. If the circumstances that a person brings to an AI system are very unusual, the system is not going to be able to provide a good prediction.

As a result, you have what I call automated majoritarianism, where the AI system performs well for most people, but for minority groups and for individuals whose cases fall outside the norm, it performs very poorly. This can ultimately alienate a large segment of the population. These are some of the key issues I identify regarding the risks of replacing bureaucratic discretion with AI.

Automated Majoritarianism Leaves Minority Cases Behind

AI facial recognition in a crowded urban setting, highlighting risks to privacy and personal freedom (AI-generated). Photo: Irina Yeryom / Dreamstime.

If democratic governance depends on individualized judgment and justification, can AI ever be reconciled with these normative commitments, or does it fundamentally reconfigure the meaning of administrative fairness?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: I think it actually does end up fundamentally reconfiguring the meaning of administrative fairness, and it does so in a way that is subtle and not very obvious. A lot of it, again, comes down to how AI systems make decisions versus how humans make decisions.

Humans make decisions based on their experience and their adherence to norms that are either embedded in institutions or exist in society. Whereas AI systems simply make decisions based on data from the past and on statistical averages. So, with a human being, you get an individualized decision, whereas with an AI system, you get a decision based on aggregate data.

That has implications for the future of administrative fairness, because the types of decisions made by AI systems, given how they function, are fundamentally different from those made by humans. How those decisions differ will depend on the circumstances to a certain extent. But we have already seen, for example, in cases from the criminal justice system, that AI systems, when they try to predict whether someone is likely to be a recidivist, can produce problematic outcomes. There is a system called the COMPAS.

This is not really an AI system per se; it is more of a machine learning algorithm, although most AI systems are based on machine learning to some extent. What the COMPAS system does is to make predictions about who would be considered at high risk of recidivism in the future. Imagine someone is arrested, their data is collected, and it is fed into this algorithm. The algorithm then predicts whether that person is risky, on a scale from 1 to 10, and this affects how they are treated within the criminal justice system. If they are predicted to be high risk, they may receive a harsher sentence and be treated more punitively; if they are predicted to be low risk, they are more likely to receive leniency.

What some authors at ProPublica found in a 2016 study was that these systems generated a much higher false positive rate for African American offenders compared to white offenders. In other words, they predicted that Black offenders were more likely to be a future risk even when they were not. This is what the well-known ProPublica article “Machine Bias”demonstrated.

In that case, it showed that AI systems can perpetuate biases into the future. They can create a situation where past discrimination becomes embedded in the criminal justice system, and once that happens, it is much more difficult to correct than with human decision-makers. With humans, you can intervene more directly—you can audit decisions or remove individuals—but with AI systems, you would have to change the entire system, including vendors and underlying models, which is far more complex.

So, these are some of the ways in which AI can reshape our understanding of administrative fairness. We will need to develop systems to audit AI in order to prevent bias, and we will have to continually ensure that these systems do not embed biases that could create long-term unfair outcomes for minority groups and others whose lives are affected by AI-driven decisions.

AI Should Inform Decisions, but Humans Must Remain in the Loop

You propose a “centaur model” where AI complements rather than replaces human decision-makers. What institutional safeguards are necessary to prevent this hybrid model from drifting toward de facto automation and accountability erosion?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: The idea behind the Centaur model is pretty simple. We need to ensure that when really important decisions are being made within government—decisions that can affect people’s lives and relate to issues of fairness or justice—there is always a human decision-maker in the loop. An AI system can be good at making predictions, but it should only be used as one piece of information within a broader file that a human decision-maker can draw upon.

The problem with this kind of Centaur model, however, is that it runs up against the incentives many governments have to cut costs. This is especially true at the state and local levels in the United States, and also for lower-level governments in Europe and elsewhere, where there are strong incentives to automate decisions.

What may ultimately prevent the Centaur model from being implemented—even though I think it is a good model—is the political economy of governance. A system that combines human judgment with AI could produce decisions that are both fairer and more just than those made by humans alone, who have biases, or by AI systems alone, which come with their own set of problems.

But these advantages may be outweighed by structural pressures. If there is insufficient tax revenue, sustained pressure to cut costs, and a broader cultural disposition—especially in the United States—that views bureaucrats as unnecessary or ineffective, then populist demands to reduce administrative capacity may lead to full automation. In such a scenario, the Centaur model would not take hold.

