We, as ECPS, are excited to share the videos of thought-provoking sessions from the International Conference on Populisms, Digital Technologies, and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia, hosted by Deakin University in collaboration with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Universitas Indonesia, and Universitas Gadjah Mada. This event, funded by the generous support of the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization (ADI), and ECPS, offers invaluable insights into Indonesia’s dynamic political landscape following its multi-level elections.
Held at the Alfred Deakin Institute, the conference provided a platform to discuss the evolving roles of populism, digital technology, AI, disinformation, religion, and socio-political forces shaping Indonesia’s democratic discourse. Over two engaging days, 31 papers were presented across eight panels, each diving into specific aspects of populism—from Gender and Youth to the impacts of Sharp Power, Disinformation, and Cancel Culture, and from Populist Strategy and Communication to Authoritarianism and Islamist Populism.
The conference also featured keynote addresses from esteemed scholars, Professor Simon Tormey, an expert in populism theory, and Professor Vedi Hadiz, known for his work on Islamic populism in Indonesia, bringing depth and perspective to this vital topic.
Don’t miss the opportunity to engage with these groundbreaking discussions—watch the full conference videos, thanks to the support of ARC, ADI, and ECPS.
Welcoming Speech
By Dr. Fethi Mansouri (Deakin Distinguished Professor, the Founding Director of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University, Australia.)
Keynote Speech
“The Populism Puzzle – Sociological Approach,” by Dr. Simon Tormey (A Political Theorist and the Executive Dean of Arts and Education at Deakin University in Australia).
Our agent-based simulations show that non-populist rhetoric, exemplified by former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, fosters societal cohesion through positivity, inclusivity, and broad audience engagement. By maintaining a “middle ground,” it promotes civil discourse and prevents ideological divisions from deepening into polarization. Inclusive language ensures all groups feel recognized, addressing societal fractures. In contrast, populist rhetoric, typified by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reinforces divides through negativity and exclusion. By antagonizing outgroups and amplifying grievances, it fosters conflict and consolidates ingroup loyalty at the expense of societal harmony. This sharp contrast highlights the stabilizing potential of inclusive rhetoric versus the fragmenting impact of populist communication.
Charismatic leaders hold extraordinary influence over their audiences, shaping the emotional and ideological contours of polarization. Their rhetoric can intensify divisions when it is extreme or reduce tensions when it emphasizes inclusivity and moderation (Betts & Bliuc, 2022; Bliuc et al., 2023; Bliuc et al., 2024). Through emotional appeals, they cultivate trust, admiration, and even anger, channeling these emotions into collective action. However, this influence is complex: emotional appeals often create feedback loops that deepen loyalty while perpetuating divisive rhetoric. The “awestruck effect,” where followers suppress their emotions in response to a leader’s overwhelming presence, highlights the intensity of this dynamic. Additionally, charisma can be contagious, fostering intra-group cohesion while amplifying intergroup polarization.
This article explores how populist and non-populist rhetoric influences societal polarization, focusing on the speeches of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern between 2017 and 2023. We present preliminary findings from our ongoing research, which uses linguistic analysis and computational modelling to understand how their communication styles shape societal dynamics. Erdogan’s speeches often reflect populist tendencies, using divisive language to define “the people” in opposition to “the elite” and “the others,” reinforcing group divisions. In contrast, Ardern’s rhetoric emphasizes inclusivity and optimism, promoting unity and social cohesion. These contrasting approaches offer valuable insights into the role of leadership communication in fostering either polarization or cohesion.
Our analysis uses tools such as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to examine the tone, content, and inclusivity of their speeches. Additionally, we apply an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate how these rhetorical styles influence societal divisions over time. The ABM treats individuals as “agents” with distinct responses to messages, allowing us to explore how individual reactions can shape larger societal trends like polarization or unity. This ongoing research aims to shed light on how leaders’ rhetoric impacts societal cohesion or division. This preliminary analysis offers critical insights into how political communication shapes group dynamics, paving the way for further exploration of its long-term effects on societal cohesion or division.
Populists and Polarization
Populism is often a significant driver of societal polarization. Populist leaders, particularly those with charismatic appeal, play a central role in driving polarization. Their rhetoric often mobilizes emotions such as anger and fear, framing societal divides as existential battles (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Right-wing populists tend to focus on issues like immigration and national sovereignty, while left-wing populists emphasize economic inequality and social justice. Regardless of ideological orientation, their communication strategies frequently amplify societal divisions by fostering in-group loyalty and out-group hostility (Hawkins, 2009).
Populist leaders often employ divisive rhetoric that frames societal conflicts as a struggle between a virtuous “people” and a corrupt “elite,” thereby deepening societal divisions. This “us versus them” narrative simplifies complex issues and fosters an environment of distrust and animosity among different social groups. The emotional and moralistic language used by populists can exacerbate polarization by reinforcing in-group solidarity while marginalizing out-groups. The relationship between populism and polarization is particularly acute in contexts where political institutions are weak or trust in governance is low.
Erdogan’s Populism
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a rally organized by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at Istanbul Ataturk Airport ahead of the local elections in Istanbul, Turkey on March 24, 2024. Photo: Tolga Ildun.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populism has become a defining feature of Turkey’s contemporary political landscape. His leadership, particularly as head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), illustrates a shift towards “civilizational populism.” This approach frames political conflicts not merely in terms of domestic divides but as existential struggles between competing civilizational identities, with Erdogan positioning himself and the AKP as defenders of Islamic values against secular and Western influences (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).
Erdogan’s populist rhetoric constructs a binary between the “pure and virtuous people” and the “corrupt elite,” with the latter often described as Westernized secularists who are portrayed as out of touch with Turkey’s authentic Islamic identity. This narrative draws on historical grievances, including the marginalization of religious conservatives during the Kemalist era, to galvanize his base. By invoking Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic heritage, Erdogan aligns himself with a broader “Islamic civilization” and situates his leadership within a narrative of resistance to Western domination and secular modernity (Yilmaz & Morieson 2023; Morieson et al., 2024).
One hallmark of Erdogan’s populism is his strategic use of crises to consolidate power and deepen polarization. For example, in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, Erdogan framed the event as an existential threat orchestrated by foreign conspirators and domestic traitors, which justified the purging of perceived enemies within the state and society. His narrative positioned the AKP as the sole protector of national sovereignty and religious values, marginalizing dissenters as enemies of the state and Islam (Tas, 2020). Civilizational populism also extends to Erdogan’s foreign policy. His rhetoric frequently portrays Turkey as the leader of the Muslim world, defending Islamic interests against a hostile West (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).
Jacinda Ardern’s Leadership and Inclusive Rhetoric
Jacinda Ardern’s leadership as Prime Minister of New Zealand (2017–2023) offers a compelling example of how inclusive and empathetic rhetoric can foster societal cohesion in a world increasingly divided by polarization. Unlike populist leaders who often amplify divisions through exclusivity and antagonism, Ardern’s communication style is characterized by optimism, inclusivity, and a focus on collective well-being. Her leadership emphasized unity over division and shared values over antagonistic narratives.
One of the defining moments of Ardern’s tenure was her response to the 2019 Christchurch Mosque attacks, in which 51 people lost their lives in an act of white supremacist terrorism. Ardern’s immediate response, marked by empathy and solidarity, included public expressions of grief, wearing a hijab to demonstrate respect for Muslim communities, and categorically denouncing hate. Her government’s “Wellbeing Budget,” introduced in 2019, shifted the focus of governance from traditional economic indicators to measures of societal well-being, such as mental health, child poverty, and environmental sustainability. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ardern’s empathetic communication style played a pivotal role in maintaining public trust and compliance. Her use of direct communication through social media, coupled with clear and consistent messaging, fostered a sense of unity and shared purpose (Craig, 2021).
Unlike the divisive strategies often employed by populist leaders such as Erdogan, Ardern’s rhetoric consistently avoided antagonism, focusing instead on fostering dialogue and inclusivity. Her communication style offers an alternative to traditional populism, highlighting the capacity of empathetic and inclusive leadership to bridge divides and promote societal cohesion.
Contrasts in Rhetorical Styles
The analysis of speeches delivered by Erdogan and Ardern highlights striking contrasts in their rhetorical styles. Erdogan’s speeches are characterized by brevity, negativity, and exclusivity, with an average length of 430 words compared to Ardern’s more expansive 2,051 words. His frequent appeals to a specific ingroup and the simultaneous exclusion or demonization of outgroups reflect a populist approach. This rhetoric employs divisive language that frames societal dynamics in binary terms: a virtuous “us” versus a corrupt or threatening “them.” Language tokens show the content of his speeches to be focused on Turkey’s prominence in the world (“nation,” “future,” “great,” “world”). This type of communication reinforces group boundaries, creating a heightened sense of identity among ingroup members while fostering animosity toward outgroups.
By contrast, Ardern’s speeches are characterized by inclusivity, positivity, and a focus on shared national identity. Her use of inclusive language, such as incorporating Māori terms like “koutou” (you all) and “katoa” (all), underscores her commitment to addressing diverse audiences as part of a unified whole. This rhetoric not only bridges ideological and cultural divides but also actively works to foster cohesion. By framing political challenges as collective issues requiring mutual effort, Ardern cultivates a sense of solidarity and reduces the potential for societal polarization.
Emotional Tone
A key finding of our study is the role of emotional tone in driving or mitigating polarization. Erdogan’s speeches often employ fear, anger, and grievance to mobilize his base. He also makes a greater use of words belonging to categories such as “power,” “politics,” “authority” compared to Ardern. These emotional appeals resonate strongly with ingroup members but simultaneously alienate outgroup members, fostering an antagonistic environment. The cyclical nature of such rhetoric—where repeated exposure reinforces emotional divides—intensifies polarization over time.
Ardern’s positive emotional appeals focus on empathy, hope, and collective well-being. This is evident in the greater prevalence of terms from categories like “perception,” “authentic,” “insight” compared to Erdogan. These messages resonate across diverse groups, creating an emotional connection that fosters trust and mutual respect. This ability to evoke positive emotions while addressing collective concerns makes inclusive rhetoric particularly effective in promoting cohesion and mitigating polarization.
Audience Reach
Another critical factor is the scope of a leader’s audience reach. Erdogan’s targeted approach speaks primarily to his ingroup, limiting the broader appeal of his message. This narrow scope ensures that his rhetoric resonates deeply with a specific subset of society but fails to engage or persuade others. His targeted communication exacerbates divisions by leaving outgroups feeling excluded and marginalized.
In contrast, Ardern’s broad reach allows her rhetoric to address diverse segments of society. By framing her messages in inclusive terms, she creates a sense of belonging among a wider audience. This broad appeal reduces the likelihood of polarization by fostering dialogue and understanding across ideological and cultural divides.
Broader Implications of Leadership Communication
The findings illustrate that the tone and reach of a leader’s rhetoric are as critical as its content in shaping societal dynamics. Erdogan’s populist approach leverages exclusionary narratives to consolidate ingroup loyalty but at the cost of societal cohesion. Ardern’s inclusive style demonstrates the potential for leadership to bridge divides and foster unity, even in challenging contexts.
These results have implications for understanding the role of political communication in contemporary society. They highlight the dual-edged nature of rhetoric: while it can mobilize and inspire, it can also divide and alienate. Leaders, therefore, carry a significant responsibility in shaping the emotional and ideological landscape of their societies.
Agent-Based Simulation: A Window into Long-Term Impacts
The Agent-Based Model (ABM) is a powerful analytical tool that simulates the way individuals interact within a society. In this case, we used it to explore how different rhetorical styles may shape public beliefs over time. This method allowed us to test the long-term effects of leaders’ communication styles in a controlled virtual environment, offering insights into their potential societal impact.
The agent-based simulations provide a unique perspective on the long-term effects of rhetorical styles. They show how individual responses to rhetoric can aggregate into broader societal trends. In Erdogan’s case, targeted, negative rhetoric creates a feedback loop of polarization. Even if the frequency of such rhetoric decreases, its polarizing effects persist due to the entrenched divisions it creates.
In contrast, Ardern’s inclusive rhetoric has a stabilizing effect. By fostering dialogue and promoting mutual understanding, her communication style helps build resilience against external shocks that might otherwise exacerbate societal divisions. These findings highlight the potential of positive, inclusive rhetoric to mitigate the destabilizing impact of populist communication.
