Labour Day celebrations

ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 3: Normalizing Authoritarian Populism — Institutions, Algorithms, and Fascist Drift

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 3: Normalizing Authoritarian Populism — Institutions, Algorithms, and Fascist Drift.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00151

 

The third panel of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium examined how authoritarian populism becomes normalized across institutions, media ecosystems, and political identities. Bringing together perspectives from political science, media studies, and political theory, the session highlighted the interplay between executive overreach, institutional erosion, and algorithmically amplified communication. Contributions by Professor Larry Diamond and Professor Bruce Cain underscored the dynamics of democratic backsliding and “autocratic drift” within the United States, while Assoc. Prof. Ibrahim Al-Marashi demonstrated how AI-driven media and “slopaganda” reshape populist mobilization in a hyperreal digital environment. Concluding the panel, Professor Tariq Modood proposed multicultural nationalism as a unifying alternative to exclusionary populism. Collectively, the panel offered a multidimensional framework for understanding and resisting contemporary authoritarian trajectories.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Third Panel of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, “Reforming and Safeguarding Liberal Democracy: Systemic Crises, Populism, and Democratic Resilience,” convened under the title “Normalizing Authoritarian Populism: Institutions, Algorithms, and Fascist Drift.” Moderated by Professor Werner Pascha, Emeritus Professor of Economics at Duisburg-Essen University and affiliated with the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), the panel examined how authoritarian populism becomes normalized through institutional weakening, executive overreach, media transformation, algorithmic amplification, and exclusionary forms of nationalism.

Professor Pascha guided the session as a moderator attentive to both institutional and conceptual linkages. His role was especially important in bringing together the panel’s diverse disciplinary perspectives—from comparative democratization and American political institutions to media studies, war narratives, and multicultural political theory—into a coherent discussion on the contemporary vulnerabilities of liberal democracy.

The panel opened with Professor Larry Diamond, William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute, and Bass University Fellow. In his presentation, “The Arc of Authoritarian Populism in the US under Donald Trump, How Far It Has Progressed, and the Prospects of Reversing It,” Professor Diamond assessed the trajectory of authoritarian populism in the United States, drawing on V-Dem indicators and comparative lessons from Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. He emphasized electoral manipulation, corruption, attacks on institutions, and the importance of broad democratic mobilization.

The second speaker, Professor Bruce Cain, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center, presented “The Institutional Enablement of American Populism.” Professor Cain offered a measured analysis of autocratic drift in the United States, distinguishing between rule-of-law erosion and longer-term shifts in America’s federalized institutional structure. His remarks highlighted executive power, emergency authority, judicial interpretation, federalism, and the political economy of democratic resilience.

The third presentation, “Algorithmic Populism in the Age of the Deep-Fake,” was delivered by Assoc. Prof. Ibrahim Al-Marashi, Associate Professor at The American College of the Mediterranean and the Department of International Relations at Central European University. Assoc. Prof. Al-Marashi explored how AI-generated media, memes, “slopaganda,” and hyperreal digital narratives reshape war, propaganda, and populist communication.

The final speaker, Professor Tariq Modood, Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of Bristol, presented “From Populist Capture to Democratic Belonging: Multicultural Nationalism as an Alternative to Exclusionary Nationalism.” Professor Modood proposed multicultural nationalism as a constructive response to exclusionary populism, seeking to integrate majority anxieties and minority vulnerabilities within a shared framework of equal citizenship and belonging.

Together, the panel offered a rich interdisciplinary account of how authoritarian populism is institutionalized, mediated, normalized, and potentially resisted.

 

Professor Larry Diamond: The Arc of Authoritarian Populism in the US under Donald Trump, How Far It Has Progressed, and the Prospects of Reversing It  

Professor Larry Diamond, a renowned expert on democratic development and Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

As the first speaker of the third panel, Professor Larry Diamond delivered a wide-ranging and analytically grounded presentation that examined the trajectory of authoritarian populism and the prospects for reversing democratic backsliding. Moving briskly through his slides, Professor Diamond framed his remarks around two central questions: how far authoritarian populism has advanced, and what strategies may effectively counter its expansion. Drawing in part on V-Dem data as well as arguments developed in his book Ill Winds, Professor Diamond outlined what he described as an “autocrat’s 12-step program,” emphasizing the cumulative and systematic nature of democratic erosion.

While not elaborating each step in detail, Professor Diamond underscored the critical importance of electoral manipulation and control, identifying it as the decisive stage in authoritarian consolidation. He noted that this dimension often determines whether democratic decline becomes entrenched, referencing recent developments in Hungary as a salient example. Turning to the United States, Professor Diamond traced the evolution of authoritarian tendencies under Donald Trump, emphasizing both continuity from the first term and new developments in the second.

Executive Power and Erosion

Among the defining features identified by Professor Diamond were the use of political pressure to deter intra-party dissent, particularly among Republican legislators, and the expansion of attacks on independent institutions, including law firms, universities, and media organizations. He highlighted the increasing concentration of media ownership in the hands of political allies, suggesting that such developments have already begun to shape editorial practices in major outlets. In addition, Professor Diamond pointed to the erosion of conflict-of-interest norms, arguing that corruption has become deeply embedded within the governing project and may ultimately prove politically destabilizing.

Further institutional concerns included the dismissal of inspectors general, the impoundment of congressionally appropriated funds, and the transformation of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) into a broader instrument of political enforcement. Professor Diamond also emphasized attempts to weaponize the Justice Department and to gain control over electoral administration, including efforts to weaken election security infrastructure. These actions, in his view, reflected a coherent strategy aimed at consolidating executive power.

Assessing the extent of democratic decline, Professor Diamond drew on V-Dem indicators to demonstrate a significant deterioration in the United States’ liberal democracy score. He highlighted a particularly sharp decline during the first year of Trump’s second presidency, noting that the country has shifted from a high-performing liberal democracy to a more illiberal form. Quantitatively, he described a 28-point decline from the end of the Obama administration, a scale of regression comparable only to early developments under Viktor Orbán among advanced democracies.

Disaggregating these trends, Professor Diamond identified pronounced declines in academic freedom, freedom of expression, and legislative constraints on the executive. At the same time, he suggested that these constraints could partially recover depending on electoral outcomes, particularly if opposition parties regain control of one or both houses of Congress. This possibility led him to argue that the trajectory toward autocracy, while serious, has recently slowed.

Courts, Protests, and Declining Support

Several factors, according to Professor Diamond, have contributed to this deceleration. The judiciary, though uneven in its responses, has played a significant role. Lower federal courts have blocked numerous executive actions, while even the Supreme Court, despite issuing decisions that expand presidential authority, has begun to show signs of resistance. Professor Diamond pointed in particular to anticipated rulings on birthright citizenship as potential indicators of judicial limits.

Equally important, in his view, has been the scale and geographic breadth of public protest. Mass mobilizations, including demonstrations in both urban centers and traditionally conservative regions, have signaled widespread opposition. However, the most decisive constraint, Professor Diamond argued, is declining presidential popularity. He emphasized that public approval functions as a critical political resource, and that current approval ratings—marked by substantial negative margins—place the administration in a vulnerable position.

Electoral dynamics, he suggested, have also shifted. Policy decisions, including military engagement with Iran and its economic consequences, have contributed to declining support and may influence forthcoming elections. These developments, combined with structural features such as the Senate filibuster and the federal system, have limited the administration’s capacity to enact more sweeping institutional changes. Professor Diamond noted that resistance within the Senate, particularly regarding efforts to remove the filibuster, has been a key factor in constraining legislative overreach.

Electoral Integrity Under Pressure

Turning to governance capacity, Professor Diamond highlighted patterns of administrative instability and perceived incompetence. Frequent turnover in key positions, coupled with broader depletion of the federal workforce, has created gaps in institutional effectiveness. Drawing on observations from public service monitoring organizations, he warned that these deficiencies may have tangible consequences for crisis response and public service delivery, further undermining political legitimacy.

In the legal domain, Professor Diamond cited data indicating that federal courts have blocked a substantial number of executive actions, suggesting that judicial resistance has been more extensive than often assumed. Nonetheless, he cautioned that such interventions have not always been sufficient to prevent institutional damage, particularly when agencies are dismantled before legal remedies take effect.

A central concern in Professor Diamond’s analysis was the potential manipulation of electoral processes. He identified legislative initiatives such as the SAVE Act as instruments that could be used to restrict voter participation, and warned of more extreme scenarios involving the declaration of electoral emergencies or interference with vote counting. While acknowledging that such outcomes are contingent on political conditions, he stressed that close electoral contests increase their plausibility.

Strategies for Democratic Renewal

In concluding his presentation, Professor Diamond turned to strategies for democratic reversal. He emphasized the importance of early and coordinated intervention, noting that the probability of successful resistance increases when democratic actors mobilize before authoritarian consolidation is complete. Drawing on comparative examples, including recent electoral developments in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, he highlighted the necessity of broad opposition unity and effective mobilization.

Importantly, Professor Diamond argued against adopting the polarizing tactics of authoritarian leaders, instead advocating for strategies that transcend political divisions and appeal to a wider electorate. He underscored the importance of addressing economic concerns and everyday issues, while also exposing vulnerabilities related to corruption and wealth concentration. Reclaiming national symbols and articulating an inclusive democratic vision were identified as key components of successful opposition strategies.

Finally, Professor Diamond stressed the importance of leadership. Effective democratic leadership, in his view, must project optimism, confidence, and strength, offering a compelling alternative to authoritarian narratives. Through this combination of institutional analysis and strategic reflection, Professor Diamond provided a comprehensive assessment of both the challenges posed by authoritarian populism and the conditions under which democratic resilience may be restored.

 

Professor Bruce Cain: The Institutional Enablement of American Populism

Bruce E. Cain is Professor of Political Science, Stanford University; Director, Bill Lane Center.

As the second speaker of the third panel, Professor Bruce E. Cain presented an institutionally grounded analysis. Positioning his remarks between alarmist and dismissive interpretations, Professor Cain described himself as “seriously concerned,” offering a measured assessment of democratic change in the United States. His intervention built upon earlier contributions while introducing a distinctive analytical framework centered on institutional dynamics, historical precedents, and the structural features of American governance.

At the outset, Professor Cain engaged directly with the empirical evidence of democratic decline, particularly the V-Dem data referenced throughout the symposium. While acknowledging the sharp downward trajectory, he emphasized that the decline effectively returns the United States to levels comparable to the mid-twentieth century. This regression, he argued, is normatively troubling given subsequent democratic reforms, yet it does not constitute a transition to outright autocracy. Rather, Professor Cain conceptualized the current situation as “autocratic drift”—a directional movement that erodes democratic quality without fully dismantling democratic status. This distinction, he suggested, is essential for maintaining analytical clarity.

Trump as Accelerator, Not Origin

Structuring his presentation around two central questions, Professor Cain first addressed whether autocratic drift has occurred and whether it is attributable to Donald Trump. He answered affirmatively, while also emphasizing that such drift must be understood in context. His second question concerned normalization: whether these changes are becoming embedded in institutional practice and therefore more difficult to reverse. This latter issue, he indicated, is closely tied to the problem of reversibility raised by other speakers.

A key contribution of Professor Cain’s analysis lies in his differentiation between two forms of autocratic drift. The first pertains to the erosion of the rule of law and fundamental democratic principles. The second concerns shifts in the distinctive institutional structure of the United States, characterized by a highly federalized and fragmented system of governance. This dual framework allowed Professor Cain to separate concerns about core democratic norms from changes in institutional balance, arguing that while both are significant, the former poses a more serious threat.

In discussing the institutional structure of American democracy, Professor Cain emphasized the importance of federalism and the vertical and horizontal fragmentation of power. He noted that while unified partisan control—so-called “trifecta government”—can weaken horizontal checks, vertical fragmentation remains a critical source of resistance. State and local governments retain substantial autonomy, complicating efforts to centralize authority. This institutional design, he argued, was deliberately constructed to prevent the concentration of power, and continues to function as a constraint on executive overreach.

At the same time, Professor Cain acknowledged that the very features that limit executive power can also produce governance difficulties, particularly under conditions of polarization. The paralysis associated with divided government has encouraged successive administrations—both Democratic and Republican—to rely increasingly on executive actions as institutional workarounds. In this sense, Professor Cain argued that autocratic drift predates Trump and reflects longer-term adaptations within the American system. Trump, in this framework, is both an accelerant and an innovator: he has intensified existing practices while also introducing new forms of institutional challenge.

From Institutional Change to Norm Erosion

Historically situating these developments, Professor Cain traced shifts in the balance of power between branches of government. The nineteenth century, he noted, was characterized by strong legislatures, while the Progressive Era marked a transition toward stronger executive authority. A partial reassertion of legislative power followed Watergate, but recent decades have again seen movement toward executive dominance. These oscillations, in his view, suggest that institutional balance is inherently dynamic, and that not all shifts toward executive power necessarily constitute democratic breakdown.

However, Professor Cain distinguished this structural evolution from the more troubling erosion of the rule of law. He identified several areas where recent developments represent a significant departure from established norms. Foremost among these was the attempt to disrupt the electoral process in 2020, which he described as a “serious and almost unthinkable act.” He also highlighted the pardoning of individuals involved in the January 6 events, noting that the combination of expansive pardon powers and judicially affirmed presidential immunity creates a particularly concerning institutional configuration.

In this regard, Professor Cain emphasized that the interaction between legal immunity and pardon authority raises the risk that individuals may engage in unlawful actions on behalf of the executive, anticipating protection from legal consequences. This possibility, he suggested, is a central concern within the election law community, which has responded by increasing monitoring efforts and preparing legal challenges. Despite these risks, Professor Cain expressed cautious optimism, citing the failure of many previous legal challenges to succeed and the presence of institutional actors willing to resist.

Executive Power and Conflict-of-Interest Gaps

Another dimension of rule-of-law erosion identified by Professor Cain was the use of public office for personal enrichment. He pointed out that the president is uniquely exempt from conflict-of-interest regulations, creating opportunities for financial gain that extend beyond direct transactions to include networks of associates and affiliates. This structural gap, he argued, undermines anti-corruption efforts and poses a significant challenge for reform.

Turning to the issue of normalization, Professor Cain argued that contemporary developments are partly rooted in earlier precedents. Instances of misconduct by previous administrations—across party lines—have contributed to a gradual lowering of normative standards. Trump’s actions, in this context, represent an amplification rather than a complete departure. This cumulative process, he suggested, increases the risk that practices once considered exceptional may become institutionalized.

Professor Cain also addressed the role of the judiciary, particularly the use of the “shadow docket,” whereby courts allow contested policies to remain in effect pending review. He suggested that recent criticism of this practice may prompt judicial recalibration, though its long-term implications remain uncertain. Similarly, he discussed the politicization of judicial appointments, linking it to procedural changes such as the elimination of the filibuster for judicial nominees, which has facilitated partisan control over the courts.

In examining the broader institutional landscape, Professor Cain identified multiple factors contributing to the concentration of executive power, including the expansion of unilateral war powers, the use of emergency authorities, and the increasing reliance on executive orders. He emphasized that these developments are not confined to a single administration, but reflect broader systemic trends shaped by both parties.

Reversibility and Enduring Change

In considering reversibility, Professor Cain suggested that many recent changes could be undone relatively quickly, particularly those associated with executive actions. However, deeper institutional shifts—especially those affecting legal interpretations and structural balances—may prove more enduring. The future direction of the judiciary, particularly regarding the unitary executive theory, will be a critical factor in this regard.

In his concluding remarks, Professor Cain introduced a provocative argument concerning the relationship between democracy and capitalism. He observed that the United States’ institutional stability has historically supported a favorable business environment, and suggested that disruptions caused by executive unpredictability may undermine this stability. He further posited that, for many voters, economic considerations may outweigh concerns about democratic norms. In this sense, the political consequences of current developments may be driven as much by economic performance as by institutional integrity.

Ultimately, Professor Cain’s presentation offered a layered and historically informed analysis of autocratic drift in the United States. By distinguishing between different forms of institutional change and situating contemporary developments within longer-term trajectories, he provided a framework that highlights both the resilience and the vulnerabilities of American democracy.

 

Associate Professor Al Marashi: Algorithmic Populism in the Age of the Deep-Fake

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi—Associate Professor at Department of History, California State University, San Marcos.

As the third speaker of the session, Associate Professor Al Marashi delivered a conceptually rich and interdisciplinary presentation that brought together insights from history and media studies to examine the evolving relationship between warfare, communication technologies, and populism. His intervention underscored the rapid transformation of contemporary conflict environments, emphasizing that the analytical frameworks used to interpret war must adapt to the accelerating pace of technological change—particularly the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and digitally mediated communication.

Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi opened by noting the obsolescence of his earlier research on what he had initially framed as the “12-Day War,” explaining that subsequent developments had already rendered that framing outdated. Instead, he proposed understanding the current situation as a prolonged and continuous conflict—extending to approximately forty days—thereby challenging conventional temporal boundaries used in historical analysis. From a geopolitical perspective, he suggested that this conflict could be interpreted as the third Gulf War from a United States vantage point, and the fourth from the perspective of the Gulf region. This reframing illustrated the fluidity of contemporary conflict narratives and the difficulty of capturing them in real time.

From CNN to Slopaganda

Central to Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi’s argument was the interplay between media evolution and the conduct of war. He traced a historical trajectory beginning with the 1991 Gulf War, often referred to as the “CNN War,” which marked the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle and introduced a model of continuous, real-time broadcast coverage. This phase, characterized by one-way communication, allowed audiences to consume war as a mediated spectacle, reinforcing a centralized narrative shaped by state and corporate media institutions.

He then contrasted this with the 2003 Iraq War, which he described as the “Al Jazeera War,” highlighting the emergence of alternative global media platforms that challenged Western-centric narratives. The early presence of blogs during this period signaled the beginnings of participatory media, although such participation remained limited in scope. These developments, according to Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi, laid the groundwork for the current media environment, in which social media, Web 2.0 technologies, and AI-driven content production have fundamentally transformed the dynamics of information dissemination.

In this contemporary phase, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi introduced the concept of “slopaganda,” referring to the proliferation of AI-generated content—often low-quality but highly viral—that saturates digital platforms. Unlike earlier forms of propaganda, which were largely centralized and controlled by state actors, slopaganda operates in a decentralized and participatory environment. This shift enables not only governments but also individuals to generate and disseminate persuasive content at unprecedented speed and scale.

AI, Hyperreality, and Memetic Warfare

Drawing on Marshall McLuhan’s famous dictum that “the medium is the message,” Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi argued that the significance of AI-generated media lies not only in its content but in its form. The ease with which such content can be created and shared transforms the very nature of political communication. In the context of populism, this facilitates direct engagement with mass audiences, bypassing traditional intermediaries and amplifying the personalization of political narratives.

Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi illustrated this dynamic through examples of AI-generated imagery depicting political leaders in exaggerated, often mythologized forms. These representations contribute to the construction of a digital “cult of personality,” reinforcing populist leadership styles while simultaneously creating easily recognizable targets for opposition narratives. This dual function—both consolidating support and inviting critique—highlights the interactive nature of contemporary propaganda ecosystems.

To further conceptualize this transformation, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi invoked the work of Jean Baudrillard, particularly the notion of hyperreality. He revisited Baudrillard’s controversial claim that the 1991 Gulf War “did not take place,” clarifying that the argument referred not to the absence of physical conflict but to the dominance of mediated representations over lived experience. In the current context, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi suggested that AI-generated media intensifies this condition, producing a form of warfare that exists simultaneously in physical and digital domains.

A key feature of this new media environment, as highlighted by Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi, is the participatory nature of content production. Unlike earlier conflicts, where propaganda was disseminated through hierarchical channels, contemporary warfare involves widespread public engagement in the creation and circulation of narratives. Metrics such as likes, shares, and comments become integral to the propagation of these narratives, transforming audiences into active participants in what he described as “memetic warfare.”

Personalized War and Symbolic Power

Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi also examined the personalization of conflict narratives, noting that contemporary wars are often framed around central political figures. In this case, he identified the prominence of a single leader as the focal point of one side’s narrative, while observing that the opposing side’s representation relied on a different kind of symbolic figure—one that may not occupy a formal leadership position but nonetheless becomes a viral emblem of resistance.

This observation led Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi to a deeper exploration of the cultural and historical dimensions of political representation, particularly in the Iranian context. He argued that understanding the nature of Iranian political communication requires engagement with the historical and religious traditions of Shiism, especially the concept of martyrdom rooted in the Battle of Karbala. This tradition, centered on the figures of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein, provides a powerful symbolic framework through which contemporary political events are interpreted.

Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi emphasized that this framework differs fundamentally from Western conceptions of political succession and legitimacy. Rather than viewing leadership transitions through a purely institutional or dynastic lens, the Iranian context incorporates elements of charismatic authority and inherited symbolic meaning. The notion of martyrdom, he suggested, serves as a potent mobilizing force, capable of generating emotional resonance and collective identity.

Importantly, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi noted that the absence of a central figure in certain visual representations does not diminish their impact. On the contrary, the symbolic power of absence—rooted in the historical narratives of Shiism—can enhance the effectiveness of these representations. In this sense, the production of memes and viral content becomes intertwined with deeply embedded cultural narratives, creating a hybrid form of communication that blends tradition with technological innovation.

War in the Age of Digital Hallucination

In concluding his presentation, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi returned to the broader theoretical implications of his analysis. Drawing on the science fiction writer William Gibson’s concept of cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination,” he argued that AI-driven media environments create a new kind of political reality—one that exists beyond physical space yet exerts tangible influence on perceptions and behavior. This “political hallucination,” as he described it, challenges conventional distinctions between reality and representation.

Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi’s final reflection posed a provocative question: whether the contemporary conflict, as experienced through these mediated forms, can be said to have “taken place” in the traditional sense. By framing the war as both a physical and a digital phenomenon, he invited a reconsideration of how scholars conceptualize and analyze conflict in the age of AI and networked communication.

Overall, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi’s presentation offered a compelling synthesis of historical perspective and media theory, highlighting the transformative impact of digital technologies on the practice of warfare and the dynamics of populism. His analysis underscored the need for interdisciplinary approaches to understanding contemporary conflicts, as well as the importance of adapting analytical frameworks to the rapidly evolving landscape of global communication.

 

Professor Tariq Modood: From Populist Capture to Democratic Belonging –Multicultural Nationalism as an Alternative to Exclusionary Nationalism 

Professor Tariq Modood, the founding Director of the Bristol University Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship.

As the final speaker of the third panel, Professor Tariq Modood presented a theoretically grounded and normatively oriented intervention that addressed one of the central ideological tensions of contemporary politics: the relationship between populist nationalism and multiculturalism. His presentation sought not merely to critique exclusionary nationalist narratives but to articulate a constructive alternative capable of reconciling majority and minority identities within a shared political framework.

Professor Modood began by outlining the core challenge posed by populist forms of exclusionary nationalism, which frequently depict multiculturalism as privileging minorities at the expense of the majority. In response, he argued that analytical critique alone is insufficient. Instead, what is required is a positive and politically viable framework that affirms the normative status of both majorities and minorities. This framework, which he termed “multicultural nationalism,” aims to cultivate a shared sense of belonging that does not demand the erasure of distinct identities.

Pluralistic Nationhood and Shared Identity

Central to Professor Modood’s conceptualization of multiculturalism is the notion of subgroup identity. He defined multiculturalism as the right of subgroups—understood as communities smaller than the polity as a whole—to have their identities recognized and incorporated within the framework of equal citizenship. This recognition is not limited to symbolic affirmation but extends to institutional accommodation and the reconfiguration of public identity. In this sense, multiculturalism involves a transformation of the national community itself, enabling previously marginalized groups to participate in shaping the collective identity on equal terms.

A key dimension of this process, as emphasized by Professor Modood, is the principle of mutual or dialogical recognition. Rejecting the idea that recognition operates in a one-directional manner—where some groups bestow recognition while others receive it—he argued that all members of the polity must participate as both givers and receivers of recognition. This reciprocity is essential for establishing a genuinely inclusive form of citizenship, in which belonging is co-constructed rather than unilaterally granted.

Professor Modood further clarified the relationship between majority and minority rights within this framework. Contrary to populist claims that minority rights undermine majority status, he argued that the rights of minorities are logically grounded in the pre-existing rights of majorities. Majorities already benefit from a national culture and identity that reflects their historical experiences and values. Extending similar recognition to minorities, therefore, is not a matter of granting special privileges but of ensuring equal participation in the shared national project. Multicultural citizenship, in this view, entails a continuous process of remaking national identity to accommodate diverse contributions.

This perspective led Professor Modood to distinguish multicultural nationalism from liberal nationalism. While liberal nationalism emphasizes individual rights, redistribution, and a neutral or secular public sphere, multicultural nationalismforegrounds the recognition of group identities, including ethno-religious communities. Moreover, he challenged the liberal nationalist notion that national culture should be “thinned” to minimize alienation among minorities. Instead, he proposed a process of “pluralistic thickening,” whereby the national culture is enriched through the inclusion of diverse identities. This additive approach seeks to expand, rather than dilute, the symbolic and cultural content of the nation.

Inclusive Nationhood Against Polarization

In addressing the contemporary political context, Professor Modood identified three key contributions that multicultural nationalism can make in responding to polarization and populism. First, he distinguished multiculturalism from cosmopolitan human rights frameworks, emphasizing that it is not inherently linked to open-border policies or specific immigration regimes. Rather than focusing on immigration, multiculturalism is concerned with citizenship and the formation of a shared “we.” This distinction allows it to engage with concerns about migration without adopting positions that may alienate segments of the electorate.

Second, Professor Modood highlighted the importance of addressing identity anxieties, particularly those experienced by majority populations. While multiculturalism has traditionally focused on minority vulnerabilities, he argued that it must also take seriously the concerns of majorities, which are often dismissed in public discourse. Recognizing these anxieties does not entail endorsing exclusionary views but rather integrating them into a broader framework of mutual respect and understanding. This approach seeks to move beyond polarized narratives that pit majority and minority identities against each other.

Third, Professor Modood emphasized the centrality of national identity in sustaining democratic citizenship. He argued that citizenship cannot function solely as a legal or institutional construct; it must be accompanied by a sense of belonging rooted in shared narratives and collective self-understanding. National identity, in this sense, is not static but continuously evolving, shaped by both historical legacies and contemporary agency. Multicultural nationalism embraces this dynamism, advocating for an inclusive national identity that reflects the diversity of the population while maintaining a coherent sense of collective purpose.

In elaborating this vision, Professor Modood stressed the need for institutional and symbolic reforms that support inclusion. These include accommodating the specific needs of minority communities, particularly in relation to ethno-religious practices, as well as reimagining public symbols and spaces to reflect a more diverse national narrative. Such measures are intended to foster a sense of belonging among all citizens, reinforcing the legitimacy of the national community.

Multicultural Nationalism as a Middle Path

In his concluding remarks, Professor Modood presented multicultural nationalism as a feasible and necessary alternative to the current dichotomy between monocultural nationalism and anti-nationalist or purely cosmopolitan approaches. By affirming the value of collective identities—both majority and minority—within the framework of equal citizenship, it offers a unifying political vision capable of bridging ideological divides. Importantly, this vision does not abandon the principles of multiculturalism but seeks to integrate them more fully into the concept of the nation.

Overall, Professor Modood’s presentation provided a sophisticated normative framework for addressing the challenges posed by populism and polarization. By reconciling the demands of diversity with the need for shared belonging, his concept of multicultural nationalism offers a pathway toward a more inclusive and resilient democratic order.

Discussions

The discussion at the end of the panel extended the presentations’ core concerns by focusing on institutional reform, executive discretion, emergency powers, constitutional safeguards, and the practical meaning of multicultural nationalism. The exchange brought together questions of democratic vulnerability in the United States with broader normative reflections on national identity and belonging.

Professor Kent Jones opened the discussion by identifying a central institutional dilemma in the American system: the broad deference often granted to presidential discretion. He noted that many legal and constitutional questions depend on executive judgment, particularly in areas framed as emergencies. Whether a situation qualifies as an emergency, whether emergency tariffs are justified, or whether extraordinary powers may be invoked often depends heavily on presidential interpretation. In the current context, this becomes especially troubling because, as Professor Jones observed, almost any justification may be constructed as an “emergency” if institutional constraints are weak.

Professor Jones connected this concern directly to anxieties surrounding future elections. If a president can define emergencies expansively, such powers could be used to justify extraordinary measures, including martial law, deployment of enforcement agencies near polling places, or other interventions that could intimidate voters or disrupt electoral administration. He therefore asked whether meaningful reform would require changes in judicial doctrine, statutory law, or even constitutional amendment, particularly in relation to powers such as presidential pardons.

Procedural Limits on Executive Authority

Responding first, Professor Bruce E. Cain agreed that reforms are necessary, though he cautioned that reliance on constitutional amendment would be unrealistic. He outlined two possible approaches. The first would be to define “emergency” more precisely in law, thereby limiting the executive’s capacity to invoke emergency powers arbitrarily. Yet Professor Cain also recognized the practical difficulty of this path: genuine emergencies may be unpredictable, and excessively rigid definitions might hinder legitimate executive action in unforeseen crises.

For that reason, Professor Cain emphasized a procedural solution modeled on the War Powers Act. Rather than trying to define every emergency in advance, he argued that arbitrary executive power should require subsequent validation by another branch of government, especially Congress. In this model, the executive could act initially, but legislative affirmation would be required within a specified period. Such a framework would force members of Congress to go on record, preventing them from hiding behind presidential action while avoiding political responsibility.

Professor Cain’s response highlighted a deeper institutional problem: the American constitutional system assumes that Congress will defend its own prerogatives. Yet under conditions of polarization and professionalized politics, legislators may be less interested in preserving institutional authority than in avoiding political risk or pursuing career advancement. As a result, Congress may fail to resist executive overreach even when its constitutional role is being weakened. Professor Cain suggested that courts may need to play a stronger role in compelling Congress to live up to its own laws and procedural responsibilities.

Professor Larry Diamond largely endorsed Professor Cain’s analysis, describing himself as strongly aligned with his approach. However, he offered one “friendly amendment” to Professor Cain’s skepticism about constitutional reform. Professor Diamond proposed that one constitutional amendment might be both politically viable and democratically valuable: a requirement that any presidential pardon take effect only with two-thirds approval of the United States Senate. In his view, the abuse of the pardon power has become a serious threat to liberal democracy, especially when combined with executive immunity and loyalty-based political networks. A president who voluntarily proposed such a constraint at the beginning of a new administration, Professor Diamond argued, would make a visionary democratic gesture and place opponents in a difficult political position.

Defining Nationhood in Plural Societies

Professor Werner Pascha
Professor Werner Pascha is an Emeritus Professor of East Asian Economic Studies (Japan and Korea) and Associate Member of the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST) at the University of Duisburg-Essen.

The discussion then turned from American institutional design to the normative and political content of multicultural nationalismProfessor Werner Pascha addressed Professor Modood’s concept directly, noting its relevance to countries such as Germany, where debates over national identity remain intense and unresolved. He asked what the concrete content of multicultural nationalism might be and how one might answer the question of what it means to be German, British, French, or American in a plural society.

Professor Tariq Modood responded by affirming the value of national debates about identity. For him, multiculturalism is fundamentally dialogical: it requires listening, learning, negotiation, and, where possible, compromise. He stressed that such dialogue does not always produce easy consensus and may sometimes remain unresolved. Yet it is still essential because national identity cannot be imposed unilaterally if it is to include all citizens.

Professor Modood used Britain as his principal example. He argued that the British case has been shaped by two important factors. First, Britain has been influenced by American debates over hyphenated identities, such as Irish American, Jewish American, and Black American. Second, Britain has long been a multinational polity, incorporating Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and broader plural traditions. These historical conditions have made it somewhat easier to imagine Britishness in plural terms. If one can be Scottish-British, Professor Modood suggested, then the idea of being Black British or British Muslim becomes less anomalous.

In institutional terms, Professor Modood pointed especially to education and the school curriculum. A multicultural national identity would require teaching national history, geography, literature, and civic belonging in ways that recognize contemporary diversity and its relationship to the past. This includes confronting difficult histories such as empire and slavery. Such engagement, he argued, is not a threat to national unity but a condition for building a more inclusive and credible national narrative.

 

Conclusion

The third panel of the symposium brought into sharp relief the multidimensional processes through which authoritarian populism is not only advanced but also normalized across institutional, communicative, and ideological domains. Taken together, the contributions of Professor Larry Diamond, Professor Bruce E. Cain, Assoc. Prof. Ibrahim Al-Marashi, and Professor Tariq Modood underscore that contemporary democratic backsliding cannot be reduced to a single trajectory or causal mechanism. Rather, it emerges through the interaction of institutional vulnerabilities, political agency, technological transformation, and competing visions of collective identity.

A central analytical thread running through the panel is the distinction between erosion and consolidation. As Professor Diamond emphasized, the trajectory of authoritarian populism is cumulative, often advancing through incremental yet coordinated steps that target electoral integrity, institutional autonomy, and normative constraints. At the same time, Professor Cain’s concept of “autocratic drift” provides an important corrective to overly deterministic narratives, highlighting both the resilience and the fragility of democratic systems. His distinction between structural shifts in governance and the erosion of the rule of law clarifies that not all institutional change is equally consequential, even as both may contribute to a broader pattern of democratic weakening.

The panel also demonstrated that normalization operates not only through formal institutions but through the transformation of the public sphere. Assoc. Prof. Al-Marashi’s analysis of AI-driven media ecosystems revealed how the proliferation of “slopaganda” and hyperreal digital narratives reshapes the conditions under which political legitimacy is constructed and contested. In this environment, populist communication is amplified, personalized, and decentralized, blurring the boundaries between producers and consumers of political meaning. This shift complicates traditional understandings of propaganda and underscores the need to rethink democratic accountability in an era of algorithmic mediation.

Against this backdrop, Professor Modood’s intervention offers a normative horizon for democratic renewal. By articulating multicultural nationalism as an inclusive and dialogical framework, he addresses the identity-based anxieties that populist movements often exploit. His emphasis on mutual recognition, institutional accommodation, and the dynamic remaking of national identity suggests that democratic resilience depends not only on institutional safeguards but also on the capacity to construct a shared sense of belonging.

Finally, the panel discussion reinforced the urgency of institutional reform, particularly in relation to executive discretion, emergency powers, and constitutional safeguards. The exchanges between Professor Kent Jones, Professor Cain, and Professor Diamond highlighted both the difficulties and the necessity of recalibrating the balance of power in democratic systems. While no single reform can fully resolve these challenges, the emphasis on procedural accountability, legislative responsibility, and targeted constitutional change points toward a pragmatic path forward.

In sum, the panel illuminated both the depth of the current democratic crisis and the range of intellectual and political resources available to confront it. By integrating empirical analysis, institutional theory, media studies, and normative political thought, it provided a comprehensive framework for understanding—and ultimately resisting—the normalization of authoritarian populism.

Donald Trump

ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 2: Institutions Under Pressure — Rule of Law, Executive Power, and Democratic Defense

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 2: Institutions Under Pressure — Rule of Law, Executive Power, and Democratic Defense.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2026.https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00150

 

Second panel of ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium examined how democracies confront coordinated pressures on courts, bureaucracies, electoral systems, and constitutional safeguards. Moderated by Yavuz Baydar, the session brought together Professor Susan C. Stokes, Dr. Robert Benson, Professor Barry Sullivan, and Professor Stephen E. Hanson to analyze both democratic erosion and possibilities for recovery. The panel moved from comparative evidence on how backsliding leaders leave office, to the transnational coordination of illiberal actors, the expansion of executive power under Trump’s second administration, and the patrimonial assault on rational-legal state institutions. Together, the speakers underscored that democratic defense requires coordinated resilience, institutional renewal, civic mobilization, and a renewed commitment to rule-bound governance.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel 2 of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, Reforming and Safeguarding Liberal Democracy: Systemic Crises, Populism, and Democratic Resilience,” convened under the title “Institutions Under Pressure: Rule of Law, Executive Power, and Democratic Defense.” Moderated by Yavuz Baydar, blogger with Mediapart and columnist with Svenska Dagbladet, the panel examined how liberal democratic institutions respond when the rule of law, bureaucratic autonomy, constitutional safeguards, and electoral accountability come under sustained pressure.

Baydar framed the discussion around the urgent question of whether democratic systems possess the institutional and civic resources necessary to resist coordinated attacks from within. His moderation emphasized that contemporary democratic backsliding rarely takes the form of a single rupture. Rather, it unfolds through cumulative pressure on courts, civil services, electoral institutions, media systems, and oversight mechanisms. This framing gave the panel a coherent analytical direction: to understand not only how democracies erode, but also how they may recover, defend themselves, and rebuild resilience.

The first speaker, Professor Susan C. Stokes, Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor and Director of the Chicago Center on Democracy at the University of Chicago, shifted attention from the causes of democratic erosion to the question of how backsliding leaders leave power. Drawing on comparative evidence, she explored elections, term limits, party dynamics, protests, and impeachment as mechanisms of accountability and democratic recovery.

The second speaker, Dr. Robert Benson, Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (CAP), widened the discussion to the transnational level. His presentation argued that attacks on liberal democracy are increasingly coordinated across borders through far-right networks, ideological circulation, institutional repurposing, and strategic inversion, requiring an equally coordinated democratic defense.

The third speaker, Professor Barry Sullivan, Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History at Loyola University, examined executive power in the United States under Trump’s second administration. His analysis focused principally on the erosion of separation of powers, the weakening of institutional guardrails, and the expansion of presidential authority through legal, political, and judicial developments during the first year of the second Trump administration.

The final speaker, Professor Stephen E. Hanson, Lettie Pate Evans Professor of Government at William & Mary, offered a broader theoretical reflection on democracy, state power, and regime change. Moving beyond the concept of populism, he argued that patrimonialism and the assault on rational-legal state institutions provide a more precise lens for understanding contemporary authoritarian drift.

Together, the panel offered a rich interdisciplinary account of institutional vulnerability and democratic defense. It showed that safeguarding liberal democracy requires not only electoral resistance, but also coordinated institutional renewal, civic mobilization, and a renewed commitment to the rule-bound democratic state.

 

Yavuz Baydar: From Democratic Erosion to Democratic Defense

Yavuz Baydar is a blogger with Mediapart and a columnist with Svenska Dagbladet.

The steering of moderator Yavuz Baydar provided a unifying and conceptually incisive thread throughout the second panel, shaping the discussion into a coherent exploration of democratic fragility and resistance. Opening the session, he framed the core themes—rule of law, executive power, and democratic defense—not as abstract principles, but as hard-won achievements now under visible strain. His invocation of a contemporary protest slogan, contrasting “right and wrong” rather than traditional ideological “right and left” divides, set a normative tone that underscored the gravity of current democratic challenges.

Baydar’s moderation was marked by a careful balance between diagnosis and inquiry. Rather than treating democratic backsliding as a singular phenomenon, he consistently emphasized its multi-layered and cumulative character. He drew attention to how erosion unfolds through coordinated pressure across institutional domains—judiciaries, bureaucracies, and electoral systems—thereby resisting simplistic explanations. This framing allowed subsequent speakers to situate their analyses within a broader architecture of systemic vulnerability.

Between interventions, Baydar sharpened the discussion by redirecting attention to points of institutional stress and potential resilience. His transition following Susan Stokes highlighted the need to move beyond identifying patterns of decline toward examining the conditions under which democratic actors can effectively respond. By foregrounding the role of civil servants, courts, and civil society networks, he articulated a key proposition: that coordinated attacks on democratic institutions require equally coordinated forms of defense. This emphasis on alignment—between institutional safeguards and civic mobilization—introduced a forward-looking dimension to the panel.

His subsequent remarks extended the discussion into the transnational implications of democratic resilience, suggesting that domestic institutional outcomes reverberate beyond national borders, particularly within the European context. This widened the analytical lens, linking internal democratic health to broader geopolitical consequences.