Instead, you could end up with layers of bureaucracy fully delegated to AI, which introduces its own risks. In that sense, the key issue is public pressure to shrink bureaucracies—something we have seen in various reform movements—combined with governments’ ongoing efforts to reduce costs. Together, these dynamics can push systems toward automated governance rather than hybrid models, and that is something people need to be aware of.

Addressing this requires a broader cultural shift. People need to understand that bureaucrats are not simply obstacles—such as those encountered at the Department of Motor Vehicles—but are integral to ensuring fairness and accountability in governance. Without that shift, we risk moving toward fully automated systems that may replicate the flaws of bureaucracies while simply making decisions faster, not better. That is the main concern I have.

AI Can Centralize Power by Aligning Decisions More Closely with Political Leaders

Three high-definition video surveillance cameras operated by the city police. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your work on delegation highlights how authority is structured through constraints and discretion. How does the delegation of decision-making authority to AI systems alter classic principal–agent problems in democratic governance?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: That’s a really good question. The way in which the delegation of authority to AI systems alters the classical problem is the following. The traditional principal–agent problem between bureaucracies and higher levels of authority is that, say in the United States, Congress wants a law passed. They pass the law and then expect it to be implemented in a way that is consistent with their intentions.

However, members of Congress and other elected leaders often lack the expertise required to implement laws themselves. For example, in the case of environmental legislation, they do not have the technical knowledge to determine how regulations should be applied in practice. As a result, they delegate this authority to expert bureaucrats, such as those in the EPA, who are responsible for implementation. The principal–agent problem arises because bureaucrats may have preferences that differ from those of elected leaders, meaning that delegation can produce outcomes that do not fully align with the preferences of those who delegated the authority.

In theory, AI could mitigate this problem. Elected leaders could design and select AI systems that align more closely with their own preferences, whether ideological or pragmatic. From the perspective of higher-level officials, AI systems can therefore be appealing, as they may replace bureaucrats who exercise independent discretion and might make decisions that leaders do not favor.

However, I think this is problematic from the public’s perspective. It leads to greater centralization of power and reduces discretion at the ground level. Bureaucrats often possess forms of expertise that elected leaders simply do not have and replacing that expertise with AI systems could introduce significant risks. Laws might not be implemented correctly, and outcomes might reflect not the interests of the public, but rather the preferences of elected leaders—or even the interests of the vendors who design the AI systems. This is where a new kind of principal–agent problem can emerge.

Perceived Unfair AI Decisions Can Fuel Populist Backlash

In the context of populism, how might the increasing use of AI in governance deepen representation gaps, particularly if citizens perceive decisions as opaque, impersonal, or technocratically imposed?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: I think that’s a real problem, and much of it comes down to the idea of backlash that I discuss in my paper on “The Limits of Authoritarian AI” with my co-author, Jason Lian.

If people perceive that AI systems are making decisions that are unfair, the resentment and backlash this generates can fuel an increase in populist movements and a desire to remove those who rely on AI systems but are not populists. That is one key risk I see emerging. 

AI can certainly increase support for populist leaders. Such leaders are often somewhat anti-technology and frequently campaign on anti-technology platforms. If AI-based decisions generate sufficient backlash, this can provide them with powerful political fuel. In that context, we could see a sharp rise in support for populist leaders as a means of rolling back the system to a time before AI systems were producing decisions perceived as unfair.

Technological Displacement Expands the Social Base of Populism

Senior male manager addressing workers.
Senior male manager addressing workers in open plan office. Photo: Monkey Business Images / Dreamstime.

Your research on technological change and populism suggests that economic disruption can fuel political discontent. How might AI-driven labor displacement interact with democratic backsliding and the rise of populist movements?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: There’s a lot of research on this, which finds that populists often draw on the idea that technology—especially automation—will replace people and take their jobs away. This is something we’ve seen since in the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. The Luddites in England were, of course, a well-known populist movement that relied on an anti-technology stance.

The Luddite movement emerged in response to the invention of the steam engine, which displaced large amounts of guild labor in textile production. Whenever there is labor displacement due to technological change, there is almost certainly backlash from those who are unemployed or otherwise disaffected by these new automation systems.