The results show stark contrasts between these approaches. Ardern’s speeches were longer, more positive, and emphasized inclusivity and shared national identity. Her frequent use of inclusive language, including Māori terms reinforced this approach. Erdogan’s speeches, by contrast, were shorter, more negative, and often appealed to a specific in-group while excluding the out-group. When modelled over time using agent-based simulations, these rhetorical styles produced markedly different effects. Erdogan’s negative, targeted rhetoric deepened societal divisions, driving bipolarization. His exclusionary language reinforced pre-existing divides, ensuring polarization persisted even when communication was less frequent. Ardern’s inclusive and positive rhetoric, however, promoted cohesion by stabilizing the “middle ground,” where disagreements occurred without escalating into entrenched polarization. Her approach acted as a mitigating force, countering the effects of external shocks or crises that might otherwise deepen divisions.
Our study also highlights the importance of context in shaping the effects of rhetoric. Erdogan’s rhetoric resonates strongly in a political environment marked by economic challenges, geopolitical tensions, and cultural divisions. These conditions amplify the appeal of populist narratives that frame societal problems as the fault of external adversaries or internal enemies.
Ardern’s rhetoric, on the other hand, is tailored to a context emphasizing collective well-being, inclusivity, and national identity. Her communication style aligns with New Zealand’s cultural emphasis on egalitarianism and community, enhancing its effectiveness in fostering cohesion. These contextual factors demonstrate that the impact of rhetoric is not solely determined by the leader’s style but also by the broader social and political environment in which it is delivered.
Conclusion
The findings of this study underscore the profound impact of political rhetoric on societal polarization. Non-populist rhetoric, characterized by its positive tone, inclusivity, and broad audience reach, emerges as a critical tool for fostering societal cohesion. By maintaining a “solid middle ground,” such rhetoric enables civil disagreements while preventing ideological divisions from escalating into entrenched polarization. Inclusive language ensures that both ingroups and outgroups feel recognized and valued, addressing the psychological and ideological fractures that often underlie societal tensions.
In contrast, populist rhetoric, with its negative tone and narrow audience focus, deepens divides by reinforcing group boundaries and antagonizing outgroups. The polarizing effect of this rhetoric lies not only in its content but in its delivery—its ability to heighten conflict, amplify grievances, and consolidate ingroup loyalty at the expense of broader societal harmony. By appealing to exclusionary identities and emotional grievances, populist leaders exacerbate societal fragmentation, leading to a more divided and contentious public sphere.
For policymakers and practitioners, these findings highlight the necessity of prioritizing communication strategies that unite rather than divide. The tone and delivery of a leader’s message can determine whether disagreements are addressed constructively or exacerbate social cleavages. This calls for a re-evaluation of political discourse, focusing on strategies that emphasize shared values and mutual respect. While these preliminary findings highlight the power of rhetoric to shape group dynamics, further investigation is needed to fully understand the long-term implications of these communication styles in diverse contexts.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.
(*) Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc is an Associate Professor of Social and Political Psychology in the Psychology Department at the University of Dundee, where she has been a faculty member since 2019. Her research explores how social identities influence behavior across various contexts, including health, environmental issues (such as climate change), and socio-political domains (such as collective action and social change). Recently, her work has focused on online communities, investigating how collective identities and behaviors are shaped through digital interactions.
(**) Dr. John Betts is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Data Science & AI at the Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia. He holds a PhD in Operations Research from Monash University, alongside qualifications in statistics, mathematics, and education. His expertise lies in computational modeling, optimization, simulation, and data science, with applications spanning social sciences, medicine, and manufacturing. His research has made significant contributions to areas such as online political behavior, prostate cancer treatment, and Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing. Noteworthy collaborations include studies on the influence of online influencers in societal polarization and the effects of local socio-political events on far-right online communities.
References
Betts, J. M. & Bliuc, A. M. (2022). “The effect of influencers on societal polarization.” In: 2022 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC) (pp. 370-381). IEEE.
Bliuc, A. M.; Betts, J. M.; Vergani, M.; Bouguettaya, A. & Cristea, M. (2024). “A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society.” Communications Psychology, 2(1), 75. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00125-1
Bliuc, A.M.; Cristea, M. & Betts, J. (2023). The role of charismatic influencers in polarisation: an agent-based modelling approach. Paper presented at 19th General Meeting of the European Association of Social Psychology (EASP), Krakow, Poland.
Craig, G. (2021). “Kindness and Control: The Political Leadership of Jacinda Ardern in the Aotearoa New Zealand COVID-19 Media Conferences.” Journalism and Media, 2(2), 288-304. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia2020017
Hawkins, K. A. (2009). “Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective. “Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), 1040–1067. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009331721
Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash.” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659
Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040
Tas, H. (2020). “The chronopolitics of Erdogan’s populism in Turkey.” International Political Science Review, 41(4), 632–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119885444
Yilmaz, I., & Bashirov, G. (2018). “The AKP after 15 years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly, 39(9), 1812–1830. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371
Yilmaz, I., & Morieson, N. (2022). “Civilizational Populism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey.” Religions, 14(5), 631. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050631
Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2023). “Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice.” In: Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. (pp. 1-22). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4262-6_2
Date/Time: Thursday, November 28, 2024 — 15:00-17:10 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Speakers
“In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape,”Dr. Spyros Sofos (Assisstant Professor, Department of Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver).
“Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023-2024),” by Dr. Emre Erdogan(Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University).
“Autocratic Practices of The Gendered Regime in Turkey,” by Hafza Girdap (Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Stony Brook University, New York).
“Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracyin Turkey,” byErgun Babahan (Journalist, Former Editor-in-Chief of Sabah daily and Ahval news).
“Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power,” byDr. Aleksandra Spancerska(Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs).
Brief Biographies and Abstracts
Professor Jocelyne Cesari holds the Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and is Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University. Since 2018, she is the T. J. Dermot Dunphy Visiting Professor of Religion, Violence, and Peacebuilding at Harvard Divinity School. President elect of the European Academy of Religion (2018-19), her work on religion and politics has garnered recognition and awards: 2020 Distinguished Scholar of the religion section of the International Studies Association, Distinguished Fellow of the Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs and the Royal Society for Arts in the United Kingdom. Her new book: We God’s Nations: Political Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in the World of Nations, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2022 (Book Award of the Scientific Society for the Study of Religion). Other publications: What is Political Islam? (Rienner, 2018, Book Award 2019 of the religion section of the ISA); Islam, Gender and Democracy in a Comparative Perspective (OUP, 2017), The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity and the State (CUP, 2014). She is the academic advisor of www.euro-islam.info
In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape
Dr. Spyros Sofos is Assistant Professor in Global Humanities at Simon Fraser University, Canada. He has held academic positions in the UK, Sweden, and Italy, including at Lund University and the London School of Economics. His research examines the intersection of societal insecurity, identity, and collective action, with a focus on Turkish politics, nationalism, populism, European Muslim identities, and populism theory. His latest book, Turkish Politics and ‘The People’: Mass Mobilisation and Populism (Edinburgh University Press, 2022), traces the genealogy of populism in contemporary Turkey. He is the founder and lead editor of #RethinkingPopulism, originally launched in collaboration with openDemocracy.
Abstract: This talk explores the construction and evolution of the concept of “the people” in Turkey’s political discourse. It examines how ideas of popular identity have been historically used to support autocratic regimes, from Ataturk’s secularist rule in early republican Turkey to the tutelary democracies that followed his death and finally to the Islamist-nationalist populism of the present day. Central to this analysis is the metaphor of “the infant people,” a symbol embodying both innocence and helplessness. The talk highlights how political elites have alternately celebrated and patronized “the people,” portraying them as the rightful bearers of sovereignty while simultaneously deeming them unprepared to exercise their rights. This dual approach has fostered a flexible yet exclusionary narrative of nationhood—one that legitimizes authoritarian governance and deepens divisions between the people, their supposed guardians, and perceived enemies. By situating this analysis within broader discussions of populist authoritarianism in the Global South, the talk sheds light on the intersection of identity politics and power.
Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023-2024)
Dr. Emre Erdogan is a Professor at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University. With a doctoral degree in Political Science from Bogaziçi University, he has served as researcher and senior consultant in various projects in academia and civil society. His research focuses on political participation, foreign policy and public opinion, child and youth well-being, methodology and statistics. He extensively studies and publishes about youth in Turkey, integration of Syrian refugee youth in Turkey, othering, polarization and populism.
Abstract: This presentation examines the evolving dynamics of populism in Turkey, focusing on the 2023 presidential and 2024 local elections. It highlights the continuities and shifts in populist strategies, exploring how nationalist rhetoric, religious symbolism, and anti-elitist narratives have persisted as central pillars of political discourse. Simultaneously, the presentation delves into significant changes, such as the impact of economic challenges, the rise of new populist actors, and the opposition’s adoption of populist tactics to counter the ruling party. By analyzing these trends, the study reveals how populism has reshaped Turkey’s political and social landscape over the past two years. It addresses critical themes, including heightened polarization, the strategic use of media, and the enduring focus on identity politics. Special attention will be given to how crises like economic instability and natural disasters have influenced populist rhetoric and voter behavior. The presentation aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between continuity and change in Turkish populism, offering insights into its implications for democracy and governance. Through this lens, the audience will gain a nuanced perspective on the strategies employed by political actors and the broader socio-political consequences of rising populism in Turkey.
Autocratic Practices of the Gendered Regime in Turkey
Hafza Girdap is an adjunct lecturer in Women’s and Gender Studies at Stony Brook University, New York, where she is also a Ph.D. candidate. She is the spokesperson and program director at Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST) and a founding member of Set Them Free, focusing on addressing women’s rights violations in Turkey. Girdap’s research examines human rights and the lives of Muslim women, particularly immigrant women’s experiences of integration and cultural identity. Her doctoral work explores self-identification and gendered racialization among immigrant women from Turkey in the US. Beyond academia, Girdap collaborates with research institutes on gender studies, incorporating the voices of women from non-Western contexts. Living in the US since 2016 due to political persecution, she has organized and spoken at UN panels on women’s issues, mentors youth, and runs online global book clubs that address women’s and youth empowerment.
Abstract: This presentation examines how patriarchy, nationalism, and political Islam intersect to shape women’s status and rights in Turkey, with a specific focus on the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era. Both secular and political Islamist patriarchies impose traditional roles on women, while Sunni nationalist hegemony marginalizes not only ethnic minorities, non-Sunni groups, and LGBTQ+ individuals but also those who fall outside the established identity of the mainstream political framework. Drawing on Islamist discourse, I will explore how the AKP has employed state policies and discursive language to regulate women’s status and justify systemic oppression. These dynamics underscore the gendered dimensions of Turkey’s autocratic regime, where authoritarian practices perpetuate systemic violence and inequality.
Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey
Ergun Babahan, born in Izmir, Turkey, in 1960, is a senior Turkish journalist. He studied law at Istanbul University, graduating in 1981. After practicing law for a year, he chose journalism as his profession. Over the years, he has worked in various prominent newspapers, including Yeni Asir, Soz, Hurriyet, Sabah, Aksam, and Star, serving as a reporter, editor, managing editor, editor-in-chief, and columnist. As editor-in-chief of Sabah, then Turkey’s second-largest newspaper, he successfully led the publication out of bankruptcy. Mr. Babahan has also enriched his professional experience internationally, attending the John S. Knight Journalism Fellowship Program at Stanford University through a scholarship from the German Marshall Fund. Additionally, he participated in a seminar on the American Foreign Policy Process at the University of Maryland, supported by the Ford Foundation.
Abstract: Erdogan once remarked to me, “The media does not bring you to power, but it can easily take you out of power.” This insight shaped his determination to control the mediafrom the beginning of his political career. Having endured significant challenges from a media landscape under the influence of the military tutelage regime, Erdogan sought not to create an independent media but rather to make the media entirely subservient to his authority. He achieved this by exploiting conflicts among media proprietors and leveraging the state’s financial and legal resources. Today, no media structure in Turkey operates independently of Erdogan’s influence—not even outlets that label themselves as opposition. Turkey’s historical tradition of media servitude to those in power has significantly facilitated this process. Erdogan’s unprecedented control over the medianow rivals the dominance once held by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the architects of military coups, shaping what he terms as “truth.” In this presentation, I will explore why the emergence of an independent media is virtually impossible in a society where reverence for state authority and wealth is deeply ingrained.
Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power
Dr. Aleksandra Maria Spancerska is a research fellow on Türkiye in the Middle East and Africa Programme. She graduated in international cultural studies and international relations with an oriental specialisation from the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz. She received her PhD in 2024 in the field of social sciences in the discipline of political science and administration. She conducts research on Turkish domestic and foreign policy. She speaks English and Turkish.