In his later intervention, Baydar adopted a more probing and critical tone when addressing the political trajectory of Donald Trump. By referencing recent statements on the limits of executive authority, he distilled a central tension between personalist leadership and established legal norms. Yet he avoided reductive critique, instead posing a more demanding question: how such an approach has achieved political traction and institutional impact. His framing of this dynamic as a “success story,” regardless of normative evaluation, compelled a deeper examination of the mechanisms—polarization, narrative saturation, and strategic defiance of constraints—that enable such transformations.

 

Professor Susan C. Stokes: Democratic Resilience Under Pressure — Institutions, Accountability, and the Return to Robust Democracy

Professor Susan C. Stokes.
Susan C. Stokes is Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor and Director of the Chicago Center on Democracy at the University of Chicago.

Professor Susan Stokes opened the second panel with a deliberately reframed analytical focus that shifted the discussion from the well-established causes of democratic erosion to a more strategically consequential question: how backsliding leaders leave power. This move marked a subtle but important departure from conventional debates. While acknowledging her own extensive scholarship linking income inequality to democratic decline, Professor Stokes chose instead to concentrate on the conditions under which democratic systems recover—or fail to recover—from sustained institutional weakening. In doing so, she oriented the discussion toward the practical dynamics of democratic resilience.

Her presentation was grounded in a systematic comparative framework. Drawing on a dataset of 27 cases of democratic erosion across 22 countries since 1999, she offered a structured and empirically informed assessment of leadership exit patterns. Contrary to prevailing narratives of democratic collapse, her findings introduced a cautiously optimistic perspective. A clear majority of backsliding leaders do not remain in power indefinitely. Of the cases examined, only a small number continue to govern, while most eventually leave office. Even more significantly, in the majority of these instances, their successors have demonstrated stronger commitments to democratic norms and the rule of law. These findings suggested that democratic erosion, while serious, does not typically culminate in permanent authoritarian consolidation.

Electoral Exit and the Limits of Autocratization

This empirical baseline framed her discussion of recent political developments, most notably the electoral defeat of Viktor Orban. Hungary had long been regarded as a critical test case for the durability of democratic institutions under prolonged illiberal governance. With extensive media control, electoral engineering, and more than a decade in power, Orban’s government appeared to many observers to have entrenched itself beyond the reach of meaningful electoral accountability. Yet his loss revealed that, even under adverse conditions, electoral mechanisms can retain their corrective function. Professor Stokes emphasized that this outcome does not imply a fully restored democracy, but it does demonstrate that the boundary between democratic erosion and authoritarian consolidation remains contingent rather than predetermined.

From this point, she developed a broader typology of exit pathways, identifying elections as the most consistent and effective mechanism for removing backsliding leaders. Across multiple regions and political systems, voter-driven electoral defeat has repeatedly served as the primary form of accountability. Cases such as the defeat of Jair Bolsonaro in 2022 and the earlier electoral loss of Donald Trump illustrated how even highly polarized environments can produce outcomes that interrupt autocratizing trajectories. While such leaders may contest results or attempt to mobilize resistance, the resilience of electoral institutions and judicial systems has, in several cases, prevented these efforts from overturning democratic outcomes.

Constraining Power: Term Limits, Parties, and Protest

Professor Stokes also highlighted the role of term limits as a secondary but significant constraint. In some contexts, leaders have adhered to constitutional restrictions and stepped down accordingly, reinforcing democratic norms of rotation in power. However, she noted that attempts to weaken or abolish term limits are a recurring feature of autocratizing strategies. Leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales pursued such reforms to extend their tenure. Yet these efforts have not always succeeded unchallenged. Public resistance, including referendums rejecting constitutional changes, indicates that citizens often retain a strong normative commitment to limits on executive power, even in contexts of broader democratic strain.

Beyond formal electoral mechanisms, Professor Stokes examined the role of intra-party dynamics. Although less common, there are instances where ruling parties themselves have facilitated leadership change. These cases typically arise when incumbents become politically costly liabilities, particularly in anticipation of future elections. Party elites, seeking to preserve broader electoral viability, may compel leaders to resign or step aside. This dynamic underscores the importance of internal political incentives and the ways in which even dominant parties can act as constraints under certain conditions.

The role of mass protest was treated with analytical nuance. Professor Stokes acknowledged that backsliding leaders almost invariably encounter resistance from civil society, often in the form of large-scale demonstrations. Examples from multiple countries illustrate how protests challenge narratives of inevitability and signal widespread dissatisfaction. However, she emphasized that such mobilization rarely leads directly to leadership removal. The notable exception of Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests, which forced the departure of Viktor Yanukovych, remains atypical. More often, protests function indirectly, shaping political conditions rather than producing immediate institutional outcomes.

A particularly striking aspect of her analysis concerned the limited effectiveness of impeachment. Despite its prominence in constitutional design, impeachment has not successfully removed a backsliding leader in the contemporary wave of democratic erosion. This absence suggests a gap between formal institutional tools and their practical application in highly polarized political environments. In contrast, electoral mechanisms—though imperfect—have proven more consistently consequential.

Reversing Backsliding: Pathways to Democratic Renewal

Throughout her presentation, Professor Stokes maintained a careful balance between optimism and caution. While the data indicate that full authoritarian consolidation is relatively rare, it remains a real possibility. Cases such as Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and developments in Nicaragua demonstrate that democratic breakdown can occur when institutional safeguards are sufficiently weakened. Moreover, she highlighted the ambiguity surrounding countries such as Turkey, where regime classification remains contingent on future political developments. The decisive factor, in her view, lies in how incumbents respond to electoral defeat—whether they accept loss and relinquish power or refuse to do so.

The broader significance of Professor Stokes’s intervention lies in its strategic implications. By focusing on exit rather than entry, she provided a framework for understanding how democratic systems can recover from periods of erosion. This perspective shifts attention toward the interplay of institutions, political actors, and societal forces that shape outcomes over time. It suggests that while democratic decline is often gradual and cumulative, reversal is possible through multiple, interacting pathways.

In concluding, Professor Stokes underscored that democratic erosion should not be understood as a linear or irreversible process. The trajectory from weakened democracy to authoritarian rule is neither uniform nor inevitable. Instead, it is shaped by contingent choices, institutional resilience, and the capacity of political and social actors to mobilize in defense of democratic norms. By mapping the varied routes through which backsliding leaders exit power, her analysis offered both a sobering recognition of democratic vulnerability and a measured basis for cautious optimism about its potential renewal.

 

Dr. Robert Benson: To Resist a Coordinated Attack, We Need a Coordinated Defense

Dr. Robert Benson.
Dr. Robert Benson is Associate Director for National Security & International Policy, Center for American Progress (CAP).

Dr. Robert Benson delivered a sharply focused and strategically oriented intervention as the second speaker of the panel, advancing a central claim that reframed contemporary democratic backsliding as an increasingly transnational phenomenon. Moving beyond country-specific analyses, he argued that the present moment is defined not by parallel national crises, but by the emergence of a coordinated, cross-border ecosystem of illiberal actors. In this context, the defense of liberal democracy, he contended, can no longer remain confined within national boundaries.

At the outset, Dr. Benson situated his remarks within a practitioner’s perspective, drawing on recent engagements with pro-democracy networks in Europe. This grounding lent immediacy to his broader analytical argument: that policymakers have been slow to recognize the extent to which far-right movements have developed transnational linkages. Where earlier frameworks treated democratic erosion as a series of discrete national trajectories—Hungary, Poland, France, or Germany—he suggested that such compartmentalization is now analytically inadequate. What has emerged instead is a structured system of coordination, characterized by the circulation of narratives, strategies, and increasingly, institutional resources.

Transnational Circulation and the Institutionalization of the Far Right

Central to Dr. Benson’s intervention was the concept of “circulation” as distinct from mere imitation. The contemporary far right, he argued, does not simply replicate successful tactics across contexts; it actively exchanges and amplifies them through networks that span political parties, digital platforms, and ideological communities. This circulation encompasses rhetorical frames—such as anti-migration panic, anti-elite resentment, and civilizational decline—as well as operational strategies, including the use of legal mechanisms, media ecosystems, and political patronage. In this sense, democratic backsliding is sustained not only by domestic conditions but by transnational reinforcement.

A key escalation in this dynamic, according to Dr. Benson, lies in the growing involvement of state actors, particularly within the United States. He presented evidence suggesting that elements of the American state apparatus have begun to function as amplifiers of European far-right movements. This development, he argued, marks a significant shift from earlier patterns of ideological diffusion, introducing a new layer of institutional backing. The implications are substantial: what was once a network of loosely connected actors now appears increasingly supported by formal diplomatic and financial channels.

To illustrate this shift, Dr. Benson pointed to recent reporting on activities within the US State Department, highlighting the roles of figures such as Samuel Sampson and Sarah Rogers. While careful not to reduce the analysis to individual actions, he treated these cases as indicative of a broader pattern. Meetings with European far-right actors, interventions in debates on migration and regulation, and efforts to reframe human rights discourse were presented as components of a larger strategy. The significance, in his account, lies not in isolated provocations, but in the apparent institutionalization of these efforts within official channels.

This process, Dr. Benson argued, reflects a deeper phenomenon of institutional repurposing. Historically, bodies such as the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor have served as instruments of liberal internationalism, promoting civil rights, electoral integrity, and press freedom. However, he suggested that these institutions are now being reoriented toward alternative normative frameworks, including a shift from human rights language to concepts framed as “natural rights.” This redefinition, he emphasized, is not merely semantic but reflects an attempt to reshape the ideological foundations of democratic governance.

Asymmetry and Coordination in Transnational Illiberal Networks

Equally consequential is the financial dimension of this transformation. Dr. Benson highlighted what he described as a reallocation of resources away from traditional democracy-support programs toward initiatives aligned with far-right priorities. Programs that once funded digital tools for activists and journalists in authoritarian contexts have reportedly been scaled back or dismantled. In their place, resources are being directed toward campaigns challenging regulatory frameworks in democratic societies, particularly in areas such as content moderation and platform governance. This shift, he argued, represents a form of strategic inversion: mechanisms originally designed to protect democratic pluralism are now deployed to contest it.

From this analysis, Dr. Benson derived four conceptual tools for understanding the current moment. First, transnational diffusion captures the movement of ideas and practices across borders through sustained interaction. Second, institutional repurposing describes the transformation of established democratic bodies into vehicles for illiberal agendas. Third, asymmetrical coordination highlights the imbalance between highly organized far-right networks and comparatively fragmented democratic responses. Finally, strategic inversion denotes the reorientation of democratic instruments against their original purposes.

These concepts collectively supported his broader argument regarding strategic asymmetry. While illiberal actors have invested in building durable, cross-border infrastructures—encompassing funding networks, media platforms, and political alliances—democratic actors, he suggested, continue to operate in a reactive and largely uncoordinated manner. Initiatives such as international conferences and ad hoc coalitions, while valuable, remain insufficient to match the scale and coherence of the challenge.

In the latter part of his intervention, Dr. Benson turned to the implications of this asymmetry. He argued that democratic resilience must be reconceptualized as a matter of transatlantic security. The weakening of democratic institutions within individual states has cascading effects on broader alliances, including NATO cohesion and collective responses to geopolitical challenges. In this sense, democratic erosion is not only a domestic concern but a factor shaping international stability.

Transnational Challenges, Coordinated Responses

He further emphasized the need to move beyond purely normative defenses of democracy. While appeals to values remain important, they must be complemented by the development of concrete institutional capacities. This includes building sustainable funding mechanisms, strengthening independent media ecosystems, and fostering long-term networks among pro-democracy actors. Without such infrastructure, democratic responses risk remaining episodic and insufficiently grounded.

A final theme of his remarks was the importance of temporal perspective. Dr. Benson cautioned against viewing democratic backsliding as a series of discrete crises that can be resolved through singular events, such as elections or judicial decisions. Instead, he described it as a long-term process involving gradual institutional capture, normalization of exclusionary rhetoric, and reinforcement across national boundaries. Effective resistance, therefore, requires a similarly sustained and strategic approach.

In sum, Dr. Benson’s intervention offered a compelling reframing of democratic backsliding as a transnational and increasingly institutionalized phenomenon. By highlighting the interplay between ideological circulation, state involvement, and structural asymmetry, he underscored the need for a more coordinated and durable response. His analysis suggested that the future of democratic resilience will depend not only on national political dynamics but on the capacity of democratic actors to recognize and respond to the cross-border nature of the challenge.

 

Professor Barry Sullivan: The Law and Politics of Fear — Executive Power in 2026

Professor Barry Sullivan is the Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and the George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History at Loyola University.

As the third speaker of the panel, Professor Barry Sullivan offered a penetrating and historically grounded analysis of the early trajectory and broader constitutional implications of Donald Trump’s second administration. Professor Sullivan situated his intervention within the conceptual vocabulary of executive power, institutional erosion, and the fragility of constitutional constraints, advancing a compelling argument about the unprecedented acceleration of presidential authority in contemporary American governance.

Professor Sullivan began by invoking the notion of “flooding the zone,” a strategic concept popularized during Trump’s first presidency by Steve Bannon and later revisited by journalist Luke Broadwater in early 2025. According to Professor Sullivan, the first week of Trump’s second administration provides a paradigmatic illustration of this strategy in action—yet in an intensified and more systematized form. Broadwater’s observation that the “flood is bigger, wider, and more brutally efficient” served as an entry point for Professor Sullivan to examine how the administration deployed a rapid succession of executive actions to overwhelm institutional opposition, fragment public scrutiny, and reshape the political agenda.

A key analytical insight offered by Professor Sullivan concerns the deliberate blurring of constitutional categories. He underscored the significance of Broadwater’s use of the term “enacted” to describe executive actions—a term traditionally reserved for legislative processes. In Professor Sullivan’s interpretation, this linguistic shift is not incidental but emblematic of a broader strategy to obscure the distinction between executive and legislative authority. By staging highly publicized signing ceremonies for executive orders—most notably in a large public arena rather than the conventional Oval Office setting—Trump symbolically elevated executive directives to the status of legislative acts, thereby reinforcing an image of unilateral presidential governance.

Executive Expansion and the Transformation of Governance

Expanding on this theme, Professor Sullivan provided a detailed account of the administration’s early actions, emphasizing both their scope and their institutional implications. Within the first days of the presidency, Trump issued a torrent of executive orders, dismissed politically independent inspectors general, pardoned individuals involved in the January 6 Capitol attack, and initiated investigations into perceived political adversaries. Additional measures included revoking security clearances, freezing federal hiring, restricting immigration, dismantling diversity initiatives, and rescinding large-scale federal funding commitments. For Professor Sullivan, the cumulative effect of these actions lies not merely in their individual substance but in their collective capacity to transform the operational logic of governance.

Over the course of the first year, Professor Sullivan observed, this pattern of executive activism continued to expand, incorporating both symbolic and substantive dimensions. He highlighted instances of overtly nativist and racially charged rhetoric, as well as unprecedented interventions in civil society, including attacks on universities, law firms, and media institutions. Structural changes to the federal bureaucracy—such as the reclassification of tens of thousands of civil service positions into politically controlled roles—further exemplify what Professor Sullivan described as a systematic effort to consolidate executive control over the administrative state.

In interpreting these developments, Professor Sullivan drew a provocative historical parallel to Richard Nixon’s conception of presidential authority. Nixon’s claim that the president functions as a quasi-monarchical figure—accountable only through impeachment—serves, in Professor Sullivan’s analysis, as a conceptual precursor to Trump’s governing philosophy. However, where Nixon ultimately failed to institutionalize this vision, Professor Sullivan argued that Trump appears, at least provisionally, to have succeeded in operationalizing it.

Unitary Executive Ascendant: Law, Courts, and Concentrated Authority

Turning to the question of causation, Professor Sullivan identified several interrelated factors that help explain the administration’s capacity to expand presidential power so rapidly. While acknowledging contingent elements—such as prior planning, partisan control of Congress, and the organizational weakness of the opposition—he emphasized a deeper, structural explanation grounded in three mutually reinforcing dynamics.

First, Professor Sullivan pointed to the failure of the separation of powers as a functional constraint. Contrary to the expectations of the constitutional framers, institutional checks have proven insufficient to counterbalance executive overreach. Second, he highlighted what he described as a relative indifference to the rule of law among the president and his supporters. This normative shift, in Professor Sullivan’s view, facilitates the reconfiguration of both governmental and societal institutions in line with ideological projects such as “Project 2025,” a comprehensive blueprint for administrative transformation.

The third factor, Professor Sullivan argued, lies in the evolving jurisprudence of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts, which has significantly expanded presidential power through the consolidation of the unitary executive theory. This doctrine posits that all officials within the executive branch must remain directly accountable to the president and subject to removal at his discretion, thereby denying the legitimacy of genuinely independent agencies. While this perspective gained prominence during the Reagan administration, Professor Sullivan traced its intellectual and political origins to post-Watergate discontent among figures associated with the Nixon and Ford administrations, who viewed institutional reforms as unjust constraints on executive authority. Key proponents of this view included Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and notably Justice Antonin Scalia, whose influential dissent articulated a maximalist conception of executive power as fully vested in the presidency. Chief Justice Roberts himself, as a young White House lawyer, had advanced similar arguments advocating the dismantling of independent agencies. In Professor Sullivan’s assessment, the jurisprudence of the Roberts Court represents the institutional culmination of these long-standing ideas. He emphasized that this development manifests in two critical dimensions: the judicial endorsement of a strong unitary executive and the expansion of presidential immunity, effectively shielding the office from civil and criminal accountability.

In synthesizing these elements, Professor Sullivan presented a sobering assessment of the contemporary American constitutional order. The convergence of institutional fragility, ideological transformation, and judicial reinforcement has enabled a form of executive governance that challenges long-standing assumptions about the resilience of liberal democratic systems.  

In conclusion, Professor Sullivan’s presentation offered a rigorous and multidimensional account of the Trump administration’s second term, illuminating the mechanisms through which executive power can be rapidly expanded within a formally democratic framework. By situating current developments within both historical and theoretical contexts, Professor Sullivan provided a critical lens through which to assess the evolving balance between authority and constraint in modern constitutional democracies.

 

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Regime Change — An Evolutionary Perspective

Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University.

As the final speaker of the panel, Professor Stephen Hanson delivered a wide-ranging and theoretically ambitious presentation that sought to reframe prevailing explanations of democratic backsliding. While acknowledging the analytical value of populism as a concept, Professor Hanson advanced a more nuanced argument: that the contemporary crisis of democracy is better understood not primarily through the lens of populism, but through the resurgence and diffusion of patrimonial forms of state-building that challenge the rational-legal foundations of modern democratic governance.

Professor Hanson began by situating current political developments within a broader global context characterized by sustained democratic decline. Drawing on widely cited datasets such as Freedom House, Polity and V-Dem, he noted that the world has experienced approximately two decades of continuous erosion in democratic quality. This trend, he emphasized, unfolds alongside intensifying geopolitical instability, including interstate conflicts and military interventions—from Russia’s war in Ukraine to ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. For Professor Hanson, these developments are not merely coincidental but constitute the structural backdrop against which democratic institutions are being weakened.

Conceptual Precision in Democratic Backsliding

Building on arguments developed in his co-authored book The Assault on the State (2024), Professor Hanson turned to the conceptual foundations of democratic theory. He questioned whether “authoritarian populism,” a term widely used to describe contemporary political dynamics, adequately captures the causal mechanisms driving democratic erosion. While recognizing that elected leaders increasingly undermine democratic norms from within—echoing arguments familiar from the literature on democratic backsliding—Professor Hanson warned against over-reliance on the concept of populism due to its analytical ambiguities.

One major concern, he argued, is what Giovanni Sartori termed “conceptual stretching.” The term populism has been applied so broadly that it risks losing explanatory precision. As Professor Hanson observed, political actors as ideologically diverse as Vladimir Putin and Alexei Navalny, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, or Jair Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva have all been labeled populists in various scholarly accounts. Such indiscriminate usage obscures critical distinctions between episodic, charismatic mobilizations and sustained projects of institutional power consolidation. For Professor Hanson, this distinction is crucial: not all populist movements produce durable authoritarian transformations.

A second limitation identified by Professor Hanson concerns the rhetorical paradox embedded in anti-populist discourse. The call to “defend democracy” by mobilizing “the people” against populists can inadvertently reproduce the very populist logic it seeks to oppose. This paradox underscores the need for a more precise analytical framework capable of distinguishing between democratic contestation and authoritarian transformation.

To develop such a framework, Professor Hanson traced the intellectual origins of contemporary regime classification systems. He highlighted that the now-dominant dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism is a relatively recent development, gaining prominence only after World War II. Earlier political thought, he noted, focused more on distinctions between monarchy and republic, with democracy itself often viewed with ambivalence. The postwar ascendancy of liberal democracy, reinforced by modernization theory and the perceived triumph of the West following the Cold War, led to the institutionalization of democracy as the normative endpoint of political development.

Within this intellectual tradition, Professor Hanson emphasized the enduring influence of Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, which sought to operationalize democracy through measurable institutional criteria such as political participation and contestation. While this approach underpins contemporary indices like Freedom House and V-Dem, Professor Hanson argued that it risks neglecting deeper philosophical questions about the meaning of democratic rule. Specifically, the focus on institutional form may overlook whether political systems genuinely reflect “rule by the people” in a substantive sense.

Patrimonial Power and the Erosion of Liberal Democracy

This critique led Professor Hanson to reintroduce the concept of the state as a central analytical category. He argued that much of the democratization literature has treated the state as a secondary concern, emphasizing instead electoral processes and civil liberties. Yet, as Professor Hanson underscored, democracy presupposes a functioning state capable of enforcing rules and maintaining order. Without such a state, the notion of popular rule becomes hollow.

Drawing on Max Weber’s typology of legitimate authority, Professor Hanson identified three distinct bases of political legitimacy: rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic. Modern liberal democracies, he noted, are grounded in rational-legal authority, where governance is structured by impersonal rules and institutional procedures. However, contemporary challenges to democracy often involve a shift toward traditional and charismatic forms of legitimacy. In such contexts, political leaders claim to embody the authentic will of a historically rooted community or present themselves as uniquely capable figures whose authority transcends institutional constraints.

It is within this theoretical framework that Professor Hanson introduced his central concept: patrimonialism. Unlike populism, which primarily describes a style of political mobilization, patrimonialism refers to a mode of state organization in which authority is personalized and governance is conducted through networks of loyalty, kinship, and patronage. In patrimonial systems, the boundary between public and private authority collapses, and the state is effectively transformed into an extension of the ruler’s household.

Beyond Populism: The Rise of Personalized State Power

According to Professor Hanson, the contemporary global trend is not merely toward populist rhetoric but toward the reconstruction of states along patrimonial lines. This process involves systematic efforts to undermine the rational-legal bureaucracy, replace meritocratic criteria with personal loyalty, and delegitimize independent institutions by labeling them as components of a “deep state.” Leaders who pursue such strategies often invoke traditional values—such as family, religion, and national identity—to justify their actions, framing them as expressions of the true will of the people.

Professor Hanson traced the diffusion of this patrimonial model to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which he identified as a central node in the global spread of alternative governance paradigms. From this core, patrimonial practices have influenced political developments in various regions, including Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and even established democracies. Figures such as Viktor Orbán, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Donald Trump, in Professor Hanson’s analysis, exemplify different manifestations of this broader trend, despite their varying ideological profiles.

Importantly, Professor Hanson distinguished between cases where populist mobilization remains episodic and those where it culminates in structural transformation. Movements such as Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain, he suggested, may channel popular discontent without fundamentally altering state institutions. By contrast, regimes that successfully embed patrimonial practices within the state apparatus pose a far more significant challenge to democratic governance, as they create enduring institutional barriers to reform.

The implications of this analysis are both theoretical and practical. For Professor Hanson, defending democracy requires more than countering populist narratives; it necessitates the preservation and reconstruction of rational-legal state institutions. This includes protecting the autonomy and professionalism of bureaucracies, reaffirming the value of expertise, and resisting efforts to politicize public administration. At the same time, he acknowledged the rhetorical difficulty of defending state institutions in societies where distrust of elites and bureaucracies is widespread.

Revitalizing Democratic Governance

Professor Hanson also emphasized the importance of engaging younger generations, many of whom have become disillusioned with formal politics. Revitalizing democratic governance, he argued, depends on cultivating a renewed commitment to public service and demonstrating that state institutions can serve as instruments of collective empowerment rather than domination.

In his concluding remarks, Professor Hanson called for a broader reorientation of political science. He advocated moving beyond static dichotomies between democracy and authoritarianism toward a more dynamic, historically grounded understanding of regime change. By examining how different forms of political organization diffuse across time and space, scholars can better anticipate emerging threats and identify pathways for institutional renewal.

Ultimately, Professor Hanson suggested that the current crisis of democracy, while profound, also opens the possibility for innovation. Rather than assuming a linear trajectory toward liberal democracy or its inevitable decline, he encouraged scholars and practitioners alike to imagine alternative forms of democratic governance that reconcile institutional stability with meaningful popular participation.

 

Discussions

In In the discussion segment, Professor Susan Stokes offered a precise reflection on the preceding presentations, expressing strong appreciation while gently pushing back on elements of Professor Barry Sullivan’s account. She noted that, until recently, she would have largely agreed with such an interpretation, but suggested that developments over the past months invite a more qualified assessment of the trajectory of autocratization in the United States.

At the center of Professor Stokes’ intervention was a clarifying question: what would genuine success look like for a leader or movement seeking to autocratize a democratic system? In her view, such success would involve a leader who sustains broad and durable popular support, commands loyalty across the political class, and faces no meaningful defections within their own party. Against this benchmark, she argued, the current situation does not fully meet the criteria of consolidated success.

Professor Stokes pointed to indicators that complicate the narrative of unchecked executive dominance. She emphasized that the president’s polling numbers remain weak and that, while party cohesion largely persists, there have been sufficient defections to obstruct key initiatives. As an example, she referred to ongoing hearings concerning a nominee for Federal Reserve chair, where opposition from within the president’s own party—linked to concerns about the politicization of the Justice Department—could jeopardize the appointment. Such moments, she suggested, reveal the continued presence of institutional and intra-party constraints.

While acknowledging that some of these difficulties may stem from individual characteristics—such as poor strategic judgment, emotional impulsiveness, or a preoccupation with personal grievances—Professor Stokes emphasized that deeper structural dynamics are also at play. Leaders who seek to undermine legal and constitutional norms, she argued, often surround themselves with advisors whose primary asset is loyalty rather than professional credibility. This, in turn, limits the quality of counsel and increases the likelihood of strategic errors. Professor Stokes stressed that, although significant changes have occurred and the challenges of re-democratization will be substantial, the current trajectory does not yet represent a fully successful autocratizing project.

Incompetence, Loyalty, and the Dynamics of Executive Power

In response, Professor Barry Sullivan largely agreed with the preceding remarks while raising questions about the president’s underlying motivations. He expressed uncertainty as to whether the president is genuinely concerned with long-term political outcomes, such as the maintenance of an authoritarian-style regime following his own term of office, suggesting instead a primary focus on present personal power and status. This, he noted, raises doubts about the depth of commitment to specific policy agendas, such as immigration, compared to more ideologically driven actors within the administration.

Professor Sullivan acknowledged some recent erosion of popular support and small pockets of Republican congressional resistance. Reflecting on the first term, however, Professor Sullivan observed that the president showed little interest in expanding his electoral base, often foregoing opportunities to broaden support. In his view, the key distinction in the second term lies not in strategic expansion but in organizational learning. The intervening years appear to have been used to reassess perceived constraints of the first administration. Most notably, Professor Sullivan emphasized a deliberate shift in personnel strategy: the conscious exclusion of advisors inclined to uphold institutional guardrails, replaced by individuals less likely to restrain executive action.

The discussions evolved into a focused exchange on the resilience of authoritarian tendencies and the challenges of democratic recovery, initiated by Dr. Bulent Kenes. Drawing on contemporary developments in countries such as Poland, Hungary, the United States, and Brazil, Dr. Kenes raised a critical concern: while democratic systems appear vulnerable and often slow to respond, autocratic or authoritarian formations seem to exhibit a striking degree of resilience. He pointed to the difficulties faced by democratic actors—such as Donald Tusk in Poland and democratic forces in Hungary—in attempting to reverse entrenched institutional transformations implemented by prior governments. Framing this as a structural asymmetry, Dr. Kenes invited Professor Stephen Hanson to reflect on how such resilience might be effectively countered.

Dr. Kent Jones, Professor Emeritus of International Economics at Babson College and author of Populism and Trade: The Challenge to the Global Trading System.

Building on this theme, Professor Kent Jones introduced a complementary line of inquiry centered on the role of incompetence within populist and authoritarian governance. Referring to Max Weber’s concept of patrimonialism, he suggested that the reliance on loyal but often unqualified appointees may lead to policy failures that undermine regime performance. At the same time, he described a “race” between the negative political consequences of such incompetence—potentially alienating voters—and efforts by leaders to entrench their power by weakening electoral accountability. If electoral mechanisms remain intact, incompetence may ultimately facilitate democratic correction; if not, it risks being politically insulated.

From Ephemeral Populism to Patrimonial Durability

In response, Professor Stephen Hanson acknowledged both questions as analytically significant and interrelated. Addressing the issue of democratic vulnerability, he argued that part of the problem lies in the absence of sustained strategic coordination among democratic actors. The assumption that historical trajectories naturally favor democracy, he suggested, has contributed to a degree of complacency, obscuring what is in fact a systemic and global shift requiring deliberate and organized responses. He further emphasized that segments of the political left have been reluctant to engage positively with the concept of the state, often associating it with overreach or surveillance. This hesitation, Professor Hanson argued, weakens the capacity to articulate a robust democratic alternative capable of governing effectively.

Turning to the question of incompetence, Professor Hanson distinguished between two forms. In cases of what he termed “ephemeral populism,” incompetence can quickly erode support, as seen in movements that fail to deliver basic governance outcomes. However, in more entrenched “patrimonial” systems, incompetence is embedded within networks of loyalty, where allegiance to the leader supersedes expertise. Such systems, he noted, are more durable precisely because they rest on historically grounded principles of legitimation, making them more resistant to collapse.

Nevertheless, Professor Hanson underscored that even within patrimonial contexts, systemic policy failures can generate political backlash. Poorly managed policies—particularly those affecting everyday economic life—can serve as focal points for mobilizing broader electoral opposition. If effectively articulated, these failures may help shift voter preferences, suggesting that incompetence, while not automatically destabilizing, remains a potential avenue through which democratic forces can regain ground.

 

Conclusion

Panel 2 has underscored that liberal democracy’s current crisis is not merely electoral, but institutional, legal, administrative, and transnational. Across the presentations and discussion, a central insight emerged: democratic backsliding advances through cumulative pressure on the rule-bound state, while democratic recovery depends on the capacity to rebuild institutions that can withstand personalist power, ideological capture, and coordinated illiberal mobilization.

Professor Susan Stokes’s comparative analysis introduced an important note of guarded optimism by showing that many backsliding leaders do eventually leave office, often through elections and election-related pressures. Yet her remarks also made clear that exit from power does not automatically restore democracy; undoing institutional damage remains a long and difficult process. Dr. Robert Benson’s intervention widened this problem by showing that illiberal actors increasingly operate through cross-border networks, making democratic defense a matter of transnational coordination rather than isolated national response. Professor Barry Sullivan’s analysis of executive power highlighted how quickly constitutional limits can be weakened when legal restraint, institutional guardrails, and political accountability erode simultaneously. Professor Stephen Hanson then deepened the theoretical frame by arguing that the challenge lies not only in populism, but in patrimonial assaults on rational-legal state institutions.

The discussion further clarified the scale of the task ahead. Democratic actors must confront not only charismatic leaders and polarizing rhetoric, but also durable networks of loyalty, weakened bureaucracies, politicized law, and public distrust of expertise. At the same time, the panel suggested that authoritarian projects are not invulnerable. Their dependence on loyalty over competence can produce policy failures, social backlash, and renewed openings for democratic mobilization.

In sum, the panel showed that democratic defense requires more than resisting individual leaders. It demands coordinated institutional renewal, protection of professional public service, civic vigilance, and a persuasive democratic language capable of reconnecting citizens to the rule-bound state. In this sense, the defense of liberal democracy is both a political struggle and a project of institutional reconstruction.

CPAC

ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 1: From Grievance to Radicalization — Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 1: From Grievance to Radicalization — Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00149

 

This panel offered a concise yet conceptually rich account of how contemporary populism transforms diffuse grievances into structured political radicalization. Bridging discourse analysis, religious studies, international political economy, and historical sociology, the discussion illuminated the multi-layered processes through which democratic erosion unfolds. Rather than locating the problem solely within institutional decline, the panel foregrounded the interplay of rhetoric, identity, and emotional mobilization—particularly the roles of humiliation, status anxiety, and perceived loss of recognition. Contributions by Professors Ruth Wodak, Julie Ingersoll, Stephan Klingebiel, and Benjamin Carter Hett collectively demonstrated that populist dynamics are sustained by both narrative construction and structural change. The session thus advanced a nuanced analytical framework for understanding how anti-pluralist politics emerge, normalize, and gain legitimacy across diverse contexts.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel 1 of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, titled “From Grievance to Radicalization: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism,” offered a rich and interdisciplinary examination of how discontent is translated into exclusionary politics, institutional erosion, and authoritarian opportunity. Bringing together perspectives from discourse studies, religious studies, development policy, and modern history, the panel explored the pathways through which grievance is narrated, organized, and mobilized across national and transnational contexts. Although the presentations addressed distinct empirical terrains—from far-right rhetoric in Europe and Christian nationalism in the United States to multilateral institutions and the lessons of Weimar Germany—they converged around a shared concern: democratic decline rarely emerges suddenly, but is prepared through the cumulative interaction of ideas, identities, institutions, and political strategies.

Moderated by Professor Ibrahim Ozturk, the session unfolded as a tightly connected conversation on the mechanisms through which populist and far-right forces gain traction in moments of social unease and political dislocation. A central strength of the panel lay in its refusal to treat populism as a singular or self-explanatory phenomenon. Instead, the speakers unpacked the rhetorical, ideological, emotional, and institutional infrastructures that enable anti-pluralist politics to flourish. 

Professor Ruth Wodak showed how democratic norms are eroded through discourse, provocation, and the normalization of exclusionary language. Professor Julie Ingersoll demonstrated how theocratic and anti-democratic religious movements, though internally diverse, have strategically converged to influence contemporary American politics. Professor Stephan Klingebiel widened the frame to the international level, showing how populist governance affects not only domestic politics but also the normative foundations of multilateral cooperation. Professor Benjamin Carter Hett, drawing on the history of late Weimar Germany, highlighted humiliation and status anxiety as powerful emotional drivers of anti-system politics, offering a historically grounded lens for understanding present-day grievance mobilization.

Taken together, the panel made clear that contemporary democratic crises cannot be understood through institutional analysis alone. What emerged instead was a layered account in which fear, humiliation, identity, ideology, and strategic communication are inseparable from formal political change. The subsequent discussion deepened these insights further, linking personal experience, comparative reflection, and normative concerns in ways that reinforced the panel’s interdisciplinary value.

In this sense, Panel 1 did more than diagnose the current moment. It established an intellectual framework for thinking about how democratic erosion is prepared, legitimized, and accelerated across multiple arenas. By tracing the movement from grievance to radicalization, the session illuminated not only the fragility of democratic norms, but also the urgency of confronting the political, cultural, and institutional conditions that allow authoritarian and exclusionary projects to take root.

 

Professor Ruth Wodak: ‘Driving On the Right’: Analyzing Far-Right Rhetoric.

Professor Ruth Wodak is Emerita Distinguished Professor of Discourse Studies at Lancaster University, affiliated with the University of Vienna, and a member of the ECPS Advisory Board.

Professor Ruth Wodak’s presentation offered a theoretically grounded and empirically attentive exploration of how democratic erosion unfolds through discourse, rhetoric, and the gradual normalization of exclusionary politics. As the first speaker of the panel, Professor Wodak set a reflective and analytically rigorous tone by anchoring her remarks in a historical insight from John Dewey. Quoting his 1931 warning that democracy becomes a farce when citizens are not equipped to think critically and recognize propaganda, she established a conceptual bridge between past and present. While acknowledging that historical analogies must be handled with caution, she argued that certain patterns—particularly the weakening of critical judgment and the manipulation of public discourse—remain deeply relevant for understanding contemporary political developments.

Building on this premise, Professor Wodak turned to the identification of observable criteria that signal when democracies are under threat. Drawing in part on recent analytical frameworks and public debates, she outlined a series of interrelated developments that characterize processes of autocratization. These included attacks on freedom of expression, the systematic defamation or marginalization of political opponents, pressures on judicial independence, and the potential use of emergency powers to bypass institutional constraints. Additional indicators encompassed the gradual discrimination of minorities, the erosion of press freedom, the undermining of academic and scientific autonomy, the emergence of personality cults, the spread of corruption and kleptocratic practices, and the strategic redesign of legal and electoral frameworks to consolidate power.

The Politics of Shameless Normalization

A central emphasis of her argument was that these developments rarely appear in their most extreme form at the outset. Rather, they emerge incrementally, as part of a cumulative and often normalized process. Each step, while perhaps appearing limited or defensible in isolation, contributes to a broader trajectory in which democratic norms are steadily weakened. This step-by-step dynamic, she suggested, is crucial for understanding why democratic backsliding can advance without triggering immediate resistance.

The core of Professor Wodak’s presentation focused on the linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms that facilitate this gradual transformation. At the center of her analysis was the concept of “shameless normalization,” which she has developed extensively in her work. This refers to a process through which the boundaries of what is publicly acceptable are progressively expanded. Statements, ideas, and attitudes that were previously considered taboo or beyond the limits of legitimate discourse are reintroduced, repeated, and ultimately rendered acceptable. Political actors present themselves as articulating what “ordinary people” supposedly think but have been unable or unwilling to express, thereby framing transgressive speech as a form of authenticity.

Professor Wodak highlighted that this process is often driven by continuous provocation. By deliberately testing and crossing normative boundaries, political actors can shift the parameters of public debate. Over time, what initially appears shocking or unacceptable becomes familiar and normalized. This strategy, she argued, is particularly effective when it is reinforced by broader political dynamics, including the willingness of mainstream actors to adopt or adapt elements of far-right discourse.

Importantly, she emphasized that normalization does not always take an overtly aggressive or confrontational form. Alongside provocation, one also encounters what she termed “coarse civility,” a mode of communication in which exclusionary or discriminatory ideas are presented in a seemingly moderate, polite, or technocratic language. This rhetorical softening allows such ideas to circulate more widely and gain legitimacy, especially when they are taken up by mainstream conservative parties. In this way, the normalization of far-right discourse often proceeds not only through radicalization at the margins, but through incorporation at the center.

To illustrate these dynamics, Professor Wodak drew on examples from Austrian politics. She traced the trajectory of a slogan originally used by a far-right politician in the 1980s, which emphasized speaking “the language of the people.” Over time, this slogan was adopted by a mainstream conservative leader and subsequently reappropriated by the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ). This example demonstrated how political language travels across ideological boundaries, shedding its original stigma and becoming part of a broader repertoire of acceptable discourse. Such processes, she argued, reveal how the mainstreaming of far-right ideas occurs through repetition, adaptation, and gradual legitimation.

Euphemism and Power: Sanitizing Coercion in Democratic Politics

In the final part of her presentation, Professor Wodak turned to the role of euphemism in shaping public perceptions of policy. Drawing on contemporary European debates on migration and asylum, she showed how practices such as detention are reframed through sanitized terminology, including phrases like “waiting zones” or “closed control access centers.” These linguistic choices, she argued, obscure the coercive nature of such measures and render them more palatable to the public. In this sense, language functions not merely as a descriptive tool, but as a mechanism that shapes what can be politically imagined and justified.