In that sense, AI is no different. It gives populist leaders something to point to, allowing them to claim that they will provide solutions to AI-driven displacement. But in practice, when they are elected, they often fail to deliver those solutions. Instead, they may cooperate with those who develop AI systems and even promote their expansion.

Nevertheless, this remains a powerful and enduring populist position. Historically, populist leaders promise to address the consequences of technological change, yet technological progress continues regardless. Still, their ability to mobilize those affected by labor displacement is likely to grow as more jobs are disrupted.

What is particularly interesting about AI, compared to earlier technologies like the steam engine, is that it is displacing not only manual labor but also intellectual work and highly skilled labor. As a result, the nature of populist and social movements may evolve, as populists begin to incorporate these groups into their constituencies rather than focusing primarily on the working class. This could become an important new dimension of populist politics moving forward.

Distrust of Bureaucracy Could Enable ‘Algorithmic Populism’

To what extent does AI governance risk creating a new form of “algorithmic populism,” where political actors leverage automated systems to claim efficiency while obscuring responsibility?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: That’s exactly the problem I identified before. Could you explain what you mean by algorithmic populism more specifically? Political leaders or actors leveraging automated systems to claim efficiency while obscuring responsibility.

That’s the general problem with AI. It’s one of the key tensions. I’m not entirely sure about the idea of algorithmic populism in general, but one condition that could give rise to it is, especially in cultures like the United States where there is a deep distrust of bureaucracies, a situation in which AI systems are perceived as being better than human bureaucrats.

In those cases, it would be easy for a political actor—an “algorithmic populist,” as you put it—to accelerate the replacement of bureaucrats with AI in government, which would again lead to many of the problems I discussed earlier. And some figures—Donald Trump, for example, who could be considered a populist—might even be seen as algorithmic populists to a certain extent, in that they promote technology and advance a strong AI agenda.

In such situations, you create a scenario where you end up with the same problems associated with AI that I mentioned earlier, but the process continues to advance. I don’t know exactly what the future would look like in terms of how an algorithmic populist movement might develop, but it is an interesting idea to consider.

Data Quality Will Determine Whether AI Supports Democracy or Control

Internet Surveilance.
Photo: Shutterstock

And lastly, Professor Anastasopoulos, looking ahead, do you see AI as ultimately stabilizing or destabilizing democratic systems—and what key variables will determine whether it becomes a tool of democratic renewal or authoritarian entrenchment?

Assoc. Prof. Jason Anastasopoulos: I’m actually pretty hopeful about AI and its effect on democracy. I think it’s going to have two effects in general: one within democratic systems and the other within authoritarian systems.

I think a lot of it comes down to data quality. In democratic systems, AI can do a very good job of helping decision-makers make fairer, more just, and more efficient decisions. That’s because, within democratic systems, the information fed into AI systems comes from a range of democratic processes—deliberation, free speech, and so on. As a result, the quality of AI systems is very high when they are used to further democratic principles and support democratic rule.

However, in authoritarian systems—and this is something I discuss in “The Limits of Authoritarian AI”—authoritarian regimes seek to use AI to control their populations. The fundamental problem they encounter is one of information. This problem relates directly to the fact that when people are being monitored, they change their behavior and hide their preferences. As a result, the information that feeds into AI systems ends up being of much lower quality in authoritarian regimes than in democratic ones. I believe this tends to further destabilize authoritarian regimes as they attempt to tighten control through AI systems and encounter the kind of threshold whiplash I mentioned earlier. Over time, authoritarian regimes may come to realize that AI tools are not the panacea they may have expected. That realization could open the door for social democratic movements within authoritarian regimes to take advantage of the instability created by AI. 

In sum, for democratic nations, as long as we avoid a situation in which we eliminate all layers of government and replace them with AI, it can be a stabilizing force. In contrast, in authoritarian regimes, it is likely to be destabilizing—at least temporarily—and may eventually push those systems toward greater democratization if they continue to rely on AI. They might, of course, decide to abandon AI systems and revert to older forms of authoritarian control, but I don’t think that is very feasible in the modern world. Instead, what we may see is a gradual broadening of democracy globally as AI systems are adopted for different purposes.