Abstract: The concept of sharp power represents a novelty in the study of international relations. It was introduced into scholarly discourse by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig in 2017 at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. The purpose of the speech is to indicate the different areas of Türkiye’s activity in the international forum in terms of sharp power. In my speech I will focus in particular on: technology, modern forms of censorship, political dissidents, and the Turkish diaspora abroad.
Describing Călin Georgescu’s first-round presidential victory as “shocking,” Professor Sorina Christina Soare highlights the pivotal role of social media, particularly TikTok, in mobilizing young voters. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she explains. She emphasizes Georgescu’s populist appeal, driven by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility,” she notes. Despite warning of potential instability, Professor Soare remains optimistic that Romania’s semi-presidential system and pro-European coalitions can sustain the country’s European trajectory.
In a candid and insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Thursday, Dr. Sorina Christina Soare, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, delves into the dynamics shaping Romania’s political landscape. She examines the resurgence of radical-right populist parties (RRPPs), their connections to historical and socio-economic grievances, and the transformative role of social media in contemporary politics.
Professor Soare begins by contextualizing Romania’s political evolution, emphasizing its “tradition of populist mobilization in post-communist politics” while highlighting systemic issues that have persisted since the democratic transition. She attributes the 2020 resurgence of RRPPs like the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) to a “perfect storm of pandemic-driven malaise, skilled political entrepreneurship, and strong grassroots mobilization.” She explains, “Significant portions of the Romanian population do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the democratic transition or EU membership, fueling dissatisfaction and driving migration.”
The interview also explores the rise of far-right parties such as AUR and SOS Romania. Despite their shared emphasis on defending national identity and traditional values, Professor Soare draws a clear distinction between their organizational strategies, noting that AUR is a “rooted party with strong social ties,” whereas SOS operates as a “personal party” reliant on its leader’s visibility. This reflects broader societal trends, she adds, where “diffuse nationalism and skepticism about EU norms cross party lines,” resonating deeply with voters.
Professor Soare further examines how social media, particularly TikTok, has become a powerful tool for mobilizing young voters, pointing to Călin Georgescu’s “shocking” first-round presidential victory in 2024. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she observes. On Georgescu’s candidacy, she emphasizes its populist appeal, underpinned by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. She notes, “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility.”
Finally, discussing the implications of Georgescu’s potential presidency, Professor Soare underscores the risks and safeguards within Romania’s semi-presidential system. While cautioning against possible instability, she remains optimistic about the country’s ability to maintain its European trajectory, provided mainstream parties can mobilize effectively.
We are thrilled to announce the successful completion of VolunCITIZEN, the very first project supported by Erasmus+ funds at ECPS! This milestone marks an exciting chapter for us as we work to empower civil society, youth, and migrants through active citizenship and intercultural exchange. Thanks to the support of Erasmus+ and the dedication of our partners, VolunCITIZEN has left a lasting impact, inspiring meaningful participation and fostering vibrant communities. Join us in celebrating this achievement and the incredible potential of collaboration for a brighter future!
Empowering Communities Through Active Participation
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Describing Călin Georgescu’s first-round presidential victory as “shocking,” Professor Sorina Christina Soare highlights the pivotal role of social media, particularly TikTok, in mobilizing young voters. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she explains. She emphasizes Georgescu’s populist appeal, driven by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility,” she notes. Despite warning of potential instability, Professor Soare remains optimistic that Romania’s semi-presidential system and pro-European coalitions can sustain the country’s European trajectory.
In a candid and insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Thursday, Dr. Sorina Christina Soare, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, delves into the dynamics shaping Romania’s political landscape. She examines the resurgence of radical-right populist parties (RRPPs), their connections to historical and socio-economic grievances, and the transformative role of social media in contemporary politics.
Professor Soare begins by contextualizing Romania’s political evolution, emphasizing its “tradition of populist mobilization in post-communist politics” while highlighting systemic issues that have persisted since the democratic transition. She attributes the 2020 resurgence of RRPPs like the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) to a “perfect storm of pandemic-driven malaise, skilled political entrepreneurship, and strong grassroots mobilization.” She explains, “Significant portions of the Romanian population do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the democratic transition or EU membership, fueling dissatisfaction and driving migration.”
The interview also explores the rise of far-right parties such as AUR and SOS Romania. Despite their shared emphasis on defending national identity and traditional values, Professor Soare draws a clear distinction between their organizational strategies, noting that AUR is a “rooted party with strong social ties,” whereas SOS operates as a “personal party” reliant on its leader’s visibility. This reflects broader societal trends, she adds, where “diffuse nationalism and skepticism about EU norms cross party lines,” resonating deeply with voters.
Professor Soare further examines how social media, particularly TikTok, has become a powerful tool for mobilizing young voters, pointing to Călin Georgescu’s “shocking” first-round presidential victory in 2024. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she observes. On Georgescu’s candidacy, she emphasizes its populist appeal, underpinned by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. She notes, “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility.”
Finally, discussing the implications of Georgescu’s potential presidency, Professor Soare underscores the risks and safeguards within Romania’s semi-presidential system. While cautioning against possible instability, she remains optimistic about the country’s ability to maintain its European trajectory, provided mainstream parties can mobilize effectively.
Here is the transcription of the interview with ProfessorSorina Cristina Soare with some edits.
Causes of the Populist Resurgence in Romania
Professor Soare, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your two articles on Romania for two ECPS reports in 2023 and 2024, you argue that the country was once considered a partial exception to the global diffusion of populism. However, in 2020, Radical Right Populist Parties (RRPPs) made a notable return to Parliament. What factors do you believe have driven this resurgence of RRPPs in Romanian politics?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Thank you for your question. There are different reasons to consider. Romania has a tradition of populist mobilization in post-communist politics, and this is something we have to take into account, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, when different political parties adopted populist platforms with relevance in terms of electoral success.
What happened in 2020 reflects, on the one hand, a specific event connected to the pandemic and the malaise felt by different segments of the population. On the other hand, it highlights something more systemic that has crossed the political arena since the very beginning of the transition to democracy: the lack of widely distributed economic benefits. This is crucial because significant portions of the Romanian population do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the democratic transition or, later, of the EU membership status achieved in 2007.
This dissatisfaction helps explain why Romania has one of the highest levels of citizens living abroad. Many emigrated due to the lack of a decent standard of living in Romania, while a smaller but significant minority sought opportunities where their training and high competencies could be better recognized in the job market.
There was an insightful article published today on Politico that illustrates the stark disparities in Romania, including gaps in education, the economy, and the pronounced divide between Bucharest and the rest of the country, as well as between the major cities and rural areas.
The 2020 resurgence of RRPPs was the result of a perfect storm: a context of widespread malaise driven by the pandemic, the rise of a skilled political entrepreneur in George Simion’s personality, and the organizational strength of the AUR party. Unlike some other populist movements, AUR cannot be considered a personal party. It has developed strong grassroots mobilization through associations and other structures, which have provided it with stable support over time since 2020.
The Rise of AUR and SOS Romania
George Simion, president of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), answers journalists’ questions during a press conference at the party’s headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, on May 10, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
How do you interpret the rise of far-right parties like AUR and SOS Romania in the context of Romania’s political landscape? What specific societal or political factors have contributed to their increasing influence? What role do you think Romanian national identity and Euroscepticism play in shaping the populist rhetoric of parties like AUR and SOS Romania, particularly in their emphasis on sovereignty and traditional values?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Thank you for your question. It is very relevant and covers several aspects. AUR and SOS Romania come from the same origins, or a new class of populist radical-right movements. Considering that SOS Romania’s leadership is represented by Diana Iovanovici Șoșoacă, who was elected as an MP on AUR’s list in 2020, there is some alignment between the two parties. However, the difference is particularly linked to their type of party organization. As I mentioned, AUR is a rooted party with social ties to various associative and activist experiences on the ground. On the other hand, SOS Romania operates more like a personal party, heavily relying on the vocal presence and visibility of its leader.
Both parties, however, share an emphasis on defending national identity. This emphasis is not unique to them. In the current presidential election, particularly during the first round, we can see that symbols of nationalism and religion are prevalent across the political spectrum. For instance, the candidate presented as pro-European, liberal, and progressive also subtly echoed these themes. She wore a small bracelet with the Romanian flag and a large cross, signaling diffuse nationalism and religious sentiment that transcends party lines.
What distinguishes AUR and SOS is the intensity with which they voice these themes. AUR increasingly resembles a radical-right party that tries to control the populist elements of its discourse, making it appear more mainstream. In contrast, SOS frequently crosses constitutional boundaries, echoing extremist rhetoric, including anti-semitism, which fundamentally clashes with Romania’s democratic constitutional pillars.
Regarding the European Union, mainstream parties often temper their criticism due to their positions in government and affiliations with European parliamentary groups. Opposition parties like AUR and SOS, however, are freer to express vocal critiques. AUR does not advocate an EU exit but calls for greater compatibility and synergy between Romanian values and EU expectations. For example, they argue against being forced to accept certain norms, such as those related to the LGBTQI+ community. Interestingly, this stance is not unique to AUR but is voiced more strongly because they are outside the governing establishment.
What I want to emphasize is that nationalism and skepticism about certain EU-related aspects are widespread in Romania. This sentiment is rooted in society, not concentrated in specific groups, and it crosses party lines. These attitudes were channeled effectively during the 2024 presidential election by a candidate who presented himself as an outsider, not part of the establishment. This provides a bridge to understanding more recent political developments.
Radical-Right Populism’s Shift in RomaniaFrom Ethnicity to Morality
How do you interpret the shift in focus from ethnic-based exclusion to cultural and religious-based exclusion among Romania’s radical-right populist parties, and what factors might have driven this transformation?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: In my most recent fieldwork, I gained a better understanding of the origins and organization of AUR. During earlier phases of research with Glad and Țufiş, we identified two main roots of AUR’s ideology. One root emphasized the need to restore a “Greater Romania,” particularly through unification with the Republic of Moldova. The other focused on conservative values, which draw on Romania’s history, including the so-called fascist period between the two World Wars. I use “so-called” because the term refers to the legendary movements of that era.
Beyond these two roots, there is a third, particularly evident in Transylvania, where a group of militants focus on defending Romania’s cultural integrity. This group views the Hungarian minority as a potential threat to the country’s territorial integrity. This tension helps explain why Viktor Orbán was so vocal when AUR joined the ECR group after the 2024 EP elections. However, ethnic minority integration is not a central issue in Romania’s political arena. Instead, AUR and SOS Romania emphasize the need to control the cultural and moral identity of the Romanian people.
Why is this so? From my interviews with militants, members, voters, and candidates for the EP elections, the explanation is relatively straightforward. There is a widespread frustration that European integration and globalization threaten the survival of Romania’s national identity. On one side, there is the perception that values inconsistent with Romania’s religious traditions—such as a liberal understanding of gender—are being imposed. On the other side, there is economic frustration, with narratives portraying Romania as a “colony” of other countries, forced to import norms and values misaligned with its traditions.
This frustration extends beyond short-term concerns. For instance, Romania experiences one of the most intense flows of economic migration in Eastern Europe, leading to a population decline. AUR and SOS claim that this shrinking population weakens Romania’s demographic strength and diminishes the relevance of the Romanian majority. While they do not explicitly target the Roma community, other groups, such as Hungarians, are subtly framed as long-term threats.
This also explains their stance on the role of women in society. AUR and SOS advocate for a traditional role for women, not only as part of Romania’s cultural traditions but also as a strategic element in ensuring the reproduction of the Romanian people. Women are viewed as critical to maintaining and securing the nation’s demographic sustainability in the long run.
Romania’s 2015 Law Transformed Party Dynamics
Official campaign posters for the 2024 Romanian presidential election in Timișoara, Romania, on October 27, 2024, featuring candidates Marcel Ciolacu, Nicolae Ciucă, Mircea Geoană, Elena Lasconi, George Simion, Hunor Kelemen, Ludovic Orban, and Cristian Terheș. Photo: Adrian Păcurariu.
How changes in Romania’s party registration laws in 2015 created an opportunity for the proliferation of new political parties? To what extent do you believe these changes reflect a broader trend in post-communist democracies, and how sustainable are these new parties in the long term?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Romania has been criticized, particularly by various NGOs active in democracy advocacy and monitoring, for having one of the most rigid laws regulating political parties. Previously, party registration required a threshold of 10,000 to 25,000 members, along with additional criteria for territorial distribution, and so on.