Professor Wodak concluded by synthesizing the broader implications of her analysis. Shameless normalization, she argued, performs multiple functions: it constructs a sense of authenticity, rejects the norms of rational deliberation, fosters identification between political leaders and “the people,” and diverts attention through provocation and scandalization. Most significantly, it facilitates the implementation of exclusionary and anti-democratic policies by embedding them within mainstream political discourse.

Her presentation thus underscored that democratic erosion is not only an institutional or legal process, but also a profoundly discursive one. The weakening of democracy occurs through shifts in language, norms, and public sensibilities, often long before formal institutional breakdown becomes visible. By foregrounding the role of rhetoric and normalization, Professor Wodak provided a compelling framework for understanding how contemporary democracies are challenged from within, and why resisting such processes requires not only institutional safeguards but also sustained critical engagement with political language and discourse.

 

Professor Julie Ingersoll: The Theocratic Blueprint of Christian Nationalism, Reconstructionism, the New Apostolic Reformation, and Catholic Integralism Behind Trump’s Agenda

Julie Ingersoll is Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies and Religious Studies Program Coordinator at the University of North Florida.

Professor Julie Ingersoll’s presentation offered a detailed and analytically nuanced account of the ideological and organizational foundations of contemporary Christian nationalism in the United States, situating it as a significant—though not singular—driver of democratic erosion. Her intervention moved beyond surface-level interpretations of religion in politics, instead tracing the historical formation, internal diversity, and strategic convergence of several distinct religious currents that have, over time, coalesced into a politically influential coalition aligned with authoritarian and anti-pluralist tendencies.

Professor Ingersoll began by clarifying a crucial analytical point: Christian nationalism in the United States is not a monolithic or representative expression of Christianity as a whole. Rather, it is a minority movement whose political influence far exceeds its demographic weight. This disproportionate power, she argued, is the product of decades-long institutional work, coalition-building, and strategic positioning within key domains of political and cultural life. Understanding its impact, therefore, requires attention not only to its beliefs but to the mechanisms through which it has embedded itself within broader structures of authority.

Three Strands, One Project: The Convergence of Christian Nationalism

At the core of her analysis was the identification of three principal strands that together constitute contemporary Christian nationalism: a white conservative evangelical tradition rooted in Christian Reconstructionism, a Catholic integralist tradition, and a Pentecostal-charismatic current associated with the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR). Each of these strands, Professor Ingersoll demonstrated, has its own theological foundations, historical trajectories, and internal logics. Yet, despite significant doctrinal differences, they have converged around shared political objectives and a common perception of existential crisis.

The first strand, Christian Reconstructionism, was presented as a theocratic and patriarchal movement with origins in mid-twentieth-century American religious thought and deeper roots in earlier Southern Presbyterian traditions. Professor Ingersoll emphasized its rejection of pluralism and its insistence that biblical law should govern all aspects of social and political life. Central to this framework is the concept of “calling,” derived from Calvinist theology, which legitimizes hierarchical social arrangements and challenges the democratic principle that authority derives from popular consent. In this view, leadership is not conferred through elections but through divine designation, a premise that fundamentally undermines democratic legitimacy.

The second strand, Catholic integralism, similarly rejects the separation of church and state, advocating instead for a political order grounded in religious authority. Professor Ingersoll noted its growing influence within legal and judicial institutions, particularly through long-term efforts to shape the composition and orientation of the judiciary. Integralist thought, she argued, frames modern liberal institutions—especially those promoting equality—as sources of moral and social decay. Its critique of the administrative state and its support for a strong, centralized executive authority align closely with broader authoritarian tendencies.

The third strand, the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR), introduces a distinct but complementary dimension rooted in charismatic and Pentecostal traditions. This movement emphasizes ongoing revelation, spiritual warfare, and apocalyptic expectation. Its doctrine of the “Seven Mountains Mandate” envisions the systematic transformation of key societal domains—such as government, media, education, and culture—under Christian authority. Professor Ingersoll highlighted the movement’s belief in the active presence of spiritual forces in contemporary political life, a worldview that intensifies polarization and, in some cases, increases the potential for legitimizing conflict and even violence.

Political Convergence in Religious Movements

A central analytical contribution of the presentation lay in explaining how these three strands, despite profound theological disagreements, have formed a cohesive political alliance. Professor Ingersoll challenged the conventional “world religions” model, which treats religious traditions as internally coherent and mutually distinct systems. Instead, she proposed a more fluid understanding of religion as a set of practices and narratives that can be selectively combined to serve social and political purposes. In this framework, doctrinal inconsistencies are less significant than shared goals related to power, identity, and social ordering.

To illustrate this point, she examined differing approaches to biblical authority across the three traditions. While Catholic integralists rely on the interpretive authority of the Church, evangelicals emphasize direct textual interpretation, and Pentecostal-charismatic actors embrace ongoing revelation. These differences, while substantial, are subordinated in practice to a set of shared political commitments: the rejection of pluralism, the affirmation of hierarchical social structures, the belief in divinely ordained leadership, and the pursuit of a theocratic or quasi-theocratic order.

Professor Ingersoll further argued that these movements are united by a common narrative of civilizational crisis. Each interprets contemporary social and political developments—whether related to gender equality, racial justice, or secular governance—as evidence of moral decline. This sense of crisis provides both a justification for radical political intervention and a framework for mobilizing supporters. Within this narrative, democratic institutions are often portrayed not as safeguards of freedom, but as obstacles to the restoration of a divinely sanctioned social order.

Internal Tensions within Christian Nationalism

The presentation also addressed the strategic flexibility of this coalition. While its proponents may utilize democratic mechanisms to gain power, they do not view democracy as intrinsically valuable. Rather, democracy is treated instrumentally, as one possible means of achieving a broader objective. Authoritarian or hierarchical forms of governance are equally acceptable if they are perceived to align with divine authority. This instrumental view of democracy, Professor Ingersoll suggested, represents a fundamental challenge to liberal democratic norms.

In her concluding remarks, Professor Ingersoll pointed to emerging internal tensions within the movement. Differences in theological interpretation, strategic priorities, and leadership styles are beginning to generate visible fractures. For example, divergent understandings of apocalyptic timelines or the role of political violence create points of friction. Additionally, certain political developments—such as controversial leadership claims or symbolic actions—have alienated segments within the coalition. While these divisions do not currently outweigh the movement’s shared objectives, they may become more significant over time.

In sum, Professor Ingersoll’s presentation provided a comprehensive and deeply contextualized analysis of Christian nationalism as a complex, evolving, and strategically coordinated force. By highlighting its internal diversity, institutional entrenchment, and ideological coherence around anti-pluralist principles, she illuminated the ways in which religious narratives and political power intersect in contemporary democratic backsliding. Her analysis underscored that the challenge posed by such movements is not merely theological or cultural, but fundamentally political, with direct implications for the future of democratic governance.

 

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: International Organizations in Times of Populism

Professor Stephan Klingebiel is Head of the Department of Inter- and Transnational Cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Professor Stephan Klingebiel delivered a wide-ranging and analytically grounded presentation examining how the contemporary rise of populism—particularly under the second administration of Donald Trump—is reshaping international organizations, development cooperation, and the normative foundations of global governance. His intervention moved carefully between institutional analysis and broader systemic implications, offering both empirical observations and conceptual framing.

At the outset, Professor Klingebiel positioned his remarks at the intersection of two overlapping domains: the functioning of international organizations and the evolving discourse on development and sustainability. He focused especially on the United Nations Development System, the OECD, and multilateral development banks such as the World Bank. These institutions, he argued, serve not only operational roles in development assistance but also act as key norm-setters in shaping global cooperation. It is precisely these normative and institutional roles that have come under increasing pressure in the current political climate.

From Multilateralism to Uncertainty

Reflecting on developments since early 2025, Professor Klingebiel suggested that the treatment of development cooperation—particularly the dismantling of USAID—served as an early signal of broader patterns in the second Trump administration’s approach to international engagement. What initially appeared as a sector-specific shift quickly revealed itself as part of a more comprehensive reorientation affecting multilateralism as a whole.

To explain these dynamics, Professor Klingebiel identified four interrelated driving logics. First, he pointed to what he termed “crude transactionalism,” a form of foreign policy that reduces international cooperation to immediate, bilateral exchanges rather than long-term institutional commitments. While transactional approaches have long existed in development policy, he argued that the current form is qualitatively different in its intensity and scope, extending into areas such as conflict mediation and geopolitical bargaining.

Second, he highlighted the role of ideological motivations, particularly in relation to issues such as family planning, gender policy, and population governance. Certain international agencies, including those working on reproductive health, have become focal points of contestation, reflecting deeper ideological divides over the scope and purpose of development cooperation.

Third, Professor Klingebiel emphasized the element of institutional disruption driven not by coherent strategy but by what he described as systemic unpredictability. Drawing on insider accounts of the dismantling of USAID, he suggested that many policy decisions appear to lack a consistent strategic foundation, instead reflecting fragmented and reactive processes.

Finally, he identified an “obsession with disruption” as a defining feature of the current approach. This involves the deliberate use of abrupt and highly visible actions—such as withdrawal announcements or dramatic policy shifts—to reshape expectations and unsettle established practices within international cooperation.

Populism and the Fragmentation of Global Cooperation

These underlying logics have translated into a series of concrete policy outcomes. Among the most striking is the dramatic reduction in US foreign aid, which, according to recent OECD data, declined by approximately 57 percent within a single year. Such a contraction, Professor Klingebiel noted, has profound implications not only for recipient countries but also for the broader ecosystem of development actors, including civil society organizations and democracy-support initiatives.

Equally significant is the announced withdrawal from dozens of international bodies. While the practical implementation of these withdrawals remains uneven, their symbolic impact is considerable. They signal a retreat from multilateral engagement and contribute to an atmosphere of uncertainty regarding the future of global cooperation.

However, Professor Klingebiel’s central concern extended beyond these immediate policy shifts to their deeper normative consequences. He argued that the most consequential impact of contemporary populism lies in its erosion of shared frameworks that have historically underpinned international cooperation. These include not only formal institutions but also the implicit agreements on language, priorities, and goals that enable collective action.

This erosion was illustrated through the example of the United Nations 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Once widely accepted as a minimal global consensus on issues such as poverty reduction, inequality, and gender equality, this framework is now increasingly contested. Professor Klingebiel noted that it has been reframed by some political actors as a form of “soft global governance” incompatible with national sovereignty, leading to active efforts to undermine it.

Fragmented Vocabulary, Fragmented Order

A particularly revealing dimension of this shift is the politicization of language itself. Drawing on recent analyses, Professor Klingebiel described how specific terms—such as “gender,” “gender-based violence,” and “climate change”—have become sites of contestation within international forums. The rejection of these terms is not merely semantic; it reflects a broader attempt to reshape the normative boundaries of acceptable discourse. In practice, this has led to subtle but significant changes, with institutions adopting alternative terminology that dilutes or reframes established concepts.

This process, he argued, contributes to a broader fragmentation of normative consensus. Where international cooperation once relied on a shared vocabulary and a baseline agreement on goals, it now operates within an increasingly contested and politicized environment. This fragmentation is further intensified by the emergence of competing visions of world order, in which different actors promote alternative frameworks for development and governance.

At the same time, Professor Klingebiel cautioned against attributing these transformations solely to Western populism. He emphasized the growing agency of actors in what is often termed the Global South, including countries such as China and India, as well as smaller states that increasingly pursue multi-alignment strategies. These actors are not merely passive recipients of global norms but active participants in shaping them, contributing to a more complex and pluralistic international landscape.

Within this evolving context, development cooperation itself is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Rather than serving primarily as a tool for poverty reduction or social development, it is increasingly embedded within geopolitical and geo-economic competition. Institutions originally designed for development purposes are being repurposed to secure access to strategic resources or to advance national interests.

Pockets of Cooperation: Uneven Continuity in Global Governance

Despite this challenging environment, Professor Klingebiel identified areas of cautious optimism. He pointed to the emergence of what he termed “mixed coalitions”—alliances that bring together actors from both the Global North and South who remain committed to multilateralism. Additionally, he highlighted the existence of “pockets of effectiveness,” instances in which international cooperation continues to function successfully despite broader systemic pressures.

These pockets, while limited, suggest that multilateralism is not uniformly in decline but rather unevenly contested. Understanding the conditions under which cooperation remains viable, Professor Klingebiel suggested, may offer valuable insights for sustaining and rebuilding international frameworks in the future.

In concluding, his presentation offered a sober but nuanced assessment. The current moment is marked not only by policy shifts but by a deeper transformation of the principles and assumptions that have long guided international cooperation. Yet within this transformation, there remain spaces for adaptation, coalition-building, and renewed engagement—provided that these efforts are grounded in a clear understanding of the changing landscape.

 

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett: Humiliation, Elite Impunity, and the Anti-System Gamble — Weimar-Type Mechanisms in Contemporary Grievance Politics

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett.
Professor Benjamin Carter Hett is a leading historian of Nazi Germany at Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY.

Professor Benjamin Carter Hett’s presentation offered a historically grounded and analytically provocative reflection on the political mechanisms that enabled the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism, while also considering the relevance of those mechanisms for contemporary grievance politics. Drawing on decades of research into late Weimar Germany, Professor Hett approached the subject with both scholarly caution and interpretive clarity. He was careful not to collapse historical contexts into one another, yet he argued that certain recurring dynamics—particularly humiliation, status anxiety, and the search for anti-system solutions—remain crucial for understanding how democratic orders become vulnerable to authoritarian appeals.

Professor Hett began by acknowledging the uneasy position of the historian in conversations about the present. Historians, he suggested, may at times reconstruct the past with care, but they are not necessarily the best guides to contemporary politics or future developments. Nonetheless, his long engagement with the final years of the Weimar Republic had led him to a set of conclusions about why that democracy failed, and these conclusions, he argued, may still offer insight into current political developments.

Humiliation and Status Anxiety

The core of Professor Hett’s argument was that the Nazi breakthrough in Germany cannot be fully understood simply through economic distress, institutional weakness, or generalized political radicalization. While all of these factors mattered, he emphasized that the message which most powerfully resonated with Nazi voters was a message organized around humiliation and its close companion, status anxiety. The emotional and symbolic dimensions of political life, in his reading, were central. What drove substantial sectors of the electorate toward the Nazis was not only hardship, but the belief that they had been dishonored, displaced, and stripped of their rightful standing.

To develop this claim, Professor Hett drew on voting studies, especially the work of German political scientist Jürgen W. Falter, whose statistical analyses remain among the most important accounts of Nazi electoral support. Since Germany in the late 1920s and early 1930s did not have opinion polling in the modern sense, scholars must reconstruct political behavior by examining constituency-level voting patterns and comparing them with the themes emphasized in Nazi campaigning. This allows one to identify which messages resonated with which groups, and why.

From this evidence, Professor Hett argued that Nazi appeals found their strongest reception among those constituencies most susceptible to humiliation and fears of status loss. These were particularly concentrated among Protestant middle-class voters, especially in rural northern and eastern Germany. The Nazi Party’s success, in his account, lay in its ability to transform diffuse anxieties into a coherent political narrative: Germany was being humiliated by external forces, weakened by internal enemies, and betrayed by a democratic system incapable of defending national dignity.

A major source of this humiliation, he suggested, was Germany’s place in the post-World War I international order. The Treaty of Versailles, reparations, the international oversight of German finance, and the constraints imposed on national sovereignty created a pervasive sense that Germany had lost control over its own destiny. Economic arrangements linked to reparations, including the role of international banking mechanisms and the subordination of German monetary policy to Allied preferences, reinforced this sense of national dependency. What later generations might describe as resentment toward globalization, Professor Hett argued, already had clear political expression in this period, even if the term itself was not yet available.

Seeds of Nazi Mobilization

This resentment was especially powerful in the countryside. Reduced tariffs and intensified agricultural competition placed heavy pressure on German farmers, especially in the north and east, where farm bankruptcies became common. At the same time, Germany’s limited ability to control its eastern border, particularly with newly established Poland, turned migration and refugee flows into volatile political issues. These developments fed the perception that the democratic state was either unwilling or unable to defend the nation’s interests. The Nazis capitalized on precisely these grievances, presenting themselves as nationalist champions against foreign domination, financial dependency, border insecurity, and economic dislocation.

Professor Hett also introduced a second, equally important dimension of humiliation: the perceived loss of religious and cultural status among German Protestants. Here his analysis intersected with broader questions of identity and belonging. Before World War I, Protestantism had enjoyed a privileged position within the German Empire. But the Weimar Republic, in the eyes of many Protestants, appeared to be politically shaped by forces outside that tradition. Its principal architects and defenders included Social Democrats, Catholics, and the Jewish legal scholar Hugo Preuss, who played a major role in drafting the constitution.

For many Protestants, Professor Hett argued, this generated a deep sense of displacement. They experienced the new order not merely as politically different, but as a system in which they had lost social and moral primacy. In electoral terms, this proved crucial. Catholics largely did not vote Nazi, in part because they had a confessional political home within the Center Party and did not feel comparably estranged from the Weimar system. Nor did the industrial working-class core of the Social Democrats move en masse toward the Nazis. The party that the Nazis most successfully destroyed, Professor Hett observed, was the Protestant middle class. In this sense, National Socialism became, to a significant degree, the party of aggrieved Protestant respectability.

This reading also enabled Professor Hett to place Weimar Germany within a broader comparative pattern. Across the authoritarian turn of the 1920s and 1930s, humiliation appeared repeatedly as a politically generative force. Citing the work of historian Robert Paxton, he noted that the rise of fascist or authoritarian systems correlated strongly with defeat in World War I—or, in some cases, with a perceived defeat. Italy, for example, had technically emerged from the war on the victorious side, yet many Italians experienced the outcome as a “mutilated victory,” a phrase that captured their sense of insult and dispossession. Authoritarian politics fed on that perception.

Global Echoes: From MAGA to European Anti-Globalization Movements

Having established these historical mechanisms, Professor Hett turned more tentatively to the present. Here he stressed again that analogies must remain cautious, yet he argued that the politics of humiliation and status anxiety are clearly visible in contemporary democracies, especially in the United States. In his view, these dynamics are among the strongest factors behind support for Donald Trump. Trump’s appeal, he suggested, has been rooted not simply in policy commitments or ideological clarity, but in the promise of retribution for those who feel displaced by social and demographic change.

The rhetoric of “I am your retribution,” which Trump used in the 2024 campaign, was especially telling in this regard. Retribution for what, Professor Hett asked implicitly, if not for a perceived historical loss of primacy? The contemporary politics of race, migration, and hostility to diversity initiatives were, in his interpretation, best understood as efforts to reassure a predominantly white constituency that feels that others have unjustly advanced at its expense. The appeal to a mythologized past—captured in slogans such as “Make America Great Again”—functions not simply as nostalgia, but as a restoration narrative aimed at those who believe they have been humiliated by modern equality.

Professor Hett then broadened the frame to Europe. Anti-globalization sentiment, he argued, has played a comparable role in the rise of populist and authoritarian parties across the continent. The Brexit vote, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and wider resentment toward migration all reflect forms of status anxiety tied to the belief that one’s country is becoming “someone else’s country.” In the German case, he pointed especially to eastern Germany, where support for the far right remains heavily concentrated. Drawing on personal observations as well as broader political patterns, he described a durable sense among many East Germans that they have been serially humiliated since reunification.

From Status Loss to Authoritarian Opportunity

These feelings, he suggested, are not reducible to economics alone. They involve wounded dignity, symbolic exclusion, and the perception that one’s world has been politically and culturally devalued. In this sense, grievance politics becomes especially potent when it can link structural change to a narrative of dishonor.

Professor Hett concluded by suggesting, modestly, that if humiliation and status anxiety are indeed major drivers of anti-system politics, then effective democratic responses must address the material and symbolic conditions that sustain them. He mentioned the idea of a kind of “Marshall Plan 2.0” as one possible way of mitigating some of the economic transformations that deepen discontent. Yet he remained cautious about prescribing solutions beyond his field of expertise.

What his presentation offered most powerfully was not a simple warning from history, but a historically informed framework for thinking about how democracies are undone. By centering humiliation, elite impunity, and status loss, Professor Hett illuminated the emotional structure of grievance politics and the ways in which anti-system actors transform wounded identities into authoritarian opportunity.

 

Discussions

The Q&A session following the first panel unfolded as a reflective and deeply engaged exchange, bringing together personal testimony, empirical insight, and conceptual debate. The discussion not only reinforced several core arguments presented earlier—particularly those concerning humiliation, status anxiety, and democratic erosion—but also broadened the analytical frame by introducing additional variables, including pandemic effects, structural inequality, and adaptive institutional responses.

Irina von Wiese opened the exchange with a personal intervention that lent lived texture to the abstract dynamics discussed by Professor Benjamin Carter Hett. Drawing on her own experience as a West German working in eastern Germany immediately after reunification, she offered a candid account of the asymmetries that characterized that moment. As a young legal advisor involved in constitutional development in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, she observed what she described as a pervasive arrogance among West German professionals toward their East German counterparts—many of whom had endured political repression but lacked formal credentials. This imbalance, she suggested, generated a reservoir of resentment that remained latent for decades before finding political expression.

Her reflections underscored a central theme in Professor Hett’s analysis: that humiliation is not always immediate in its political effects, but can endure, accumulate, and eventually crystallize into protest or support for anti-system actors. Von Wiese noted that the eventual rise of far-right mobilization in eastern Germany was not sudden, but rather the delayed outcome of long-standing grievances awaiting political articulation. In this sense, the emergence of parties such as the far right can be seen less as the origin of discontent than as its vehicle.

Extending her argument beyond Germany, von Wiese pointed to similar dynamics in other contexts, including her experiences in the United States and the United Kingdom. She recalled the stark social contrasts she encountered outside elite academic environments in the United States during the early 1990s, particularly in relation to poverty and racial segregation. These conditions, she argued, formed part of the underlying landscape that later enabled figures like Donald Trump to mobilize political support. Likewise, she interpreted the Brexit campaign as deeply rooted in narratives of national decline and loss of status, with appeals to a diminished imperial past serving as a powerful emotional driver.

While affirming the explanatory value of humiliation and status anxiety, von Wiese also raised a critical question regarding remedies. She expressed skepticism about whether economic interventions alone—such as a modern “Marshall Plan”—would suffice, suggesting that deeper systemic transformations may be required, particularly in relation to inequality and the structure of contemporary capitalism. Her intervention thus shifted the discussion from diagnosis to the more difficult terrain of response.

The Multi-Dimensional Nature of Democratic Backsliding

Professor Ruth Wodak followed by situating the panel within a broader interdisciplinary framework. She emphasized the importance of integrating multiple analytical perspectives in order to grasp the complexity of contemporary democratic challenges. While acknowledging the relevance of Professor Hett’s emphasis on humiliation and recognition, she cautioned against overly singular explanations. In her view, democratic backsliding and far-right mobilization are multi-causal phenomena that cannot be reduced to a single driver.

Professor Wodak introduced two additional factors that she argued deserve greater attention. The first was the long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. She suggested that the pandemic generated widespread fear and uncertainty on a global scale, creating fertile ground for both authoritarian narratives and renewed forms of religiosity. Drawing on sociological insights, she noted that periods of existential anxiety often lead individuals to seek stability in identity-based frameworks, including religion, while also increasing susceptibility to aggression and polarization. In this sense, the pandemic may have functioned as an accelerant in the latest phase of far-right mobilization.

The second factor she highlighted was what might be termed anticipatory anxiety. While Professor Hett’s framework emphasizes the experience of humiliation and loss, Professor Wodak pointed to cases where far-right support is strongest not among the most economically deprived, but in relatively affluent societies. Citing examples such as Austria, Switzerland, and Denmark, she observed that high levels of prosperity have not prevented the rise of far-right parties. Instead, she suggested, these contexts are characterized by a fear of losing existing advantages—a forward-looking anxiety rather than a retrospective grievance. This introduces a subtle but important distinction: the politics of resentment may be driven as much by perceived future decline as by past injustice.

Turning to the question of institutional response, Professor Wodak engaged with the earlier presentation by Professor Stephan Klingebiel on the politicization of development discourse. She noted that while certain policy areas—such as gender and climate—have become targets of political contestation, actors within international organizations have begun to develop adaptive strategies. One such strategy involves reframing or relabeling projects in order to avoid triggering ideological opposition, while continuing substantive work under different terminology. This form of quiet institutional resilience, she suggested, illustrates how bureaucratic actors may navigate hostile political environments without abandoning core objectives.

At the same time, Professor Wodak did not understate the severity of recent developments, particularly the dismantling of major development institutions and the reduction of aid flows. She highlighted the moral and human consequences of such policies, noting the stark contradiction between global wealth concentration and the withdrawal of support for the world’s most vulnerable populations. Her remarks conveyed both analytical concern and normative urgency.

Explaining Religious-Political Convergence

The Q&A session continued with a focused exchange between Dr. Bulent Kenes, and Professor Julie Ingersoll, centering on the timing and recent consolidation of religiously driven political movements in the United States. The question probed a central puzzle emerging from the panel: while religious actors have long played a role in American public life, why have certain strands of Christian nationalism reached a new peak of visibility and influence at this particular historical juncture?

In posing the question, Dr. Kenes framed the issue as one of convergence. He invited Professor Ingersoll to reflect on whether the current moment could be explained by the interaction of structural and contingent factors—demographic change, economic insecurity, intensifying political polarization, and the strategic mobilization of religious networks within populist movements. His formulation implicitly shifted the discussion from historical description to causal explanation, asking not simply what these movements are, but why their influence has crystallized now.

In her response, Professor Ingersoll offered a careful recalibration of the premise. She challenged the assumption that these religious formations have always existed in their present form, emphasizing instead their relatively recent consolidation. While acknowledging that certain traditions—particularly Catholic political engagement—have deep historical roots, she argued that the specific configurations associated with contemporary Christian nationalism represent a more recent development. These movements, in her account, should not be understood as continuous extensions of longstanding traditions, but as new iterations shaped by decades of strategic organization.

A central element of her explanation was the long-term institutional work undertaken by groups such as the Christian Reconstructionists. Over several decades, these actors invested in building parallel educational infrastructures, including private Christian school networks that later evolved into homeschooling systems. These institutions did more than provide alternative education; they cultivated generational continuity, transmitting a distinct worldview and historical narrative that diverged from mainstream interpretations. This process, Professor Ingersoll suggested, has created a durable social base capable of sustaining and amplifying political influence.

Importantly, she situated the expansion of these networks within a specific historical context: the desegregation of public schools. The timing was consequential. As integration policies reshaped the public education system, segments of white evangelical communities withdrew into private and religious schooling structures. While often framed in theological terms, this shift also intersected with broader social and racial dynamics, allowing communities to maintain separation while articulating their choices through religious language. Over time, these parallel institutions became key sites of ideological formation.

Professor Ingersoll also pointed to more recent catalysts, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic. Echoing earlier remarks in the panel, she argued that the pandemic functioned as a moment of intensified mobilization. Religious actors capitalized on widespread uncertainty and fear, framing public health measures—such as restrictions on gatherings—as threats to religious freedom. This narrative, she suggested, resonated strongly within conservative constituencies, reinforcing existing suspicions of state overreach and contributing to a broader sense of existential threat.

At the same time, Professor Ingersoll emphasized that no single factor can account for the current prominence of these movements. Rather, their rise reflects the cumulative effect of long-term organizational strategies interacting with more immediate political and social disruptions. What appears as a sudden surge is, in her formulation, the visible outcome of processes that have been unfolding over decades.

Secularization, Inequality, and Backlash

The exchange moved beyond diagnosis toward a more reflective interrogation of responsibility, causality, and the limits of existing analytical frameworks. Professor Jack A. Goldstone suggested that what is currently unfolding across multiple contexts is not merely the resurgence of religion or populism in isolation, but the normalization of an assertive and exclusionary ideological fusion—where perceived humiliation is channeled into aggressive identity-based politics. In this reading, religious nationalism operates not only as belief, but as a vehicle for reasserting dominance in response to status loss.

Professor Goldstone then turned a critical eye toward the role of social science itself, arguing that earlier intellectual assumptions may have inadvertently contributed to the present moment. The expectation that secularization would steadily marginalize religion, he suggested, proved deeply misleading. Instead, policies and discourses shaped by this assumption often alienated religious communities, creating fertile ground for backlash movements that now seek to reintegrate religion into the core of political authority. Parallel to this, he identified a second misjudgment in economic thinking: the prioritization of growth over distribution. While aggregate prosperity increased, the failure to address inequality produced widespread discontent, reinforcing perceptions of exclusion and injustice.

Extending this argument, Professor Goldstone highlighted a longer-term global transformation. Over the past half century, the relative dominance of Western societies has eroded, as economic and technological advancements in other regions have reshaped the global hierarchy. This shift, he argued, has unsettled previously taken-for-granted assumptions of superiority among segments of Western populations. The resulting nostalgia—rooted in a memory of unchallenged status—feeds contemporary grievance politics. His central question, directed to the panel, concerned how societies might address this structural recalibration without intensifying resentment, exclusion, and the normalization of antagonistic rhetoric.

The Deepening Impact of Populist Pressure

Responding to earlier interventions and this broader framing, Professor Stephan Klingebiel emphasized that the current transformations cannot be reduced to discursive shifts alone. While the strategic avoidance or substitution of politically sensitive terminology—such as replacing “climate change” or “gender” with more neutral language—may offer short-term tactical advantages, he cautioned that such practices risk deeper forms of self-censorship. This “self-policing,” as he described it, signals not adaptation but internalization of external pressure, ultimately weakening the normative foundations of international cooperation.

Professor Klingebiel further underscored that the stakes extend beyond language to the substance of policy and institutional priorities. Changes in funding allocations, the redirection of development agendas, and the politicization of multilateral institutions reflect a broader erosion of solidarity. He pointed to a shifting political climate in which engagement with development cooperation—once a source of professional and political legitimacy—has become increasingly stigmatized. This transformation, he suggested, illustrates how populist pressures reshape not only public discourse but also the incentives and self-perceptions of policymakers.

At the same time, Professor Klingebiel stressed the necessity of active resistance. Silence or strategic accommodation, in his view, risks accelerating the very dynamics it seeks to navigate. Instead, he advocated for the formation of new coalitions among actors committed to multilateralism and democratic norms. Crucially, he also called for a rethinking of how academic and policy communities communicate their work. Empirical evidence, while indispensable, is no longer sufficient in isolation. To counter populist narratives effectively, scholars must engage more directly with the emotional and symbolic dimensions of political life—crafting narratives that resonate beyond technocratic audiences.

In sum, this segment of the discussion highlighted a convergence around a central insight: contemporary democratic challenges are sustained by an interplay of structural change, emotional response, and discursive transformation. Addressing them requires not only institutional reform or policy adjustment, but also a deeper engagement with the narratives through which individuals interpret their place in a rapidly changing world.

 

Conclusion

Panel 1 of the symposium offered more than a set of parallel analyses; it articulated a coherent and multi-dimensional understanding of how contemporary democratic erosion takes shape. Across the presentations and subsequent discussion, a consistent insight emerged: populist radicalization is neither episodic nor accidental, but the outcome of long-term interactions between structural transformations, ideological projects, and affective dynamics. Grievance, as the panel demonstrated, does not automatically translate into anti-democratic politics. It becomes politically consequential when it is narrated, organized, and strategically mobilized through discursive, institutional, and symbolic means.

A central contribution of the panel lies in its insistence on integrating the emotional and the structural. Processes such as humiliation, status anxiety, and fear of future loss were shown to operate not as secondary effects, but as constitutive elements of political mobilization. At the same time, these affective dynamics are embedded within broader shifts – economic dislocation, geopolitical reordering, and the erosion of normative consensus in international cooperation. The convergence of these factors creates conditions under which exclusionary ideologies can gain legitimacy and resonance across diverse contexts.

Equally important was the panel’s attention to the role of agency – both in the emergence of populist forces and in the responses available to democratic actors. The discussions highlighted how political entrepreneurs, religious movements, and institutional actors actively construct narratives that transform diffuse unease into coherent political projects. Yet they also pointed to the adaptive capacities within democratic systems, including the formation of new coalitions, the persistence of institutional “pockets of effectiveness,” and the possibility of recalibrating political communication to address not only facts, but meanings and emotions.

The implications of these insights are both analytical and normative. If democratic erosion is prepared through gradual normalization, discursive shifts, and the instrumentalization of identity, then its counter requires equally sustained and multidimensional responses. Institutional reforms, while necessary, are insufficient in isolation. What is required is a renewed engagement with the cultural, social, and emotional foundations of democratic life – an effort to reconstruct not only policies, but also the narratives and forms of recognition that underpin democratic legitimacy.

In sum, the panel underscored that the trajectory from grievance to radicalization is not predetermined. It remains contingent on how societies interpret, articulate, and respond to the pressures they face. Understanding this contingency is essential not only for diagnosing democratic decline, but for imagining pathways of resilience and renewal in an increasingly unsettled global order.

Professor Staffan I Lindberg, Director of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.  Photo: Johan Wingborg.

ECPS Symposium 2026 / Keynote by Professor Staffan I. Lindberg: The Chicken-and-Egg Dilemma — Systemic Crises and the Rise of Populism

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “Keynote by Professor Staffan I. Lindberg: The Chicken-and-Egg Dilemma — Systemic Crises and the Rise of Populism.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00148

 

The opening session of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium offered a timely and intellectually rigorous entry point into one of the central dilemmas of contemporary politics: how liberal democracy can be defended, renewed, and reimagined amid systemic crisis and accelerating autocratization. Moderated by Professor Ibrahim Ozturk, the session combined normative urgency with empirical depth. In her opening remarks, Irina von Wiese underscored the geopolitical immediacy of democratic strain, while Professor Staffan I. Lindberg’s keynote, grounded in V-Dem data, traced the global scale of democratic erosion and challenged simplistic readings of populism by foregrounding anti-pluralism as a more precise analytical category. The discussion that followed further enriched the session, probing the measurement, lived experience, and reversibility of democratic decline across contexts.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The opening session of ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium opened on April 21, 2026 within a carefully structured intellectual framework that brought together empirical rigor, normative urgency, and interdisciplinary reflection. Moderated by Professor Ibrahim Ozturk, the opening segment of the symposium set out to interrogate one of the defining challenges of contemporary politics: how liberal democracies can be reformed and safeguarded in an era marked by systemic crises, populist mobilization, and intensifying pressures on institutional resilience.

From the outset, the session positioned itself at the intersection of scholarly analysis and real-world political developments. The framing emphasized that democratic backsliding is no longer a peripheral or regionally confined phenomenon, but a global trend with profound implications for governance, legitimacy, and international order. In this context, the symposium’s thematic focus—linking systemic crises to populism and democratic resilience—provided a coherent lens through which to examine both structural drivers and political responses.

The opening remarks by ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese underscored the urgency of the moment, situating the symposium within a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. Her reflections highlighted the accelerating pace of political change, particularly in transatlantic relations, and the difficulty of keeping analytical frameworks aligned with unfolding realities. This sense of temporal compression—where events outpace interpretation—reinforced the need for sustained, collective intellectual engagement.

The keynote address by Staffan I. Lindberg, Professor of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Founding Director (2012–2025) of V-Dem Institute, further anchored the session in empirical analysis, offering a data-driven diagnosis of global democratic decline. By questioning conventional interpretations of populism and emphasizing the role of anti-pluralism, the keynote set the stage for a deeper exploration of the mechanisms underlying democratic erosion.

The discussion segment that followed extended the analytical depth of the opening session by bringing empirical findings, methodological concerns, and lived political experience into direct dialogue. Participants engaged critically with the keynote’s claims, probing the interpretation of data, the pace and nature of democratic decline, and the conditions under which institutional resilience may still operate. The exchange moved fluidly between macro-level indicators and context-specific realities, revealing both the strengths and limits of comparative measurement in capturing complex political transformations. In doing so, the discussion underscored a central theme of the symposium: that understanding democratic backsliding requires not only robust data, but also careful attention to institutional nuance, temporal dynamics, and the contested nature of political change.

Taken together, the opening session established both the analytical foundations and the normative stakes of the symposium. It framed the subsequent discussions around a central tension: while the challenges facing liberal democracy are systemic and far-reaching, the possibilities for resilience and renewal remain contingent on timely, informed, and collective responses.

 

Opening Remarks

Irina von Wiese is ECPS Honorary President.

Irina von Wiese: Collective Intellectual Engagement in an Age of Uncertainty

At the opening of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese set a reflective yet urgent tone, situating the event within a rapidly shifting global landscape marked by political volatility and democratic uncertainty. Addressing a geographically dispersed audience, she welcomed participants with a sense of continuity—recalling previous in-person gatherings—while underscoring the heightened significance of this year’s theme: reforming and safeguarding liberal democracy amid systemic crises, populism, and pressures on democratic resilience.

Her remarks were anchored in the immediacy of unfolding geopolitical transformations. Drawing on the recent launch of ECPS’s annual report on transatlantic relations—presented in Brussels and subsequently in Washington, D.C.—she emphasized how swiftly the international environment has evolved, to the point that even the most up-to-date analyses risk rapid obsolescence. This acceleration of change, particularly in relations between the United States and Europe, was described as both profound and disorienting, challenging not only scholars but also policymakers striving to interpret and respond to events in real time.

A central thread in her intervention was the interplay between domestic political dynamics and global geopolitical shifts. Developments within major democratic actors, especially the United States and European Union member states, were identified as key drivers reshaping international alignments. Within Europe itself, she noted ongoing political flux, including leadership changes and the persistent influence of populist forces, suggesting that the broader trajectory remains tilted toward autocratization rather than democratic renewal.

While deferring to the scholarly expertise of the symposium’s participants, von Wiese highlighted the normative and practical urgency of the symposium’s core question: whether contemporary populist surges signal a failure of liberal democracy or reflect more complex, reciprocal dynamics between institutions and political mobilization. This question, she implied, resists simplistic causal narratives and demands sustained interdisciplinary inquiry.

Importantly, her reflections were not confined to abstract analysis but grounded in lived political experience. Referencing her engagement in local electoral campaigning in the United Kingdom, she illustrated how broader patterns of populist mobilization are increasingly evident even in contexts once considered relatively resilient. Conversations with voters revealed familiar themes—disaffection, polarization, and shifting political allegiances—underscoring the diffusion of populist dynamics across national contexts.

In closing, von Wiese reaffirmed the value of collective intellectual engagement at a moment of uncertainty. By bringing together scholars and practitioners, the symposium was framed as a necessary space for critical reflection, exchange, and the generation of ideas capable of informing both academic debate and political practice.

 

Keynote Speech

Professor Staffan I. Lindberg: “The Chicken-and-Egg Dilemma: Systemic Crises and the Rise of Populism”

Figure from the V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.
Figure from the V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.

Professor Staffan I. Lindberg delivered a comprehensive and empirically rich keynote that addressed one of the most pressing questions in contemporary political science: how should we understand the relationship between systemic crises and the rise of populist—or more precisely, anti-pluralist—politics? Framed as a “chicken-and-egg dilemma,” the lecture did not seek a simplistic causal answer. Instead, it mapped a complex, mutually reinforcing relationship between structural transformations, political agency, and institutional erosion, grounded in extensive cross-national data and longitudinal analysis.

Professor Lindberg began by situating his remarks within the broader findings of the V-Dem Institute’s 2026 Democracy Report, drawing on an expansive dataset that captures global developments in democratic governance, civil liberties, and institutional integrity. He presented a stark visual overview: a world increasingly marked by autocratization. Compared to the optimism that followed the “third wave” of democratization—beginning in the mid-1970s and extending through the end of the Cold War—the contemporary landscape is characterized by a reversal of democratic gains. The spread of red across global maps, indicating declining democratic quality, is not merely symbolic but empirically substantiated.

Yet, as Professor Lindberg emphasized, the interpretation of this decline depends critically on how democracy is measured. Conventional country-averaged indicators suggest a gradual, statistically significant downturn over the past two decades. On the surface, this might appear concerning but not catastrophic. However, such averages treat all countries equally, regardless of population size or global influence. This methodological limitation, he argued, obscures the true magnitude of the crisis.

When democracy is measured in terms of the average citizen’s experience—weighting countries by population—the picture changes dramatically. Under this lens, global democratic standards have regressed to levels last seen in the late 1970s. This implies that the cumulative gains achieved during decades of democratization have effectively been erased for the majority of the world’s population. Alternative weightings, including territorial size and share of global GDP, further reinforce this conclusion. In particular, the GDP-weighted measure reveals that economic power is increasingly concentrated in less democratic contexts, underscoring the geopolitical implications of democratic decline.

The New Era of Accelerating Autocratization

From this perspective, Professor Lindberg advanced a central claim: the world is experiencing a systemic crisis of democracy. This is not a localized or temporary fluctuation but a structural transformation affecting a majority of the global population. Indeed, approximately three-quarters of humanity now live under autocratic regimes. Such a statistic, he suggested, fundamentally alters the baseline assumptions of both scholarly analysis and policy discourse.

To deepen this diagnosis, the keynote shifted from static measurements to dynamic processes. Rather than focusing solely on aggregate levels of democracy, Professor Lindberg examined the number of countries actively democratizing or autocratizing at any given time. This approach revealed a striking asymmetry. During the mid-1990s, the peak of the third wave, over 70 countries were simultaneously advancing democratic reforms. Today, that number has dwindled to fewer than 20. In contrast, the number of countries undergoing autocratization has risen sharply, reaching levels unprecedented in modern history.

This comparative perspective led to one of the keynote’s most provocative assertions: the current wave of autocratization surpasses that of the 1930s in both scale and intensity. While acknowledging differences in the number of sovereign states across periods, Professor Lindberg noted that the proportion of countries and the share of the global population affected by democratic decline are now higher than during the interwar era. Moreover, the duration of the current trend—spanning approximately 25 years—exceeds that of earlier waves, suggesting a more entrenched and potentially more resilient pattern.

The cumulative nature of this transformation was further illustrated through a longitudinal analysis of autocratization episodes since the year 2000. Over this period, approximately 85 countries—nearly half of the world—have experienced significant democratic erosion. Importantly, the majority of these countries remain less democratic today than they were at the onset of the century. Even in cases where temporary reversals have occurred, the overall trajectory remains downward.

Democratic Resilience Amid Global Decline

Despite this bleak global picture, Professor Lindberg acknowledged instances of democratic recovery. Countries such as Brazil and Poland were highlighted as examples where broad-based political coalitions succeeded in reversing autocratizing trends. These cases demonstrate that democratic resilience is possible, particularly when diverse political actors unite around a shared commitment to institutional norms. However, such reversals remain the exception rather than the rule.

Having established the scale and depth of the crisis, the keynote turned to its underlying drivers. Professor Lindberg identified two interrelated mechanisms as particularly significant: the spread of disinformation and the intensification of political polarization. Drawing on both macro-level patterns and a growing body of micro-level experimental research, he argued that these factors play a central role in facilitating autocratization.

The relationship between disinformation and democratic decline is not merely correlational but strategic. In autocratizing contexts, governments and aligned actors systematically increase the production and dissemination of misleading or false information. This is not an accidental byproduct of political competition but a deliberate tactic. By flooding the information environment with contradictory narratives, these actors undermine citizens’ ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood. The resulting epistemic uncertainty erodes trust in institutions, media, and even the possibility of objective knowledge.

This process, Professor Lindberg suggested, has profound psychological effects. Faced with uncertainty about fundamental issues—national identity, economic prospects, security—individuals may become more receptive to appeals for strong leadership. In such contexts, the promise of clarity and decisiveness can outweigh concerns about democratic norms. Disinformation thus creates the conditions under which anti-democratic appeals become politically effective.

Disinformation, Polarization, and Democratic Breakdown

The second stage of the process involves the targeted use of disinformation to delegitimize political opponents. By portraying adversaries as existential threats—enemies of the nation, culture, or way of life—political actors can intensify polarization to a “toxic” level. At this point, the boundaries of legitimate political competition collapse, and the exclusion or repression of opposition becomes justifiable in the eyes of supporters. This dynamic, in turn, facilitates the concentration of power and the erosion of democratic checks and balances.

Importantly, Professor Lindberg cautioned against attributing these developments solely to “populism.” While the term is widely used to describe contemporary political movements, he argued that it lacks sufficient conceptual precision. Instead, he proposed focusing on “anti-pluralism” as the key analytical category. Drawing on data from the V-Party project, he demonstrated that political actors who reject pluralism—manifested in rhetoric that delegitimizes opposition, undermines democratic procedures, and concentrates authority—are significantly more likely to initiate autocratization once in power.

This finding has important implications. While populist rhetoric may coexist with anti-pluralist tendencies, it is not in itself a reliable predictor of democratic breakdown. Rather, it is the erosion of pluralist commitments—the willingness to accept political competition, institutional constraints, and the legitimacy of dissent—that signals the greatest danger. In this sense, anti-pluralism represents a more precise and normatively grounded concept for analyzing contemporary democratic challenges.

Empirical Evidence of Anti-Pluralist Democratic Decline

The empirical analysis supporting this argument was extensive. By operationalizing indicators derived from classic theoretical frameworks, including Juan Linz’s work on democratic breakdown, Professor Lindberg and his colleagues were able to track the evolution of party rhetoric over time. The results revealed a strong and consistent relationship between anti-pluralist discourse and subsequent democratic decline. This pattern holds across regions and political systems, underscoring its general applicability.

A particularly striking illustration of these dynamics was provided through the case of the United States. Using the Liberal Democracy Index, Professor Lindberg traced a sharp decline in democratic quality in recent years. While acknowledging the historical resilience of American institutions, he argued that the scale and speed of the current erosion are unprecedented. When compared to other cases of autocratization—such as Hungary, Turkey, and India—the United States stands out for the rapidity of its decline.

In comparative terms, the extent of institutional erosion observed in the United States over approximately one year is equivalent to processes that took several years in other countries. This includes the weakening of judicial independence, constraints on media freedom, and the concentration of executive power. Such developments, he noted, are not isolated but part of a broader pattern of executive aggrandizement—a gradual but systematic dismantling of democratic safeguards.

To convey the magnitude of this shif, Professor Lindberg drew a historical parallel with the early years of authoritarian consolidation in 1930s Germany. While careful to distinguish between contexts, he emphasized that the comparison is based on measurable indicators rather than rhetorical analogy. In terms of the speed and depth of democratic decline following an electoral victory, the current US trajectory is among the most dramatic recorded in modern datasets.

At the same time, the keynote emphasized that these processes are neither inevitable nor irreversible. The existence of democratic recoveries, albeit limited, points to the the importance of political agency and institutional resilience. Broad coalitions, civil society mobilization, and the defense of pluralist norms can counteract autocratizing trends. However, such efforts require both analytical clarity and sustained commitment.

Mutual Reinforcement of Crisis and Anti-Pluralism

In concluding his remarks, Professor Lindberg returned to the “chicken-and-egg” dilemma. Rather than resolving it definitively, he suggested that systemic crises and anti-pluralist mobilization are mutually constitutive. Economic inequality, cultural anxiety, and geopolitical instability create fertile ground for political actors who exploit division and uncertainty. In turn, the strategies employed by these actors—disinformation, polarization, institutional manipulation—exacerbate the very crises that enabled their rise.

This recursive dynamic, he argued, lies at the heart of the current democratic crisis. Understanding it requires moving beyond simplistic narratives and engaging with the complex interplay of structure and agency. By combining large-scale data analysis with theoretical insight, the keynote provided a robust framework for such engagement.

Ultimately, Professor Lindberg’s address offered both a sobering diagnosis and a call to action. The erosion of liberal democracy is neither abstract nor distant; it is a lived reality for the majority of the world’s population. Yet the tools for understanding and responding to this challenge—empirical data, comparative analysis, and interdisciplinary dialogue—are more developed than ever. The task, as framed in this keynote, is to deploy these resources with urgency, precision, and a renewed commitment to the principles of pluralism and democratic governance.

Discussions

During the Q&A session, von Wiese opened the discussion by expressing strong appreciation for the V-Dem Institute’s work, highlighting its importance as a reliable empirical resource for both scholars and practitioners. She then raised a pointed methodological question concerning the visual representation of democratic decline, particularly the apparent similarity in how Russia and the United States were depicted in one of the keynote slides. While explicitly acknowledging the seriousness of democratic backsliding in the United States, she noted that assigning similar visual intensity to two historically and institutionally distinct cases seemed counterintuitive, and invited clarification on the underlying classification criteria.

Responding to this query, Professor Lindberg emphasized that different slides captured different dimensions of democratic change. He clarified that in the principal map depicting current levels of democracy, the United States is still categorized as a democracy—albeit a declining one—while Russia occupies a markedly lower position. He acknowledged ongoing scholarly debate on this classification, noting that some experts consider the United States to have already crossed into competitive authoritarianism. However, according to V-Dem’s methodology, electoral indicators—updated during election cycles—still sustain its formal democratic classification pending further data.

Turning to the slide likely referenced, Professor Lindberg explained that it illustrated not absolute levels of democracy but the magnitude of change over time. In this context, countries are visually grouped according to the extent of their democratic decline rather than their current regime type. As such, the United States and Russia may appear similarly marked because both have experienced substantial downward shifts, albeit from very different starting points. Crucially, he underscored that the United States, despite recent erosion, remains significantly more democratic than Russia at comparable points in its trajectory.

Institutional Dynamics and the Limits of Executive Power

Bruce E. Cain is Professor of Political Science, Stanford University; Director, Bill Lane Center.

The exchange between Professor Bruce E. Cain and Professor Lindberg brought into sharp focus an important tension between macro-level measurement and context-sensitive interpretation of democratic change. While both scholars agreed on the seriousness of contemporary democratic pressures, their dialogue revealed differing emphases regarding how to interpret the pace, depth, and institutional consequences of recent developments, particularly in the United States.

Professor Cain began by acknowledging the significance of Professor Lindberg’s research, while nonetheless expressing concern about what he perceived as potentially misleading visual representations. Speaking from the vantage point of lived political experience in the United States, he argued for a more nuanced reading of recent trends. In his view, it is essential to distinguish between rhetorical ambition, temporary political advantage, and enduring institutional transformation. While conceding that the trajectory described in the data might reflect the intentions of political leadership, he cautioned against equating those intentions with fully realized outcomes.

Central to Professor Cain’s intervention was the institutional variability of the American political system. He emphasized the importance of differentiating between periods of “trifecta” government—where executive and legislative power are unified—and periods of divided government. In an era of heightened polarization, he argued, these configurations produce more pronounced effects than in the past. Under unified control, executive authority can be rapidly expanded through coordinated legislative support and administrative action. However, this expansion is contingent rather than permanent. Once political control becomes divided, institutional resistance intensifies, slowing or reversing policy initiatives and reasserting checks and balances.

Professor Cain further highlighted the role of judicial processes, particularly the strategic use of procedural mechanisms such as the “shadow docket,” which can temporarily enable controversial executive actions. In his interpretation, some policies advanced under these conditions may ultimately be overturned, suggesting that the system retains corrective capacities. He also pointed to additional constraints—including public opinion, partisan opposition, and market reactions—that continue to shape political outcomes. Taken together, these dynamics suggest a more fluid and contested process than a linear model of democratic decline might imply.

In response, Professor Lindberg clarified that the contested visualizations were intended to capture the magnitude of democratic change rather than absolute regime equivalence. The similarity in color intensity, he explained, reflects the scale of decline relative to each country’s starting point, not a convergence in regime type. The United States, despite significant erosion, remains at a substantially higher level of democratic performance than historically autocratic regimes.

At the same time, Professor Lindberg defended the empirical basis of his broader argument, stressing that the pace and scope of institutional change in the United States are historically unprecedented. He pointed to the extensive use of executive orders, the shifting balance of power toward the presidency, and the systematic weakening of oversight mechanisms as indicators of substantial transformation. While acknowledging the presence of resistance and institutional friction, he maintained that these developments collectively represent a significant and measurable shift.

The exchange underscored the value of analytical pluralism. Professor Lindberg emphasized the importance of examining democratic change from multiple perspectives—both in terms of measurement and interpretation—while Professor Cain’s intervention highlighted the need to remain attentive to institutional dynamics and contextual variation. Together, their dialogue illuminated the challenges of capturing complex political realities through aggregate indicators, while reaffirming the importance of rigorous, multi-layered analysis in understanding contemporary democratic trajectories.

Erosion of Accountability in Practice

Professor Jack A. Goldstone, one of the world’s leading scholars of revolutions and social change, holds the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Chair in Public Policy at George Mason University. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Mercatus Center and Director of the Center for the Study of Social Change, Institutions and Policy (SCIP).

The discussion deepened as Professor Jack A. Goldstone entered the exchange, shifting the focus from methodological interpretation to the lived realities of political transformation in the United States. Speaking from his position in Washington, D.C., Professor Goldstone offered a vivid account of how institutional and symbolic changes are experienced on the ground, reinforcing and, in some respects, intensifying the concerns raised in the keynote.

He described a political environment marked by increasingly visible assertions of executive authority, from the personalization of public institutions to the reshaping of national symbols and spaces. These developments, he suggested, go beyond abstract indicators of democratic decline and manifest as tangible shifts in the character of governance and public life. Particularly striking in his account was the cumulative effect of such changes: taken individually, each might appear limited, but together they signal a broader reconfiguration of political norms.

Professor Goldstone placed special emphasis on pressures facing key pillars of democratic society, including universities, media, and civil liberties. He pointed to growing constraints on academic freedom, financial pressures on public institutions, and a climate in which both scholars and journalists may feel compelled to exercise caution in their speech. These dynamics, he argued, are compounded by structural changes predating the current administration, notably judicial decisions that have expanded executive immunity and facilitated the increasing influence of private and opaque funding in electoral politics. Such developments, in his view, have altered the institutional landscape in ways that extend beyond any single political actor.

While acknowledging the persistence of resistance, particularly at the level of state governments, local authorities, and lower courts, Professor Goldstone noted that these countervailing forces often face limitations, including judicial reversals and procedural constraints. The cumulative effect, he argued, is a system in which traditional mechanisms of accountability are increasingly strained, even if not entirely dismantled.

Responding briefly, Professor Lindberg affirmed the relevance of these observations, noting that many of the developments described are reflected in the empirical findings of the Democracy Report. He highlighted, in particular, the significance of recent judicial interpretations regarding presidential authority, which, in his assessment, effectively shift elements of legal accountability toward the executive. This, he suggested, represents not merely a policy shift but a structural reallocation of institutional power.

The Narrow Window for Democratic “U-Turns”

The discussion took a more forward-looking turn as Irina von Wiese raised the question of irreversibility in processes of democratic backsliding. Moving beyond diagnosis, her intervention focused on a critical concern for both scholars and practitioners: at what point does autocratization become so entrenched that democratic reversal is no longer realistically achievable through electoral means? Referencing recent political developments in Hungary and Poland, she highlighted both the possibility of reversal and the uncertainty surrounding its limits, asking whether there exists a threshold beyond which democratic recovery becomes unlikely.

In response, Professor Lindberg drew on empirical research conducted with colleagues on what he termed “U-turns,” or instances in which countries successfully reverse autocratizing trajectories. His findings suggest that such reversals tend to occur within a relatively narrow temporal window. Specifically, the likelihood of democratic recovery is highest within the first one or two electoral cycles following the onset of autocratization. Beyond this period, the probability declines sharply, indicating that time plays a decisive role in shaping political outcomes.

Professor Lindberg noted that cases such as Hungary, where a reversal occurred after a prolonged period of entrenched rule, are exceptional rather than typical. In most instances, once autocratizing actors consolidate control over key institutions, electoral competition becomes increasingly constrained, reducing the viability of democratic change from within the system. This observation aligns with broader research on electoral authoritarianism, which shows that repeated electoral cycles under such conditions tend to stabilize rather than undermine authoritarian rule.

Applying this framework to contemporary contexts, Professor Lindberg suggested that the window for democratic reversal in countries currently experiencing backsliding may be limited. Early intervention—whether through electoral mobilization, institutional resistance, or coalition-building—is therefore crucial. While he acknowledged that outcomes remain uncertain and contingent on multiple factors, the evidence points to a clear pattern: the longer autocratization persists, the more difficult it becomes to reverse.

Conclusion

The opening session of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium made clear that the current crisis of liberal democracy cannot be understood through narrow institutional or purely electoral lenses alone. What emerged instead was a layered picture of democratic erosion as a structural, political, and epistemic process shaped by anti-pluralist mobilization, disinformation, polarization, and the weakening of institutional constraints. By placing empirical measurement in dialogue with political experience and comparative reflection, the session demonstrated that democratic backsliding is both globally patterned and nationally specific.

A particularly important contribution of the session lay in its refusal of easy binaries. Rather than presenting democracy and authoritarianism as fixed categories, the speakers and discussants illuminated the gradations, accelerations, and contingencies that define contemporary regime change. At the same time, the discussion underscored that analytical precision matters: the distinction between populism and anti-pluralism, between absolute democratic levels and the magnitude of decline, and between reversible erosion and entrenched authoritarian consolidation all bear directly on how the present moment is interpreted.

The session also highlighted that democratic resilience cannot be assumed as an automatic property of established institutions. It depends on timing, coalition-building, civic vigilance, and the continued legitimacy of pluralist norms. If autocratization is indeed cumulative and self-reinforcing, then democratic defense must be equally deliberate, coordinated, and sustained.

In sum, the opening session provided more than an introduction to the symposium. It established a conceptual and normative framework for the discussions that followed, reminding participants that the defense of liberal democracy demands not only diagnosis, but also intellectual clarity, institutional imagination, and political resolve.

Participants of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, gather for a group photo on July 1, 2025.

Collection of the 28-Session ECPS Workshop Series: ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches

This collection assembles the reports and full video recordings of the 28-session ECPS Workshop Series, integrating the Oxford in-person programme (July 1–3, 2025) with its extended virtual continuation (September 2025–April 2026). Together, these sessions offer a sustained interdisciplinary inquiry into the political and normative complexities of invoking “the people” in contemporary democratic life, with populism as a central analytical lens. Across diverse cases and theoretical perspectives, the series examines how populism both reflects democratic grievances and actively reshapes institutional and symbolic orders. By tracing themes such as representation, identity, legitimacy, and technological transformation, the collection provides a comparative and analytically rigorous account of democracy under strain, while highlighting the conditions under which democratic resilience may still emerge.

Compiled by ECPS Staff

This collection brings together the reports and full video recordings of the sixteen-session ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, convened between September 4, 2025 and April 16, 2026. The series constitutes a direct continuation and intellectual expansion of the three-day, eight-session in-person programme held at St. Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1–3, 2025. Together, these interconnected formats form a sustained scholarly intervention into one of the defining political questions of our time: the meaning, mobilization, and consequences of invoking “the people” in contemporary democratic life.

The Oxford gathering established the conceptual and normative foundations of this inquiry. Set against the sobering reality that between 2012 and 2024 one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared, participants explored how populist discourse—often structured through stark “us versus them” binaries—has reshaped political competition, eroded institutional trust, and strained the pluralistic fabric of liberal democracies. At the same time, the discussions underscored that democracy’s trajectory is neither uniformly declining nor predetermined. Across contexts, democratic resilience continues to emerge, often through the same contested language of “the people” that fuels its erosion.

The subsequent virtual programme extended this dialogue across sixteen bi-weekly sessions, enabling a broader, more sustained, and globally inclusive exchange. Bringing together scholars from political science, law, sociology, history, philosophy, and the arts, the series examined how “the people” is constructed, institutionalized, and contested across diverse political and cultural settings. From populist authoritarianism and crises of representation to religion, identity, digital transformation, and decolonial perspectives, the sessions traced the multiple trajectories through which populism operates—as both a symptom of democratic strain and a force capable of reshaping democratic norms and institutions.

A central thread running throughout the series is the dual character of “the people” as both a normative ideal and a political instrument. While it can serve as a basis for democratic inclusion, participation, and renewal, it can equally function as a mechanism of exclusion, homogenization, and majoritarian domination. Understanding the conditions under which these divergent outcomes unfold requires precisely the kind of interdisciplinary and comparative engagement that this programme has sought to cultivate.

By presenting the reports alongside the full recordings, this collection invites readers and viewers to revisit, engage with, and critically reflect upon the rich discussions that unfolded over the course of both the Oxford conference and its virtual continuation. In doing so, it offers not closure, but an ongoing invitation to interrogate the evolving relationship between populism, representation, and the future of democracy in the twenty-first century.

 

Click Here to Explore the Reports and Video Recordings of the 12-Session In-Person Workshop at Oxford University

 

Reports and Video Recordings of the 16-Session Virtual Workshop Series 

Session 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World

The ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, launched its Virtual Workshop Series on “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World” on September 4, 2025. Spanning 16 sessions through April 2026, the series examines how populist strategies reshape democracy across diverse contexts. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the opening session featured Professor David Sanders’ keynote on six structural drivers fueling populism and its growing threats to liberal democracy. Case studies explored populist dynamics in the US, India, Greece, Thailand, and Argentina, highlighting intersections of dynasties, corporate power, elite cues, and economic crises. Discussant Dr. João Ferreira Dias emphasized three takeaways: populism as performance, polarization over persuasion, and the enduring impact of national political cultures.

Session 2: The ‘Nation’ or Just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland

On September 18, 2025, ECPS held the second session of the Virtual Workshop Series — “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (Oxford), the panel examined Poland’s democratic trajectory through themes of patriotism, constitutional conflict, human rights, and representation. Highlights included Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s call to recover Solidarity’s inclusive legacy, Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional “quagmire,” Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s exploration of contested women’s and minority rights, and Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reframing of judicial representation. Discussants added comparative and moral-philosophical perspectives. The session concluded that Poland’s experience reflects global struggles: reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending institutions, and embedding rights remain vital for democratic renewal.

Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes

On October 2, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Chaired by Dr. Marietta D.C. van der Tol, the session examined how populist and illiberal actors across Hungary, Slovakia, and the United States instrumentalize the language of religious freedom to consolidate power and reshape national identity. Presentations by Dr. Marc Loustau, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, followed by reflections from Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, revealed how religion, once central to pluralism, is increasingly politicized as a weapon in culture wars and transnational illiberal strategies.

Session 4: Performing the People — Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging

On October 16, 2025, the ECPS held the fourth session of its Virtual Workshop Series “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches.” The session examined how political actors construct and mobilize “the people” to legitimize both inclusive and exclusionary political projects. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the session featured presentations by Samuel Ngozi Agu, Shiveshwar Kundu, and Mouli Bentman & Michael Dahan, each exploring different regional and theoretical perspectives. Abdelaaziz El Bakkali and Azize Sargın provided incisive discussant feedback, followed by a lively Q&A. Concluding reflections by Prof. Mazzoleni emphasized populism’s dual nature as both a political strategy and a symptom of structural democratic crises, setting the stage for future interdisciplinary debate.

Session 5: Constructing the People — Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions

Session 5 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series examined how populist movements across different regions construct “the people” as both an inclusive democratic ideal and an exclusionary political weapon. Moderated by Dr. Heidi Hart, the session featured presentations by Dr. Amir Ali, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari, and Andrei Gheorghe, who analyzed populism’s intersections with austerity politics, linguistic identity, and post-communist nationalism. Their comparative insights revealed that populism redefines belonging through economic moralization, linguistic appropriation, and historical myth-making, transforming pluralist notions of democracy into performative narratives of unity and control. The ensuing discussion emphasized populism’s adaptive power to manipulate emotion, memory, and discourse across diverse democratic contexts.

Session 6: Populism and the Crisis of Representation –Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice

On November 13, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the sixth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Under the skillful moderation of Professor Ilhan Kaya (Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada), the session featured Dr. Jonathan Madison, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho, and Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira, who examined how populism both mirrors and magnifies democracy’s crisis of representation. Their analyses, complemented by insightful discussant interventions from Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, generated a vibrant dialogue on institutional resilience, digital disruption, and the reconfiguration of democratic legitimacy in an age of populist contention.

Session 7: Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism

Session 7 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a compelling interdisciplinary examination of how contemporary populism unsettles the foundations of democratic representation. Bringing together insights from digital politics, the history of political thought, and critical social theory, the session illuminated the multiple arenas—affective, constitutional, and epistemic—through which representation is being reconfigured. Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano revealed how memetic communication and generative AI reshape political identities and moral boundaries within far-right movements. Maria Giorgia Caraceni traced these dynamics to enduring tensions within the conceptual history of popular sovereignty, while Elif Başak Ürdem demonstrated how neoliberal meritocracy generates misrecognition and drives grievances toward populist articulation. Collectively, the session highlighted the necessity of integrated, cross-disciplinary approaches for understanding the evolving crisis of democratic representation.

Session 8: Fractured Democracies — Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn

On December 11, 2025, the ECPS convened Session 8 of its Virtual Workshop Series under the theme “Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn.” Chaired by Dr. Azize Sargin, the session examined how contemporary populism reshapes democratic politics through affect, moral narratives, and strategic communication. Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse explored charismatic populism, focusing on suffering, moral inversion, and ritualized transgression in Trumpism, while Artem Turenko analyzed the evolving rhetoric of AfD across the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament elections. Discussants Dr. Helena Rovamo and Dr. Jonathan Madison offered critical reflections on theory, methodology, and causality. A lively Q&A further addressed economic grievance, cultural representation, and the politics of knowledge production, underscoring the session’s interdisciplinary depth and relevance.

Session 9: Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion

On January 8, 2026, ECPS convened Session 9 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion.” The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Helen L. Murphey, who framed exclusionary populism as a dual process that claims to empower an “authentic people” while simultaneously criminalizing stigmatized “others.” Assoc. Prof. Christopher N. Magno introduced the concept of criminal populism, showing how legal scandal and criminality can be transformed into political capital in the United States and the Philippines. Dr. Russell Foster examined how Austria’s FPÖ and France’s Rassemblement National legitimate anti-migration agendas through securitization and Gramscian metapolitics. Saga Oskarson Kindstrand drew on ethnographic research on the Sweden Democrats to challenge assumptions that populism undermines party organization. Discussants Hannah Geddes and Vlad Surdea-Hernea provided incisive reflections on theory, methodology, and democratic implications.

Session 10 — Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times

ECPS convened Session 10 of its Virtual Workshop Series on January 22, 2026, bringing together scholars to examine how democracies endure, adapt, and contest authoritarian pressures amid the normalization of populist discourse and the weakening of liberal-constitutional safeguards. Chaired by Dr. Amedeo Varriale, the session framed resilience as an active democratic project—defending rule of law, pluralism, and civic participation against gradual forms of authoritarian hollowing-out. Presentations by Dr. Peter Rogers, Dr. Pierre Camus, Dr. Soheila Shahriari, and Ecem Nazlı Üçok explored resilience across market democracies, local governance, feminist self-administration in Rojava, and diaspora activism confronting anti-gender politics. Discussants Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois and Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano connected these contributions through probing questions on the ambivalence, burdens, and transformative potential of resilience.

Session 11: Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era

Session 11 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, convened On Thursday, February 5, 2026, examined the tension between democratic inclusion as a normative promise and inclusion as an everyday institutional practice. Bringing together interdisciplinary perspectives, the panel explored how belonging is constructed, experienced, and contested across administrative, participatory, historical, and theoretical domains. Contributions highlighted how exclusion often operates through subtle mechanisms—bureaucratic encounters, identity-based narratives, digital mobilization, and post-revolutionary boundary drawing—rather than overt denial. Across cases from the United States, Sub-Saharan Africa, Iran, and liberal democracies more broadly, the session underscored that democratic legitimacy today depends on both representation and effective, fair governance. Collectively, the discussions illuminated why gaps between democratic ideals and lived experiences continue to fuel distrust, polarization, and populist mobilization.

Session 12: Decolonizing Democracy — Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South

Session 12 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series explored on On Thursday, February 19, 2026, how “decolonizing democracy” requires attention to the material and symbolic structures shaping participation, legitimacy, and representation. The presentations framed democracy not as a settled institutional model but as a contested field shaped by colonial legacies, extractive political economies, and identity-based struggles over inclusion and authority. Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s comparative study of Nigeria and the United Kingdom showed how environmental governance can produce “participation without power,” where formal inclusion coexists with persistent injustice. Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s analysis of Cameroon highlighted how pluralism has intensified communal claims to state ownership, complicating political alternation. Supported by Dr. Gabriel Cyril Nguijoi’s feedback, the session underscored the value of concepts such as biocultural sovereignty and communocratic populism and emphasized the need for context-sensitive, interdisciplinary approaches to democratic renewal in the Global South.

Session 13: Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis

Convened on On Thursday, March 5, 2026, Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series examined how “the people” are constructed, contested, and institutionalized across diverse political arenas. Chaired by Dr. Leila Alieva (Oxford School for Global and Area Studies), the panel brought together interdisciplinary perspectives on populism, democratic participation, and representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović analyzed the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton political order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve explored how participants in France’s Yellow Vests movement sought to institutionalize grassroots assembly-based democracy. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez examined the exclusion of stateless and marginalized communities from international diplomacy, arguing for a “right to diplomacy.” Together, the contributions illuminated the evolving and contested meaning of “the people” in contemporary democratic politics.

Session 14: From Bots to Ballots — AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation

On March 19, 2026, session 14 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series examined, how artificial intelligence, algorithmic infrastructures, and digital platforms are reshaping democratic participation in the contemporary era. Bringing together perspectives from political science, communication, cultural heritage, and democratic theory, the panel explored the implications of AI for political legitimacy, collective identity, and the future of “the people” in an increasingly post-digital world. Contributions ranged from public attitudes toward algorithmic governance and the role of ChatGPT in shaping cultural memory to Big Tech’s influence on class consciousness and the fragmentation of digital publics. Together, the presentations and discussions showed that AI is no longer external to democracy, but increasingly constitutive of its communicative, institutional, and symbolic foundations—raising urgent questions about power, accountability, and democratic contestation.

Session 15 — From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, Crisis, and Democracy

On Thursday, April 2, 2026, Session 15 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a timely and theoretically rich interrogation of how populism, personalized leadership, and systemic crisis are reshaping the horizons of democratic politics. Bringing cybernetics, political sociology, and democratic theory into productive dialogue, the session illuminated the deep entanglement between emotional mobilization, institutional fragility, and global governance under conditions of accelerating complexity. Dr. Robert R. Traill’s systems-theoretical analysis of “populist panic” and Professor Lorenzo Viviani’s political-sociological account of “manipulated resonance” together revealed populism not as a peripheral disruption, but as a central mode through which legitimacy, leadership, and “the people” are being redefined today. Enriched by incisive discussant interventions and a conceptually fertile Q&A, the session underscored the need for new democratic vocabularies capable of confronting both exclusionary affect and global instability.  

Session 16: Voices of Democracy — Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization

The final session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered on April 16, 2026, a rich interdisciplinary reflection on democracy under conditions of deepening polarization. Bringing together legal, historical, and political perspectives, the panel illuminated how “the people” is constructed, contested, and mobilized across different contexts—from defamation law in the United States to institutional legitimacy in Israel, classical rhetoric in Athens, and emotional narratives in contemporary European populism. A central insight concerned the interplay of law, emotion, and symbolic representation in shaping democratic resilience and vulnerability. By foregrounding the cultural and affective dimensions of politics, the session underscored that democracy is not only institutional but deeply interpretive—sustained, challenged, and reimagined through competing narratives of identity, legitimacy, and belonging.

Illustration by Lightspring.

ECPS Virtual Workshop Series / Session 16 — Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Virtual Workshop Series / Session 16 — Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00147

 

The final session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a rich interdisciplinary reflection on democracy under conditions of deepening polarization. Bringing together legal, historical, and political perspectives, the panel illuminated how “the people” is constructed, contested, and mobilized across different contexts—from defamation law in the United States to institutional legitimacy in Israel, classical rhetoric in Athens, and emotion narratives in contemporary European populism. A central insight concerned the interplay of law, emotion, and symbolic representation in shaping democratic resilience and vulnerability. By foregrounding the cultural and affective dimensions of politics, the session underscored that democracy is not only institutional but deeply interpretive—sustained, challenged, and reimagined through competing narratives of identity, legitimacy, and belonging.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, April 16, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened the sixteenth and final session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the title “Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization.” Bringing together perspectives from legal studies, political science, history, and discourse analysis, the session examined how democratic life is shaped—and at times distorted—through struggles over representation, institutional legitimacy, collective identity, and the symbolic construction of “the people” in contexts marked by deepening polarization.

The participants of the session were introduced by ECPS intern Daniela Puggia, whose introductory remarks on behalf of ECPS set the stage for the discussion and helped situate the panel within the wider aims of the workshop series. Chaired by Dr. Joni Doherty (Kettering Foundation), the session was organized around a broad but urgent set of questions: how are democratic norms defended when truth itself becomes contested? In what ways do institutional arrangements persist under conditions of deep social division? How do political leaders transform grief, fear, or resentment into collective identity and consent? And what role do art, speech, and symbolic representation play in either sustaining or undermining democratic life?

The panel featured four intellectually rich and conceptually complementary presentations. Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy (Stetson University) examined the role of defamation law in defending democracy in the United States, focusing on the legal and political significance of the Freeman and Moss case in the aftermath of the 2020 election. Dr. Niva Golan-Nadir (Reichman University), co-authoring with Dr. Michael Freedman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), explored how religious policy and balanced dissatisfaction shape institutional legitimacy within the Israeli military. Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou (University of Illinois Springfield) offered a historically grounded reinterpretation of Pericles’ Funeral Oration as a rhetorically sophisticated form of populist mobilization in wartime Athens. Dr. Cristiano Gianolla (University of Coimbra), together with Lisete S. M. Mónico and Manuel João Cruz, analyzed the exclusionary identity of “the people” in radical right populism through a comparative study of emotional narratives in Portugal and Italy.

The session was further enriched by the interventions of its discussantsDr. Justin Patch (Vassar College) and Dr. Amedeo Varriale (University of East London), whose comments drew connections across the presentations and raised broader questions concerning aesthetics, institutional resilience, populist rhetoric, and democratic contestation. Together, the contributions of chair, speakers, discussants, and moderator produced a wide-ranging interdisciplinary dialogue on the fragility, adaptability, and symbolic politics of democracy in an age of polarization.

 

Dr. Joni Doherty: Art, Speech, and the Politics of ‘the People’

Dr. Joni Doherty is Senior program officer for Democracy and the Arts at Kettering Foundation.

In her opening remarks for the sixteenth and final session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, Dr. Joni Doherty offered a concise yet conceptually rich framing of the session’s intellectual terrain. Originally designed to engage with the intersection of art, law, and education in an era of deepening polarization, the session underwent a modest recalibration due to the postponement of contributions addressing the artistic dimension. Nevertheless, Dr. Doherty briefly reintroduced this element, situating it within a broader reflection on populism and the ambivalent role of “the people” in contemporary political discourse.

Her remarks underscored a central tension: while populism often invokes “the people” as a normative good—an embodiment of democratic legitimacy—it can equally serve as a mechanism of exclusion and manipulation. In this sense, the category of “the people” is neither neutral nor inherently virtuous, but rather contingent and politically constructed. Dr. Doherty drew a parallel with the domain of art and free expression, noting that while freedom of speech and artistic autonomy are foundational democratic values, they are not immune to instrumentalization. Both can function as vehicles of propaganda, capable of mobilizing affect, distorting reality, and obscuring empirical truths.

This duality, she suggested, provides a unifying thread across the session’s presentations. The cases to be discussed—ranging from electoral manipulation in the United States to competing value claims in Israeli society, from classical rhetorical strategies in Pericles’ Funeral Oration to contemporary identity-based narratives in Italy—each illuminate how emotional appeals and symbolic constructs can reinforce or undermine democratic norms. Particularly striking is the recurring interplay between legitimacy and exclusion, where competing visions of “the people” are mobilized against one another.

Dr. Doherty concluded by posing a guiding question for the session: how can scholarly inquiry into free speech and populism reveal their inherent complexities in ways that enhance our capacity to interpret—and respond to—contemporary political developments? Her remarks thus set a reflective and critical tone, inviting participants to move beyond binaries and engage with the nuanced dynamics shaping democratic life today.

 

Prof. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy: “‘I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy”

Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy.
Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy is Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University.

In her presentation, Professor Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy offered a penetrating legal and normative analysis of the role of defamation law in defending democratic institutions in the United States. Drawing on her longstanding research at the intersection of corporate law, election law, and political corruption, she situated her remarks within a broader intellectual trajectory shaped by a fundamental question: what is the proper role of money—and, more recently, truth—in a democracy under strain?

Opening with a personal reflection, Professor Torres-Spelliscy invoked an early lesson from her father, an African American artist, who urged her to “ask the big questions.” This intellectual orientation has guided her scholarship over two decades, from examining the influence of corporate money in politics to confronting the more urgent contemporary concern of democratic survival. Her recent work, focusing on why election workers have turned to defamation law, reflects this shift in emphasis from structural distortions of democracy to the immediate threats posed by disinformation and institutional erosion.

At the core of her presentation was an exploration of defamation as a distinct category within First Amendmentjurisprudence. While much of her earlier work engages with campaign finance law—where the US Supreme Court has controversially equated money with speech—this paper turns to the limits of protected expression. Defamation, defined as the publication of false statements that harm an individual’s reputation, occupies a narrow but significant exception to constitutional free speech protections. Yet, as she emphasized, the legal threshold for proving defamation—particularly for public figures or officials—remains exceptionally high, requiring demonstration of “actual malice” under the landmark precedent of New York Times v. Sullivan.

This doctrinal background framed her analysis of the events surrounding the 2020 US presidential election and its aftermath. Professor Torres-Spelliscy provided a detailed account of the multi-pronged efforts to overturn the election results, commonly referred to as “the big lie”—the false claim that Donald Trump had won the election. She unpacked the mechanisms through which this narrative was constructed and disseminated, highlighting its reliance on a series of interlocking falsehoods and legal maneuvers. These included attempts to seize voting machines, orchestrate the “fake elector” scheme across key swing states, pressure state officials to alter vote counts, and pursue extensive litigation challenging electoral outcomes.

Particularly striking in her account was the role of legal and institutional settings in amplifying disinformation. False claims were not merely circulated through partisan media but were presented in formal venues—legislative hearings and court filings—where audiences typically expect a higher standard of truthfulness. This institutional embedding of falsehoods lent them a veneer of credibility, contributing to their widespread acceptance. Among the most consequential instances were the defamatory allegations made against two Georgia election workers, Ruby Freeman and Shay Moss, whose routine administrative duties were recast as evidence of electoral fraud.

Professor Torres-Spelliscy then turned to the question of accountability, observing that traditional mechanisms—most notably criminal prosecution—largely failed to produce meaningful consequences. Efforts to prosecute Trump and his associates, including federal proceedings led by Special Counsel Jack Smith and state-level cases in Georgia, ultimately collapsed due to legal, procedural, and political constraints, including the Supreme Court’s controversial expansion of presidential immunity and longstanding Department of Justice policies regarding sitting presidents.

In this context, she argued, two avenues of accountability proved more effective: professional disciplinary actions against attorneys and civil litigation through defamation suits. The disbarment of figures such as Rudy Giuliani and others signaled a form of institutional sanction within the legal profession. More significantly, however, defamation lawsuits brought by Freeman and Moss demonstrated the potential of tort law to address harms that the criminal justice system could not.

The case against Giuliani was particularly illustrative. Based in part on his dissemination of manipulated video footage—a so-called “cheap fake”—the lawsuit resulted in a nearly $150 million jury award in favor of the plaintiffs. While subsequent settlements limited the broader legal impact of the case, Professor Torres-Spelliscy underscored its symbolic and deterrent value. The magnitude of the damages signaled that even in a permissive speech environment, there remain boundaries beyond which legal consequences can be severe.