The original purpose of this regulation, introduced in the 1990s and amended in the early 2000s, was to reduce fragmentation in the political arena and enhance governability. However, NGOs, experts, and academics highlighted its negative consequences. The most significant issue was the difficulty new parties faced in organizing themselves, which severely restricted opportunities for renewal within the party system. Romania’s party system has often been described in the literature as relatively closed. While this framework provided predictability and stability, it also created an artificially constrained system—a cartel of parties that, through legal regulations on party laws, funding, and electoral thresholds (e.g., requiring a high number of signatures for candidacies), implicitly controlled not only Parliament but also broader political competition, thereby limiting the voice of the people.
When the party registration law changed, lowering the membership threshold to just two or three members—the same number required to establish an NGO—it symbolically aligned political parties with genuine civil society representation. This change significantly increased the number of new parties being created. As Claudia Țuțuianu and I observed in an article even before 2020, there was already evidence of radicalism in the extra-parliamentary political party landscape, indicating a demand for representation.
The change in the law facilitated the development of radical parties in Romania. For example, ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for December 1, several new parties associated with former AUR MPs are emerging as potential surprises. One such party, focused on young people, even endorsed the unexpected candidate who won the first round of the 2024 presidential election.
While the legal reforms certainly encouraged the proliferation of these parties, they did not create them. These parties emerged in response to existing conditions on the ground—political entrepreneurs addressing widespread frustration and a perceived need for greater representation.
This phenomenon is not unique to Romania and can be observed across Eastern Europe. A useful comparison is Bulgaria, where the political party system also experienced significant changes and increased fragmentation, particularly with the rise of radical right populist parties. These developments highlight similar levels of frustration and disillusionment among the electorate in both countries.
AUR Mobilized Economic Anxieties and Harnessed Diaspora Support
How has the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) managed to capitalize on economic and social anxieties to expand its political influence despite its controversial ties and radical rhetoric?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: I think one element I forgot to mention in the previous question, but which I will use as the starting point here, is that while the law facilitated the proliferation of parties, some of these parties are well-developed in terms of organizational infrastructure, and AUR is one of them.
How AUR succeeded in voicing these anxieties is quite simple. First of all, through its origins, particularly at the diaspora level. What we observed in our research with Claudio Țuțuianu was that many militants were already active in providing social services to Romanians in Romania. They were channeling part of their well-being in Western countries to help their families, relatives, and, more broadly, the Romanian community in need back home.
By channeling these frustrations and demonstrating that they cared—through recruitment and by creating networks and connections with active individuals in formal and informal diaspora associations—AUR showed credibility. It was not just a political entrepreneur making promises; it presented itself as genuinely engaged. These networks significantly increased its credibility.
Additionally, George Simion himself was seen as credible because of his involvement in these networks, particularly in projects related to the union with the Republic of Moldova. While SOS Romania uses skilled communication and a highly fluid approach, the capacity of AUR to voice these anxieties is linked to its stability and organizational pervasiveness. The difference lies in AUR’s solid and far-reaching networks compared to SOS’s reliance on skilled political representation, particularly in the person of its leader, Mrs. Șoșoacă.
What role has the Romanian diaspora played in shaping the electoral success of populist parties like AUR, particularly in the light of their strategic targeting of diaspora voters?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: This is one of the most intensive areas of research on my agenda, so I feel quite comfortable answering it. The Romanian diaspora began to matter politically, becoming a significant actor capable of altering the direction and results of national-level competition, particularly starting with the 2009 presidential election.
The diaspora did not become active solely with AUR; its mobilization has evolved over time, particularly after 2008, when a change in the electoral law reserved seats in Parliament for diaspora representation. This created an incentive for political parties to mobilize diaspora voters. Of course, when discussing the diaspora, we are referring to a multi-layered and multi-sectoral community.
Why multi-layered? Because there are different temporal layers corresponding to various waves of migration. Some began their migration trajectory before the fall of the Berlin Wall, others in the early 1990s, and more in the 2000s and beyond. The level of integration within their resident communities varies depending on these chronological trajectories. There is also significant variation in professional trajectories—some diaspora members moved to highly skilled jobs, while others took less-skilled positions. Some exchanged exploitation in Romania for severe exploitation in other areas, particularly in southern Sicily, where there have been numerous reports of Romanian agricultural workers being exploited by Italian entrepreneurs. This triggered mechanisms from the Romanian state to defend its migrant workers.
The Romanian diaspora is highly heterogeneous. Why have these people felt mobilized by AUR, SOS, and even a credible, liberal party like USR? They have been mobilized primarily by parties presenting themselves as new—whether through their origins, age (as newer parties), or connections with the diaspora—and by their vocal anti-establishment platforms. These parties stood out as different from the traditional offerings of political parties, particularly the Social Democrats and Liberals.
Diaspora voters tend to vote not only based on the content of party platforms but also on the belief that they need politicians who are fundamentally different from the traditional post-communist elite. They seek politicians who can dismantle the “cartel” of parties, reduce corruption, and bring real change. Interestingly, in my interviews, I found that many diaspora voters expressed a strong desire for a future for themselves in Romania. They viewed their investment in these parties as a way to increase the quality of life and democracy in Romania.
The people I interviewed were not extremists, to the best of my knowledge. None of them advocated for regime changes or anti-democratic positions. Instead, their concerns centered on increased transparency, reduced corruption, and improved living standards in Romania, which would enable them to return and rebuild. This is, I believe, an important aspect of their motivation.
Calin Georgescu’s ‘Shocking’ Rise
Although far-right independent candidate Calin Georgescu was not seen as a serious candidate in almost all the polls, he won the first round of presidential elections which was dubbed as ‘shocking’ by many European experts. What are the key factors behind the unprecedented surge in support for Georgescu, particularly given his low polling numbers before the election? Do you agree with the characterization of his victory as ‘shocking’?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Yes, it was definitely shocking on different levels. First of all, as you rightly pointed out, it was unexpected based on the analyses and surveys published before the elections, which foresaw a runoff between the candidate endorsed by the Social Democrats and, in second position, a tight fight between the candidates of USR (Uniunea Salvați România-Save Romania Union) and AUR.
This candidate seemingly came out of nowhere. He was not very well known to the broader public, but he was not entirely new to Romanian politics. Those familiar with Romania’s political landscape and its moments of governmental instability know that his name had been mentioned on various occasions, starting in 2011 and again in 2015, as a potential technocratic Prime Minister. Additionally, after the 2020 elections, AUR initially endorsed Călin Georgescu as a potential Prime Minister before distancing themselves from him. This split occurred after a highly controversial interview in which Georgescu publicly supported two controversial figures in Romanian history—one a leader of the Legionary Movement and the other a marshal who aligned with Nazi Germany during the war in Russia. These statements were widely criticized as aligning with anti-democratic ideals, and Georgescu faced legal scrutiny over them, though the outcome of these proceedings remains unclear.
Furthermore, Georgescu has been active in publishing books and participating in associations that echo themes deeply rooted in nationalist rhetoric. These themes, while seemingly simple and basic, are reminiscent of ideas prevalent in the 1990s and even earlier. For example, he has espoused an unrefined form of nationalism, portraying Romanians as an extraordinary people and civilization. In one interview, he controversially claimed that proto-Romanian is the basis of Latin, which contradicts conventional historical and linguistic understanding.
Georgescu has also propagated conspiracy theories, such as denying the moon landing or questioning the official narrative of the September 11 attacks in the United States. While these ideas are contentious, they resonate with certain segments of the population, aligning with the common suspicions and frustrations of everyday people. This ability to connect with widespread sentiments is a hallmark of populism: speaking like the people while presenting oneself as a savior or a figure with extraordinary abilities.
Georgescu excels in this role. He voices what people think and does so with a reassuring tone and demeanor. He is well-educated, speaks polished Romanian, and appears as a composed and credible figure. These traits contrast with George Simion’s more vocal and aggressive style, which uses a simpler Romanian. Georgescu, by comparison, projects an image of sophistication and calm.
His campaign also made strategic use of visual and symbolic elements. For example, TikTok videos depicted him on a white horse wearing traditional Romanian clothing or as a wolf with fire emanating from his eyes or mouth, symbolizing strength and purity. These portrayals reinforced his image as a savior or protector. What truly explains his success, however, is his effective use of TikTok. His campaign on the platform was remarkably successful, allowing him to reach a broad audience with simple, relatable messages that resonated deeply with many voters.
How do you interpret the role of social media, particularly platforms like TikTok, in mobilizing voter support for far-right candidates in Romania? Does this signal a broader trend in European politics?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: I wouldn’t generalize about TikTok at the European level, but it has definitely been both utilized and challenged by different candidates—not only in Romania but also across Europe and in the United States. TikTok is undoubtedly efficient. Why? Because it allows for short, impactful messages. While there is limited space for interaction, there is significant potential for engagement.
TikTok’s visual nature and simplicity make it highly accessible, which explains why a significant portion of Georgescu’s support came from young people, who are particularly familiar with the platform. Moreover, TikTok has been less scrutinized by regulatory organizations responsible for monitoring campaign activities, giving it an edge in reaching audiences without strict oversight.
As you may know, there has been ongoing debate in the European Parliament about TikTok’s policies, particularly its claim that it does not allow political campaigns or engagement. However, cases like this reveal vulnerabilities or loopholes in the system that enable mobilization in gray areas. This is a challenge not only for Romania but potentially for Europe and beyond.
Risks and Scenarios for Romania’s Future in EU and NATO
Marcel Ciolacu, president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Romanian prime minister, delivers a speech at the conclusion of the PSD Congress at ROMEXPO in Bucharest, Romania, on August 22, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.
Lastly, Professor Soare. What chance do you give to Calin Georgescu in the second round of presidential elections that will be held on December 8th? If elected, how efficient will he be in challenging EU and NATO’s positions on Ukraine? Given Georgescu’s pro-Russia stance and criticism of NATO, what might his potential presidency mean for Romania’s foreign policy, especially its role as a NATO member and supporter of Ukraine?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: It is difficult to assess Georgescu’s chances at the moment. There has been significant endorsement for his opponent, and a burgeoning cordon sanitaire is forming among mainstream political parties. However, one major factor is missing: the position of the Social Democrats. This is understandable, given the strategic importance of the legislative elections, which are scheduled between the two rounds of the presidential elections. The legislative elections will take place on December 1, followed by the second round of the presidential election on December 8.
Parties may be hesitant to publicly endorse Elena Lasconi at this stage, as such endorsements could jeopardize their own performance in the legislative elections. This creates a significant risk because Romania is a semi-presidential republic. On one hand, if the legislative elections result in a pro-European and mainstream coalition securing a majority, the risk posed by Georgescu’s presidency could be mitigated. The constitutional court’s rulings over the past decades have circumscribed presidential powers, meaning that control by a pro-European government and Parliament would ensure stability.
However, there is also a significant risk given that, in the first round, radical right candidates, including Georgescu, collectively received around 37% of the vote. This suggests strong potential for these parties, including smaller ones connected to AUR’s network, like the Party of Young People, which was active in supporting Georgescu’s candidacy. These parties could gain substantial influence in the next Parliament, complicating coalition-building efforts.
Two scenarios are plausible: i) A co-habitation scenario where Georgescu wins the presidency but is constrained by a pro-European government and Parliament, similar to the political situation in Poland. ii) An alignment between a pro-European coalition and Lasconi’s victory, driven by increased voter mobilization in the second round. This scenario seems credible but faces challenges.
One significant risk for the second round is that Georgescu could position himself as a victim of the establishment. If voter mobilization for Lasconi fails to materialize, it could instead rally anti-establishment voters behind Georgescu. This risk is heightened by the current complaint filed with the constitutional court, alleging illegal activities related to Georgescu’s TikTok campaign and calling for the annulment of the first round. Such actions could provoke greater sympathy for Georgescu and further energize his supporters, especially those with anti-establishment sentiments.
If Georgescu wins, however, there are still factors that could maintain Romania’s European trajectory. The alignment of Parliament and government with pro-European forces would act as a counterbalance, ensuring the preservation of Romania’s commitments to the EU and NATO. Thus, while his presidency could introduce instability, the broader political framework offers some safeguards for maintaining the country’s European route.
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Speakers
“In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape,”Dr. Spyros Sofos (Assisstant Professor, Department of Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver).
“Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023-2024),” by Dr. Emre Erdogan(Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University).
“Autocratic Practices of The Gendered Regime in Turkey,” by Hafza Girdap (Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Stony Brook University, New York).
“Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey,” byErgun Babahan (Journalist, Former Editor-in-Chief of Sabah daily and Ahval news).
“Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power,” byDr. Aleksandra Spancerska(Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs).