At the same time, she acknowledged the limitations of this pathway. Settlements, while providing compensation to victims, curtailed the possibility of appellate rulings that might have clarified or recalibrated the “actual malice” standard. Thus, the opportunity for doctrinal evolution in defamation law—potentially lowering barriers for plaintiffs in cases of egregious disinformation—was foreclosed, at least for now.

The human dimension of these events remained central to her analysis. Professor Torres-Spelliscy highlighted the profound personal and social costs borne by election workers, who faced harassment, threats, and racialized abuse. Their experience underscored the vulnerability of those tasked with administering democratic processes and the extent to which disinformation can destabilize not only institutions but also individual lives.

In conclusion, the presentation advanced a cautiously optimistic argument: while many institutional safeguards failed in the face of coordinated efforts to undermine electoral integrity, defamation law emerged as a residual mechanism of accountability. It does not, in itself, resolve the structural challenges facing democracy, but it offers a tangible means of redress for those harmed by falsehoods and a potential deterrent against future abuses. In an era marked by the strategic manipulation of truth, this legal avenue, however limited, may remain an essential component of democratic defense.

 

Dr. Niva Golan-Nadir: State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military”

Dr. Niva Golan-Nadir.
Dr. Niva Golan-Nadir is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University.

In her presentation at the session, Dr. Niva Golan-Nadir offered a theoretically grounded and empirically rich examination of how state institutions sustain legitimacy in deeply divided societies. Focusing on the intersection of religion, policy, and military cohesion in Israel, her analysis advanced a nuanced challenge to conventional democratic theory, particularly regarding the relationship between citizen satisfaction and institutional stability.

At the heart of her intervention lay a reconsideration of the democratic process as it operates under conditions of persistent social division. In standard accounts, institutional design is expected to respond to public dissatisfaction: when policies lose legitimacy, citizens express discontent, and democratic mechanisms facilitate adjustment or reform. Yet, as Dr. Golan-Nadir emphasized, this model often fails to capture the dynamics of real-world political systems. In many cases, institutional arrangements remain remarkably stable despite enduring dissatisfaction, suggesting the presence of structural barriers that inhibit policy change. These “policy barriers” can lock in contested arrangements, producing long-standing gaps between public preferences and institutional outcomes.

To explain this apparent paradox, she introduced what she termed the “balanced dissatisfaction hypothesis.” In divided societies—where multiple groups hold conflicting preferences—policy arrangements may generate dissatisfaction across the board, but not in a manner that disproportionately burdens any single group. Under such conditions, dissatisfaction becomes diffused and symmetrical, preventing the emergence of a unified opposition capable of driving institutional change. Rather than destabilizing the system, this equilibrium of discontent can, counterintuitively, sustain institutional legitimacy and cohesion.

The Israeli case provided a compelling empirical context for this argument. Defined as both a Jewish and democratic state, Israel maintains a complex and historically rooted relationship between religion and state institutions. Dr. Golan-Nadir traced these arrangements back to pre-state agreements forged in 1947 by David Ben-Gurion, who sought to ensure unity among Jewish factions by embedding religious authority within key areas of public life. These included observance of the Sabbath, regulation of kosher food in public institutions, religious control over marriage, and the segmentation of educational systems along religious lines. Over time, these arrangements expanded to encompass additional domains such as burial practices, conversion, and questions of military service.

The result is a highly institutionalized form of religion-state integration that shapes both civilian and military life. In the context of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), these dynamics become particularly salient. As a central state institution with mandatory conscription, the IDF brings together individuals from across the religious spectrum—secular, traditional, religious, and ultra-Orthodox—within a single organizational framework. At the same time, it incorporates formal religious structures, including a military rabbinate that oversees the implementation of religious guidelines.

Dr. Golan-Nadir highlighted how these arrangements generate friction across different segments of society. Secular Israelis often view religious regulations—such as restrictions on activities during the Sabbath—as intrusive, while religious groups may perceive the military environment as insufficiently accommodating of their practices. The issue of ultra-Orthodox conscription, in particular, has emerged as a focal point of contention, especially in light of ongoing military demands and personnel shortages. Yet despite these tensions, the IDF continues to enjoy relatively high levels of public trust, in stark contrast to other political institutions such as the parliament or government, where distrust levels are significantly higher.

Empirical data presented in the study reinforced this paradox. Surveys indicate widespread dissatisfaction with religious policies across Israeli society, with a majority expressing discontent. However, perceptions of institutional fairness remain strikingly balanced. When asked which groups benefit most from military policies, respondents distributed their answers almost evenly among secular, religious, and mixed categories. This symmetry suggests that no single group perceives itself as systematically disadvantaged relative to others, even if all experience some degree of dissatisfaction.

From a theoretical standpoint, this finding challenges the assumption that legitimacy depends on the satisfaction of preferences. Instead, Dr. Golan-Nadir’s analysis suggests that legitimacy may derive from a perceived equilibrium of burdens and benefits. In other words, institutions can maintain cohesion not by fully satisfying any group, but by ensuring that dissatisfaction is shared in a relatively even manner. This insight has important implications for the study of civil-military relations, where cohesion is often understood as contingent upon alignment between institutional practices and societal preferences.

The presentation also engaged with broader theoretical frameworks concerning divided societies. Drawing on concepts such as confessionalism and power-sharing, Dr. Golan-Nadir situated Israel alongside other cases—such as Lebanon or Belgium—where deep social cleavages shape institutional design. In such contexts, the state often seeks to balance competing interests through proportional representation and negotiated arrangements. However, the Israeli case demonstrates that balance can also emerge through less formal mechanisms, including the distribution of dissatisfaction itself.

A further dimension of the analysis concerned the role of religion as both a source of identity and a structural constraint. When embedded within state institutions, religion acquires an organizational form that can limit pluralism and create barriers to alternative expressions. This monopolization of religious authority can alienate segments of the population, yet it also stabilizes expectations and reduces uncertainty. In the military context, this duality is particularly evident: religious norms may constrain individual behavior, but they also provide a shared framework that contributes to organizational coherence.

Dr. Golan-Nadir concluded by reflecting on the normative implications of her findings. One might expect that periods of acute external threat—such as ongoing conflict—would prompt a reevaluation of contentious policies, particularly those affecting military effectiveness. Yet the persistence of existing arrangements suggests that even existential pressures may not suffice to overcome entrenched institutional barriers. This underscores the resilience of policy frameworks rooted in historical compromise and collective identity.

At the same time, her analysis invites a more cautious interpretation of institutional stability. The endurance of the status quo does not necessarily indicate the absence of conflict, but rather its containment within a structured equilibrium. Whether such an equilibrium can be sustained indefinitely remains an open question, particularly in light of shifting demographic patterns and evolving political dynamics.

In sum, the presentation offered a sophisticated account of how democratic institutions operate under conditions of division and constraint. By foregrounding the concept of balanced dissatisfaction, Dr. Golan-Nadir provided a novel lens through which to understand the persistence of contested policies and the resilience of institutional legitimacy. Her analysis not only enriches debates on religion and state in Israel but also contributes more broadly to the study of democracy in fragmented societies.

 

Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou: “Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics”

Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou.
Elizabeth Kosmetatou , a Professor, History Faculty, University of Illinois, Springfield.

In her presentation, Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou offered a striking reinterpretation of one of the most celebrated texts of classical antiquity: the Funeral Oration attributed to Pericles in Book II of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. Long regarded as the quintessential affirmation of Athenian democracy and civic virtue, the speech was reassessed not simply as a noble statement of political ideals, but as a carefully calibrated act of political persuasion delivered at a moment of mounting anxiety, military uncertainty, and personal risk for its speaker. Rather than treating the oration as an uncomplicated monument to democratic values, Professor Kosmetatou situated it within the realities of war and argued that it may also be understood as an early and remarkably sophisticated example of populist rhetoric.

She began by recalling the speech’s conventional status in modern scholarship and public memory. For generations, the oration has been read as a defining expression of classical Athens at its democratic height, a speech in which Pericles appears as the model statesman articulating the virtues of a free and self-confident polis. Yet this familiar reading, she argued, obscures the urgency of the political circumstances in which the speech was delivered. The funeral took place in 431 BCE at the public cemetery in the Kerameikos, at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War. This was no ordinary ceremonial occasion. It followed the city’s first military losses in a conflict that would eventually last twenty-seven years, devastate Athenian power, and end with the city’s defeat and submission to Sparta. The event therefore carried far more than commemorative meaning: it was also a politically charged moment in which public grief, wartime expectation, and the credibility of leadership converged.

Professor Kosmetatou stressed that Pericles had entered the war with enormous confidence and had persuaded the Athenians that victory would be swift and assured. Athens, he believed, possessed the naval strength, wealth, and strategic advantages necessary to prevail. But by the time of the funeral, the war had already begun to expose the fragility of those expectations. Spartan invasions had ravaged the Athenian countryside, casualties had mounted, and the prospect of a quick victory was fading. In this setting, the oration had to do more than honor the dead. It had to restore confidence, legitimize sacrifice, and preserve the political narrative that Pericles himself had helped create.

One of the most revealing features of the speech, in Professor Kosmetatou’s reading, is precisely what it does not do. Although it is ostensibly a funeral oration, the fallen soldiers occupy relatively little space within it. Their deaths are acknowledged, but they do not stand at the center of the address. Nor does the speech dwell on personal mourning. On the contrary, women—mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters—are sternly instructed to observe restraint and silence. Pericles’ famous admonition that a woman’s greatest glory lies in not being talked about “for good or for evil among men” was interpreted here as more than a conventional reflection of gender norms. It also functioned politically: women, as the group most likely to express grief publicly and emotionally, were discouraged from turning mourning into a spectacle that might spread panic, resentment, or resistance.

Instead of foregrounding the dead, the speech foregrounds Athens itself. Its laws, institutions, customs, military courage, openness, intelligence, refinement, and civic spirit become the real object of celebration. Pericles constructs a portrait of Athens as uniquely balanced and superior: a city that cultivates beauty without extravagance and wisdom without softness, a city open to the world yet strong in war, intellectually vibrant yet disciplined in public duty. In one of the most enduring phrases of the speech, Athens becomes “the school of Hellas,” not merely one polis among others, but the model and teacher of the Greek world. Professor Kosmetatou showed how this move transforms the speech from an elegy into an affirmation of collective identity. The war dead are honored primarily because they embody the city’s virtues; their deaths serve as evidence of Athens’ greatness rather than as an occasion for reflection on loss.

This rhetorical strategy, she argued, performs distinctly political work. By emphasizing Athens as an exceptional community, the speech dissolves internal differences among citizens and subsumes social variation into a single, idealized people. Wealth, status, local loyalties, and divisions within the demos are rhetorically erased in favor of a unifying civic identity. The Athenians are not represented as a plural or contested body politic, but as a morally coherent collective defined by its superiority over others. In this sense, the speech constructs “the people” in a way that is highly recognizable to modern analyses of populist discourse: a unified moral community is imagined into being and then mobilized in support of political aims.

Professor Kosmetatou further argued that the oration establishes a powerful contrast between Athens and its enemies, especially Sparta, even when Sparta is not explicitly named. Athens is portrayed as open, free, flexible, cultured, and self-confident; its adversaries, by implication, are secretive, rigid, austere, and inferior. War is thereby reframed. It is no longer simply a contest over power, territory, or strategic interests. It becomes a struggle between ways of life and between political systems. If Athens represents the highest form of civic and cultural development, then defending Athens becomes synonymous with defending civilization itself. Such a framing gives the war moral meaning and renders continued sacrifice not merely necessary, but noble.

The speech’s treatment of death is crucial in this regard. Pericles transforms the deaths of the soldiers into proof of civic excellence. The dead are not mourned primarily as individuals; they are elevated into symbols of the city’s enduring glory. His famous declaration that “For the whole earth is the tomb of famous men” was examined as a rhetorical device that universalizes and immortalizes sacrifice. Professor Kosmetatou noted as well the significance of the unknown soldier in the funeral procession, perhaps the earliest instance of this powerful symbolic figure. In a culture where burial and bodily integrity mattered deeply, the decision to honor an unidentified soldier at the head of the procession offered a potent answer to the anguish of those whose loved ones had vanished in war. Even in the absence of physical remains, the city would provide meaning, honor, and public remembrance.

Yet this elevation of sacrifice also contains a darker implication. By transforming private loss into collective glory, the speech prepares the city for further deaths. The dead are presented less as an occasion for caution than as a model to be imitated. Fathers are urged to take pride in their sons’ courage; young men are called to emulate the fallen; bereaved couples still capable of having children are implicitly or explicitly invited to replenish the ranks. The management of grief here becomes a means of sustaining war. The speech channels emotion into renewed commitment and turns mourning into a form of political mobilization.

Professor Kosmetatou also placed the funeral oration alongside the other speeches Thucydides attributes to Pericles, particularly the later speech in which the statesman adopts a markedly different tone. There, as public frustration intensifies, Pericles responds more harshly, effectively reminding the Athenians that they themselves voted for the war. This contrast is illuminating. The funeral oration appears as a moment of rhetorical confidence, a speech designed to inspire and unify before the harsher realities of protracted conflict become undeniable. Read together, the speeches reveal both the brilliance and the limits of Periclean leadership. The oration’s exalted vision of democratic identity stands in tension with the suffering, resentment, and eventual political backlash that followed.

The presentation concluded by insisting on the ambiguity of the funeral oration’s place in democratic thought. It remains one of the most eloquent surviving celebrations of civic community and democratic pride. But it is also a reminder that democratic rhetoric can be used to mobilize populations for destructive purposes, to suppress dissenting emotions, and to sustain a political narrative in the face of mounting evidence that reality has diverged from promise. In this sense, the speech is not only a monument to Athens, but one of the earliest and most enduring examples of how a political leader can transform collective grief into consensus, and shared identity into support for prolonged conflict. Professor Kosmetatou’s reading thus restored to the text its unsettling political edge, revealing its brilliance not only as literature or philosophy, but as an instrument of power.

 

Dr.Cristiano Gianolla: “The Exclusionary Identity of ‘The People‘ in Radical Right Populism”

Dr. Cristiano Gianolla
Dr. Cristiano Gianolla is a Researcher at the Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra.

In his presentation, Dr. Cristiano Gianolla offered a conceptually ambitious and methodologically innovative analysis of the exclusionary construction of “the people” in radical right populism. Drawing on research conducted within the broader project Unpacking Populism: Comparing the Formation of Emotional Narratives and Their Effects on Political Behavior, he explored the interplay of discourse, emotion, and political identification in two distinct yet revealing European settings: Portugal and Italy. The presentation moved beyond familiar accounts of populism as merely a politics of resentment or anger, instead proposing a more layered understanding of how emotion narratives structure belonging, exclusion, and political allegiance.

At the core of Dr. Gianolla’s intervention was the claim that radical right populism cannot be adequately understood without attention to its emotional architecture. While much of the earlier literature on populism tended to emphasize negative affects—fear, hatred, ressentiment, or anxiety—his work sought to capture a fuller emotional spectrum. Populist politics, he argued, does not mobilize only aversion toward enemies; it also generates positive emotions such as pride, admiration, security, and joy. These emotions are not incidental to populist discourse but constitutive of it. They help define who belongs to the people, what is worth defending, and which forms of political action become desirable or legitimate.

This argument was developed through the heuristic of the “emotion narrative,” an analytic device intended to bridge the cognitive and affective dimensions of politics. Rather than treating emotions as irrational residues external to political reasoning, Dr. Gianolla conceptualized them as embedded in narrative structures that orient individuals toward objects, values, and collective identities. Emotion narratives, in his formulation, are long-term, identity-related configurations that link political discourse to feelings about belonging, threat, and protection. They are produced not simply through isolated messages or campaign rhetoric, but through the circulation of meanings around what he called “deep objects” and “shallow objects.”

The theoretical inspiration for this framework was drawn from the work of Sara Ahmed on affective economies and from discourse-analytic approaches to emotions developed by scholars such as Manuel Alcántara-Pla. Deep objects, in Dr. Gianolla’s use of the concept, refer to those entities or values endowed with enduring emotional significance: homeland, family, liberty, security, national identity, and authority. These are perceived as both valuable and vulnerable. Shallow objects, by contrast, are the immediate figures, institutions, or groups that are interpreted as either threatening or protecting these deeper values. Migrants, minorities, political opponents, the European Union, or liberal elites can be cast as threats; leaders, parties, or certain favored groups may be represented as opportunities or safeguards. What matters is not the object in itself, but the emotional relation constructed around it.

To investigate how these dynamics operate, Dr.Gianolla and his co-authors adopted a mixed-methods approach that combined qualitative and quantitative tools. On the supply side, the research examined semi-structured interviews with members of parliament from two radical right parties: Fratelli d’Italia in Italy and Chega in Portugal. This allowed the study to trace how political elites articulate emotion narratives in their own language, linking political projects to particular visions of community, danger, and restoration. On the demand side, the team conducted surveys with representative samples in both countries shortly before national elections—Italy in 2022 and Portugal in 2024. Importantly, respondents were not asked only what they thought about certain political statements or scenarios, but what they felt about them. This shift from opinion to emotion marked a crucial methodological intervention.

For the survey component, Dr.Gianolla relied on the Geneva Emotion Wheel, a tool designed to capture a broad range of emotional responses across different levels of arousal and valence. Rather than reducing reactions to a simple positive/negative dichotomy, the instrument allowed the researchers to track several emotional families, including both high- and low-intensity forms of affect. Respondents were offered a range of emotional responses to political facts and hypothetical scenarios, thus making it possible to compare the affective profiles of radical right voters with those of other citizens.

The comparative design of the project was particularly instructive. Portugal and Italy provided two contrasting cases: one of recent far-right breakthrough, the other of long-standing populist entrenchment. In Portugal, the emergence of Chegasince 2019 represented a relatively new development within a political system historically resistant to far-right parliamentary success. In Italy, by contrast, Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) entered the study as part of a much longer tradition of populist and right-wing mobilization, and at a moment when it was poised to become the leading party of government. This asymmetry enabled Dr. Gianolla and his collaborators to examine how similar emotional mechanisms may operate differently depending on whether a party presents itself as insurgent outsider or imminent governing force.

The analysis of parliamentary interviews revealed strong thematic convergence across the two cases. Deep objects such as nation, security, family, liberty, and authority appeared consistently as emotionally charged values at the center of radical right discourse. These values were presented as under siege and in need of protection. Threatening shallow objectsincluded “bad” migrants, minorities associated with disorder or un-deservingness, and political actors on the left, who were portrayed as undermining national cohesion, weakening social norms, and privileging outsiders over the authentic people. Welfare chauvinism was especially visible in these narratives: social rights were not rejected in principle but redefined as benefits to be reserved for the deserving national in-group.

At the same time, the discourse also relied on positive emotional objects. “Good” migrants—particularly Ukrainians in the cases discussed—could be represented sympathetically, not as a contradiction but as a selective confirmation of the rule. Likewise, the leader and the party themselves emerged as positive shallow objects, invested with proximity, authenticity, and emotional attunement to the people. The party is not simply an instrument of representation; it becomes a medium through which citizens feel recognized, protected, and emotionally anchored.

The survey findings complemented these qualitative observations. When asked how they felt about certain political realities—such as membership in the European Union, the presence of populist parties in parliament, or the prospect of authoritarian leadership—radical right voters consistently displayed emotional patterns distinct from the rest of the electorate. In relation to the European Union, for example, these voters expressed less pride and more fear, sadness, or anger than others, especially in Italy. This suggested not only cognitive Euroscepticism but an affective distancing from supranational belonging. By contrast, the fact that populist parties had parliamentary representation generated stronger emotions of pride and admiration among radical right voters, alongside lower levels of shame or fear. These parties were not merely tolerated or strategically supported; they were emotionally embraced.

One of the most provocative results concerned hypothetical authoritarian leadership. In both Portugal and Italy, those aligned with the radical right were more likely to respond to the idea of an authoritarian leader with pride, joy, or admiration, and less likely to react with fear or anger. Dr. Gianolla did not present this as evidence of straightforward authoritarianism in a simplistic sense, but rather as an indication that centralized and personalized executive power can acquire positive emotional resonance within a populist political culture, especially when it is associated with order, decisiveness, and national protection.

These results fed into a broader argument about democratic vision. The political culture articulated through radical right populist emotion narratives privileges strong leadership, centralized executive authority, and representative identification over participatory pluralism. Referendums and direct democracy may still be invoked, but not necessarily as expressions of deliberative inclusion. Instead, the leader and party are themselves imagined as the direct embodiment of the people, reducing the need for more complex forms of mediation or plural negotiation. Diversity, in this framework, is not valued as a democratic resource but framed as a source of insecurity or dilution. The people become culturally homogeneous, morally superior, and emotionally bound to a threatened national core.

At the same time, the differences between the Portuguese and Italian cases underscored the importance of political context. Dr. Gianolla noted that Chega, still operating more clearly as an outsider force, retained a stronger anti-systemic tone in Portugal, while Fratelli d’Italia, campaigning to govern, moderated some of its outsider rhetoric and located its antagonism more visibly at the European rather than the national level. This distinction is revealing emotion narratives do not disappear as parties move closer to power, but they are recalibrated to fit different strategic positions.

In sum, Dr. Gianolla’s presentation offered a compelling contribution to the study of populism by showing that the exclusionary identity of “the people” is built not only through ideological content or institutional strategy, but through structured emotional worlds. Radical right populism succeeds, in part, because it provides emotionally coherent narratives that bind citizens to protected values, identify threatening others, and promise moral and political restoration. By integrating discourse analysis, affect theory, and survey research, the presentation illuminated how populism is felt as much as it is believed—and why its appeal cannot be understood without taking those feelings seriously.


Discussants’ Feedback

Feedback by Dr. Justin Patch

Associate Professor ustin Patch.
Dr. Justin Patch is an Associate Professor and Chair of Music at Vassar College.

In his discussant remarks, Dr. Justin Patch offered an unusually integrative reflection that drew the session’s presentations into a shared conceptual frame. Although he positioned himself, with some self-awareness, as an apparent outsider—given his own work on art, music, and political campaigns—his response revealed precisely the opposite. By following the threads of representation, emotional formation, symbolism, and aesthetic mediation across the presentations, he illuminated a deeper common structure underlying the session’s discussions. What emerged from his comments was a compelling argument that art, broadly understood, is not peripheral to politics but constitutive of the ways in which power persuades, identities are shaped, and democratic or populist formations are sustained.

His first set of reflections addressed Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy’s presentation on defamation law, election disinformation, and the weaponization of manipulated images in the aftermath of the 2020 US election. Dr. Patch read this case not only through legal or political categories, but through the history of aesthetic techniques. What stood out to him in the Giuliani case—especially the use of edited video to defame election workers—was the appropriation of artistic practices that historically relied on believability, illusion, and the manipulation of perception. He suggested that the “cheap fake” in question belongs to a much longer genealogy of visual deception, one that stretches from Renaissance perspective to twentieth-century cinematic montage. In this view, edited political media is not merely a technological distortion; it is the contemporary deployment of old artistic logics designed to make the eye believe what is not in fact true.

Dr. Patch’s observation was especially significant because it shifted the discussion from content to form. The problem was not simply that falsehood circulated, but that it did so through aesthetic means whose persuasive power is rooted in the history of representation itself. Renaissance perspective, he noted, originally involved mathematical and scientific precision, yet in art it became a means of grandeur and illusion. Likewise, cinematic techniques developed by masters such as Sergei Eisenstein demonstrated how editing could construct meaning, emotion, and even political consciousness by shaping what viewers believed they were seeing. In the hands of contemporary political actors, such techniques no longer elevate a public ideal but instead foster atomization, credulity, and manipulated subjectivity. Dr. Patch thus cast disinformation not merely as lying, but as the instrumentalization of artistic practice for anti-democratic ends.

Turning to Dr. Niva Golan-Nadir’s presentation on religious policy and social dissatisfaction within the Israeli military, Dr. Patch reframed the discussion around symbolism and representation. He was struck by her argument that relatively balanced dissatisfaction across different religious groups may help sustain cohesion within the IDF, and he posed a different but related question: through what symbolic means are these hardships rendered collectively meaningful? His comparison with the US military was instructive. In the American case, he suggested, institutions such as the Navy have become highly adept at romanticizing hardship, using what he called a form of “industrial art” to produce emotional identification with service, sacrifice, and discipline. Through these representational practices, suffering is not merely endured but made noble, even beautiful.

This led him to wonder whether something similar might operate in the Israeli case. If soldiers from distinct secular and religious backgrounds remain within a shared institutional framework despite dissatisfaction, perhaps this is not only because burdens are evenly distributed, but because hardship is symbolically represented in ways that make it appear shared, dignified, and necessary. Dr. Patch’s invocation of Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth deepened this interpretation. The line he paraphrased—about humanity one day being judged by the similarity of its needs rather than the quality of its wants—served as a suggestive lens through which to view Dr. Golan-Nadir’s findings. Common dissatisfaction, in this reading, does not simply produce tension; it may create a basis for solidarity when different groups recognize one another as giving something up for a larger collective purpose.

In responding to Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou’s interpretation of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, Dr. Patch found perhaps the clearest illustration of the intimate relation between populism, democracy, and artistic form. He read her account as making a bold historical claim: that populism is not a late distortion of democracy but may be bound up with democracy from its earliest rhetorical and political expressions. What particularly drew his attention was the way sacrifice is aesthetically rendered in wartime democracies. The glorification of death, he suggested, cannot operate through argument alone. It must be mediated through artistic representation—through speech, statuary, ritual, and symbolic pilgrimage.

In this respect, Dr. Patch emphasized that the transformation of sacrifice into civic glory depends on forms that give the bereaved something visible and collective in which to see their loss reflected. The tomb, the monument, the unknown soldier, the stylized oration—all are artistic mediations that transform individual grief into public meaning. He linked this insight to classic scholarship on nationalism, especially the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger on the invention of tradition. Collective identities, he implied, are never simply discovered; they are staged, performed, and materialized through representational forms that allow individuals to recognize themselves in something larger than themselves. What Professor Kosmetatou had shown in relation to Pericles, Dr. Patch suggested, was the early democratic-populist power of this aestheticization: a leader creates a collective subject not only by naming it, but by giving it visible, emotional, and commemorative form.

His response to Dr. Cristiano Gianolla’s presentation on emotional narratives in Portuguese and Italian radical right populism then brought the discussion into the present with explicitly theoretical force. Dr. Patch strongly endorsed the proposition that emotion is not secondary to politics but central to it. Against the still influential assumption—often traced to Enlightenment rationalism—that political judgment ought to be or can be separated from feeling, he insisted that emotion is “the engine” of politics and democracy. Here he connected Dr. Gianolla’s framework of deep and shallow objects to the sociological work of Zygmunt Bauman on friendship and enmity. What interested him was the way populism appears to collapse or recombine these categories. Rather than placing political objects on a linear scale of affinity or hostility, populist discourse creates a circle in which friendship and enmity operate simultaneously, binding identity and threat together in a mutually reinforcing emotional structure.

Dr. Patch then pushed Dr. Gianolla’s framework in a philosophical direction by suggesting that the distinction between deep and shallow objects echoes two competing Enlightenment notions of identity. One, associated with Kant, assumes that identity is something original and essential, obscured by false additions that must be stripped away. The other, associated with Rousseau, imagines the self as initially open or blank and gradually formed through accumulation and development. Populism, he suggested, appears to rely heavily on the first model: deep identity is imagined as something already there—national, authentic, prior—and politics becomes the work of clearing away the debris of modernity, pluralism, migration, or liberal mediation so that the “true” self or people can re-emerge. In this sense, radical right populism is not merely exclusionary in content; it is aesthetic and philosophical in form, presenting political identity as revelation rather than construction.

It is in the final segment of his remarks that Dr. Patch most fully articulated the broader significance of the arts across the session. Drawing on John Dewey, he argued that art is fundamental to democratic life because it enables people to create and express a sense of self rather than simply receive one from external authorities. Dewey’s claim that democracy requires widespread access to the arts was invoked not merely as a cultural ideal but as a political necessity. If people lack the means to represent themselves—to make poetry, music, images, performances, and other forms of expressive abstraction—then they are more vulnerable to having others tell them who they are. Under such conditions, strong leaders can step in and define the collective self on behalf of the population: this is who “we” are, this is who we have always been. Populism thrives, in part, where self-formation is impoverished and identity is outsourced.

This culminated in the central question Dr. Patch left with the group: how is art being used across these cases, by whom, and to what ends? More importantly, is there a counter-aesthetic, a “weapon of the weak,” capable of resisting homogenizing populist formations and their powerful emotional machinery? Rather than offering a definitive answer, he opened a crucial line of inquiry. Across legal disinformation, military cohesion, classical rhetoric, and contemporary populist discourse, he identified the arts not as decorative supplements but as active forces in the making of political realities. His remarks thus gave the session an unexpected but coherent conclusion: if populism and democracy are both inseparable from emotion and representation, then the arts remain one of the most contested and consequential terrains on which the struggle over political identity is fought.

 

Feedback by Dr. Amedeo Varriale

Dr. Amedeo Varriale earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism.

Dr. Amedeo Varriale’s remarks as discussant offered a measured, conceptually attentive engagement with each presentation, marked by both appreciation and careful analytical distancing. His intervention moved across legal theory, democratic legitimacy, classical political thought, and contemporary populism, drawing out both convergences and tensions within the panel’s contributions. Rather than imposing a single interpretive frame, he treated each paper on its own terms while situating it within broader debates on populism, democracy, and institutional resilience.

He began with Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy’s presentation on defamation law and the role of legal accountability in the aftermath of the 2020 US election. What struck him most was the combination of narrative accessibility and legal sophistication through which a highly complex issue had been rendered intelligible. The Freeman and Moss case, in his reading, served as a powerful illustration of the enduring importance of independent institutions—particularly courts—in safeguarding truth and protecting individual rights. He emphasized that the right not to be defamed is not merely a private concern but a fundamental component of democratic life, as reputational harm can effectively destroy civic participation and personal security.

From this starting point, Dr. Varriale drew a broader lesson about the nature of electoral integrity. While acknowledging that minor irregularities—clerical errors or isolated procedural mistakes—may occur in any electoral system, he underscored that such imperfections do not invalidate outcomes. This distinction, he suggested, is one that populist actors often blur or ignore. The “big lie” surrounding the 2020 election thus represents not simply a political strategy but a profound distortion of democratic norms. Yet he was careful to qualify this observation by noting that such denialism is not intrinsic to populism as a general phenomenon. In Europe, he observed, even radical right leaders have typically conceded electoral defeat. For this reason, he proposed understanding Trumpism as an “extremification” of populism—a trajectory in which populist rhetoric risks evolving into something closer to authoritarianism. Drawing implicitly on the work of Paul Taggart, he suggested that once populism crosses a certain threshold—abandoning electoral competition and institutional constraints—it ceases to be populism in any meaningful sense and becomes a qualitatively different political form.

Turning to Dr. Niva Golan-Nadir’s presentation on the Israeli military, Dr. Varriale approached the argument through the lens of institutional legitimacy in divided societies. He noted that a degree of dissatisfaction with state institutions is not only normal but structurally embedded in representative democracies. What distinguished the Israeli case, however, was the persistence of legitimacy in the face of such dissatisfaction. He attributed this, in part, to the unique position of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a central institution tied to national survival and collective identity. Universal conscription, in particular, transforms the military into a shared social experience rather than a distant bureaucratic apparatus.

At the same time, he highlighted the paradox at the heart of Dr. Golan-Nadir’s findings: dissatisfaction is not only widespread but symmetrically distributed. Religious and secular groups alike perceive the institution as insufficiently responsive to their respective norms and expectations. Yet precisely because no single group can claim ownership of the military, this dual dissatisfaction appears to sustain its cross-cutting legitimacy. Dr. Varriale interpreted this as a form of equilibrium—fragile but functional—where competing grievances prevent the monopolization of the institution by any one ideological camp. Still, he raised a crucial question for further inquiry: how durable is this balance? At what point might shared dissatisfaction shift from a stabilizing force to a source of delegitimization, particularly as social divisions deepen?

In his engagement with Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou’s analysis of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, Dr. Varriale underscored the value of historical perspective in understanding contemporary populism. He praised the contribution for drawing a line of continuity between ancient and modern forms of political rhetoric, particularly in relation to war, identity, and leadership. The oration, as he interpreted it, framed the Peloponnesian War as a collective civic project, mobilizing citizens through appeals to shared identity and moral purpose. This, he suggested, resonates with modern political efforts to shape public opinion around conflict, including claims—such as those associated with Donald Trump—that complex wars can be resolved swiftly through decisive leadership.

However, Dr. Varriale was careful to distinguish between populism and demagogy, especially in the classical context. While figures such as Pericles are often labeled demagogues, contemporary populism, he argued, has developed into something more structured and ideologically articulated. It is no longer merely a rhetorical strategy to incite mass emotion but a broader political logic with programmatic elements. Even so, he acknowledged that Pericles’ rhetoric displayed key features associated with modern populism: a direct appeal to “the people,” the construction of an antagonistic other, and the moral elevation of the collective. In this sense, the Athenian case offers not a direct equivalence but a historically grounded analogy, illuminating the enduring dynamics of leadership, persuasion, and collective identity.

Dr. Varriale’s final set of reflections addressed Dr. Cristiano Gianolla’s study of emotional narratives in radical right populism in Portugal and Italy. Here, his emphasis fell on methodology and conceptual clarity. He commended the ambitious empirical design, particularly the combination of elite interviews and survey data capturing emotional responses.

He regarded this dual approach—linking the “supply side” of political discourse with the “demand side” of voter emotion—as a notable strength, especially in a field where affective dynamics are often acknowledged but less rigorously measured. The effort to map emotions systematically, rather than treating them as diffuse background conditions, struck him as both innovative and necessary for advancing the study of populism.

At the same time, Dr. Varriale introduced a series of careful conceptual reservations. He expressed some skepticism toward the proposition that a perceived “crisis of democracy” constitutes the central core of populist ideology. In his view, populism’s defining features remain more firmly anchored in anti-elitism and people-centrism, often accompanied by a critique not of democracy per se but of liberalism—especially in its neoliberal or technocratic forms. This distinction, he implied, matters analytically: framing populism primarily as a response to democratic crisis risks mischaracterizing actors who, rhetorically at least, claim to defend democracy against its perceived distortions.

He also engaged critically with the classification of contemporary parties, particularly the Italian case. While acknowledging that many scholars continue to place Fratelli d’Italia within the radical right family, Dr. Varriale suggested that such categorizations may lag behind political developments. He pointed to what he sees as a process of ideological moderation: softened positions on immigration, alignment with transatlantic institutions, and a more pragmatic engagement with European governance structures. This raised a broader question about whether certain parties are genuinely transforming or whether their positions are being normalized by a wider shift in the political center. The ambiguity, in his account, is not easily resolved.

This line of reflection led him to a more general observation about the contemporary European landscape. If positions once associated with the radical right—on migration control, sovereignty, or welfare chauvinism—are increasingly echoed by mainstream center-right actors, then two interpretations become plausible. Either the radical right has moderated, or the political mainstream has moved closer to it. In practice, he suggested, elements of both dynamics may be at play. The consequence is a blurring of ideological boundaries that complicates both scholarly classification and political judgment.

Despite these critical notes, Dr. Varriale’s overall assessment of Dr. Gianolla’s work remained strongly positive. He emphasized the clarity with which key concepts were defined, particularly the distinction between radical and extreme right—an analytical boundary that is often neglected in the literature. He also acknowledged the practical difficulty of conducting elite interviews and assembling comparative datasets, recognizing the empirical labor underpinning the study. These methodological achievements, in his view, contribute meaningfully to a field that still grapples with how best to integrate qualitative and quantitative insights.

Across all four interventions, a consistent thread in Dr. Varriale’s remarks was the importance of analytical precision without rigidity. He resisted sweeping generalizations, instead favoring distinctions that preserve the complexity of political phenomena: between populism and authoritarianism, dissatisfaction and delegitimization, demagogy and ideology, moderation and mainstreaming. His comments suggested a concern not only with what populism is, but with how it is studied—how categories are drawn, how evidence is interpreted, and how contemporary developments are situated within longer historical trajectories.

In closing, his tone returned to one of collegial appreciation. He acknowledged the intellectual range of the session and the quality of the contributions, framing his own interventions as prompts for further reflection rather than definitive critiques. What emerged from his discussion was less a unified theory than a set of carefully posed questions—about institutional resilience, emotional mobilization, historical continuity, and conceptual clarity—that linger beyond the session itself.

 

Q&A Session

The concluding Q&A session unfolded as a reflective and intellectually generative exchange, drawing together the conceptual threads of the presentations while opening new avenues of inquiry. Rather than merely clarifying points of detail, the discussion turned toward deeper questions about the nature of “the people,” the role of identity and exclusion, and the cultural and institutional conditions under which populism operates. What emerged was less a set of definitive answers than a layered conversation about tensions—between inclusion and exclusion, individuality and collective identity, emotion and reason, and, perhaps most strikingly, between democracy’s ideals and its practices.

The discussion opened with a question by moderator Dr. Joni Doherty that subtly shifted the analytical lens: how might the concept of intersectionality—associated with Kimberlé Crenshaw—complicate the populist construction of “the people” as a unified entity? This intervention introduced a productive dissonance. If populism depends on the simplification of social divisions into a singular collective subject, then intersectionality, by contrast, insists on the irreducible plurality of identities—race, class, gender, and more—that shape political experience. The question lingered over the session, prompting participants to consider whether populism necessarily erases complexity or whether, in some instances, it can accommodate it.

Dr. Justin Patch responded by reframing populism itself as a variable form, distinguishing between inclusive and exclusive variants. Drawing on theoretical currents associated with Ernesto Laclau and Margaret Canovan, he suggested that populism can function as an “empty signifier,” capable of incorporating diverse constituencies under a shared symbolic banner. In this reading, populism is not inherently exclusionary; at its most expansive, it allows individuals from different social locations to recognize themselves as part of “the people.” His reference to the broad—if unstable—coalitions in contemporary American politics illustrated this possibility, even as he acknowledged their fragility.

Dr. Cristiano Gianolla’s intervention both extended and qualified this perspective. While accepting that populist movements may attract support across intersecting social categories, he emphasized that their discursive structure often remains exclusionary. Drawing on the conceptual distinction developed by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, he argued that many of the cases under discussion—particularly on the radical right—should be understood as exclusionary populisms, insofar as they construct a bounded national identity in opposition to perceived outsiders. At the same time, he pointed to the existence of more inclusionary forms, particularly in certain strands of left-wing populism, where the “people” may be articulated in more expansive, pluralistic terms. The implication was not that populism resolves the tension between inclusion and exclusion, but that it navigates it differently depending on context and ideological orientation.

Dr. Niva Golan-Nadir’s reflection drew the discussion back to a more foundational level. What united the presentations, she observed, was the persistent presence of an “us versus them” dynamic—an insight resonant with the political theory of Carl Schmitt. Whether in legal disputes, military institutions, historical rhetoric, or contemporary party politics, the construction of collective identity appeared inseparable from the delineation of an adversary. In this sense, the logic of populism was not an anomaly but an intensification of a broader political grammar in which enmity and solidarity are intertwined.

Dr. Amedeo Varriale offered a further refinement by challenging the distinction between inclusive and exclusive populism. In his view, all populisms are, at some level, exclusionary, because they necessarily define a boundary around “the people.” The difference lies not in whether exclusion occurs, but in whom it targets—immigrants, elites, or other groups. This observation shifted the emphasis from typology to structure: populism, by its nature, tends toward anti-pluralism, even if degrees and forms vary. Dr. Cristiano Gianolla’s subsequent response suggested a partial convergence. While acknowledging that populist practice often results in homogenization, he maintained that the discursive construction of “the people” may initially aspire to inclusivity, even if it ultimately collapses internal differences.