Professor Jocelyne Cesari holds the Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and is Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University. Since 2018, she is the T. J. Dermot Dunphy Visiting Professor of Religion, Violence, and Peacebuilding at Harvard Divinity School. President elect of the European Academy of Religion (2018-19), her work on religion and politics has garnered recognition and awards: 2020 Distinguished Scholar of the religion section of the International Studies Association, Distinguished Fellow of the Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs and the Royal Society for Arts in the United Kingdom. Her new book: We God’s Nations: Political Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in the World of Nations, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2022 (Book Award of the Scientific Society for the Study of Religion). Other publications: What is Political Islam? (Rienner, 2018, Book Award 2019 of the religion section of the ISA); Islam, Gender and Democracy in a Comparative Perspective (OUP, 2017), The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity and the State (CUP, 2014). She is the academic advisor of www.euro-islam.info
In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape
Dr. Spyros Sofos is Assistant Professor in Global Humanities at Simon Fraser University, Canada. He has held academic positions in the UK, Sweden, and Italy, including at Lund University and the London School of Economics. His research examines the intersection of societal insecurity, identity, and collective action, with a focus on Turkish politics, nationalism, populism, European Muslim identities, and populism theory. His latest book, Turkish Politics and ‘The People’: Mass Mobilisation and Populism (Edinburgh University Press, 2022), traces the genealogy of populism in contemporary Turkey. He is the founder and lead editor of #RethinkingPopulism, originally launched in collaboration with openDemocracy.
Abstract: This talk explores the construction and evolution of the concept of “the people” in Turkey’s political discourse. It examines how ideas of popular identity have been historically used to support autocratic regimes, from Ataturk’s secularist rule in early republican Turkey to the tutelary democracies that followed his death and finally to the Islamist-nationalist populism of the present day. Central to this analysis is the metaphor of “the infant people,” a symbol embodying both innocence and helplessness. The talk highlights how political elites have alternately celebrated and patronized “the people,” portraying them as the rightful bearers of sovereignty while simultaneously deeming them unprepared to exercise their rights. This dual approach has fostered a flexible yet exclusionary narrative of nationhood—one that legitimizes authoritarian governance and deepens divisions between the people, their supposed guardians, and perceived enemies. By situating this analysis within broader discussions of populist authoritarianism in the Global South, the talk sheds light on the intersection of identity politics and power.
Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023-2024)
Dr. Emre Erdogan is a Professor at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University. With a doctoral degree in Political Science from Bogaziçi University, he has served as researcher and senior consultant in various projects in academia and civil society. His research focuses on political participation, foreign policy and public opinion, child and youth well-being, methodology and statistics. He extensively studies and publishes about youth in Turkey, integration of Syrian refugee youth in Turkey, othering, polarization and populism.
Abstract: This presentation examines the evolving dynamics of populism in Turkey, focusing on the 2023 presidential and 2024 local elections. It highlights the continuities and shifts in populist strategies, exploring how nationalist rhetoric, religious symbolism, and anti-elitist narratives have persisted as central pillars of political discourse. Simultaneously, the presentation delves into significant changes, such as the impact of economic challenges, the rise of new populist actors, and the opposition’s adoption of populist tactics to counter the ruling party. By analyzing these trends, the study reveals how populism has reshaped Turkey’s political and social landscape over the past two years. It addresses critical themes, including heightened polarization, the strategic use of media, and the enduring focus on identity politics. Special attention will be given to how crises like economic instability and natural disasters have influenced populist rhetoric and voter behavior. The presentation aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between continuity and change in Turkish populism, offering insights into its implications for democracy and governance. Through this lens, the audience will gain a nuanced perspective on the strategies employed by political actors and the broader socio-political consequences of rising populism in Turkey.
Autocratic Practices of the Gendered Regime in Turkey
Hafza Girdap is an adjunct lecturer in Women’s and Gender Studies at Stony Brook University, New York, where she is also a Ph.D. candidate. She is the spokesperson and program director at Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST) and a founding member of Set Them Free, focusing on addressing women’s rights violations in Turkey. Girdap’s research examines human rights and the lives of Muslim women, particularly immigrant women’s experiences of integration and cultural identity. Her doctoral work explores self-identification and gendered racialization among immigrant women from Turkey in the US. Beyond academia, Girdap collaborates with research institutes on gender studies, incorporating the voices of women from non-Western contexts. Living in the US since 2016 due to political persecution, she has organized and spoken at UN panels on women’s issues, mentors youth, and runs online global book clubs that address women’s and youth empowerment.
Abstract: This presentation examines how patriarchy, nationalism, and political Islam intersect to shape women’s status and rights in Turkey, with a specific focus on the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era. Both secular and political Islamist patriarchies impose traditional roles on women, while Sunni nationalist hegemony marginalizes not only ethnic minorities, non-Sunni groups, and LGBTQ+ individuals but also those who fall outside the established identity of the mainstream political framework. Drawing on Islamist discourse, I will explore how the AKP has employed state policies and discursive language to regulate women’s status and justify systemic oppression. These dynamics underscore the gendered dimensions of Turkey’s autocratic regime, where authoritarian practices perpetuate systemic violence and inequality.
Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey
Ergun Babahan, born in Izmir, Turkey, in 1960, is a senior Turkish journalist. He studied law at Istanbul University, graduating in 1981. After practicing law for a year, he chose journalism as his profession. Over the years, he has worked in various prominent newspapers, including Yeni Asir, Soz, Hurriyet, Sabah, Aksam, and Star, serving as a reporter, editor, managing editor, editor-in-chief, and columnist. As editor-in-chief of Sabah, then Turkey’s second-largest newspaper, he successfully led the publication out of bankruptcy. Mr. Babahan has also enriched his professional experience internationally, attending the John S. Knight Journalism Fellowship Program at Stanford University through a scholarship from the German Marshall Fund. Additionally, he participated in a seminar on the American Foreign Policy Process at the University of Maryland, supported by the Ford Foundation.
Abstract: Erdogan once remarked to me, “The media does not bring you to power, but it can easily take you out of power.” This insight shaped his determination to control the media from the beginning of his political career. Having endured significant challenges from a media landscape under the influence of the military tutelage regime, Erdogan sought not to create an independent media but rather to make the media entirely subservient to his authority. He achieved this by exploiting conflicts among media proprietors and leveraging the state’s financial and legal resources. Today, no media structure in Turkey operates independently of Erdogan’s influence—not even outlets that label themselves as opposition. Turkey’s historical tradition of media servitude to those in power has significantly facilitated this process. Erdogan’s unprecedented control over the media now rivals the dominance once held by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the architects of military coups, shaping what he terms as “truth.” In this presentation, I will explore why the emergence of an independent media is virtually impossible in a society where reverence for state authority and wealth is deeply ingrained.
Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power
Dr. Aleksandra Maria Spancerska is a research fellow on Türkiye in the Middle East and Africa Programme. She graduated in international cultural studies and international relations with an oriental specialisation from the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz. She received her PhD in 2024 in the field of social sciences in the discipline of political science and administration. She conducts research on Turkish domestic and foreign policy. She speaks English and Turkish.
Abstract: The concept of sharp power represents a novelty in the study of international relations. It was introduced into scholarly discourse by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig in 2017 at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. The purpose of the speech is to indicate the different areas of Türkiye’s activity in the international forum in terms of sharp power. In my speech I will focus in particular on: technology, modern forms of censorship, political dissidents, and the Turkish diaspora abroad.
Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. November 27, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0022
Andy Knott’s Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics offers a groundbreaking exploration of populism through the lens of time, challenging traditional spatial and ideological frameworks. Knott and his contributors delve into the temporal dimensions of populism’s emergence, persistence, and transformation, drawing on historical, philosophical, and regional perspectives. The volume’s innovative use of metaphors and analyses sheds light on populism’s ability to navigate crises and disrupt hegemonic norms. By examining regional variations and the interplay between technology and populist dynamics, the book provides fresh and valuable insights. It is an essential resource for scholars, redefining populism as a diachronic force shaping contemporary politics.
In Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics, editor Andy Knott and contributing authors offer a compelling exploration of the relationship between populism and temporality, an often overlooked yet crucial aspect of this political phenomenon. While the spatial dimensions of populism have dominated much of the academic discourse, this volume distinguishes itself by situating populism within the framework of time, presenting fresh theoretical insights into its emergence, persistence, and impact.
The collection originated from an idea for a workshop that ultimately took place online during the COVID-19 lockdown. Keynote speakers María Esperanza Casullo and Simon Tormey laid the groundwork for the book’s rich intellectual inquiry. Comprising ten chapters organized into three thematic parts, the book addresses historical, technological, and regional dimensions of populism. Contributions from scholars such as Tormey, Clare Woodford, and Casullo tackle critical questions: What triggers populism’s explosive emergence? Why does it seem to thrive in particular historical moments? And how do technological advancements reshape populist dynamics? Why does populism arise in advanced democracies? What role does algorithmic interference play in forging populist solidarities? And why are populist leaders so resilient in power? These inquiries are enriched by conceptual frameworks like cyclicality, spatiotemporality, and populist constitutionalism, offering a nuanced lens to examine populism’s global manifestations.
Knott’s introduction critiques teleological frameworks that dismiss populism as a fleeting anomaly. He instead situates it as a dynamic, diachronic force capable of disrupting hegemonic political norms. Drawing on the philosophical insights of Nietzsche and Heidegger, alongside Machiavelli’s interplay of necessity and contingency, the volume investigates populism’s ontology, asking whether its recurrence stems solely from the politicization of “the people” or deeper ontological parameters that shape modern politics. Particularly compelling is the volume’s focus on regional specificity, especially in Latin America. Scholars such as Paula Biglieri and Eleonora Mesquita Ceia analyze how populism in the region navigates the dual pressures of rupture and institutionalization, challenging its characterization as inherently unstable.
The first chapter of the book titled “Introduction: Populism, Metaphor, Temporality” penned by editor Knott, highlights the neglect of temporality and seeks to address this gap by advancing a nuanced, interdisciplinary framework for understanding populism through the lens of time. Knott begins by critiquing the predominant spatial focus in populism studies, which has been shaped by disciplines such as comparative politics and international relations. He notes that global and regional analyses often overlook how populism operates within temporal frameworks, an omission that limits the depth of our understanding. This chapter ambitiously aims to reframe populism not as a static anomaly but as a dynamic, time-sensitive phenomenon with implications for political stability and transformation.
Central to Knott’s analysis is the role of metaphors in shaping perceptions of populism’s temporal character. The tidal metaphor, for example, suggests cyclicality and permanence, aligning with the ebbs and flows of political phenomena. In contrast, the wave and eruption metaphors evoke disruption, irregularity, and transformative power, underscoring populism’s capacity to challenge established political orders. These metaphors reveal populism’s temporal flexibility, adapting to various contexts while disrupting hegemonic political structures.
Knott further draws on philosophical perspectives, engaging with Martin Heidegger’s notions of temporality, Jacques Rancière’s plural modernities, and Niccolò Machiavelli’s interplay of necessity and contingency. By linking these theoretical insights to populism, Knott presents a compelling argument for understanding populism’s emergence, persistence, and evolution as deeply rooted in temporal contexts. Knott’s introduction effectively situates populism within a broader temporal framework, offering fresh insights into its ontology and dynamics. By bridging philosophy, history, and political theory, this chapter not only reframes populism as a diachronic phenomenon but also invites readers to reconsider its role in shaping contemporary political trajectories. It sets the stage for a rich exploration of populism’s temporalities throughout the volume.
In the second chapter titled “On Populism’s Beginnings,” Knott embarks on an ambitious exploration of the origins of populism, mapping out three distinct historiographical approaches while critiquing their methodologies and assumptions. This chapter serves as a foundational inquiry into the historiography of populism, bridging disciplines such as history, political science, and theory to illuminate how populism’s beginnings have been conceptualized. Knott identifies three frameworks: the first locates populism within specific historical case studies, such as the People’s Party in late 19th-century America and Russia’s narodniki movement. These case-based approaches often tie populism to particular social and economic conditions, such as industrialization and urbanization. The second framework, exemplified by Federico Finchelstein, elevates populism as a transnational regime with its roots in mid-20th-century politics, positioning it alongside liberal democracy, fascism, and communism. Lastly, theorists like Margaret Canovan and Ernesto Laclau trace populism back to antiquity, framing it as a persistent political logic grounded in the antagonistic relationship between “the people” and elites. Knott’s interdisciplinary analysis critically interrogates these approaches, highlighting tensions between populism as a historical phenomenon and as a timeless political form. By weaving together historical narratives and theoretical insights, Knott not only questions the adequacy of existing historiographies but also underscores the need for more nuanced, transdisciplinary research.
Clare Woodford’s chapter “Populism, Impossible Time, and Democracy’s People Problem” is a scathing critique of prevailing populism scholarship, exposing its foundational contradictions and its often-unacknowledged complicity in undermining democracy. Central to her argument is the bold assertion that much of the literature on populism perpetuates a flawed conceptualization of “the people” and “democracy,” framing the former as a perpetual threat to the latter. Woodford dismantles this perspective, arguing that such scholarship narrows democratic possibilities and inadvertently bolsters authoritarian tendencies. Woodford critiques the dominant binary framework that pits populism against democracy. Scholars, she argues, have too readily labeled populism as anti-democratic, ignoring the complexity of its interactions with democratic processes. By casting populism as inherently problematic, these academics, whom Woodford does not hesitate to criticize as gatekeepers of an elitist liberal-democratic orthodoxy, distort the political landscape into a restrictive populism-vs-democracy dichotomy. This oversimplification delegitimizes left-wing alternatives and conflates democratic expressions with anti-democratic tendencies, thereby shrinking the space for meaningful political discourse.
Her engagement with theorists like Rancière, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe underscores the necessity of redefining populism. Woodford particularly emphasizes the aesthetic moment of democracy, where competing definitions of the people coexist, making politics an ongoing, transformative process rather than a static structure. By rejecting the “false dichotomy” of liberal minimalism versus right-wing authoritarianism, she challenges scholars to embrace the pluralistic, dynamic nature of democracy. Woodford’s chapter is a clarion call for populism scholars to abandon their entrenched biases and reconsider their theoretical foundations. Her critique is not merely an academic exercise but a plea for a renewed commitment to democracy that respects the people’s role as its central actors.
Adrià Porta Caballé’s chapter, titled “Politics and Time: The Nostalgic, the Opportunist and the Utopian. An Existential Analytic of Podemos’ Ecstatic Times,” offers a profound exploration of Podemos’ political trajectory in Spain, reframing its internal conflicts through the lens of temporality. By weaving Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophies into his analysis, the author develops a compelling framework to dissect the tensions within Podemos, which he categorizes as nostalgic, opportunist, and utopian – aligned with the past, present, and future, respectively. Caballé’s critique challenges traditional analyses that confine themselves to ideology, class, or politics, arguing that they neglect the crucial role of time in understanding political movements. His temporal framework posits that the internal factions within Podemos – Pablistas (nostalgic), Errejonistas (opportunist), and Anticapitalistas (utopian) – represent distinct, albeit incomplete, relationships with temporality. This fragmentation, Caballé argues, was both the source of Podemos’ initial success and its eventual decline.
The chapter excels in its integration of Heidegger’s existential temporality and Nietzsche’s historical triad, applying these abstract concepts to a concrete political case. Particularly striking is Caballé’s assertion that Podemos’ fragmentation mirrors the disunity of political temporality itself, where prioritizing one temporal mode over the others inevitably leads to imbalance and conflict. This approach not only sheds light on Podemos but also provides a heuristic for analyzing broader left-populist movements. Caballé’s work is a masterclass in blending philosophy and political analysis, offering an original perspective on the existential dynamics of time in politics. His call for an “authentic politics” that integrates nostalgia, opportunism, and utopia underscores the necessity of temporal unity for sustainable political action.
Simon Tormey’s chapter, titled “Populisation: Populism – Temporary Dysfunction or Modernity’s Revenge?” offers a comprehensive and provocative exploration of populism’s entrenchment in modern politics, challenging conventional narratives that view it as a transient phenomenon. Tormey’s core argument positions populism not as an aberration but as a symptom of deeper systemic crises in liberal democracy and late modernity. Through his concept of “populisation,” he illustrates how populism has evolved into a normalized and persistent feature of the political landscape. The chapter critically interrogates the dominant frameworks in populism studies – treating it as a regime, strategy, or event – and instead reframes it as a product of endemic tendencies within late modernity. These tendencies, including globalization, media transformation, and the erosion of traditional authority, create fertile ground for populist movements and leaders. Tormey’s analysis links populism to the cultural and economic grievances exacerbated by modernity’s rapid changes, offering a nuanced explanation of its rise across the political spectrum.
Particularly compelling is the chapter’s assertion that populism thrives on the pervasive sense of crisis, amplified by new media technologies that foster immediacy, emotionality, and a demand for simplistic solutions. Tormey argues that these conditions have entrenched a style of politics characterized by spectacle, hyper-representation, and an “outsider” ethos that increasingly defines democratic engagement. Thus, Tormey positions populism as a response to, and symptom of, late modernity’s failures – a reflection of systemic anxiety and dislocation rather than a temporary disruption. His insights provide a vital framework for understanding populism’s permanence and its implications for democratic systems.
In his chapter, titled “Populism and the Mirror of Technology,” author Michaelangelo Anastasiou’s presents a critical intervention in populism studies by scrutinizing the predominance of synchronic analyses. He argues that such approaches reduce populism to static, episodic snapshots, neglecting its diachronic evolution and the political dynamics underlying its (re)constitution in time. This critique challenges the established methodologies within the field, which often favor universal definitions or linear cause-effect reasoning. Anastasiou identifies two significant shortcomings in current populism scholarship: first, the reliance on fixed typologies that fail to capture populism’s fluid and context-dependent manifestations; and second, the under-theorization of the political practices that enable populism’s emergence and evolution. By equating populism with a series of static outcomes, according to Anastasiou, these studies overlook its historical and temporal dimensions, thus underemphasizing the creative agency and disruptive potential inherent in populist politics.
The chapter advances a compelling theoretical framework grounded in post-Marxist thought, linking populism’s spatiotemporality to the affordances of modern technology. Technology, Anastasiou argues, acts as both an enabler of spatial connectivity and a catalyst for temporal disruption, thereby broadening the scope of populist possibilities. Through this lens, populism is positioned as a political logic rooted in the interplay of space and time, facilitated by the indeterminacy and dislocation characteristic of modern social configurations. The exploration of populism’s ontological ties to technology in this chapter offers an innovative perspective on its historical emergence and its adaptability across contexts. By situating populism within the broader socio-technological dynamics of modernity, Anastasiou provides a critique of synchronic methodologies, calling for a more nuanced, diachronic understanding of populist politics.
Jamie Ranger’s chapter, titled “Populism, Social Media and the Technospheric,” critically examines the intersection of populism, social media, and the “technospheric condition.” Drawing on Bernard Stiegler and Hartmut Rosa, Ranger argues that the technospheric condition—a sociotechnical milieu accelerating since the Industrial Revolution—reshapes politics by distorting democratic contestability into technical expertise. This environment fosters public distrust in political institutions and contributes to the resonance of populist rhetoric, which opposes “the people” against technocratic elites.
The chapter explores how the technospheric, underpinned by social media and the attention economy, intensifies political polarisation and disrupts traditional political processes. Ranger critiques the algorithmic steering of political affinities on platforms, arguing that chains of equivalence, central to populism, are increasingly shaped by algorithmic interference rather than authentic political will. This phenomenon, termed “semi-automated politics,” complicates the authenticity of populist solidarities, raising questions about the agency behind contemporary digital populism.
Ranger highlights the dual potential of social media as both a counter-hegemonic tool for progressive change and a breeding ground for reactionary forces. He emphasizes the risks of fragmented political subjectivities in the hyperconnected technospheric world, where misinformation and algorithm-driven partisanship challenge cohesive political mobilization. This chapter offers a deep analysis of the technospheric’s role in reshaping modern politics, making it a vital contribution to understanding populism’s rise in the digital age.
María Esperanza Casullo’s chapter, titled “Antagonism, Flexibility, and the Surprising Resilience of Populism in Latin America,” provides an incisive analysis of the resilience of Latin American populism, challenging dominant narratives that depict populism as a fleeting political phenomenon. By focusing on the leftist populist presidencies of Hugo Chávez, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and Fernando Lugo, Casullo highlights how flexibility in antagonistic narratives and the capacity for rapid public mobilization underpin the endurance of these leaders in a politically volatile region.
Casullo effectively argues that populist leaders construct a compelling “myth” centered on a heroic leader, a villainous antagonist, and a damaged collective identity. This myth fosters unity among diverse constituencies and enables populists to adapt antagonistic rhetoric to shifting political contexts. Furthermore, she underscores the role of street mobilization as a critical tool for countering threats, illustrating how mass demonstrations often shield populist leaders from impeachment, protests, or coups. Her chapter also addresses objections to populist resilience, including arguments that attribute their longevity to favorable economic conditions or the absence of opposition. Casullo counters these claims by emphasizing the strategic nature of populist politics, which leverages antagonism and mobilization to navigate crises. Casullo’s exploration situates populism as a rational and effective political strategy, offering valuable insights into its persistent presence in Latin America’s political landscape.
Chapter 9 by Paula Biglieri and Gloria Perelló, titled “Populist Temporality in Latin America,” offers a theoretical exploration of the temporal and spatial dynamics of Latin American populism. Anchored in the works of Laclau and Mouffe, the authors argue that populism embodies an irreducible tension between rupture—a dislocation of established order—and spatialisation, the institutionalisation of new configurations. This duality, they contend, defines the “heart” of populist politics.
The chapter’s strength lies in its nuanced analysis of populist temporality as a moment of radical reactivation that disrupts entrenched practices, creating space for new possibilities. Biglieri and Perelló underscore how populist leaders connect this rupture to historical struggles, constructing a lineage that situates present movements as heirs of past resistance. This linkage not only legitimises their causes but also sustains popular mobilization by blending hope for the future with a reimagining of the past.
The authors also highlight how spatialisation translates populist ideals into institutional frameworks, such as constitutions that challenge neoliberal or colonial legacies. However, they argue that this institutionalisation never fully resolves the rupture, leaving an open-ended struggle that ensures the continuous evolution of populist politics.
Eleonora Mesquita Ceia’s chapter titled “Populism and Constitutionalism in Brazil: : An Enduring or Transitional Relationship in Time?” provides a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between populism and constitutionalism in Brazil’s political history. Through case studies of key populist leaders—from Getúlio Vargas to Jair Bolsonaro—the chapter examines how populist projects have alternately reinforced and challenged liberal-democratic constitutionalism. The chapter argues against the simplistic binary often drawn between populism and constitutionalism in Global North scholarship. Ceia highlights the diverse constitutional engagements of Brazilian populist regimes, noting how some, such as Lula’s and Dilma Rousseff’s administrations, upheld liberal-democratic principles, while others, like Vargas’s and Bolsonaro’s governments, pursued constitutional reforms and institutional capture to consolidate power.
Particularly striking is the chapter’s discussion of populism’s dual nature in Brazil, where it emerges as both a response to crises and a tool for political inclusion. Vargas’s reforms integrated the working class into the political process, while Bolsonaro’s far-right populism weaponized constitutional mechanisms to deepen societal divisions. Ceia underscores that these approaches reflect not populism as a monolith but its variability across time and contexts. A key takeaway from the chapter is the distinction between populism and authoritarian populism: while both can challenge liberal-democratic norms, only the latter consistently undermines constitutional protections and institutions. By contrasting different administrations’ approaches, Ceia offers an insightful critique of the notion of a “permanent populist constitutionalism” in Brazil. This chapter underscores the resilience of Brazil’s 1988 constitution, which has withstood authoritarian populist pressures, reaffirming the importance of institutional integrity in democratic systems.
Andy Knott’s concluding chapter titiled “Time for More? Populism’s Prospects” offers an examination of populism’s future by juxtaposing theoretical models with real-world contexts. Rather than presenting definitive answers, Knott embraces the speculative nature of his subject, framing populism as a contextual phenomenon shaped by crises and historical transitions. The chapter effectively contrasts Tormey’s populisation thesis, which views populism as a permanent feature of modern politics, with the cyclical model, which situates populism within recurring patterns of hegemonic breakdown and reconstruction. Knott’s use of sociological and ontological approaches enriches his exploration of populism’s adaptability and persistence. By grounding these models in historical examples from Europe and Latin America, the chapter avoids abstract theorizing, offering a nuanced understanding of populism’s dynamics. The critique of anti-populist narratives adds depth, challenging the dismissal of populism as an aberration.
Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics is a thought-provoking exploration that repositions populism within the framework of time, challenging traditional spatial and ideological analyses. By delving into the temporal dimensions of populist emergence, endurance, and transformation, Knott and his contributors provide a groundbreaking interdisciplinary perspective on this political phenomenon. The book’s innovative use of temporal metaphors, alongside rigorous engagement with historical, philosophical, and regional contexts, illuminates populism’s dynamic interaction with crises and hegemonic transitions.