At this point, Dr. Doherty returned to the earlier invocation of intersectionality, grounding it in a more human register. Beneath the abstraction of “the people,” she noted, lie individuals with multiple, overlapping identities and interests. The process of subsuming these individuals into a singular collective inevitably produces tension—especially for marginalized groups whose experiences cannot be easily reconciled with dominant narratives. This observation resonated particularly with the discussion of divided societies, where competing identities must coexist within shared institutions. The question, implicitly, was whether populism can ever accommodate such complexity without erasing it.

A further shift occurred when Dr. Patch posed a more speculative question: is a “utopian populism” possible, or is populism inherently bound to struggle against an adversary? The responses suggested a cautious skepticism. Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou drew on historical examples from antiquity, recalling attempts to construct egalitarian political communities—most notably the failed insurrection led by Aristonicus in Pergamon. These episodes, while imaginative, underscored the fragility of utopian projects and their vulnerability to political and military realities. 

Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, in turn, approached the question from a contemporary perspective, offering a dual outlook. On one hand, she expressed concern about ongoing institutional pressures and the instrumental use of legal processes for political ends. On the other, she pointed to the resilience of civic action and the role of artistic and journalistic practices in countering misinformation and sustaining democratic engagement.

The conversation then turned more explicitly to the role of the arts—a theme that had surfaced throughout the session.Professor Torres-Spelliscy emphasized the importance of visual documentation and grassroots media in shaping public understanding, suggesting that creative practices can serve as a counterweight to manipulative narratives. ProfessorKosmetatou added a note of caution, highlighting the vulnerability of the humanities in the face of political and financial pressures. The contraction of support for the arts, she suggested, may weaken precisely those capacities—critical reflection, symbolic expression—that enable societies to resist authoritarian tendencies.

Yet this view was not left uncontested. Dr. Patch offered a counterpoint, arguing that artistic expression is not wholly dependent on institutional support. Drawing on examples such as graffiti culture, he suggested that creativity and resistance often emerge independently of formal funding structures. This exchange revealed a subtle tension: while institutions can enable and amplify artistic production, they may also constrain it, and their withdrawal does not necessarily extinguish creative expression.

As the session drew to a close, the discussion retained a sense of openness rather than resolution. The final reflections returned implicitly to the central paradox that had animated the exchange: populism, democracy, and identity are bound together in ways that resist simple categorization. The effort to define “the people” remains both necessary and fraught, entangled with questions of inclusion, exclusion, and representation. The Q&A session, in this sense, did not seek to resolve these tensions but to illuminate them—leaving participants with a richer, more nuanced understanding of the terrain they had collectively explored.

 

Conclusion

In its final session, the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series concluded with a timely and intellectually compelling reflection on the fragility, resilience, and contested meanings of democracy in an age of polarization. What bound the diverse contributions together was a shared concern with the political and symbolic construction of “the people” and with the institutional, rhetorical, and emotional mechanisms through which democratic legitimacy is either defended or distorted. Across legal, historical, political, and cultural registers, the session showed that democracy cannot be understood solely through formal procedures or constitutional design. It must also be examined through the narratives, affects, and representations that shape how communities imagine themselves and their adversaries.

The presentations collectively demonstrated that populism is not a singular phenomenon but a flexible political logic capable of operating through different institutional settings and historical contexts. Whether through disinformation and defamation in the United States, balanced dissatisfaction in Israeli state institutions, the rhetorical transformation of grief in classical Athens, or the emotional narratives of radical right populism in contemporary Europe, each case illuminated a distinct mode through which democratic orders are strained, mobilized, or reproduced. At the same time, the session made clear that democratic vulnerability does not imply democratic collapse. Law, institutional equilibrium, historical memory, artistic expression, and civic action all emerged as possible sites of resistance, even if each remains partial, contingent, and politically contested.

A particularly valuable contribution of the session was its insistence on the centrality of culture and emotion to democratic life. Art, speech, and symbolic performance were shown to be neither ornamental nor secondary, but integral to the ways political identities are formed and collective realities sustained. In this respect, the session moved beyond narrow oppositions between reason and emotion, law and culture, structure and agency. Instead, it offered an interdisciplinary account of democracy as a field of ongoing struggle over meaning, legitimacy, and belonging.

In sum, Session 16 provided a fitting conclusion to the workshop series. It left participants not with closure, but with a sharpened awareness of the complexity of democratic life and of the urgent need to study its tensions with analytical rigor, historical depth, and interdisciplinary openness.

Decison Making.

ECPS Virtual Workshop Series / Session 15 — From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, Crisis, and Democracy   

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Virtual Workshop Series / Session 15 — From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, Crisis, and Democracy.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 8, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00146

 

Session 15 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a timely and theoretically rich interrogation of how populism, personalized leadership, and systemic crisis are reshaping the horizons of democratic politics. Bringing cybernetics, political sociology, and democratic theory into productive dialogue, the session illuminated the deep entanglement between emotional mobilization, institutional fragility, and global governance under conditions of accelerating complexity. Dr. Robert R. Traill’s systems-theoretical analysis of “populist panic” and Professor Lorenzo Viviani’s political-sociological account of “manipulated resonance” together revealed populism not as a peripheral disruption, but as a central mode through which legitimacy, leadership, and “the people” are being redefined today. Enriched by incisive discussant interventions and a conceptually fertile Q&A, the session underscored the need for new democratic vocabularies capable of confronting both exclusionary affect and global instability.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, April 2, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened the fifteenth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” under the title “From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, War, and Democracy.” Bringing together perspectives from political sociology, economics, and cybernetics, the session explored the evolving relationship between populist leadership, systemic crisis, and the changing architecture of democratic governance in an increasingly complex and unstable global order.

The participants of the session were introduced by ECPS intern Reka Koleszar. Chaired by Dr. Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University), the session was framed around a central question of contemporary political life: how can democratic systems sustain legitimacy and effectiveness amid intensifying global pressures, including geopolitical conflict, economic uncertainty, climate crisis, and the rise of populist movements that challenge institutional mediation and pluralist norms? As Dr. Ali underscored in his opening remarks, the current conjuncture is marked not only by a crisis of representation but also by deeper transformations in how “the people” are constructed, mobilized, and governed across diverse political contexts.

The panel featured two analytically distinct yet conceptually complementary presentations. Dr. Robert R. Traill (Brunel University) offered a cybernetic and systems-theoretical intervention on the limits of democratic decision-making in the face of global-scale challenges. His presentation examined how complex adaptive systems—from individual cognition to national governance and global coordination—struggle to maintain stability when confronted with phenomena such as climate change and limits to economic growth. By introducing the notion of “populist panic” as a systemic response to perceived breakdown, Dr. Traill’s contribution invited participants to reconsider populism not merely as a political ideology, but as a symptom of deeper failures in collective decision-making.

In contrast, Professor Lorenzo Viviani (University of Pisa) advanced a political-sociological framework centered on the concept of “manipulated resonance” to analyze personalized leadership in populism. His presentation interrogated how populist leaders construct direct, emotionally charged relationships with “the people,” reconfiguring political representation through processes of identification, embodiment, and symbolic power. By foregrounding the role of emotions—particularly resentment—and the strategic bypassing of institutional intermediaries, Professor Viviani illuminated the cultural and affective foundations of contemporary populist mobilization.

The session was further enriched by the critical interventions of its discussants, Dr. Azize Sargin (ECPS) and Professor Ibrahim Ozturk (University of Duisburg-Essen), whose comments deepened the theoretical stakes of both presentations. Their reflections engaged key issues such as the distinction between democratic responsiveness and manipulated resonance, the tensions between technocratic solutions and populist distrust, and the broader challenges of governing complexity in a rapidly changing world.

Together, the contributions of chair, speakers, and discussants generated a rich interdisciplinary dialogue that bridged micro-level analyses of leadership and emotion with macro-level concerns about global governance and systemic stability. Session 15 thus provided a compelling exploration of how populism, far from being a peripheral phenomenon, is deeply embedded in the contemporary reconfiguration of democratic life and global political order.

Dr. Robert R. Traill: “Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing?”

Dr. Robert R. Traill.
Dr. Robert R. Traill is a researcher in Cybernetics and Psychology at Brunel University.

Dr. Robert R. Traill delivered a conceptually ambitious presentation titled “Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing?” Drawing on cybernetics, cognitive psychology, and systems theory, Dr. Traill advanced a multi-level framework for understanding the limitations of contemporary governance systems in addressing global crises.

At the core of Dr. Traill’s argument lies a diagnosis of what he terms a “problem landscape” defined by systemic challenges—most notably inequality and climate change—that demand coordinated global responses but remain resistant to consensus-based solutions. These structural issues, he argues, exceed the decision-making capacities of existing political systems, particularly when public discourse is distorted by populist dynamics that prioritize proximate symptoms—such as migration—over underlying causes.

To conceptualize governance under such conditions, Dr. Traill employs W. Ross Ashby’s cybernetic model of adaptive systems, notably the metaphor of the “clever thermostat.” In this framework, intelligence is structured hierarchically across meta-levels (MnL), where base-level actions (M0L) are monitored and adjusted by successive layers of oversight (M1L, M2L, M3L, etc.). Crucially, higher levels enable reflexivity: the capacity not merely to act, but to revise the rules governing action. When such adaptive mechanisms fail—due to insufficient options or cognitive limitations—systems may either stagnate or resort to arbitrary “panic” decisions, a dynamic Dr. Traill associates with contemporary political volatility.

Extending this model to political organization, Dr. Traill draws on Stafford Beer’s Brain of the Firm to argue that governments function as collective intelligence systems. Effective governance requires a balance between directive action (M1L), normative frameworks (M2L), and rational, analytical reasoning (M3L). However, he contends that modern political discourse is frequently “dragged downward” by powerful actors who instrumentalize fear-based narratives, thereby suppressing higher-level reasoning and fostering conditions conducive to populist mobilization.

The presentation offers a comparative analysis of democratic and autocratic systems through this lens. Democracies, Dr. Traill suggests, rely on voters as meta-level selectors among competing policy frameworks. Yet, when mainstream options appear inadequate, electorates may “panic,” turning to untested alternatives that can generate either innovation or instability. Autocracies, by contrast, simplify decision-making hierarchies by collapsing advisory functions into command structures. While this may yield short-term stability, it renders such systems brittle, as reform becomes politically dangerous and often triggers repression or systemic breakdown.

A particularly innovative dimension of Dr. Traill’s framework is his integration of three parallel “intelligence hierarchies”: individual cognitive development (via Piaget), organizational governance (via Beer), and global systemic coordination (via Aslaksen). This triadic model highlights a critical mismatch between the complexity of global challenges and the cognitive-institutional capacities available to address them. Dr. Traill argues that effective solutions to transnational problems require decision-making at higher meta-levels (at least M3L), implying the need for enhanced educational, institutional, and analytical capacities across societies.

The presentation identifies two “elephants in the room”—climate change and limits to economic growth—as paradigmatic MtopL (highest-level) challenges. These systemic pressures cascade downward into observable socio-political symptoms, including economic precarity, migration, and political polarization. However, populist movements frequently misattribute causality, focusing on these symptoms rather than the structural dynamics driving them. This misrecognition, Dr. Traill argues, not only exacerbates instability but also undermines democratic problem-solving capacity.

Dr. Traill further underscores the growing influence of transnational “mega-companies,” whose economic power rivals that of nation-states. Existing regulatory frameworks, he suggests, are inadequate for addressing their systemic impact, particularly given their ability to exploit global tax and governance asymmetries. As a provocative institutional innovation, he proposes the creation of a UN-adjacent “House of Mega-Companies” to enhance transparency and facilitate coordination between corporate and political actors.

In concluding, Dr. Traill outlines a series of reform proposals aimed at mitigating what he terms “populist panic.” These include expanding higher-order education, regulating misinformation, leveraging artificial intelligence for complex problem-solving, and introducing institutional reforms such as ranked-choice and compulsory voting. Ultimately, he argues that the survival of democratic governance—and potentially civilization itself—depends on the capacity to develop higher-level collective intelligence capable of adapting to an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world.

 

Professor Lorenzo Viviani:“The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalized Leadership in Populism” 

Professor Lorenzo Viviani .
Lorenzo Viviani is a Professor of Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy.

Professor Lorenzo Viviani (University of Pisa) presented a theoretically rich and analytically nuanced paper. His contribution advances a political-sociological framework that moves beyond descriptive accounts of personalization to interrogate the structural, symbolic, and affective mechanisms underpinning populist leadership.

Professor Viviani’s intervention is guided by three interrelated research questions: first, what distinguishes populist personalization from other forms of leader-centered politics; second, how the direct relationship between leader and people reshapes political representation through what he terms “manipulated resonance”; and third, how populist leadership constructs a hegemonic project by signifying “the people” in emotionally charged and politically consequential ways.

A central premise of the presentation is that political personalization is not a uniform phenomenon. While contemporary politics across democratic systems has undoubtedly become more leader-centered, Professor Viviani insists on differentiating between leader democracy and populist leader democracy. In the former, personalization remains compatible with liberal-democratic norms: leaders may become more visible and central, yet they operate within institutional constraints, pluralistic competition, and electoral accountability. Figures such as Barack Obama, Tony Blair, or Gerhard Schröder exemplify this model, where leadership personalization does not fundamentally disrupt representative mechanisms.

By contrast, populist personalization entails a qualitative transformation of political representation. Here, the leader is no longer merely a representative actor but becomes the symbolic locus of political belonging. Drawing on insights from Pierre Bourdieu, Professor Viviani conceptualizes representation as a performative and relational process of claim-making, through which leaders actively constitute the very collective they claim to represent. In populist contexts, this symbolic power is intensified: leaders such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, or Giorgia Meloni claim to embody the “authentic people,” often positioning themselves against liberal institutions, constitutional norms, and pluralist mediation.

This reconfiguration shifts the foundations of representation from delegation and authorization toward identification and embodiment. The leader does not simply “act for” or “stand for” a constituency but becomes the site through which “the people” are imagined, unified, and politically mobilized. As such, populist representation is not anti-representational; rather, it reconstructs representation as a morally charged, direct relationship between leader and people.

A key contribution of Professor Viviani’s framework lies in foregrounding the constitutive role of emotions in this process. Populist leadership, he argues, operates not primarily through programmatic coherence or rational persuasion but through the strategic mobilization of affect. Political emotions are not incidental but foundational to the construction of collective identities. In particular, Professor Viviani highlights resentment as the paradigmatic populist emotion—though he conceptualizes it not as a singular feeling but as a complex emotional cluster encompassing frustration, anger, humiliation, moral alienation, and perceived loss of agency.

This emotional structure is both retrospective and anticipatory. It reflects not only grievances rooted in past experiences of exclusion or injustice but also anxieties about future loss—of status, security, identity, or opportunity. Such dynamics help explain the broad resonance of populist mobilization across diverse contexts, from the American Midwest’s support for Trump’s “Make America Great Again (MAGA)” narrative to the backing of Brexit in deindustrialized regions or the electoral success of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in eastern Germany. In these cases, economic grievances are intertwined with deeper cultural and existential insecurities.

Professor Viviani further situates these dynamics within a broader cultural-sociological perspective, drawing implicitly on Jeffrey C. Alexander’s concept of cultural trauma. Populist leaders act as “entrepreneurs of emotion,” translating diffuse anxieties and fragmented experiences into coherent political narratives. These narratives not only articulate grievances but reorganize them into a shared interpretive framework that defines both collective identity and political antagonism.

It is within this context that Professor Viviani introduces his central concept of manipulated resonance. Resonance, in his formulation, refers to an affective mode of political connection that makes social reality appear responsive and meaningful to individuals’ lived experiences. However, in populist politics, this resonance is not spontaneous or organic; it is strategically constructed through media performance, symbolic codes, and carefully staged displays of proximity. Leaders present themselves as “one of us,” embodying ordinariness while simultaneously occupying positions of extraordinary power.

This performative proximity is often reinforced through the personification of victimhood. Populist leaders portray themselves as targets of elites, media, or judicial institutions, thereby aligning their personal struggles with those of “ordinary people.” In doing so, they transform individual or collective grievances into political capital. Shame, frustration, and perceived marginalization are rearticulated as sources of legitimacy and mobilization.

Professor Viviani emphasizes that this process operates across multiple registers—strategic, stylistic, and symbolic—but is ultimately anchored in the leader’s capacity to re-signify social reality. Drawing on Stuart Hall, he underscores that politics is fundamentally a struggle over meaning. Populist leadership intervenes at this level by detaching signifiers—such as “the people,” “sovereignty,” or “democracy”—from their established meanings and rearticulating them within new chains of equivalence. This re-signification process enables the construction of a hegemonic project that reorganizes political identities and boundaries.

Importantly, Professor Viviani argues that populism should not be understood as a coherent ideology but as an ongoing hegemonic project—a dynamic process of meaning-making, identity construction, and symbolic struggle. In this process, the leader’s role is pivotal: by naming and defining “the people,” the leader exercises symbolic power that reshapes the political field.

The implications of this framework are far-reaching. Populist resonance, Professor Viviani concludes, constitutes a profound transformation of political representation. The traditional distance between representatives and represented is compressed, replaced by a direct, affective, and symbolically mediated bond. This bond, however, is inherently exclusionary. By defining “the people” in morally homogeneous terms, populist leaders often exclude migrants, minorities, and other marginalized groups from the political community, advancing a form of differential nativism characteristic of contemporary sovereignist movements.

In sum, Professor Viviani’s presentation calls for a reorientation of analytical approaches to populism. Rather than focusing solely on institutional arrangements, party systems, or strategic behavior, he advocates for a political sociology that takes seriously the interplay of symbolic power, emotional dynamics, and performative representation. What is at stake, he suggests, is not merely who governs, but how “the people” are constructed, how political belonging is defined, and how legitimacy is produced in an era of increasingly personalized and affect-driven politics.


Discussants’ Feedback

Feedback by Dr. Azize Sarg
in

Dr. Azize Sargin.
Dr. Azize Sargin is Director for External Affairs at ECPS.

Dr. Azize Sargın offered an analytically rich set of remarks, engaging critically with both presentations while highlighting their broader theoretical implications for the study of populism, political representation, and governance under conditions of complexity.

Focusing first on Professor Lorenzo Viviani’s paper on “manipulated resonance,” Dr. Sargin commended the presentation for moving beyond conventional leader-centric explanations of populism. Rather than treating leadership as an individual attribute or charismatic essence, she underscored the value of conceptualizing it as a relational and symbolic mechanismthrough which “the people” are actively constructed. In this respect, she emphasized that Professor Viviani’s framework departs from the assumption that leaders merely represent pre-existing constituencies, instead positing that populist leadership continuously produces and redefines the collective subject it claims to embody.

Dr. Sargin identified the concept of resonance as a particularly significant contribution. By framing populist leadership as a process that amplifies lived anxieties, cultural codes, and affective experiences into politically meaningful narratives, the paper captures the dynamic interplay between emotional identification and political mobilization. However, she suggested that the notion of manipulated resonance would benefit from further theoretical clarification. Specifically, she called for a more precise distinction between manipulative resonance and democratic responsiveness, noting that resonance inherently implies a two-way relational process. This raises an important question: to what extent are “the people” passive recipients of elite-driven narratives, and to what extent do they actively shape and co-constitute the leader’s discourse?

In this regard, Dr. Sargin encouraged a deeper exploration of the reciprocal nature of the leader–people relationship. Clarifying whether populist resonance operates primarily as a top-down mechanism or as a mutually constitutive process would, in her view, significantly strengthen the analytical framework. Relatedly, she highlighted the importance of the concept of disintermediation, which in the context of populism extends beyond the mere bypassing of parties and media to encompass a broader redefinition of political legitimacy. Disintermediation, she argued, rests on the normative assumption that institutional mediation is inherently corrupting, while direct, unmediated connection is equated with authenticity—an insight that resonates strongly with contemporary populist leadership practices.

Turning to Dr. Robert R. Traill’s presentation, Dr. Sargin praised its ambitious attempt to connect democracy, authoritarianism, and global governance challenges—particularly climate change and limits to growth—within a cybernetic framework of decision-making systems. She identified the notion of “decision-system breakdown” in a populist age as especially compelling, suggesting that the paper opens a productive line of inquiry into populism as not only a crisis of representation but also a crisis of cognitive governability.

At the same time, Dr. Sargin proposed several avenues for theoretical deepening. One key issue concerns the tension between complexity reduction and democratic legitimacy. While all political systems necessarily simplify complex realities to render them governable, she argued that not all forms of simplification are normatively equivalent. The critical question, therefore, is which modes of simplification remain democratically accountable, and which risk drifting toward authoritarian, technocratic, or populist distortions.

She also engaged critically with the reform proposals advanced in Dr. Traill’s paper, particularly the use of artificial intelligence and institutional innovations such as ranked-choice and compulsory voting. While recognizing their potential as responses to evolving decision environments, Dr. Sargin highlighted a fundamental tension: if populism is partly driven by distrust of mediation, the introduction of AI-assisted decision-making may exacerbate rather than alleviate public suspicion—unless embedded within robust frameworks of transparency, accountability, and contestability.

Finally, Dr. Sargin reflected on the paper’s broader theoretical ambition to extend models of individual cognition to collective and global decision-making. While acknowledging this as a bold and innovative move, she cautioned that collective actors cannot be treated simply as scaled-up cognitive systems. Instead, they are inherently asymmetrical and stratified, requiring more careful theorization of what is gained—and potentially lost—when translating cybernetic analogies into political theory.

Thus, Dr. Sargin underscored the shared contribution of both papers in advancing a more nuanced understanding of populism—not merely as rhetoric or ideology, but as a complex configuration of symbolic, emotional, and institutional processes. Her reflections and feedback thus highlighted the need for interdisciplinary approaches capable of grappling with the intertwined challenges of representation, legitimacy, and governance in an increasingly complex political landscape.

Feedback by Professor Ibrahim Ozturk

As discussant at the workshop, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk offered a concise yet incisive set of remarks, raising critical questions that probe the intersection of populism, technocratic governance, and institutional mediation. Framing his intervention as a preliminary engagement pending a full reading of the papers, Professor Ozturk focused on one key question for each presenter, thereby highlighting core tensions within both contributions.

Addressing Dr. Robert R. Traill’s presentation, Professor Ozturk expressed particular interest in the application of cybernetic models—especially the Ashby–Beer “collective brain” framework—to explain populist “panic” in response to structural crises such as climate change and limits to economic growth. From an economic perspective, he found the linkage between systemic instability and environmental constraints especially compelling. However, he raised a critical concern regarding the proposed institutional and technological remedies, including artificial intelligence and ranked-choice voting. Given that populism often emerges as a backlash against expert-led governance and technocracy, Professor Ozturk questioned whether such reforms might inadvertently intensify populist distrust. In a context marked by growing anxieties about “techno-feudalism” and the expanding influence of large digital corporations, he asked whether the integration of algorithmic decision-making risks deepening perceptions that democratic agency is being displaced. Crucially, he challenged Dr. Traill to account for the emotional and irrational resistance that may arise against ostensibly rational, technocratic solutions.

Turning to Professor Lorenzo Viviani’s presentation, Professor Ozturk engaged with the concept of disintermediation and the personalization of leadership in contemporary populism. While acknowledging the analytical strength of the argument that populist leaders construct direct, unmediated bonds with “the people,” he raised a fundamental question about the durability of institutional mediation. Specifically, he asked whether traditional intermediaries—such as the free press, independent judiciaries, and other liberal-democratic institutions—can regain their legitimacy once bypassed by populist leadership. Or, alternatively, whether the politics of proximity and performative identification has permanently reshaped citizens’ expectations toward a more direct, anti-institutional model of governance.

In sum, Professor Ozturk’s remarks foregrounded a shared concern across both papers: whether contemporary transformations in political representation and governance signal reversible disruptions or more enduring structural shifts in democratic life.

Response by Professor Lorenzo Viviani

In his response to the discussants, Professor Lorenzo Viviani offered a clarifying and theoretically grounded elaboration of his framework on populist personalization and “manipulated resonance.” Engaging directly with the comments of the discussants, Professor Viviani reaffirmed the relational and sociological foundations of his approach while addressing key concerns regarding agency, manipulation, and the role of institutions.

At the core of his response was a rejection of overly individualistic or essentialist interpretations of leadership. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, Professor Viviani emphasized that political representation and resonance necessarily emerge within a social field. Leadership, including charismatic leadership, cannot be understood as an intrinsic quality of the individual leader; rather, it depends on an interactive process of mutual recognition between leaders and followers. Even in populist contexts, resonance presupposes the existence of shared, albeit unstructured, social dispositions that leaders can activate and organize. Without such symbolic and cultural preconditions, the mechanisms of identification—whether authentic or manipulated—would fail.

Addressing the question of manipulation, Professor Viviani clarified that it does not primarily consist in offering concrete solutions to crises, but rather in framing and interpreting those crises in ways that resonate emotionally with individuals’ lived experiences. Populist leaders, he argued, construct narratives that position individuals as victims of systemic injustice, thereby fostering a sense of shared identity grounded in perceived grievance. In this context, “similarity” between leader and people functions as a substitute for traditional forms of representation. However, this similarity is largely performative rather than substantive, constituting what Professor Viviani described as a “functional equivalent” of representation.

Professor Viviani further acknowledged the discussants’ concerns regarding the reciprocal nature of resonance. While affirming that resonance involves mutual recognition, he noted that populist dynamics often weaken the demand for responsiveness. Unlike conventional representative systems, where social demands generate policy responses, populist resonance relies on emotional identification rather than programmatic accountability. This dynamic becomes particularly fragile during moments of acute crisis—such as the COVID-19 pandemic—when symbolic proximity alone proves insufficient, and the limits of disintermediated leadership are exposed.

Expanding on the concept of disintermediation, Professor Viviani situated it within broader processes of societal individualization and the erosion of traditional political cleavages, such as class and religion. In increasingly fragmented and competitive societies, the decline of collective identities creates a vacuum that populist leaders fill through emotionally charged, “catch-all” forms of representation. These bypass intermediary institutions and instead establish direct, affective bonds with individuals. Yet, Professor Viviani cautioned that such populist appeals are often defensive in nature, centered on identity and recognition rather than substantive socio-economic transformation.

Professor Viviani also distinguished populist leadership from classical Weberian notions of charisma. Whereas charismatic authority, in the Weberian sense, rests on the perceived superiority of the leader and their capacity to enact transformative change, populist leadership operates through a performative identification with “ordinary people.” It is, in his terms, a form of “servant leadership,” albeit a strategically constructed and manipulated one, in which the leader claims equality with followers while symbolically embodying them.

Moreover, Professor Viviani addressed the broader normative implications of his argument by contrasting populist resonance with what he termed democratic resonance. While populist resonance is often exclusionary—constructed “against” perceived enemies—democratic systems can also generate forms of resonance grounded in principles of freedom, equality, and pluralism. Institutions such as constitutional courts and the rule of law, he suggested, embody an alternative, “anti-populist” resonance that affirms equal rights and collective belonging within a pluralistic framework.

Thus, Professor Viviani’s response not only clarified the conceptual underpinnings of manipulated resonance but also opened a broader reflection on the possibility of reclaiming resonance as a democratic resource rather than a purely populist mechanism.

Q&A Session

The Q&A session evolved into a rich and multilayered discussion that brought into sharp focus the tensions between populist mobilization, constitutional democracy, and the evolving nature of political representation. Anchored by interventions from participants and responses by Professor Viviani, the exchange moved beyond clarification to engage foundational theoretical debates concerning ideology, emotional politics, mediation, and the future of democratic legitimacy.

The discussion was initiated by Dr. Amir Ali, who reflected on the applicability of constitutional patriotism—associated with Jürgen Habermas—in the context of contemporary populist governance, drawing on the case of India under Narendra Modi. Dr. Ali highlighted a striking contrast between the “sobriety” of constitutional patriotism and the emotionally charged, performative nationalism characteristic of populist politics. While constitutional patriotism relies on mediated institutional frameworks and normative commitments, populism thrives on what he described as a “raw,” unmediated construction of “the people,” often driven by urgency, anxiety, and affective intensity.

This contrast, Dr. Ali suggested, may help explain why constitutional patriotism has struggled to mobilize broad public support in contexts where populism has consolidated power. Invoking Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the alliance between elites and mass mobilization in The Origins of Totalitarianism, he further argued that populism often operates through a volatile fusion of elite strategy and popular sentiment, thereby destabilizing mediated forms of democratic representation.

Professor Viviani’s response acknowledged this asymmetry but sought to reframe constitutional patriotism as a potentially more dynamic and assertive project. Rather than viewing it as a purely procedural or technocratic model, he argued that constitutional patriotism embodies substantive cultural and normative values—freedom, equality, and pluralism—that can themselves generate forms of political resonance. In this sense, he suggested that constitutional democracy may evolve into a more “militant” form, capable of actively contesting populist narratives and reconstructing collective identities around inclusive principles.

Central to Professor Viviani’s intervention was a Gramscian understanding of politics as an ongoing struggle for hegemony, drawing on Antonio Gramsci. Populism, in this view, represents only one hegemonic project among others, rather than an inevitable or irreversible transformation. The contemporary populist moment, he argued, reflects not the end of democratic politics but the re-emergence of ideological contestation following decades marked by the assumption that liberal democracy constituted the “end of history.” The task, therefore, is not merely to defend existing institutions but to articulate alternative democratic projects capable of mobilizing both normative commitment and emotional identification.

The discussion then shifted toward the nature of populism itself, particularly in response to a comment by Dr. Amadeo Varriale regarding whether populism should be understood as an ideology. Drawing on the influential work of Cas Muddeand Michael Freeden, Dr. Varriale suggested that populism may be conceptualized as a “thin-centered ideology,” given its structured set of ideas about the primacy of “the people” and its normative critique of elites.

Professor Viviani, however, rejected this classification, offering a sociological reinterpretation. He argued that populism lacks the comprehensive normative and programmatic architecture characteristic of full-fledged ideologies such as liberalism or socialism. Rather than providing a structured vision of society, populism functions as a political logic or hegemonic project that simplifies social reality into antagonistic categories—“the people” versus “the elites.” While this simplification may resemble the mapping function of ideology, as described by Freeden, Professor Viviani maintained that it remains fundamentally limited: it organizes political perception without articulating a coherent model of social organization.

Importantly, he acknowledged that when populist movements enter government, they often incorporate elements from other ideological frameworks—such as nationalism, nativism, or sovereignism—thereby becoming more ideologically structured. In this sense, populism may serve as an entry point into broader ideological transformations rather than constituting an ideology in itself. His distinction between Donald Trump’s first and second presidencies illustrated this dynamic, suggesting a shift from a primarily populist mode of governance toward a more explicitly ideological, nationalist-authoritarian project.

A further line of discussion, raised by Dr. Azize Sargin, addressed the apparent paradox of populist leadership: namely, that many populist leaders emerge from elite backgrounds while claiming to represent “ordinary people.” Professor Viviani responded by emphasizing the centrality of emotional identification in populist politics. The bond between leader and followers is not grounded in objective socio-economic similarity but in the performative construction of shared victimhood. Leaders such as Trump or Silvio Berlusconi—despite their elite status—successfully position themselves as targets of cultural, political, or institutional elites, thereby aligning themselves symbolically with broader publics.

This dynamic, Professor Viviani argued, reveals a fundamental departure from rational models of political representation. Populist legitimacy is not derived from policy outcomes or material alignment but from affective resonance. Consequently, empirical contradictions—such as policies that disproportionately benefit economic elites—do not necessarily undermine populist support. The emotional bond between leader and followers operates independently of, and often in tension with, rational evaluation.

The discussion further explored alternative modes of political identification, particularly through Dr. Sargin’s suggestion that populist leaders may also be perceived as “heroes” rather than merely as “one of the people.” Professor Viviani acknowledged this possibility but introduced an important distinction between populist and authoritarian forms of personalization. While populist leadership emphasizes similarity and proximity, authoritarian leadership tends to elevate the leader into a superior, heroic figure. This transition, he argued, reflects a shift from populist to autocratic modes of governance.

Drawing on historical examples such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, Professor Viviani noted that authoritarian regimes often combine politics of fear with what he termed “dark hope”—a forward-looking, albeit exclusionary and often destructive, vision of collective renewal. In contemporary contexts, he suggested that some leaders initially emerging from populist movements may evolve toward more authoritarian forms of personalization, as illustrated by the trajectory from Hugo Chávez to Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.

A recurring theme throughout the Q&A was the role of emotion in structuring political allegiance. Professor Viviani contrasted the “politics of fear,” which underpins much populist mobilization, with the potential for a “politics of hope” capable of fostering inclusive forms of identification. Drawing on examples such as Barack Obama’s rhetoric of unity, he argued that democratic politics must also engage affective dimensions if it is to counter populist narratives effectively. Hope, as a positive and inclusive emotion, offers an alternative basis for political belonging that does not rely on the construction of enemies or exclusionary identities.

At the same time, the discussion highlighted the challenges inherent in such an endeavor. As Dr. Sargin observed, many supporters of populist leaders may perceive their alignment not as a choice but as a necessity, shaped by structural conditions and limited alternatives. This raises important questions about agency, constraint, and the socio-political contexts that sustain populist appeal.

Overall, the Q&A session underscored the need for a multidimensional approach to populism—one that integrates insights from political sociology, political theory, and cultural analysis. It revealed populism not merely as a set of political strategies or ideological claims, but as a complex process involving the construction of collective identities, the mobilization of emotions, and the reconfiguration of institutional relationships.

In doing so, the exchange also pointed toward a broader normative challenge: how democratic systems can reconstruct forms of political resonance that are both emotionally compelling and normatively inclusive. As the discussion suggested, the future of democracy may depend not only on institutional resilience but also on the capacity to articulate alternative narratives of belonging, identity, and political community in an increasingly fragmented and contested political landscape.

Conclusion

Session 15 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series demonstrated with particular clarity that contemporary populism must be understood not as an episodic disturbance of democratic normalcy, but as a revealing expression of deeper transformations in political representation, collective identity, and the governance of complexity. Across the two presentations, the discussant interventions, and the extended Q&A, the session illuminated how populism operates at the intersection of affect, symbolism, institutional erosion, and systemic instability.

Dr. Robert R. Traill’s contribution situated populism within a wider crisis of cognitive and political governability, showing how democratic systems struggle to respond adequately to global problems whose scale exceeds inherited frameworks of decision-making. Professor Lorenzo Viviani, by contrast, traced the micro-foundations of populist leadership, emphasizing how “manipulated resonance” reconfigures representation through emotional identification, symbolic power, and the performative construction of “the people.” Taken together, these perspectives offered a valuable synthesis: populism emerges both from failures of institutional adaptation and from the affective reorganization of political belonging.

The discussants’ critiques and the subsequent discussion further sharpened the normative and theoretical stakes of the session. Questions concerning the democratic limits of simplification, the ambivalent promise of technocratic remedies, the durability of institutional mediation, and the distinction between populist and democratic forms of resonance revealed the analytical richness of the session’s interdisciplinary approach. Particularly significant was the recurring recognition that democracy cannot be defended through procedure alone. If populism succeeds in mobilizing fear, resentment, and immediacy, democratic actors must also grapple with the emotional and cultural dimensions of legitimacy.

In this sense, the session pointed toward a broader conclusion: the future of democracy depends not only on preserving institutions, but on renewing the social, symbolic, and normative bonds that make democratic life meaningful. To confront populism effectively, democratic politics must offer more than resistance; it must articulate compelling alternatives capable of reconnecting freedom, equality, pluralism, and collective agency under conditions of global uncertainty. Session 15 thus made a significant contribution to ongoing debates on how democracy might still be reimagined—and sustained—in an age of crisis, personalization, and escalating power struggles.

MarineLe Pen

French Court Ruling Convicting Marine Le Pen: Implications for the Future of the Far Right in France

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Please cite as:
Al-Sheikh Daoud, Emad Salah & Al-Dahlaki, Khudhair Abbas. (2026). “French Court Ruling Convicting Marine Le Pen: Implications for the Future of the Far Right in France.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 26, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0052 

 

Abstract
This article examines the political and institutional repercussions of the French court ruling convicting Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Rally, of embezzling public funds and barring her from holding public office. Using a case study approach, the study analyzes how the verdict reshapes the trajectory of the French far right, the internal dynamics of the National Rally, and broader debates on judicial independence and democratic legitimacy. It explores competing interpretations of the ruling—as either a manifestation of rule-of-law accountability or an instance of political targeting—while assessing its impact on public opinion and electoral prospects ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Drawing on polling data and political reactions, the article argues that the ruling may paradoxically reinforce populist narratives of victimhood in the short term, even as it introduces strategic uncertainty for the party’s future leadership. Ultimately, the study highlights the tension between legal accountability and symbolic politics, positioning the case as a critical moment in the evolution of contemporary European populism.

Keywords: French judiciary, National Rally, Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, European Parliament, Populism, Far-right politics, Political polarization, Rule of law

 

By Emad Salah Al-Sheikh Daoud* & Khudhair Abbas Al-Dahlaki

Introduction

Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party in France, has long been a controversial figure in French and European politics. Since succeeding her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, as party leader, the party has seen its presence grow in the political and media landscape, even making gains in French legislative elections and European Parliament elections. It now holds the largest bloc in the National Assembly (the French lower house), and Marine Le Pen herself reached the second round of the French presidential elections, facing President Emmanuel Macron in both 2017 and 2022.

However, qualification for the second round of the presidential election did not prevent Marine Le Pen and 12 members of her party from being convicted of embezzling public funds by the Paris Criminal Court on March 3, 2025. The total damage was estimated at approximately €2.9 million, relating to funds from the European Parliament that were used to pay individuals who were in fact working for the far-right party. The French judiciary ruled that Le Pen would be barred from running for public office for five years, effectively preventing her from contesting the 2027 presidential election. She was also sentenced to four years in prison, two of which are to be served under electronic monitoring.

The significance of this research lies in its analysis of the repercussions of the French court’s decision to convict Marine Le Pen on France’s social and political landscape. It examines how major judicial rulings shape the trajectory of political parties—particularly the party under study—and how French public opinion responds to such decisions. In doing so, the study adds an important dimension to understanding the relationship between the judiciary and politics in democratic systems.

Research Objective

This research aims to analyze the details of the conviction issued by the French judiciary, its repercussions for the political and personal future of the leader of the National Rally (RN), and to assess the impact of this decision on the party’s popularity and political discourse, particularly in the context of preparations for upcoming elections.

Research Problem

This research seeks to address the central question: “Was the French court’s decision influenced by hidden political pressures, or was it a fully independent judicial ruling based solely on legal evidence?”

To explore this, the study further examines two sub-questions: How independent is the judiciary in cases with clear political dimensions? And how do such decisions shape public trust in judicial institutions?

Research Hypothesis

The main hypothesis of this research is that the popularity of the National Rally will not decline significantly and may even increase among certain groups. This is based on the possibility that the party’s supporters may interpret the decision as part of a “political conspiracy” against them, thereby reinforcing the cohesion of their base and strengthening loyalty to the party and its leadership.

Research Methodology

The topic will be studied using the case study method in dissecting the details of the French court’s decision and its political repercussions.

The Origins and Ideology of the National Rally and Its Political Role

France is the home of the emergence of extreme right-wing movements and parties. One of the repercussions of the French Revolution was the emergence of forces and figures who adopted radical visions, positions and policies accompanied using armed violence and repression against opponents. This led to the division of political forces into a right–left dichotomy, which has persisted and become deeply entrenched in shaping the French political system across all historical periods up to the present.

In this regard, Article (4) of the French Constitution issued on October 4, 1958, specifies the function of political parties: “Political parties and groups participate in the exercise of the right to vote. They are formed and carry out their activities freely. They must respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy. The laws guarantee the right to express different opinions and the fair participation of political parties and groups in the democratic life of the nation,” (French Constitution, 1958). The freedom of formation and exercise granted to them by the Constitution did not prevent successive governments from banning small local or national extremist parties, whether right-wing or left-wing.