Knott’s editorial vision is particularly commendable for bridging philosophical insights and political realities, effectively situating populism as a phenomenon deeply intertwined with historical and temporal conditions. While some chapters revisit familiar theoretical debates, the collection as a whole offers fresh and innovative perspectives, especially through its focus on regional variations and the transformative interplay between technology and populist dynamics. This volume is an essential resource for scholars and students of political theory, providing a deeper and more nuanced understanding of populism as a diachronic force shaping contemporary politics. Ultimately, the book stands as a timely and significant contribution to the ongoing debate on populism’s evolving role in influencing and redefining political trajectories in the modern world.
Andy Knott (eds). (2024). Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics. Edinburgh University Press. 272 pp. Hardcover $103,12, ISBN-10: 139952772X, ISBN-13: 978-1399527729
Highlighting Elon Musk’s dual role as a private tech mogul and a potential quasi-governmental leader under elected US President Donald Trump, Professor Anthony J. Nownes underscored the dangers of unregulated private power intersecting with public institutions. He emphasized that ceding excessive power to any private interest—whether in the tech industry or another sector—poses a significant threat to democracy. Illustrating this concern, Professor Nownes pointed to the proposed “Doge Department,” noting, “Unlike actual government departments with conflict-of-interest rules, such private entities lack safeguards, making them a potential avenue for unchecked influence over public resources.”
In an illuminating discussion with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Anthony J. Nownes, a political science expert from the University of Tennessee and co-author of the book titled The New Entrepreneurial Advocacy -Silicon Valley Elites in American Politics, offered his insights on the growing influence of tech elites and its implications for democracy. Centering on the theme of the delicate balance between private power and public accountability, Professor Nownes emphasized a pressing concern: “Ceding too much power to any private interest—whether the tech industry or any other sector—poses a threat to democracy.”
Highlighting Elon Musk’s dual role as a private tech mogul and a potential quasi-governmental leader under elected US President Donald Trump, Professor Nownes pointed out the dangers of unregulated private power intersecting with public institutions. He explained, for instance, the risks of the proposed “Doge Department” (or Department of Government Efficiency), stating that “unlike actual government departments with conflict-of-interest rules, such private entities lack safeguards, making them a potential avenue for unchecked influence over public resources.”
Turning to the broader historical context, Professor Nownes compared today’s tech moguls to past industrial giants. While corporate influence is not a new phenomenon, he argued that the tech industry’s vast resources and rapid innovation—outpacing government regulation—make its impact unique. Using examples like Microsoft protecting Ukraine from cyberattacks and SpaceX ensuring Ukrainian connectivity, Professor Nownes highlighted how tech companies wield unprecedented power over geopolitical and societal outcomes.
On the issue of lobbying and political advocacy, Professor Nownes delved into the disproportionate focus of Silicon Valley philanthropy on post-material causes, such as environmental conservation and DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion), rather than structural inequalities. He warned that this prioritization risks sidelining critical issues like income inequality and homelessness, leaving a vacuum often filled by populists like Donald Trump, who, while lacking substantive solutions, at least address these concerns rhetorically.
Professor Nownes also discussed the erosion of public trust in tech companies, exacerbated by scandals such as Cambridge Analytica. Referencing a Pew study that found 78% of Americans believe social media companies wield too much political power, he noted that despite this skepticism, tech giants have not yet faced significant political or economic repercussions. However, he foresees this changing, particularly as ethical considerations—such as the negative effects of social media on children—gain political traction.
Professor Nownes also addressed the future of American democracy under a second Trump administration. While cautiously optimistic about its survival, he acknowledged the erosion of democratic norms and the slow response of legal institutions to recent challenges. His reflections offer a sobering reminder of the delicate equilibrium between private power and public accountability, as well as the need for vigilance in preserving democratic principles in the face of rapid technological and political change.
Highlighting Elon Musk’s dual role as a private tech mogul and a potential quasi-governmental leader under elected US President Donald Trump, Professor Anthony J. Nownes underscored the dangers of unregulated private power intersecting with public institutions. He emphasized that ceding excessive power to any private interest—whether in the tech industry or another sector—poses a significant threat to democracy. Illustrating this concern, Professor Nownes pointed to the proposed “Doge Department,” noting, “Unlike actual government departments with conflict-of-interest rules, such private entities lack safeguards, making them a potential avenue for unchecked influence over public resources.”
In an illuminating discussion with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Anthony J. Nownes, a political science expert from the University of Tennessee and co-author of the book titled The New Entrepreneurial Advocacy -Silicon Valley Elites in American Politics, offered his insights on the growing influence of tech elites and its implications for democracy. Centering on the theme of the delicate balance between private power and public accountability, Professor Nownes emphasized a pressing concern: “Ceding too much power to any private interest—whether the tech industry or any other sector—poses a threat to democracy.”
Highlighting Elon Musk’s dual role as a private tech mogul and a potential quasi-governmental leader under elected US President Donald Trump, Professor Nownes pointed out the dangers of unregulated private power intersecting with public institutions. He explained, for instance, the risks of the proposed “Doge Department” (or Department of Government Efficiency), stating that “unlike actual government departments with conflict-of-interest rules, such private entities lack safeguards, making them a potential avenue for unchecked influence over public resources.”
Turning to the broader historical context, Professor Nownes compared today’s tech moguls to past industrial giants. While corporate influence is not a new phenomenon, he argued that the tech industry’s vast resources and rapid innovation—outpacing government regulation—make its impact unique. Using examples like Microsoft protecting Ukraine from cyberattacks and SpaceX ensuring Ukrainian connectivity, Professor Nownes highlighted how tech companies wield unprecedented power over geopolitical and societal outcomes.
On the issue of lobbying and political advocacy, Professor Nownes delved into the disproportionate focus of Silicon Valley philanthropy on post-material causes, such as environmental conservation and DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion), rather than structural inequalities. He warned that this prioritization risks sidelining critical issues like income inequality and homelessness, leaving a vacuum often filled by populists like Donald Trump, who, while lacking substantive solutions, at least address these concerns rhetorically.
Professor Nownes also discussed the erosion of public trust in tech companies, exacerbated by scandals such as Cambridge Analytica. Referencing a Pew study that found 78% of Americans believe social media companies wield too much political power, he noted that despite this skepticism, tech giants have not yet faced significant political or economic repercussions. However, he foresees this changing, particularly as ethical considerations—such as the negative effects of social media on children—gain political traction.
Professor Nownes also addressed the future of American democracy under a second Trump administration. While cautiously optimistic about its survival, he acknowledged the erosion of democratic norms and the slow response of legal institutions to recent challenges. His reflections offer a sobering reminder of the delicate equilibrium between private power and public accountability, as well as the need for vigilance in preserving democratic principles in the face of rapid technological and political change.
Professor Anthony J. Nownes is a political science expert from the University of Tennessee and co-author of the book titled The New Entrepreneurial Advocacy – Silicon Valley Elites in American Politics.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Anthony J. Nownes with some edits.
Tech Titans Shape Public Discourse by Spotlighting Key Issues
Professor Nownes, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How do you view the growing influence of tech elites in shaping political agendas? Are they effectively becoming a new form of political aristocracy? How has the concentration of economic power among tech giants influenced the balance of political power in the United States? Could you discuss whether their dominance undermines or enhances democratic institutions?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: First of all, thank you for having me here today. I appreciate the opportunity. I’m glad you phrased the first part of your question the way you did, focusing on agendas rather than policy outcomes. This distinction is important. There’s no question that tech elites shape the political agenda. Let’s start with Elon Musk. He’s the wealthiest man on earth and commands significant media attention for almost anything he does. Beyond that, his direct involvement in media platforms like Twitter—now X—and others like Instagram amplifies his influence. His posts, or whatever they’re called now, and his public statements certainly affect which issues people think about.
This doesn’t necessarily mean people agree with him, but it does mean they see what he says and often recognize the issues he highlights as important. Elon Musk is not alone in this regard. Other tech elites—Mark Zuckerberg, Reid Hoffman, Tim Cook, and many others—also have massive social media followings. While they may not always achieve their desired policy outcomes, there’s no doubt that the issues they publicly engage with are those that garner significant public attention. In this way, they have considerable success in shaping the political agenda.
Now, regarding the second part of your question about the concentration of economic power, these are, of course, challenging questions to answer definitively. Speaking both as a scholar and a citizen, I would argue that whenever the government cedes too much power to private actors, it risks undermining democracy. The government should and must work with private actors—after all, in a capitalist system, the economy’s health depends largely on the private sector’s vitality. But the government has its own role here, and at least theoretically, that role is to look out for the rest of us. I believe that ceding too much power to any private interest—whether the tech industry or any other sector—poses a threat to democracy. To demonstrate this, let me highlight some of the perils of granting excessive power to private actors.
Take, for example, the so-called “Doge Department.” You may not be familiar with this, but it’s the quasi-governmental body Donald Trump has claimed he has already begun forming. Officially called the Department of Government Efficiency (I use air quotes because it’s not actually a government department), it’s essentially a quasi-governmental—or really, a non-governmental—organization. Trump has reportedly chosen Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy to head it, with the stated goal of making the government more efficient.
Real government institutions, agencies, and bureaucratic departments operate under strict rules and regulations. These rules dictate who they can hire, what sorts of behavior are and are not allowed in the workplace, the qualifications required for employment, and, crucially, who the department is accountable to.
Now, imagine this organization gets up and running. Suppose, within six months, Trump grants it actual power. There would be little to stop someone like Elon Musk from making decisions that, for example, ensure his companies receive lucrative government contracts while his competitors do not. Unlike actual government departments, which have conflict-of-interest rules and similar safeguards, a private, non-governmental organization like this lacks such mechanisms.
This is one of the clearest examples of what could go wrong when excessive power is given to private actors within a democratic system. It underscores the importance of maintaining strict oversight and clear boundaries between public institutions and private entities to preserve the integrity of democratic governance.
Power of Tech Giants Today Is Unprecedented Compared to Past Corporate Interests
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg in Press conference at VIVA Technology (Vivatech) the world’s rendezvous for startup and leaders in Paris, France on on May 24, 2018. Photo: Frederic Legrand.
Looking at the historical relationship between corporate power and politics, how does the role of hi-tech oligarchs compare to past industrial moguls in shaping American political landscapes? Is this a continuation of corporate influence, or does the unique nature of digital platforms present new challenges?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: For the first part of your question, I’d like to preface my response by acknowledging that I’m not a historian, so I hesitate to draw extensive comparisons between current tech oligarchs and past industries in American politics. That said, it’s certainly not unprecedented for a powerful industry to wield significant influence over political outcomes in this country.
For instance, every school kid in the US learns about the robber barons of the Gilded Age. Additionally, the tobacco industry wielded extraordinary political power for decades, successfully staving off serious regulation of tobacco products. Throughout US history, doctors, the insurance industry, and other healthcare providers have collectively spent immense amounts of money lobbying against socialized medicine, with considerable success. So, corporate influence in politics is nothing new—it has been a feature of the American Republic from its very beginning.
However, I think it’s worth noting that the tech industry is different in several respects from previous industries that wielded political power. One key difference is the almost unfathomable resources these companies possess. As an industry and even at the individual company level, tech entities have significantly more wealth and resources than many nation-states. This is unprecedented.
Another difference is the rapid pace of innovation within the tech industry, which often outpaces the ability of governments and regulatory agencies to keep up. For example, SpaceX is currently more capable than the US government when it comes to space exploration. Similarly, Alphabet (Google) is far ahead of the US government—and likely any other government—in developing and deploying artificial intelligence. This gives tech companies tremendous influence over our lives, even if that influence is not overtly political.
I believe the rise of the tech industry introduces challenges that are different from those posed by previous corporate powers—some of which we may not even fully understand yet. For instance, consider the war in Ukraine. Tech companies are not directly involved in the conflict, yet they are significantly affecting events on the ground. Microsoft, for example, protects Ukraine from cyberattacks. SpaceX ensures that Ukrainians remain connected to the Internet. I recently read that Google has removed images of Ukraine from its open-source maps. These actions, while not traditionally political, have a profound impact on real-world political and international events. In this sense, the power of the tech industry over people’s lives is unprecedented compared to the influence wielded by previous corporate interests.
‘Leave Us Alone’ Ethos Shapes Platforms and Policies
How do hi-tech firms’ lobbying activities compare to other industries in terms of expenditure and focus? Specifically, what does the dominance of issues like taxes, intellectual property, and technology indicate about their priorities in shaping US policy? How does this concentrated influence by a few tech giants affect policymaking transparency and public interest considerations?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: I certainly understand why both the media and ordinary people are focusing on tech lobbying and the political influence of big tech. However, I think it’s important to recognize that the tech industry is just one of many industries in this country that spend hundreds of millions of dollars every year attempting to influence policy and elections.
There are other perennial heavyweight industries that spend on a similar scale to the tech industry. For example, the pharmaceutical industry, the health insurance industry, securities and investment companies, and the oil and gas industry are all highly politically active and spend significant sums. In that sense, the tech industry is not fundamentally different from other high-profile, politically active industries.
As for your final question, I found it interesting the way you phrased it. I study what we call public interest groups or non-governmental organizations in this country, which are comprised of individual members. At this point, there simply aren’t many public interest groups—or what we might also call citizen groups—working on the opposite side of the issues that big tech is pushing.
In many other industries, there are countervailing groups. For instance, in the oil and gas industry, there are hundreds of environmental groups in the United States. While they don’t have the same resources as oil and gas companies, they’ve managed to achieve a number of political victories over the past several decades. Similarly, healthcare and pharmaceutical companies often contend with public interest groups—especially senior citizen organizations—that lobby against them on issues like the cost of prescription drugs and government programs. Currently, I don’t see many public interest groups or citizen groups actively working to counterbalance the power of big tech. This, I believe, is another way in which this corporate sector is somewhat unusual.
What role do tech oligarchs play in shaping public discourse, and how do their personal ideologies influence the policies and practices of their platforms? Are we witnessing a new form of political lobbying through algorithmic curation and platform management?
Professor Anthony Nownes: This question seems almost perfectly shaped to refer to Elon Musk. Certainly, his personal ideology seems to affect every aspect of his newest company, X. I think there’s an element of this influence among other tech moguls as well.
It’s a cliché, but I believe it’s accurate to say that many of these individuals, even those who have traditionally supported center-left or left causes and the Democratic Party, are at their core economic libertarians. They are libertarians on social issues as well, but their general ethos of “leave us alone and let us do what we want” seems to permeate how they run their companies. I’m particularly thinking here of platforms like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and X. It doesn’t take much time spent on these platforms to realize that a fairly libertarian ethos influences what happens on them.
As for your second question, I’m not entirely sure I know enough about algorithms and platform management to say much definitively. However, I can say this: it seems to me that the conservative criticism these companies faced during the first Trump administration did affect some of their practices. For example, this criticism likely influenced content moderation policies, decisions to label certain material as misinformation or disinformation, and determinations about who to platform and who to de-platform. So, I do think there is some evidence that algorithmic curation and platform management are having political effects.
Social Media Companies Contribute Significantly to Misinformation Epidemic
Given the rise of misinformation and polarization on social media platforms, do you believe tech companies bear responsibility for mitigating these issues, or should this be addressed through government regulation? How do we balance such regulation with the principles of free speech?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: I’m not sure this is exactly how the question was intended—but I’ll answer it this way regardless, more as a citizen than as a scholar. Social media companies absolutely bear some responsibility for the explosion of misinformation and disinformation in this country. Of course, they don’t see it that way, but I think the evidence is overwhelming that they have contributed significantly to the epidemic of misinformation and disinformation in the US and elsewhere.
No matter how one feels about government regulation, it seems to me that there’s really only one entity in this country large enough, powerful enough, and well-resourced enough to rein in these companies: the federal government. The EU, of course, also has the capacity to impose regulations. However, these companies have shown very little commitment to addressing misinformation and disinformation on their own, so I see the idea of self-regulation as a bit of a nonstarter.
As for the free speech aspect of the issue, I don’t think balancing regulation with free speech is particularly difficult. We already do it all the time in other domains—for example, with tobacco advertising. I think the free speech defense offered by social media companies to justify their conduct is, frankly, somewhat nonsensical. We regulate many things in society without infringing on people’s rights to express themselves or act within legal boundaries.
Do you think the political donations and lobbying efforts by Silicon Valley’s tech executives disproportionately sway policy outcomes? Are there examples where their influence has significantly impacted legislation or political campaigns? With federal campaign finance laws being described as “byzantine and ever-changing,” what challenges do these laws pose in regulating the contributions of tech leaders, and how can these challenges be addressed without infringing on free speech rights?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: Before addressing this question directly, I want to point out something that may already be familiar to many of you: for those of us who study interest groups, corporate influence, or lobbying, determining influence is incredibly difficult. The primary reason is the old adage: correlation does not equal causation.
For example, in the US, we see the gun lobby making significant contributions to right-leaning politicians, who then work diligently to maintain access to firearms. However, this doesn’t necessarily prove influence because these politicians likely would have acted the same way without the gun lobby’s financial support. Indeed, that alignment is often why the gun lobby supports them in the first place. As a result, proving policy influence is challenging, and at best, we can make educated guesses based on available evidence.
That said, it’s clear to me that the tech industry, like many others, has been highly influential politically. One prominent example is the tech sector’s campaign to preserve Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. This legislation protects online platforms from being treated as publishers, granting them virtual legal immunity for content posted on their sites—a unique advantage in US law. Social media companies have invested significant time and resources at both the state and federal levels to ensure Section 230 remains intact.
Another notable example is Proposition 22 in California. Uber and Lyft spent substantial sums to secure their exemption from labor laws in one of the country’s most liberal states. Similarly, big tech firms, including Amazon, have successfully resisted legislation aimed at increasing transparency about how user data is utilized. On the individual level, tech leaders like Peter Thiel have played pivotal roles in the political ascendance of figures such as J.D. Vance.
As for the second part of your question about campaign finance laws, I think it’s essential for people to realize that campaign finance laws in this country, as they are currently configured, really can’t stop an individual or organization from pouring as much money as they want into our campaign finance system. Yes, there are regulations, and yes, these regulations can and do prevent the ultra-rich and well-resourced organizations from donating money directly to candidates for office. However, the way the laws are currently structured—and I don’t see this changing anytime soon—there is nothing the government or anyone else can do to stop a person or organization from spending unlimited sums of money to support candidates or parties they favor.
For example, Elon Musk reportedly contributed something between $200 and $300 million to help Trump get elected. He’s not allowed to give that money directly to Trump, as the amount he can donate directly to a candidate is severely limited. But he is allowed to give that money to a Super PAC. In this case, he contributed to his own Super PAC, “America PAC.” All he had to do was hire one or two competent lawyers to ensure they followed the letter of the law, and there was nothing to stop him from funneling unlimited sums of money into the election.
I see no evidence at all that either major political party has any appetite to change anything about the current system. As such, I view the question of regulating this kind of spending as rather moot. I do not see any significant reform in this area on the horizon.
Most People Are Getting All Their News from Podcasters
You discuss “super citizens” leveraging their wealth and public profiles to influence policy through media and social platforms. How do you see this form of direct advocacy evolving, especially with the growing influence of social media as an unmediated channel?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: I’m not particularly skilled at predicting the future of politics, and I don’t feel I know enough about technology to provide a deeply insightful answer to this question. However, after reflecting on it, I can offer the following observation: One trend my co-author, Darren Halpin, and I have noted regarding the concept of “super citizens” is that an increasing number of people—particularly younger individuals, and especially younger men—are receiving all of their news, not just part of it, from individuals who are not traditionally part of the news industry. Figures like Joe Rogan and Theo Vaughn, for instance, are immensely popular podcasters who exemplify what we term prototypical super citizens. These individuals initially gained fame through non-political activities but now wield considerable political influence through their podcasts.
I think the extent to which people rely on these sources for news and information is somewhat underappreciated. As traditional or legacy media continues to decline in importance, and in some cases disappears altogether, I believe we’re going to see much more of this phenomenon. Unfortunately, as a result, disinformation and misinformation are likely to become even bigger problems moving forward.
Your book suggests that Silicon Valley philanthropy tends to favor postmaterial causes, such as environmental conservation and arts, over redistributive efforts that address economic inequality. What implications does this trend have for addressing structural inequalities in American society?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: The first part of the question addresses disproportionate funding for certain issues. A good example here is education. Our research showed that Silicon Valley figures and their foundations have spent considerable amounts of money over the past couple of decades on what they call education reforms—initiatives such as charter schools, privatization, and voucher schemes. There’s substantial evidence that this advocacy, and in some cases direct funding, has influenced state policies and school districts across the United States. This demonstrates how Silicon Valley’s prioritization of certain issues over others can have significant impact, though it remains challenging to definitively prove causation.
Regarding the disproportionate focus on post-material issues, the implications are far-reaching. This emphasis on post-material causes means that critical problems in the US, such as income inequality, homelessness, underemployment, poverty, and inadequate access to healthcare, are not prioritized in political discourse. To be a liberal in the 1930s meant focusing on the day-to-day economic interests of ordinary people. Today, however, left-leaning Silicon Valley elites often concentrate on issues like abortion, DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) programs, LGBTQ rights, and global warming. While these issues are undeniably important, this shift has left economic concerns largely to right-wing populists like Donald Trump.
Although Trump does not approach these issues with serious policy solutions, he, at least, acknowledges them, which resonates with voters. The center-left’s overwhelming focus on post-material issues has been disastrous for the working class and has, in part, enabled the rise of Trump and other MAGA Republicans.
Regarding current political tendencies, there’s no question that some high-profile tech figures—Elon Musk being a prime example—have aligned themselves with Trump and the right. Others, such as Mark Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos, appear to have softened their rhetoric toward Trump, even if they may not have supported him outright. However, voting and campaign finance records suggest that Silicon Valley employees, including both rank-and-file workers and many executives, remain largely Democratic and liberal-leaning.
I think that some high-profile names have definitely turned toward Trump. However, I don’t believe they have changed that much. It’s politics that has changed significantly. For example, even though many Silicon Valley employees—particularly the rank-and-file employees—haven’t changed much in their political tendencies, they are certainly more silent than they were 8 or 10 years ago.
I think some of the rhetoric coming from the tech titans—the entrepreneurs, owners, and founders—stems from sheer pragmatism. They understand Trump as a political reality, and this time, they want to position themselves favorably. As for employees, they see how the world has changed and likely feel there’s little reason to engage in protests, as it probably wouldn’t make a significant difference. Additionally, such actions could potentially get them into trouble at work. So, that was a bit of a rambling answer, but that’s my perspective.
People Believe Social Media Companies Wield Too Much Political Power
Elon Musk, founder, CEO, and chief engineer of SpaceX; CEO of Tesla; CTO and chairman of X (formerly Twitter); and co-founder of Neuralink and OpenAI, at VIVA Technology (Vivatech) in Paris, France, on June 16, 2023. Photo: Frederic Legrand.
Given the discussion on the erosion of public trust in tech firms due to scandals like Cambridge Analytica, what role do you think transparency and ethical considerations should play in maintaining the political capital of these companies?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: I think it’s quite interesting. Given how much influence tech companies wield and how closely Donald Trump has aligned himself with Elon Musk, public opinion polls in this country clearly show that the vast majority of Americans are skeptical or even negative about tech companies. For example, in my lobbying class, I reference a Pew study from earlier this year that revealed 78% of Americans believe social media companies wield too much political power. To me, this is an astonishing figure.
Despite this widespread skepticism, these companies haven’t yet paid a significant political or economic price. However, I believe this may be starting to change, potentially influenced by recent political shifts among some tech leaders. What do I mean by this? Over the past couple of years, somewhat quietly, multiple states in the US have passed age verification laws for pornographic websites. While this development hasn’t garnered much media attention, I suspect social media companies are paying close attention. They may be wondering if similar regulations could soon target them, particularly given the growing discourse about the harmful effects of social media on children.
For instance, Jonathan Haidt’s highly successful book The Anxious Generation discusses these negative effects, particularly on children, and I think this conversation is beginning to permeate our political discourse. As a result, tech companies will likely need to start addressing the ethical considerations you mentioned. This growing dialogue and the precedent set by regulations on other industries might push tech companies to pay more attention to these issues in the near future.
And lastly, Professor Nownes, there are those pundits arguing that American democracy may not survive another Trump administration. How do you think American institutions will react to a second Trump administration?
Professor Anthony J. Nownes: Well, this is a tough question. For both professional and personal reasons, I’ll say this: Do I think American democracy will survive? Yes, I do. But what it will look like a few years from now? I honestly don’t know.I see some disturbing signs, particularly regarding democratic norms. Many of these norms have taken quite a hit over the last few years. The legal system, for example, has been quite slow in addressing certain actions, especially attempts by the president-elect to change the outcome of the last election.I think this remains an open question. I wish I had a more definitive answer, but at this point, I just don’t know.