The National Rally, previously known as the National Front, has been—and remains—a controversial and divisive force in the French political scene due to its extreme right-wing ideology, ideas, and programs, as well as the political influence and personal charisma of its founder, the late Jean-Marie Le Pen, and his daughter and successor, party leader Marine Le Pen, along with the political and media discourse they have advanced. Therefore, the party can be regarded as a significant and influential actor in France’s political, social, and cultural landscape.

The National Rally is widely regarded as one of the most successful right-wing populist parties and a source of inspiration for similar movements across Europe, having achieved notable gains both domestically in France and in European Parliament elections. The party has undergone several phases of development and political influence, which can be broadly divided into two main periods. The first is the founding phase, led by its founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, beginning with the party’s establishment in 1972 and lasting until 2011, when leadership passed to his daughter, Marine Le Pen.

This initial period saw significant transformations in the party’s orientation, organizational structure, and political activity, alongside growing electoral success at both national and European levels. Marine Le Pen’s rise to the presidency not only resolved internal leadership questions but also clarified the party’s future direction. Her leadership strengthened the party’s effectiveness, improved its public image, and facilitated its integration into the French political mainstream. Moreover, the party expanded its agenda beyond security and immigration, presenting itself as a credible alternative to governing parties rather than merely a source of political disruption (Ivaldi & Maria Elisabetta, 2016: 138).

Marine Le Pen’s first task after being elected party leader was to implement a “de-demonization” agenda aimed at shedding the party’s far-right image and enhancing its credibility. However, the changes introduced also reflected the continuation of a dynastic model of leadership characterized by strong centralization and hierarchical organization. Marine Le Pen capitalized on this transformation, particularly through media and social media engagement—appearing frequently on television and radio—to reshape the party’s ideological discourse and adopt a more “populist,” or at least “neo-populist,” orientation.

The party increasingly positioned itself as a defender of “the people” against globalization, outsourcing, and mainstream parties such as the Union for a Popular Movement and the Socialist Party, which it accuses of betraying the public (François, 2014: 52–53). At the same time, it has been argued that Marine Le Pen’s populism also reflects resistance to sharing welfare benefits, perceived by supporters as hard-won entitlements (Marcus, 1995: 105).

The ideology, policies, and programs of the National Rally are based on several key principles, most notably:

Emphasis on national identity: The party highlights the perceived existential threat to French identity posed by foreigners and immigrants. This threat is framed as coming from two directions: historically from the east, associated with communist ideology in the former Soviet model, and from the south, associated with what is described as an Islamic threat (Marcus, 1995: 103).

National preference: A fundamental element of its economic doctrine, “national preference” prioritizes French citizens in access to limited state resources such as healthcare, housing, and social welfare benefits (Marcus, 1995: 103).

Foreign and security policy vision: The party’s outlook is grounded in the idea that France has a unique global mission. It advocates restoring national independence and prioritizing French national interests, arguing that relations with European Union should not come at the expense of sovereignty and that ties with the United States should remain balanced.

Rejection of globalization and market liberalization: The party views the ideology of globalization as an embodiment of the hegemony of a global superpower, particularly the United States. At the same time, despite elements of neoliberal rhetoric and some criticism of the welfare state, “the party adopts a pro-market liberal economy and combines traditional left-wing themes of social and economic protectionism and anti-globalization with strong working-class appeal” (Ivaldi & Elisabetta, 2016: 17).

Regarding the electoral performance of the National Rally, since its founding, the party has participated in all elections for the National Assembly (Parliament/Lower House) and the European Parliament, aiming to consolidate its presence on the political scene. However, it was unable to surpass the 5% threshold required for entry into the National Assembly during the 1970s and until the mid-1980s, as it remained in a formative stage, seeking to attract and persuade different segments of French society of its political project and socio-economic program.

At the same time, the French party system was characterized by strong polarization and competition between two major blocs—the right and the moderate left—which by the mid-1980s had shifted toward the ideological center, limiting the party’s electoral gains. The number of seats the party won in the 2017 elections was insufficient to form a parliamentary group, as the rules of the National Assembly require at least fifteen deputies, with groups playing a central role in parliamentary organization and committee formation.

In the 2022 legislative elections, however, the National Rally achieved a major breakthrough, securing 17.30% of the vote and forming, for the first time, a significant parliamentary bloc with 89 seats (Al-Dahlaki, 2024: 250).

In French presidential elections, and in the context of demonstrating the strength and popularity of the party and his ambitions as the party’s leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen participated in several electoral cycles and achieved notable gains. Most prominently, in the 2002 election, he secured an unprecedented result with 16.9% of the vote, advancing to the second round against Jacques Chirac, which he ultimately lost, receiving 17.8% of the total vote. This outcome was described as a political earthquake and a wake-up call for moderate French political forces, underscoring the need to unite against the far right. At the time, many voters resorted to “punitive voting,” supporting Chirac despite reservations (Shields, 2007: 196).

In the 2012 presidential election, opinion polls indicated that Marine Le Pen was a serious contender, though she did not advance to the runoff. She ran again in 2017, reaching the second round, where she faced Emmanuel Macron, who won with 65.82% of the vote compared to her 34.18% (Nordstrom, 2017). In the 2022 presidential election, she once again reached the second round but was defeated by Macron, despite achieving the highest result for a far-right candidate under the Fifth Republic, established in 1958. Macron received 58.5% of the vote, compared to 41.5% for Le Pen (Al-Dahlaki, 2022).

In this regard, we refer to the accusation leveled by President Emmanuel Macron against Marine Le Pen during the televised debate ahead of the 2017 presidential elections, when he accused her of “financial subservience and dependence on Putin’s broader project, and submission to values that are not our own.” This allegation stemmed from a loan Le Pen obtained from the First Czech-Russian Bank, which she denied (Vie Publique, 2017). The National Rally party also reportedly received a loan of eight million euros from Laurent Foucher, a French businessman with investments in the Republic of Congo. These funds were channeled through the UAE-based financial company Noor Capital and deposited into the party’s accounts at the end of June 2017, shortly before being transferred to Le Pen’s presidential campaign account (Laske & Turchi, 2019).

It is also worth noting that French prosecutors questioned billionaire Pierre-Édouard Stérin in June 2024 as part of an ongoing investigation into campaign finance violations linked to the National Rally. According to the Marseille prosecutor’s office, the inquiry concerns loans totaling 1.8 million euros granted to several party candidates for the 2020 municipal and 2021 regional elections, including in major cities such as Lyon and Nice. In parallel, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has opened an investigation into alleged misuse of funds by the now-defunct Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament, of which the National Rally was a member (Goury-Laffont & Solletty, 2025).

It is also worth noting that French prosecutors questioned a French billionaire in June 2024 who was allegedly seeking to use his wealth to promote a radical liberal and anti-immigrant agenda, as part of an ongoing investigation into campaign finance violations involving the National Rally party. The Marseille prosecutor’s office stated that it had questioned Pierre-Edouard Sterin, a media mogul who made his first millions with the gift card company Smartbox.

The questioning formed part of an investigation into loans totaling 1.8 million euros granted to several National Rally candidates to finance campaigns in the 2020 municipal and 2021 regional elections, including in major cities such as Lyon and Nice. In parallel, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has launched an investigation into alleged misuse of funds by the now-defunct Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament, of which the National Rally was a member (Goury-Laffont & Solletty, 2025).

Details of the European Funds Embezzlement Case

In a French court ruling considered by political and media circles to be a political earthquake with far-reaching repercussions on the French political scene, and potentially even at the European Union level, the French judiciary issued a verdict convicting Marine Le Pen of embezzling public funds. The court also ruled to disqualify her from running for office, with the sentence to be carried out immediately. Alongside Le Pen, the Paris court convicted eight other members of the European Parliament from her party in connection with the same case. As a result, Le Pen will, most probably, be unable to run in the upcoming presidential elections. The court estimated the total damage at €2.9 million, as the European Parliament was charged with the costs of individuals who were effectively working for the far-right party. Although her seat in the French parliament will not be threatened, Marine Le Pen may be barred from running in the 2027 presidential election. This follows the confirmation of her political disqualification, which will be enforced immediately (Le Monde, 2025).

Le Pen’s National Rally received money from the European Parliament for parliamentary assistants who were working either partially or wholly in favor of the party. These allegations, relating to the years 2004 to 2016, have haunted Marine Le Pen and her party for years. The total number of defendants in the case is 28. The amount of money involved is approximately €7 million ($7.3 million). Le Pen repaid €330,000 to the European Parliament in 2023; however, her party insisted that this was not an admission of wrongdoing.

A conviction for Le Pen would have serious consequences. The prosecutor requested a five-year ban from holding public office if she were found guilty, which would effectively end her hopes of running again in the 2027 presidential election. The prosecution also called for the sentence to be applied immediately, not only after a legally binding ruling from a higher court. The investigation into the case began in 2015, involving the National Rally’s head of personnel along with 24 other members, and extended to contracts for political aides between 2004 and 2016. It also included figures such as an assistant and a secretary of Marine Le Pen who received their salaries from recruitment bonuses under false and fabricated pretexts (Eremnews, 2025).

As part of the campaign targeting the National Rally, on July 9, 2025, French authorities raided the headquarters of the National Rally as part of a major investigation into whether the party violated campaign finance laws during the last election. Prosecutors said the investigation, which began the previous year, is examining whether the party partially financed its campaigns through illegal loans between January 1, 2020, and July 12, 2024.

Party leader Jordan Bardella confirmed this on platform X, stating that the National Rally headquarters, “including the offices of its leaders,” had been searched. Bardella described the raids as “unprecedented” and “a serious attack on pluralism,” although several other party headquarters in France have been raided in recent years, including those of the center-right Republicans and the far-left France Unbowed. He added that “emails, documents, and accounting records belonging to the party” were confiscated, and later claimed in a subsequent post on X that the investigations were based on “a vague, undefined criminal offense” and were politically motivated (Jory-Lafont, 2025).

Echoes and Reactions to the Court’s Decision

Reactions to the French court’s decision varied and were marked by a clear division between those who supported and endorsed the ruling and those who condemned and rejected it, describing it as political targeting aimed at preventing Marine Le Pen from running in the 2027 presidential elections. This division was not confined to the French political and media scene but extended to differing positions among far-right leaders in Europe and the United States, as well as the Russian stance on the matter. We will review these positions as follows:

The Positions of Marine Le Pen and the National Rally

Marine Le Pen appeared in a television interview hours after the verdict, during which she commented on the ruling. Speaking on TF1, she demanded a swift appeal hearing and affirmed that she would not retire from politics, describing the verdict against her as a “political decision.” “I will not allow myself to be eliminated in this way,” she declared, referring to practices she believed were “the preserve of authoritarian regimes.” In a hearing before the National Assembly the following day, she asserted that the judiciary had used a “nuclear bomb” to prevent her from winning the 2027 presidential election.

Jordan Bardella, the leader of the National Rally and a potential replacement for Le Pen in the 2027 presidential election, said the court had “sentenced French democracy to death.” Bardella called for popular protests, stating, “Through our peaceful mobilization, let us show them that the will of the people is stronger.”

The Positions of French Political Actors

Regarding political actors’ positions on the ruling, they were varied and divided between those who considered it a purely judicial decision and others who viewed it as an unprecedented political targeting of a political figure. Sources close to the right-wing French Prime Minister Francois Bayrou reported that he expressed his “displeasure” with the ruling, although his entourage added that he does not intend to comment publicly on the court’s decision. Bayrou had previously been tried for defrauding European Parliament assistants, who were suspected of actually working for the MoDem party, and was acquitted in February 2024.

Former French President Francois Hollande stated that the “only response” to the condemnation of Marine Le Pen was “to respect the independence of the judiciary,” adding that “it is unacceptable in a democratic system to attack judges and the court.” Following Le Pen’s conviction, the Socialist Party issued a press release calling for “respect for the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law” (Henley, 2025).

Jean-Luc Melenchon, leader of the far-left France Unbowed party, stated in a television interview following Marine Le Pen’s conviction: “The decision to dismiss an elected official should be in the hands of the people” (Le Monde, 2025).

External Reactions and Positions

Several leaders and heads of far-right parties in the European Union and the United States have expressed anger and condemnation over the French court’s decision, describing the ruling as politically motivated and personally targeting Marine Le Pen. In any case, the sympathetic and supportive reactions toward Le Pen are likely to remain limited to media appearances, social media posts, and press conferences. Among these reactions are:

Leaders of far-right European parties have declared their support for Marine Le Pen, including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who expressed his solidarity by writing “Je suis Marine!” on platform X. Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch far-right Party for Freedom (PVV), also expressed his shock at what he described as an extremely harsh sentence (Le Point, 2025). Meanwhile, Matteo Salvini, leader of the far-right League party and Italy’s deputy prime minister, considered the ruling a declaration of war from Brussels and a conspiracy by leaders of EU institutions, stating that “the exclusion of individuals from the political process is particularly troubling in light of the aggressive and corrupt legal battle being waged against President Donald Trump.”

In the United States, billionaire Elon Musk said that the decision to prevent Marine Le Pen from running “will backfire,”adding: “When the radical left cannot win through democratic voting, it uses the judicial system to imprison its opponents. This is how it operates all over the world.”

As for the Russian position, it was reflected in a statement expressing regret over what was described as a violation of democratic standards. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that a growing number of European capitals are moving toward “a violation of democratic standards,” while also describing the ruling as a French internal matter (Mediapart, 2025).

Strategic Options for Marine Le Pen and the National Rally

Marine Le Pen announced that she would not give up and would appeal the decision, while working to garner support from her followers and political forces opposed to the ruling. Simultaneously, she planned a media campaign and public mobilization to pressure the judiciary to reverse its decision. Le Pen reiterated this in her address to the French National Assembly, stating that the French people would not accept the verdict. Indeed, her party organized demonstrations in several French cities.

A potential appeal to the Court of Cassation could be decided within six months. With the presidential elections approaching in mid-April 2027, approximately five to six months would remain. However, the chances of overturning the verdict before the presidential elections are slim. Le Pen’s problem lies in the fact that there is no real guarantee that the Court of Appeal will reach a different conclusion than the lower court. However, theoretically, there are three possible outcomes:

The first option is acquittal on appeal. However, given the well-documented nature of the system in question, achieving this outcome would be difficult. The second, and more plausible, option is that the appeals court reduces the period of ineligibility to one and a half or two years. Since this period would run from the date of the lower court’s decision, it could expire in time for her to meet the eligibility requirements for candidacy. The third option is that the lower court’s ruling is upheld—the likelihood of the appeals judges refraining from imposing ineligibility is low, as, under existing jurisprudence, disqualification from holding office is typically imposed in similar cases (Schmitt-Leonard, 2025).

The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed that it had received three appeals against the decision issued by the Paris Court of Justice and stated that it would examine the case “within a timeframe that allows for a decision in the summer of 2026.” If these deadlines are met, the decision will therefore be issued several months before the 2027 presidential election. The party’s lawyer also announced that he had filed an appeal on behalf of the party and its former treasurer (Wallerand de Saint-Just, 2025).

The Impact of the Decision on Le Pen’s Popularity and Presidential Prospects

Following the French court ruling, there is a possibility of increased public support for the party in the short term. This is because what occurred aligns closely with the National Rally’s narrative that the populist right is a victim of “the system.” It is likely that many of those who voted for the party do not seriously blame Marine Le Pen for the illegal funding of her party with money from the European Parliament, for which she was convicted. It is widely perceived that many French political parties have, at times, resorted to similar practices.

Similarly, her “harsh” punishment—the ban on running for president—may be interpreted as a badge of honor, reinforcing the idea that she is the only one standing up to the establishment. In the long run, however, this level of support may diminish, especially if Marine Le Pen fails to prove her innocence (Schofield, 2025).

The results of polls conducted by various media outlets and polling centers regarding Marine Le Pen’s popularity and chances of running for president varied as follows:

Marine Le Pen tops the list of political figures with whom the French feel the most sympathy, with an approval rating of 37%, according to an Odoxa poll conducted by the Mascaret Institute for the Senate and the regional press. A majority of the French do not believe she received special legal treatment: 53% felt she was treated “like any other person subject to the law,” according to the same poll.

Around 24% of the French (and 25% of National Rally supporters) even view the situation as an opportunity for the party, as it could allow it to turn the page on Le Pen. In this context, Jordan Bardella has entered the race for the Élysée Palace. The young MEP also surpasses Le Pen in popularity: 31% of the French prefer him to Marine Le Pen, a figure that rises to 60% among National Rally supporters.

Nearly one in two French people (49%), a 7-point increase in one month, want Marine Le Pen to be a candidate in the next presidential election, according to a poll conducted by Ifop-Fiducial for Sud Radio. On the other hand, 51% of French people said they do not want the National Rally leader to be able to run for the Élysée Palace, a result that has dropped by 7 points compared to a previous survey conducted at the end of February 2025.

However, according to the same poll, only 37% of French people believe that Marine Le Pen will ultimately be a candidate, a figure that has fallen by approximately 37 points in one month. Only supporters of the Republicans (69%) believe their candidate will be competitive. An overwhelming majority of respondents (79%) consider Marine Le Pen to be far-right, including 76% of supporters of the Republican Party. The poll was conducted via an online self-administered questionnaire among a sample of 1,000 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over (quota sampling method), with a margin of error between 2.8 and 3.1 points (RTBF, 2025).

A poll conducted by the Ifop-Opinion polling institute in early April 2025 predicted that Marine Le Pen, the long-time leader of the French far right, would garner up to 37% of the vote in the 2027 presidential election—more than 22 points higher than in 2022 and 10 points ahead of any other candidate. Frédéric Dabi, the institute’s president, stated that “the page has certainly been turned.” The poll was widely interpreted as confirmation of Le Pen’s successful rebranding strategy in her effort to normalize the far right (Al Jazeera, 2025).

Conclusion

The French court’s decision against Marine Le Pen was a legal and political blow. However, it did not weaken her influence or undermine the credibility of her party. Instead, the trial became a platform for Le Pen to reaffirm her political narrative. Despite the legal condemnation and moral tarnishing, the National Rally maintained its political relevance by framing the verdict as an act of political persecution, and Marine Le Pen proved resilient in the face of public opinion. This resilience is rooted in a post-truth populist strategy that prioritizes narrative over norms and emotional appeal over factual reality. It has been particularly evident among her supporters, who view the ruling as a symbol of political oppression and an attempt to preempt the 2027 election.

If the French judiciary fails to overturn the appeal and instead upholds the verdict against Marine Le Pen, the options available to the National Rally—and its margin for maneuver to remain politically competitive and enhance its candidate’s prospects in the presidential elections—will, in our estimation, be reduced to one of two:

The first option is to nominate Jordan Bardella, the current party leader. Being young, he could help attract younger voters, and the party may present him as a model of youth leadership. He has already played a significant role in increasing support among younger voters in France; within two years, the percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds who voted for the National Rally in parliamentary elections doubled. However, this option may carry risks for the party, given Bardella’s limited political experience and relatively less developed debating and public speaking skills. He may require time and effort to reach the level of Marine Le Pen. At the same time, he holds somewhat different positions on key issues, such as immigration, where he is more hardline, while in economic policy he appears more liberal and supportive of a laissez-faire approach.

The second option is to nominate Marion Marechal, Marine Le Pen’s niece. She left the party a few years ago to join the far-right party led by Eric Zemmour, from which she has recently separated, and she enjoys considerable acceptance and popularity among the party’s voters.

The case of Marine Le Pen and her party members is not merely a corruption case being examined by the judiciary; it is a test of the ability of European institutions and judicial authorities to confront populist rhetoric that thrives on mobilizing the public and fostering an atmosphere of distrust. It is not simply a matter of reframing a single political figure’s conviction as a form of persecution; rather, it is a case study of how the legal process can be transformed into an arena of competing realities shaped by partisan political struggles.

At its core, this case reveals a deeper tension between practical accountability and symbolic politics, and represents a new chapter in the struggle between moderate and more radical forms of populism.


 

(*) Dr. Emad Salah Al-Sheikh Daoud is a Professor of Public Policy and Sustainable Development, College of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University.


 

References

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Al-Dahlaki, Khudhair. (2024). The European Populist Right: Vision, Role and Influence. Dar Al-Shamel for Publishing and Distribution, Ramallah, 1st Edition.

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François, Stephane. (2014). “Recent developments in the French far right, The Far Right in Europe.” European Summer University for Social Movements, Rosa Luxburg Stiftung Brussels Office.

Goury-Laffont, Victor & Solletty, Marion. (2025). “French billionaire interrogated as part of probe into National Rally campaign financing.” Politico. July 11, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/french-far-right-billionaire-interrogated-in-probe-into-le-pen-partys-campaign-financing /

Goury-Laffont, Victor. (2025). “French police raid far-right National Rally’s headquarters.” Politico. July 9, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/national-rally-france-marine-le-pen-jordan-bardella-police-raids-headquarters /

Henley, John. (2025). “Le Pen vows to fight ‘political’ ruling, as France’s main parties stage rival rallies.” The Guardian.April 6, 2025). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/06/le-pen-vows-to-fight-political-ruling-as-frances-main-parties-stage-rival-rallies

Ivaldi, Gilles & Maria Elisabetta. (2016). The French National Front: Organizational Change and Understanding Populist Party Organization the Radical Right in Western Europe, Adaptation from Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen,Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London.

Laske, Karl & Turchi, Marine. (2019).   Un prêt émirati de 8 millions d’euros a sauvé le Rassemblement national.” Mediapart. October 4, 2019.  https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/041019/un-pret-emirati-de-8-millions-d-euros-sauve-le-rassemblement-national

Le Monde. (2025, April 1). “Condamnation de Marine Le Pen : la cour d’appel de Paris envisage un procès avec « une décision à l’été 2026 ».” https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/live/2025/04/01/en-direct-condamnation-de-marine-le-pen-la-cour-d-appel-de-paris-envisage-un-proces-avec-une-decision-al-ete-2026_6588724_823448.html

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Photo: Dreamstime.

ECPS Virtual Workshop Series / Session 14 — From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series / Session 14 — From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 24, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00145

 

Session 14 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series examined how artificial intelligence, algorithmic infrastructures, and digital platforms are reshaping democratic participation in the contemporary era. Bringing together perspectives from political science, communication, cultural heritage, and democratic theory, the panel explored the implications of AI for political legitimacy, collective identity, and the future of “the people” in an increasingly post-digital world. Contributions ranged from public attitudes toward algorithmic governance and the role of ChatGPT in shaping cultural memory to Big Tech’s influence on class consciousness and the fragmentation of digital publics. Together, the presentations and discussions showed that AI is no longer external to democracy, but increasingly constitutive of its communicative, institutional, and symbolic foundations—raising urgent questions about power, accountability, and democratic contestation.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, March 19, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened the fourteenth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the title “From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation.” Bringing together scholars from political science, communication studies, democratic theory, cultural heritage, and digital governance, the session examined one of the most urgent questions of contemporary political life: how artificial intelligence, algorithmic infrastructures, and platform logics are transforming democratic participation, political legitimacy, and the very conditions under which “the people” are constituted. From public attitudes toward algorithmic decision-making and the cultural politics of generative AI to the restructuring of class consciousness and the fragmentation of digital publics, the panel explored the shifting contours of democracy in an increasingly post-digital age.

The participants of the session were introduced by ECPS intern Stella Schade. Chairing the panel, Dr. Paolo Gerbaudo of the Complutense University of Madrid situated the discussion within a broader reflection on the transformation of democracy in the contemporary technological era. As he underscored, democracy has always been shaped by mediations—whether institutional, communicative, or technological—but what distinguishes the present moment is the centrality of digital infrastructures as key mediating forces in the organization of visibility, participation, and power. Algorithms, artificial intelligence systems, and platform architectures, he suggested, have become decisive “bottlenecks” through which political communication and democratic agency are increasingly filtered. In this sense, the session was framed not merely as a discussion of technology, but as an inquiry into the changing nature of democratic life itself.

Under Dr. Gerbaudo’s chairmanship, the panel featured four presentations that illuminated distinct yet interconnected dimensions of this transformation. Presenting a co-authored paper on behalf of his co-authors, Professor Joan Font (IESA-CSIC) examined citizens’ conceptions of democracy in the context of artificial intelligence in public administration and governance, asking who, if anyone, would want an algorithm to govern. Alonso Escamilla (The Catholic University of Ávila), co-authoring with Paula Gonzalo (University of Salamanca), explored how ChatGPT may shape European cultural heritage and its implications for the future of democracy. Aly Hill (University of Utah) turned to the United States to analyze how Big Tech is reshaping white working-class consciousness and reconfiguring populist narratives. Finally, Amina Vatreš (University of Sarajevo) offered a theoretical intervention on “the people” in an algorithmically mediated world, focusing on the interplay between filter bubbles, filter clashes, and populist identity formation.

The session also benefited from the incisive engagement of its discussants, Dr. Jasmin Hasanović (University of Sarajevo) and Dr. Alparslan Akkuş (University of Tübingen). Their interventions not only deepened the theoretical stakes of the presentations but also connected them to wider debates on political legitimacy, technological power, digital capitalism, and democratic fragmentation. 

Together, chair, speakers, and discussants produced a rich interdisciplinary exchange that highlighted both the promise and the peril of AI-mediated politics. Session 14 thus offered a compelling inquiry into how democracy is being rearticulated in a world where digital systems no longer merely support political life, but increasingly structure its possibilities.

Democracy, Mediation, and Digital Power

Dr. Paolo Gerbaudo is a sociologist and political theorist at Department of Political Science and Administration and senior researcher in Social Science at Complutense University in Madrid and lead researcher for the After Order project at Alameda Institute.

In his introductory remarks, Dr. Paolo Gerbaudo situates the discussion within his broader scholarly engagement with the transformation of democracy in the contemporary technological era. His intervention underscores the growing entanglement between democratic malaise, the rise of populist movements, and the evolving infrastructures of mediation that shape political life.

Dr. Gerbaudo foregrounds a fundamental paradox at the heart of democratic theory: the tension between the ideal of democracy as the unmediated expression of the popular will and the empirical reality of complex, layered mediations. Drawing implicitly on classical conceptions of direct democracy, he contrasts the normative aspiration for transparency and immediacy with the institutional and technological filters through which political power is necessarily exercised. In this sense, democracy is never purely direct but always structured through channels that organize participation, authority, and legitimacy.

Extending this argument, Dr. Gerbaudo emphasizes that mediation is not a recent development but a constitutive feature of democratic systems across history—from ancient Athens to modern representative regimes. However, what distinguishes the present moment is the centrality of digital technologies as key mediating forces. Algorithms, artificial intelligence, and platform architectures increasingly function as “bottlenecks” and “pivot points,” shaping the distribution of visibility, influence, and ultimately political power.

Crucially, he highlights the hybrid nature of these processes, where human agency and technological systems interact in complex ways. This interplay produces new configurations of power that challenge traditional understandings of democratic participation and representation. By framing the session around these dynamics, Dr. Gerbaudo positions the subsequent presentations as contributions to a broader inquiry into the opportunities and limits of digital democracy in contemporary societies.

 

Professor Joan Font: “Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us?” 

Joan Font is research professor at the Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC).

In his presentation, Professor Joan Font offers a rigorous empirical examination of public attitudes toward the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in democratic governance. His intervention is situated within the broader framework of the AutoDemo project, a collaborative research initiative aimed at exploring citizens’ preferences regarding democratic procedures and decision-making models in contemporary societies.

Professor Font begins by positioning AI as a critical new dimension in longstanding debates about “which kind of democracy we want.” Rather than treating AI as a purely technical innovation, he integrates it into a normative and empirical inquiry into democratic legitimacy, participation, and authority. The rapid diffusion of AI technologies—particularly within public administration—raises fundamental questions about transparency, accountability, and the locus of decision-making power. Yet, as he notes, systematic knowledge of citizens’ perceptions and preferences in this domain remains limited and fragmented.

To address this gap, the AutoDemo project conducted a large-scale survey of approximately 3,000 respondents in Spain, capturing attitudes toward AI in general, as well as its potential applications in public administration and government. A key contribution of the study lies in its differentiation between varying levels of AI involvement—from low-stakes administrative assistance to high-stakes political decision-making. This nuanced approach allows the authors to move beyond binary or dystopian framings of AI governance and instead map gradations of public support.

The descriptive findings reveal a clear and consistent pattern: respondents are broadly supportive of AI when it is confined to routine administrative tasks, such as improving efficiency or processing information. However, this support declines significantly as AI is envisioned as playing a more direct role in political decision-making. The lowest levels of acceptance are observed in scenarios where AI would oversee or conduct electoral processes, indicating persistent concerns about legitimacy and democratic control. These findings align with comparable studies conducted in other European contexts, suggesting a degree of cross-national consistency.

Moving beyond descriptive analysis, Professor Font employs multivariate regression techniques to identify the key drivers of these attitudes. The results indicate that general attitudes toward AI—such as trust in technology or perceived benefits—constitute the most powerful explanatory factor. In comparison, democratic preferences and broader political attitudes play a more conditional role. Notably, their influence becomes more pronounced in relation to higher levels of AI authority. Individuals with more authoritarian orientations are significantly more likely to support an expanded role for AI in political decision-making, whereas those who favor representative democratic models tend to express greater skepticism.

This stratification underscores a crucial insight: support for AI governance is not merely a function of technological optimism, but is also shaped by underlying normative commitments regarding how democracy should function. In this sense, AI becomes a lens through which broader tensions between competing models of democracy—technocratic, representative, participatory, and authoritarian—are refracted.

Professor Font concludes by emphasizing both the empirical and normative implications of these findings. While AI is not yet a central issue in electoral politics, its growing presence in governance raises the possibility that it may become politically salient in the near future. As such, the question of how citizens perceive and evaluate AI’s role in decision-making warrants sustained scholarly and policy attention. By embedding AI within the broader debate on democratic preferences, the presentation offers a valuable contribution to understanding the evolving relationship between technology and democracy in the digital age.

 

Alonso Escamilla: “How Does ChatGPT Shape European Cultural Heritage for the Future of Democracy?” 

Alonso Escamilla is Manager of European Projects and Research at the Catholic University of Ávila (Spain). For this same institution, he is a PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation and a Member of the Research Group: Territory, History and Digital Cultural Heritage.

In his presentation at Session 14 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, Alonso Escamilla advances an original and exploratory inquiry into the relationship between artificial intelligence, European cultural heritage, and the future of democracy. His paper situates itself at the intersection of political theory, cultural studies, and digital governance, offering a conceptually rich and methodologically innovative contribution to ongoing debates on the democratic implications of generative AI.

Escamilla begins by establishing a conceptual foundation that links European cultural heritage and democracy through a shared normative architecture. Drawing on UNESCO’s definition, he frames cultural heritage as the legacy of tangible and intangible assets transmitted across generations and preserved for collective benefit. This definition is subsequently expanded through the lens of the European Union, where cultural heritage is understood not only as a repository of memory but also as a strategic resource underpinning economic development, social cohesion, territorial competitiveness, and the consolidation of European values. Democracy, in parallel, is conceptualized as a system grounded in rights, rule of law, and representative institutions, through which citizens’ dignity and public reason are institutionalized.

A key analytical move in Escamilla’s framework is the recognition of cultural heritage as a polysemic concept—simultaneously functioning as identity, memory, symbol, and political resource. This multiplicity, he argues, renders cultural heritage both a site of democratic possibility and a terrain of contestation. In the context of the European Union, where shared identity is continuously negotiated, cultural heritage becomes central to the construction and reproduction of democratic legitimacy.

This conceptual discussion is embedded within a broader historical and geopolitical context. Escamilla highlights a series of crises that have shaped the European project over the past two decades—including the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ongoing war in Ukraine—arguing that these events have placed significant strain on both democratic institutions and cultural narratives. To these pressures is added the accelerating impact of digitalization and artificial intelligence, which introduces new uncertainties regarding the mediation of knowledge, identity, and political participation.

Against this backdrop, Escamilla formulates his central research question: how does ChatGPT conceptualize the role of artificial intelligence in shaping European cultural heritage for the future of democracy? Methodologically, the study adopts an innovative design, treating ChatGPT not merely as a tool but as an object of inquiry. A set of 30 open-ended questions is administered across three levels of complexity—basic, intermediate, and expert—each designed to elicit distinct layers of conceptualization. By structuring the interaction in this way and isolating each level within separate conversational contexts, the study seeks to capture variations in discourse while minimizing contextual bias.

The resulting dataset is subjected to qualitative content analysis, involving thematic coding, identification of discursive patterns, and mapping of conceptual relationships. This approach allows Escamilla to reconstruct the “narrative logic” through which ChatGPT articulates the interplay between cultural heritage, democracy, and artificial intelligence.

The findings reveal a clear stratification in the model’s responses. At the basic level, ChatGPT adopts a pedagogical and normative tone, presenting European cultural heritage as a shared historical legacy, linking it to civic participation, and defining democracy primarily in terms of human rights and the rule of law. These responses reflect dominant institutional discourses, closely aligned with EU policy frameworks and UNESCO definitions.

At the intermediate level, the model’s discourse becomes more analytical and reflexive. Cultural heritage is framed as a resource for critical thinking and democratic literacy, as well as a space—both physical and digital—where citizens negotiate meanings and engage in dialogue. Importantly, ChatGPT begins to conceptualize heritage as dynamic, capable of responding to contemporary challenges and facilitating democratic resilience.

At the expert level, a more critical and ambivalent perspective emerges. Here, ChatGPT articulates both the opportunities and risks associated with AI. On the one hand, AI is portrayed as a powerful tool for enhancing accessibility, inclusivity, and preservation, enabling new forms of cultural production and engagement. On the other hand, significant risks are identified: the privileging of dominant narratives, the reproduction of existing power hierarchies, and the potential for AI to shape—if not determine—how heritage is accessed, interpreted, and transmitted.

One of the most intriguing aspects of the findings is the model’s “performative adaptability.” Escamilla observes that ChatGPT appears to adopt different epistemic identities depending on the level of questioning—ranging from a pedagogical voice at the basic level to a quasi-expert authority at the highest level. This suggests not only responsiveness to input complexity but also an embedded capacity to simulate varying degrees of expertise, raising important questions about epistemic authority in AI-mediated knowledge production.

In the discussion, Escamilla situates these findings within existing literature on cultural heritage policy and digital governance. He notes that the model’s outputs largely reproduce dominant European narratives, reflecting the influence of institutional discourse embedded within training data. While this lends coherence and legitimacy to the responses, it also points to a limitation: alternative or marginalized conceptions of cultural heritage may be underrepresented or excluded.

The analysis of future-oriented responses further underscores the ambivalent role of AI. While its capacity to democratize access and foster inclusion is acknowledged, its potential to distort public discourse, manipulate information, and reshape collective memory raises significant concerns. In particular, the prospect that AI systems might influence not only how heritage is disseminated but also what is deemed worthy of preservation introduces a profound challenge to democratic governance.

Escamilla concludes by emphasizing the bidirectional and evolving relationship between artificial intelligence, cultural heritage, and democracy. AI is not merely a neutral intermediary but an active agent in the production, selection, and transmission of cultural meaning. As such, its growing influence necessitates sustained scholarly attention and critical engagement.

Ultimately, the presentation highlights a central tension: whether artificial intelligence will serve as a tool that enhances democratic participation and cultural pluralism, or as a force that centralizes interpretive authority and constrains diversity. By foregrounding this question, Escamilla’s work contributes significantly to emerging debates on the governance of digital knowledge infrastructures and their implications for democratic futures.

 

Aly Hill: “The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness.” 

Aly Hill is a third-year Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at The University of Utah.

In her presentation, Aly Hill offers a conceptually incisive examination of the evolving relationship between technological governance, populism, and class politics in the contemporary United States. Positioned as a “human-centered” complement to more system-oriented analyses of digital democracy, Hill’s intervention foregrounds the lived and political consequences of technocratic restructuring, particularly as it intersects with the transformation of populist narratives and white working-class consciousness.

Hill’s analysis is anchored in the political developments surrounding the second administration of Donald Trump, with particular attention to the institutional and ideological implications of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), an initiative associated with the prominent tech entrepreneur Elon Musk. Through this lens, the presentation examines how the increasing alignment between big tech and right-wing political power is reshaping not only governance practices but also the symbolic and material foundations of populist politics.

The presentation begins by situating this shift within a broader historical trajectory of relations between political power and the technology sector. Hill notes that while the contemporary alignment of major technology firms with conservative political actors may appear novel, it is better understood as a function of structural economic incentives rather than ideological realignment. In earlier periods, particularly during the 2000s and early 2010s, big tech was closely associated with liberal, innovation-driven narratives that emphasized democratization, participation, and disruption of traditional power centers. However, as these firms have consolidated economic and infrastructural dominance, their political positioning has increasingly aligned with agendas favoring deregulation, tax reduction, and the minimization of state constraints—policies more closely associated with conservative governance.

This transformation is interpreted not as a departure from prior commitments but as a logical extension of capital-driven interests. Hill highlights how the regulatory environment under successive administrations has played a crucial role in this shift. While earlier administrations pursued antitrust measures and regulatory oversight, more recent policy frameworks—particularly under Trump—have offered incentives conducive to technological expansion, including relaxed environmental regulations affecting data infrastructure and reduced corporate constraints. Within this context, the convergence of political and technological power emerges as both strategic and mutually reinforcing.

At the core of Hill’s argument is the question of how this realignment affects populist discourse, particularly its traditional articulation around the dichotomy of “the people” versus “the elite.” To explore this, she draws on three empirical case studies: the mass dismissal of approximately 140,000 federal employees, the attempted administrative takeover of key government agencies by DOGE, and the deployment of mass communication systems to monitor and manage federal labor. While these cases vary in scope and implementation, they collectively illustrate a broader transformation in the logic of governance.

The first major finding centers on the reconceptualization of governance as an optimization problem rather than a site of political negotiation. Hill argues that the introduction of data-driven managerial frameworks reframes political decision-making in terms of efficiency, performance metrics, and algorithmic calculation. This shift echoes earlier traditions of managerial rationalization, particularly Taylorism, but is now reconfigured through digital infrastructures—a phenomenon she identifies as “digital Taylorism.” In this model, complex political questions are reduced to technical challenges, thereby displacing democratic deliberation with procedural optimization.

The second finding concerns the transformation of state communication. Hill observes that governmental interaction with citizens and employees increasingly mirrors the logic of corporate platform management. The use of standardized, impersonal communication—exemplified by mass emails announcing layoffs or monitoring productivity—reflects a shift toward scalable, automated governance. Importantly, this mode of communication is accompanied by an algorithmic logic that seeks to depoliticize conflict. When errors occur—such as wrongful dismissals—the responsibility is often attributed to technical malfunction or systemic inefficiency, rather than to political decision-making. This displacement of accountability obscures the inherently political nature of these processes, reinforcing the perception of neutrality associated with technological systems.

The third and perhaps most consequential finding addresses the redefinition of workers within this emerging framework. Hill argues that efficiency-driven governance increasingly treats workers as system costs rather than as political subjects. This reclassification has profound implications for populist politics, particularly given that many of those affected by these policies belong to the very constituencies that populist movements claim to represent. In this sense, the presentation identifies a growing disjunction between populist rhetoric and policy outcomes. While populism continues to invoke the grievances of the working class, the implementation of technocratic efficiency measures often undermines the material conditions of these same groups.

Hill further highlights the paradoxical status of technocratic actors within this system. Figures such as Elon Musk, initially positioned as central agents of reform, are themselves subject to the logic of disposability. When their actions generate political friction or undermine narrative coherence, they can be rapidly replaced, reinforcing the primacy of system-level efficiency over individual agency. This dynamic underscores the extent to which authority is shifting away from identifiable elites toward more diffuse, technologically mediated structures of power.

In synthesizing these findings, Hill proposes a significant transformation in the structure of populist discourse. The traditional antagonism between “the people” and “the elite” is increasingly supplanted by a more complex and unstable configuration in which technology itself becomes a focal point of contestation. As citizens encounter the material consequences of algorithmic governance—job loss, surveillance, bureaucratic opacity—they may begin to reorient their grievances toward technological systems rather than conventional political actors. This shift suggests the emergence of a “people versus tech” paradigm, in which the locus of power becomes more difficult to identify and contest.

At the same time, Hill remains attentive to the limits of this transformation. Whether citizens will fully recognize the structural interplay between technological systems and political authority remains an open question. The opacity of algorithmic processes, combined with the enduring appeal of populist narratives, may inhibit the development of a coherent critique. Nevertheless, the presentation underscores the importance of rethinking populism in light of these evolving dynamics, particularly as digital infrastructures become increasingly central to governance.

In conclusion, Aly Hill’s presentation offers a compelling and theoretically grounded account of how technological rationality is reshaping the terrain of democratic politics. By linking empirical developments in US governance to broader conceptual debates on populism, class, and digital power, the study provides valuable insights into the future of democratic contestation. It highlights a critical juncture in which the promises of efficiency and innovation are intertwined with new forms of exclusion, dispossession, and depoliticization—raising fundamental questions about the capacity of democratic systems to adapt to, and regulate, the expanding influence of technology.

 

Amina Vatreš: “Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: ‘The People’ in an Algorithmically Mediated World.” 

Amina Vatreš is a teaching assistant at the Department of Communication Studies/Journalism at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Sciences.

In her presentation, Amina Vatreš develops a theoretically ambitious and conceptually rich account of the relationship between algorithmic mediation and contemporary populism. Her paper is explicitly framed as a theoretical intervention rather than an empirical study. Its primary objective is to clarify how digital platforms, as socio-technical systems, actively shape the conditions under which collective identities are formed, contested, and destabilized.

Vatreš begins from the premise that digital platforms should not be understood as neutral channels of communication. Rather, they are infrastructures that structure what can be seen, said, and believed. In this way, they participate directly in the production of social reality. This perspective enables her to connect platform logics with the formation of subjectivity and, more specifically, with the articulation of political identities within populist frameworks. At stake, therefore, is not simply the circulation of information, but the deeper question of how “the people” are constructed in digitally mediated environments.

To illustrate this argument, Vatreš offers concrete examples drawn from recent political events. She invites the audience to imagine two users following the same anti-government protests in Sarajevo or the same international conflict, but receiving radically different representations of these events depending on their platform use, prior interactions, and digital networks. One user may encounter content emphasizing governmental responsibility and civic mobilization, while another sees narratives that delegitimize protest and defend authorities. In such instances, she argues, the issue is not merely that users are exposed to different opinions; rather, they inhabit different realities. These realities are produced through algorithmic curation systems that rank, prioritize, and amplify content based on previous behavior and predicted engagement.

This observation leads Vatreš to a larger conceptual claim: contemporary politics unfolds within what she describes as a post-digital environment. In such a setting, technology, communication, and social life are no longer separable domains. Algorithms and users exist in a reciprocal relation: users shape algorithms through their interactions, while algorithms simultaneously shape users’ practices, interpretations, and political orientations. This recursive loop is crucial for understanding the contemporary transformation of populism.

Within this framework, Vatreš introduces the concept of post-digital populism. She defines it as a form of populism in which collective identities are co-produced through the ongoing interaction between users and algorithmic systems. Users, through their clicks, searches, and engagements, effectively train the algorithms, and the algorithms in turn reinforce and amplify the preferences, identities, and affective dispositions that informed those behaviors in the first place. This process is not accidental but rooted in the business logic of digital platforms, which optimize for engagement and thus privilege emotionally charged, polarizing, and identity-affirming content.

A central contribution of the presentation lies in her identification of two key mechanisms through which collective identities are reconfigured in post-digital contexts: filter bubbles and filter clashes. Filter bubbles refer to relatively homogeneous informational spaces produced by personalization and recommendation systems. Within them, users are repeatedly exposed to content that confirms preexisting beliefs, while dissonant viewpoints are minimized. According to Vatreš, this repetition serves to stabilize in-group identification. It strengthens a sense of “us” while constructing a corresponding “them,” often in simplified or distorted terms. In this sense, filter bubbles do not merely isolate; they also consolidate identity through the constant reinforcement of familiar narratives.

Yet Vatreš argues that algorithmic mediation does not operate solely through isolation. It also generates confrontation, and this is where the concept of filter clashes becomes analytically important. Filter clashes occur when antagonistic positions collide across algorithmically curated realities. These are not moments of open dialogue or mutual understanding; rather, they are structured encounters in which users move beyond their own informational environments in order to challenge, confront, or discredit opposing views. These clashes are intensified by algorithms because platforms tend to amplify conflictual and emotionally charged content. Thus, digital mediation not only separates publics but also stages their encounters under conditions that privilege antagonism over deliberation.

From a communication studies perspective, Vatreš insists that the core problem is not simply the absence of constructive dialogue. After all, such dialogue is often limited even in offline or analog contexts. The deeper problem concerns which messages reach users, how those messages are framed, and how they provide justification for particular political demands. What emerges is a fragmented communicative space composed of micro-publics, each structured by its own patterns of visibility, affect, and interpretation.

Here Vatreš introduces an important theoretical insight drawn from Ernesto Laclau’s work on populism. She suggests that the fragmentation of digital publics makes it difficult to create broader “chains of equivalence” through which dispersed grievances might be articulated into a coherent collective project. Although algorithmic environments intensify grievances and facilitate their circulation, they do not necessarily enable their stabilization into durable political meanings. Instead, political affect often remains at the level of reactive polarization. What appears as mobilization may in fact be a simulation of politics—an expression of identity without durable articulation or strategic coherence.

This leads to one of the presentation’s most important conclusions: in algorithmically mediated environments, the “people” do not emerge as a stable political subject. Rather, what one finds is a constant process of mobilization without consolidation. Algorithms generate intensity, accelerate circulation, and produce moments of antagonistic visibility, but they do not provide the conditions for lasting unity. In this sense, populism becomes both effective and fragile. It is effective because it fits the logic of algorithmic systems, simplifying complexity into the stark opposition between “the people” and “the elites.” But it is fragile because it operates within an environment that continuously fragments meaning and reconfigures identity.

Vatreš returns to the Sarajevo protests as an example of this dynamic. What began as collective grief after a tragic accident was quickly transformed into a politically charged event mediated through digital platforms. Competing narratives emerged almost immediately, polarizing public discourse and restructuring the meaning of the protests in real time. Social media did not simply reflect social divisions; it actively organized them, creating the conditions under which different versions of “the people” could emerge, clash, and circulate.

In conclusion, Vatreš argues that the key question in a post-digital world is no longer simply who “the people” are, but how “the people” are produced through the interaction of users, platforms, and algorithmic systems. Algorithms sustain antagonism both by enclosing users within bubbles and by exposing them to conflict through clashes. At the same time, they undermine the stabilization of collective meaning by fragmenting publics and intensifying reactive affect. Populism, in this context, appears both as a strategy of articulation and as a symptom of fragmentation.

Her final argument is particularly striking: algorithms do not produce “the people” as a unified and enduring collective subject. Rather, they create the conditions under which “the people” can continuously emerge and just as continuously dissolve. What remains, therefore, is not a stable democratic collectivity but a shifting field of fragmented, algorithmically mediated identities. In this sense, Vatreš’s presentation offers a compelling theoretical framework for understanding the unstable relationship between digital infrastructures, populist articulation, and democratic subject formation in the contemporary political landscape.

Discussants’ Feedback

Feedback by Assist. Prof. Jasmin Hasanović

Dr. Jasmin Hasanović
Dr. Jasmin Hasanović is an Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science.

In his role as discussant at Session 14 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, Dr. Jasmin Hasanović offers a wide-ranging and theoretically grounded set of reflections that both synthesize and critically interrogate the panel’s contributions. His feedback is marked by a consistent effort to situate the presented papers within a broader conceptual shift—from understanding “the digital” as an external domain to recognizing a fully post-digital condition in which technological systems are deeply embedded in the fabric of everyday social and political life.

Dr. Hasanović opens by commending the panel for collectively demonstrating that digital technologies—particularly platforms, algorithms, and artificial intelligence—can no longer be treated as novel or disruptive add-ons to political analysis. Rather, they constitute an integral and normalized dimension of contemporary social reality. This framing establishes the conceptual foundation of his intervention: that political theory must now grapple with a condition in which the boundaries between the technological and the social have effectively dissolved.

Turning first to the presentation by Professor Joan Font, Dr. Hasanović identifies a central theoretical issue raised by the study: the question of political legitimacy in the age of artificial intelligence. While classical political theory has traditionally conceptualized legitimacy in relation to human actors and institutions, the increasing role of algorithmic systems in decision-making processes necessitates a rethinking of this foundational concept. He praises the paper for innovatively linking attitudes toward AI with broader democratic preferences, thereby demonstrating that technological attitudes cannot be analytically separated from underlying normative conceptions of democracy.

However, Dr. Hasanović also identifies several areas requiring further development. Most notably, he calls for a deeper exploration of the finding that individuals with authoritarian orientations tend to exhibit stronger support for AI in political decision-making. Without a substantive theoretical explanation, he argues, such empirical observations remain descriptively interesting but analytically limited. The critical question—why authoritarian or technocratic predispositions correlate with support for AI—remains insufficiently addressed. This omission is particularly consequential given the normative implications: if support for AI aligns with authoritarian tendencies, then AI cannot be regarded as a neutral instrument but must instead be understood as potentially facilitating depoliticization and the concentration of power.

Relatedly, Dr. Hasanović raises concerns about the implicit conceptualization of AI within the study. He suggests that the analysis risks naturalizing the idea of AI as an autonomous political subject, thereby obscuring the human, institutional, and economic structures that underpin algorithmic systems. This critique redirects attention to the political economy of AI: who designs these systems, under what conditions, and for whose benefit. In doing so, Dr. Hasanović underscores that debates about AI’s role in governance cannot be divorced from questions of power, ownership, and capital.

This line of critique leads him to articulate a broader interpretive framework: the future role of AI in politics is inseparable from the capacity of capitalism to adapt and transform. Technological development, he notes, is driven not only by innovation but also by capital investment and, in many cases, military interests. Thus, the question of whether AI will enhance or undermine democratic governance must be situated within this structural context.

In his engagement with Alonso Escamilla’s presentation, Dr. Hasanović shifts focus to the cultural and epistemic dimensions of artificial intelligence. While acknowledging the methodological ingenuity of interrogating ChatGPT as an analytical subject, he suggests that the study would benefit from a comparative perspective. Specifically, he proposes examining how generative AI models conceptualize different cultural heritages in relation to democracy, rather than focusing exclusively on the European case. Such an approach, he argues, would help reveal potential biases embedded within AI systems.

Here, Dr. Hasanović advances a critical argument concerning the Eurocentrism of generative AI. He emphasizes that the dominant training data for models like ChatGPT are heavily skewed toward Western intellectual and cultural traditions. This asymmetry is further compounded by the global division of labor underlying AI production, where data annotation and content moderation are often outsourced to regions such as Africa and Asia under conditions of economic inequality. By invoking the example of companies such as Sama in Kenya, he highlights the often-invisible labor infrastructures that sustain AI systems.

This critique culminates in a broader theoretical point: AI should not be understood as an autonomous or abstract intelligence, but as a socio-technical product shaped by material conditions, labor relations, and global inequalities. In this regard, Dr. Hasanović invokes a Marxian perspective, emphasizing that technologies are “objectified knowledge” produced through human labor. The data that feed AI systems, he notes, are derived from collective social activity—often voluntarily provided by users through digital platforms—yet appropriated within capitalist frameworks for profit generation.

This political economy perspective also informs his engagement with Aly Hill’s presentation, which he identifies as particularly valuable for “humanizing” the discussion of technology. He expresses interest in the possibility of alternative technological paradigms that move beyond capitalist imperatives. This raises a normative and political question that extends beyond the panel: whether it is possible to imagine forms of technology organized around social benefit, communal ownership, or democratic control, rather than profit maximization.

Dr. Hasanović’s comments on Amina Vatreš’s presentation further deepen his theoretical intervention. He strongly endorses her conceptualization of populism as a discursive practice rather than a fixed ideology, aligning it with post-foundational approaches in political theory. He argues that her analysis convincingly demonstrates how algorithmic systems facilitate the partial construction of antagonistic identities—“us” versus “them”—through mechanisms such as filter bubbles and filter clashes.

At the same time, he highlights a crucial limitation identified in her work: the inability of algorithmically mediated environments to stabilize these antagonisms into coherent political subjects. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s theory, Dr. Hasanović emphasizes that the formation of a “people” requires the articulation of diverse demands into a unified chain of equivalence. However, in digital environments characterized by rapid fragmentation and continuous reconfiguration, such stabilization becomes increasingly difficult. As a result, political subjectivities emerge and dissolve in rapid succession, producing a condition of perpetual mobilization without consolidation.

This insight leads Dr. Hasanović to a critical reflection on the limits of contemporary digital activism. While early examples such as Occupy Wall Street or the Arab Spring suggested that social media could serve as tools for political mobilization, recent developments—such as algorithmic suppression or “shadow banning”—indicate that these platforms are no longer neutral arenas for political engagement. Instead, they are governed by opaque logics that users can neither fully understand nor effectively influence.

In light of these constraints, Dr. Hasanović proposes a shift in analytical and political focus: from engagement withintechnology to engagement over technology. Rather than merely adapting to algorithmic systems, he suggests the need for strategies that seek to intervene in, reshape, or even “untrain” these systems. This raises the possibility of a more active and critical form of technological engagement—one that challenges the structures of algorithmic governance rather than passively reproducing them.

In conclusion, Dr. Hasanović’s feedback provides a unifying and critical perspective on the session’s contributions. By foregrounding the post-digital condition, the political economy of technology, and the limits of algorithmically mediated politics, he not only identifies key theoretical tensions but also points toward new avenues for research and political intervention. His remarks underscore the necessity of rethinking core concepts—such as legitimacy, subjectivity, and collective identity—in light of the profound transformations brought about by digital and algorithmic systems.

 

Feedback by Dr. Alparslan Akkuş

Dr. Alparslan Akkuş
Dr. Alparslan Akkuş is a Teaching Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, Germany.

In his role as discussant, Dr. Alparslan Akkuş offers a reflective and experience-driven intervention that situates the panel’s contributions within a broader historical and technological trajectory. His remarks are characterized by an effort to bridge empirical findings with long-term patterns of technological transformation, emphasizing both the inevitability of artificial intelligence (AI) and its profound implications for political, social, and epistemic structures.

Dr. Akkuş opens his commentary by underscoring the timeliness and importance of the session’s theme, noting that the diverse presentations collectively illuminate multiple dimensions of what he describes as “this AI thing.” Rather than approaching AI as a distant or speculative phenomenon, he firmly situates it within the present, arguing that societies and institutions have already entered a new technological epoch. To illustrate this point, he draws on a personal anecdote from his professional experience in an innovation company in Germany. Recounting a management debate over whether to adopt AI, he invokes a historical analogy from the Ottoman Empire’s delayed adoption of the printing press. For Dr. Akkuş, this example serves as a cautionary tale: resistance to transformative technologies—particularly those central to knowledge production—can have long-term consequences for institutional and societal vitality. The implicit lesson he derives is clear: AI cannot be ignored or postponed; it must be actively engaged and integrated.

This historical framing is further extended through a comparison with the Industrial Revolution. Dr. Akkuş suggests that while earlier technological transformations primarily displaced manual and routine labor, AI represents a qualitatively different shift insofar as it encroaches upon cognitive and creative domains traditionally associated with human agency. This observation introduces a central concern that runs throughout his commentary: the potential reconfiguration of human roles, authority, and autonomy in an AI-driven environment. At the same time, he highlights the risks of bias embedded within such systems, thereby linking technological expansion with normative and political challenges.

Engaging with Professor Joan Font’s presentation, Dr. Akkuş focuses on the ambivalent attitudes of citizens toward AI in governance. He notes that while individuals may accept the use of AI for administrative or technical tasks, they exhibit significant resistance when AI is associated with core political functions such as decision-making or electoral processes. This distinction, he suggests, reveals an important boundary in public trust: AI is tolerated as an instrument but resisted as an authority. Drawing attention to the empirical finding that individuals with more technocratic or authoritarian orientations tend to be more supportive of AI governance, Dr. Akkuş interprets this as indicative of deeper political dispositions. In his reading, critical and reflective citizens are more likely to question the expansion of AI into political domains, whereas those aligned with technocratic or hierarchical frameworks may be more receptive to delegating authority to algorithmic systems.

However, Dr. Akkuş also raises a methodological and contextual concern regarding the generalizability of these findings. He points out that Spain’s political history, which he characterizes as lacking a strong technocratic tradition, may limit the broader applicability of the results. This observation highlights the importance of situating empirical studies within specific historical and institutional contexts, and suggests that the relationship between technocracy and AI acceptance may vary across political systems.

Turning to Alonso Escamilla’s presentation, Dr. Akkuş offers a more normative and critical reflection on the state of European values. While acknowledging the conceptual link between cultural heritage and democratic norms, he expresses skepticism regarding the contemporary vitality of these values. Drawing on his own experiences in Europe, he argues that the foundational democratic principles historically associated with the European project have been significantly eroded, due in part to crises such as migration, the COVID-19 pandemic, and geopolitical tensions. Within this context of perceived decline, he suggests that AI may emerge not merely as a tool but as a potential framework for reconstructing social and political realities. This perspective introduces a provocative dimension to his commentary: that AI could serve as an alternative—or even substitute—for weakened normative structures.

Dr. Akkuş’s engagement with Aly Hill’s presentation shifts the focus to the political economy of technology. He strongly concurs with the argument that the relationship between political actors and major technology companies is fundamentally driven by financial interests. Using the United States as an illustrative case, he describes a dynamic interplay between different forms of capital—particularly the technology and defense sectors—and their influence on political decision-making. His interpretation frames political alignments not primarily in ideological terms, but as outcomes of competing economic interests.

At the same time, Dr. Akkuş extends Hill’s analysis by emphasizing the fluidity and replaceability of both human actors and technological systems within this political-economic landscape. He notes that not only can individuals—such as technocratic elites—be rapidly replaced when they become politically inconvenient, but even major technology companies are subject to similar dynamics. Referring to recent developments in US federal procurement decisions, he highlights how shifts in political authority can reconfigure technological infrastructures, thereby underscoring the contingent and strategic nature of AI deployment in governance.

In his comments on Amina Vatreš’s presentation, Dr. Akkuş engages with the conceptual distinction between “filter bubbles” and “filter clashes.” He identifies this distinction as a valuable contribution that moves beyond the more commonly discussed notion of echo chambers. While echo chambers emphasize the reinforcement of homogeneous viewpoints, the concept of filter clashes introduces a new analytical layer by examining the spaces and mechanisms through which opposing narratives confront one another. Dr. Akkuş interprets this as an important advancement in understanding the dynamics of digital communication, particularly in relation to populism, where antagonistic interactions play a central role.

Beyond his engagement with individual papers, Dr. Akkuş concludes with a broader reflection on the accelerating development of AI technologies. Drawing on his own experience working with large language models, he emphasizes the rapid pace at which these systems learn and evolve. He notes that AI is not only trained through user interaction but also through the involvement of human labor in model development and refinement. This observation reinforces his earlier point about the inevitability of AI’s integration into everyday practices, including academic writing and knowledge production.

Importantly, Dr. Akkuş acknowledges the transformative impact of AI on intellectual labor. He contrasts his previous experience as a journalist—when writing was a wholly human endeavor—with contemporary practices in which tools like ChatGPT are routinely used to generate and refine text. This shift, he suggests, is not merely technical but ontological: it alters the very nature of authorship, creativity, and reality construction. In this sense, AI does not simply assist in communication; it actively shapes the content and form of knowledge itself.

In conclusion, Dr. Akkuş’s feedback offers a multifaceted and thought-provoking perspective that complements the session’s scholarly contributions. By combining historical analogies, empirical observations, and personal experience, he underscores the urgency of engaging with AI as a transformative force. His remarks highlight both the opportunities and the risks associated with this technological shift, while also pointing to the broader structural and normative questions that it raises for democracy, governance, and human agency.

 

Questions by Participants

The Q&A session of Panel 14 was marked by a set of conceptually rich and forward-looking interventions that deepened the panel’s central concern with the transformation of democracy under conditions of rapid technological change. Participants’ questions coalesced around the ontological, normative, and political implications of artificial intelligence, particularly its status within democratic systems and its role in reshaping power relations.

A central intervention, raised by Dr. Bulent Kenes, crystallized a key theoretical tension: whether artificial intelligence should be conceptualized not merely as a tool or infrastructure, but as a political agent. Building on earlier remarks by Dr. Jasmin Hasanović, who framed AI as a potential “subject,” Kenes sharpened the inquiry by explicitly asking whether AI possesses—or is evolving toward—agentic qualities within political processes. Directed to Professor Joan Font, this question foregrounded the need to interrogate the boundaries between human and non-human actors in governance, as well as the implications of delegating decision-making authority to algorithmic systems.

Expanding the discussion, Dr. Paolo Gerbaudo encouraged participants to reflect on the broader theoretical takeaways of their research in relation to democratic transformation. His intervention connected empirical, conceptual, and normative strands across the panel, inviting speakers to consider how AI-mediated governance, platform power, and algorithmic knowledge production intersect with the rise of populism and evolving forms of political subjectivity. Collectively, the questions underscored a shared concern with the reconfiguration of agency, legitimacy, and public awareness in an increasingly AI-mediated democratic landscape.

 

Responses

Response by Amina Vatreš

In her response, Amina Vatreš provided a theoretically sophisticated reflection on the phenomenon of AlgoSpeak, situating it firmly within the broader dynamics of algorithmic mediation and post-digital populism. Engaging with the question raised by Dr. Jasmin Hasanović, she argued that AlgoSpeak should not be understood merely as a linguistic workaround designed to evade platform moderation. Rather, it constitutes a revealing symptom of algorithmic power over visibility, communication, and the structuring of public discourse.

Vatreš emphasized that AlgoSpeak emerges from users’ growing awareness that both the content and form of their communication are continuously filtered, ranked, and potentially suppressed by platform algorithms. This awareness, she suggested, marks a fundamental shift: communication is no longer oriented solely toward other users but is increasingly shaped by strategic considerations directed at algorithmic systems themselves. In this sense, digital expression becomes dual-facing—simultaneously social and computational.

Importantly, she linked AlgoSpeak to the production of collective identity, arguing that it illustrates the active role of users in negotiating and adapting to algorithmic constraints. Users are not passive recipients of curated content; rather, they demonstrate agency by modifying language, employing coded expressions, and experimenting with alternative forms of communication. However, this agency remains structurally limited. As Vatreš noted, such practices operate within the very systems they seek to circumvent, rendering them reactive rather than transformative.

Consequently, AlgoSpeak is neither external to the problem nor a solution to it. Instead, it exemplifies the post-digital condition in which algorithmic systems shape not only what is seen but also how individuals speak, express political positions, and construct collective identities. While users may tactically adapt to algorithmic governance, these adaptations do not fundamentally alter the underlying structures of power. In this regard, AlgoSpeak reflects adaptation rather than resistance, underscoring the enduring constraints of platform-mediated communication.

 

Response by Aly Hill

In her response, Aly Hill offered a reflective and analytically nuanced engagement with broader questions concerning the political economy of digital platforms, the possibilities of resistance, and the evolving nature of political activism in a technologically mediated environment. Her intervention extended her presentation’s central themes by exploring alternative platform architectures and the limits of contemporary digital mobilization.

Hill first addressed the question of whether technology might exist outside the dominant logics of capital-driven platforms. In this context, she introduced a distinction between centralized and decentralized media systems. Decentralized platforms—such as Reddit or emerging alternatives like Bluesky—were presented as potential counter-models to the monopolistic tendencies of large-scale technology companies. These platforms, characterized by community-based moderation and less centralized algorithmic control, may mitigate some of the pathologies associated with mainstream platforms, including content homogenization, harassment, and the concentration of communicative power. However, Hill remained cautious, noting that the structural dominance of major tech actors raises serious doubts about the scalability and transformative potential of such alternatives.

Turning to the question of political activism, Hill reflected on the growing instability of political identities and movements in the digital age. She suggested that while online platforms enable rapid mobilization and broad dissemination of information, they may lack the durability required for sustained political change. Drawing on insights from Zeynep Tufekci’s work, she highlighted the tension between digitally facilitated protest and long-term organizational capacity. While offline, on-the-ground mobilization retains significance—particularly in contexts of internet shutdowns—Hill expressed skepticism about its ability to fully substitute for the reach and immediacy of digital networks.

Ultimately, her response underscored a dual condition: digital platforms remain indispensable for contemporary activism, yet their structural constraints continue to shape—and potentially limit—the prospects for transformative political change.

 

Response by Alonso Escamilla

In his response, Alonso Escamilla provided a reflective and forward-looking elaboration on his exploratory research, emphasizing both its conceptual scope and its potential for future development. Acknowledging the feedback and critical insights offered by discussants and participants, he framed his study as an initial step—“the tip of the iceberg”—within a broader research agenda aimed at systematically examining the relationship between artificial intelligence, cultural heritage, and democracy.

Escamilla highlighted the importance of comparative analysis as a key direction for future inquiry. He underscored that cultural heritage is not a monolithic category, but rather a multifaceted domain encompassing tangible, intangible, industrial, and increasingly digital forms. Accordingly, he suggested that the relationship between cultural heritage and democratic values may vary significantly across these different dimensions, as well as across regional and cultural contexts. In particular, he emphasized that comparing European cultural heritage with non-European traditions could reveal underlying biases and asymmetries in how democracy is conceptualized and reproduced.

A central theme of his response concerned the role of youth and sectoral diversity in shaping contemporary engagements with cultural heritage. Drawing on his ongoing research, Escamilla noted that different sectors—such as education, youth work, and sports—approach cultural heritage and democratic participation in distinct ways. He pointed to youth organizations as particularly significant actors in preserving civic-oriented values, even as broader European policy frameworks increasingly prioritize competitiveness and strategic preparedness. In this context, he suggested that youth initiatives often act as a form of normative “buffer,” resisting the erosion of participatory and democratic ideals.

Importantly, Escamilla also reflected on the growing entanglement between digital and physical realities. He illustrated how young people integrate traditional, hands-on practices with digital tools such as 3D printing, thereby creating hybrid forms of cultural production. This interplay, he argued, exemplifies how artificial intelligence and digital technologies are not only reshaping cultural heritage but also redefining spatial and social environments—from urban design to everyday practices of self-representation.

In conclusion, Escamilla emphasized that artificial intelligence is no longer a future prospect but an already operative force that is actively transforming both cultural and democratic landscapes. While the same technological tools are globally available, their meanings and effects remain context-dependent, underscoring the need for nuanced and comparative research moving forward.

 

Response by Professor Joan Font

In his response, Professor Joan Font offered a reflective and methodologically self-critical engagement with the comments raised by participants, while clarifying key conceptual and empirical dimensions of his research on public attitudes toward artificial intelligence in governance.

A central theme of Professor Font’s intervention was the need to more explicitly integrate political theory into empirical research. Responding to remarks by Dr. Hasanović, he acknowledged that while his study implicitly addresses questions of political legitimacy, this foundational concept was not sufficiently foregrounded in the analysis. He identified this as a broader limitation within public opinion research, which often prioritizes operationalization and statistical modeling at the expense of deeper theoretical engagement. Moving forward, he suggested that a more explicit articulation of the relationship between public attitudes and legitimacy would significantly strengthen the analytical framework.

Responding to the question regarding whether artificial intelligence can be conceptualized as a political agent, Professor Font approached the issue with caution. While recognizing that AI increasingly performs functions that resemble decision-making authority, he did not endorse the view of AI as a fully autonomous political agent. Rather, he implied that AI should be understood as part of a continuum of decision-making arrangements shaped by human design, institutional contexts, and political actors. In this sense, AI may exercise delegated or mediated agency, but its authority remains embedded within—and ultimately dependent upon—human-driven structures of governance and accountability. This perspective aligns with his broader emphasis on legitimacy, suggesting that the critical question is not whether AI is an agent in itself, but how its use affects citizens’ perceptions of legitimate political authority.

Professor Font also addressed concerns regarding the conceptualization of artificial intelligence and the categorization of its roles. He recognized that the term “levels of decision-making authority,” employed in his study, may obscure important distinctions between qualitatively different uses of AI—ranging from routine administrative functions to more speculative or high-stakes political applications. While he justified the inclusion of this broad spectrum on the grounds that such uses are either already implemented or actively debated by political actors, he conceded that a more precise conceptual differentiation would enhance clarity and interpretive rigor.

Turning to the empirical findings, Professor Font acknowledged the limitations of survey-based research in establishing causal mechanisms. In particular, he reflected on the observed correlation between support for AI and what he termed “market-driven authoritarianism.” Rather than indicating outright anti-democratic attitudes, he suggested that this orientation may reflect a pragmatic willingness to prioritize efficiency and outcomes over procedural democratic norms—an interpretation that remains tentative but theoretically suggestive.

Finally, addressing questions of external validity, Professor Font noted that while Spain’s limited experience with technocratic governance may constrain generalization, comparative evidence—particularly from Germany—indicates similar attitudinal patterns. This suggests a degree of cross-national applicability, albeit with important contextual caveats.

 

Conclusion

Session 14 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series demonstrated that artificial intelligence can no longer be treated as an external or merely technical supplement to democratic life. Across the presentations and discussions, a shared insight emerged: AI, algorithms, and platform infrastructures are increasingly involved in shaping not only political communication and administrative decision-making, but also cultural memory, class consciousness, and the very conditions under which “the people” can be imagined and articulated.

What made the session especially valuable was its interdisciplinary breadth. Professor Joan Font’s empirical analysis illuminated the normative tensions surrounding algorithmic legitimacy; Alonso Escamilla’s exploratory study revealed the cultural and epistemic implications of generative AI; Aly Hill showed how Big Tech is reconfiguring populist narratives and working-class subjectivities; and Amina Vatreš offered a powerful theoretical account of identity formation in an algorithmically mediated world. The discussants further enriched the exchange by foregrounding the political economy of AI, the erosion of democratic norms, and the structural limits of digital agency.

Taken together, the session suggested that the future of democracy will depend not simply on whether AI is adopted, but on how it is governed, by whom, and in whose interests. If digital systems increasingly structure the horizons of visibility, participation, and legitimacy, then democratic theory and practice must confront the challenge of ensuring that these emerging infrastructures do not deepen depoliticization, fragmentation, and inequality, but instead remain subject to critical scrutiny, public accountability, and democratic contestation.

Iran, US, Israel.

Power Transition in the Middle East: The Intersection of US Global Rivalries and Israel’s Regional Ambitions

In this long ECPS commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines the 2026 US–Israeli strikes on Iran as part of a broader transformation in global power politics rather than an isolated regional conflict. He argues that the confrontation reflects a strategic intersection of energy security, regional military dynamics, and intensifying great-power rivalry, particularly between the United States and China. The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz—through which a substantial share of global oil flows—demonstrates how military escalation, energy markets, and geopolitical competition are increasingly intertwined. Professor Ozturk suggests that contemporary conflicts are being managed through strategic compartmentalization: limited escalation, selective alliances, and narrative control. In this emerging landscape, regional actors and global powers alike seek to reshape influence within a fragmented and increasingly competitive international order.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

The Israeli-US attack on Iran, at this pivotal moment, is more than just another Middle Eastern conflict or a simple prelude to a new oil shock. It should be seen as part of a broader shift in global power, in which regional conflict, energy security, and great-power rivalry are managed together rather than separately. The aim in this deliberately segmented crisis caused by the last military stand-off with Iran is (i) to weaken Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities to bolster Israel’s regional dominance focused on security; (ii) Washington’s effort to retain strategic control over global energy flows amid rising competition with China; and (iii) in doing so, to keep the conflict politically contained—avoiding the perception of a broader clash of civilizations in the Muslim world, thus preventing them from falling under China’s influence and minimizing the reasons for China’s growing influence in the Global South.

That stance closely aligns with a recent British parliamentary report, which suggests that energy, war, diplomacy, and narrative are no longer separate policy areas. Instead, they are being strategically managed together. The result is a new power dynamic—one that shifts away from crisis management within a liberal international order and toward a more fragmented system characterized by selective coalitions, limited violence, and varying legitimacy.

Beyond Energy and Iran’s Nuclear Capacity

Without any convincing legal justification, UN resolution, or data from American institutions indicating that Iran posed an imminent threat—and launched during ongoing negotiations—these attacks resulted in the “arbitrary” killing of thousands of civilians in Iran, the massacre of schoolchildren, the arbitrary sinking of an unarmed Iranian ship returning from military exercises in India and of a Sri Lankan ship, killing hundreds of soldiers, as well as severe damage to many UNESCO-protected historical monuments in Iran. In such a context, the first and most important task is to correctly situate these attacks by the US–Israel axis.

On February 28, 2026, Israel and the US carried out coordinated strikes on Iran, targeting leadership sites, military forces, and nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure. The immediate market response was straightforward. After the attacks, global energy markets became extremely volatile, with Brent crude soaring to a peak of $119.50 on March 9, 2026, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz threatened 20% of global supply. This ‘panic spike’ was followed by a sharp intraday reversal, with prices sliding back toward $90.00 after US officials indicated a quick end to the military operations, ultimately leaving the market stuck in a highly volatile trading range between $85.00 and $105.00 (Figure 1). 

The strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz in the global oil supply is beyond discussion. In 2025, nearly 15 million barrels of crude oil per day and about 20 million barrels of total oil transited Hormuz, most of which headed to Asian markets rather than Europe (Figure 2). Any serious disruption, therefore, impacts not just supply but also freight, insurance, and risk premiums across the wider global economy. Therefore, the 2026 assault on Iran has clearly and rightly revived a familiar concern: that the global economy remains vulnerable to disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.

Energy Leverage and the China Factor

The energy dimension gives this compartmentalization broader strategic significance. The IEA reports that China and India together received 44 percent of the crude oil exported through Hormuz in 2025, while Europe accounted for only around 4 percent of those crude flows. The Atlantic Council similarly estimates that roughly 78 percent of Middle Eastern crude exports to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan passed through the Strait in 2025. A crisis involving Iran and Hormuz is therefore not merely a Middle Eastern problem; it is also a point of pressure on Asian industrial power.

China is particularly vulnerable, though not helpless. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies estimates that about half of China’s crude imports and roughly one-third of its LNG come from the Middle East. According to comprehensive market monitoring and tanker-tracking data, unofficial Iranian oil flows to China reached an average of approximately 1.38 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2025 (Kpler; Vortexa). While some short-term fluctuations were observed in early 2025, the annual average remained robust, consistently exceeding the 1.3 million marks. Reuters and financial analysts report that China purchased more than 80 percent of Iran’s total shipped crude throughout the year (Reuters; Modern Diplomacy). This volume represents approximately 13.4 percent of China’s total seaborne oil imports, underscoring Iran’s critical, albeit unofficial, role in Beijing’s energy security strategy despite ongoing international sanctions (Energy Policy Research Foundation). In this context, pressure on Iran also indirectly affects a vital part of the Chinese economy. However, the strategic significance should not be overstated. The EIA indicates that China’s crude supply sources are diverse, with Russia and Saudi Arabia remaining its top suppliers in 2024, while the IEA’s Global Energy Review shows China continuing to lead global renewable capacity growth. Blocking Iranian flows can cause friction, uncertainty, and increased costs, but it is unlikely to fundamentally derail China’s rise on its own.

The situation in Venezuela aligns with this perspective. Even before the January 2026 US unilateral and unlawful military strike that led to Nicolás Maduro’s kidnapping, Venezuelan crude oil was not a key element of Chinese energy security. Reuters reported that, in the first half of 2019, China imported around 350,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude daily—about 3.5 percent of its total imports. In 2025, Reuters estimated Chinese imports from Venezuela at approximately 470,000 barrels per day, or roughly 4.5 percent of China’s seaborne crude imports. A later Reuters report stated that Venezuelan supply accounted for only about 4 percent of China’s crude imports. The message is clear: Venezuela has been a useful supplier to China due to its discounts and political convenience, but not a vital part of Chinese energy security. Disrupting one sanctioned supplier may be strategically significant; however, it is not automatically a decisive move.

There is also a broader distribution issue. An oil price spike caused by war would hurt not only Asia but also Europe. The IEA has already warned of renewed volatility in the gas market and ongoing pressure on European competitiveness, while its Electricity 2026 report notes that electricity prices for energy-intensive industries in the European Union remained roughly twice US levels in 2025. In contrast, the EIA indicates that the US has been a net petroleum exporter since 2020, and its world oil transit chokepoints analysis shows that US imports from Persian Gulf countries have decreased significantly over time. The energy situation is real and important—but in the larger power struggle, it appears as a meaningful yet still limited factor rather than a decisive tool of containment.

Despite all these facts and figures, it would be inaccurate to view the current crisis as just a repeat of the 1970s. The main issue is not only scarcity but also how conflict is framed, limited, and strategically handled. The war is better understood as a managed crisis within a larger shift in global order: force is used, but not arbitrarily; escalation is tolerated, but only to a certain extent; legitimacy is not universal but gradually built through temporary alliances and selective diplomatic efforts. In this context, energy is more than just a commodity at risk. It is a vital part of a broader strategic struggle.

Israel’s Security Dilemma and the Logic of Securitization

As R. Gilpin puts it, history suggests that moments of major power shifts or systemic transitions do not simply unsettle small and middle powers; they also redistribute opportunity. Some regional actors use great-power rivalryimperial retreat, or strategic ambiguity to rise above their original weight—as Piedmont-Sardinia did in the wake of the Crimean War, Meiji Japan under the pressure of Western encroachment, and Ibn Saud amid the collapse of Ottoman authority. Some others, for instance, misread the same fluidity and overreach, as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did in 1990, when a bid for regional expansion triggered the first major post–Cold War crisis and ended in rapid military defeat. In this sense, periods of power transition rarely leave the regional tier untouched: they create openings for some states to rise and traps for others to collapse. Israel’s conduct in the present phase of global power transition suggests that it is trying to exploit precisely such a window—not merely reacting to uncertainty but attempting to convert it into a regional hegemonic opportunity.

As US primacy becomes more contested and the Middle East is reorganized by overlapping energy, security, and corridor politics, Israel appears to be pursuing a dual strategy of expansion through both partnership and coercion. Besides, on the side of deterrence, its aggressive stance on war also reflects Israel’s recognizable security calculation. For years, Iranian missile capabilities, proxy networks, and nuclear advances have been cast in Israeli strategic discourse as existential or near-existential threats. From that vantage point, the February 2026 campaign is intelligible even if it is not thereby rendered lawful or strategically prudent. Once a hostile regime is defined as a total strategic danger, the political threshold for extraordinary measures falls: Preemptive force, regime-degrading strikes, regional militarization, and external coalition-building become easier to justify.

That said, deepening structured cooperation with states can help establish a favorable regional order. In that context, Israel is using punitive military actions against adversaries such as Iran, Syria, Hamas, and allied armed groups to weaken hostile capabilities, restore deterrence, and expand its strategic maneuvering spaceThis suggests that Israel is acting less like a besieged small state and more like an aspiring regional poweraiming to secure regional dominance before the emerging multipolar order becomes less accommodating. This also explains why the current conflict setup is not just about immediate battlefield outcomes but about shaping the future political landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. 

The partnership aspect of this strategy is particularly evident in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s trilateral framework with Greece and Cyprus has evolved well beyond ad hoc diplomacy into a more institutionalized framework for security, maritime coordination, energy cooperation, connectivity, and technological partnership, sharply excluding Turkey. The December 2025 joint declaration explicitly linked this cooperation to natural gas development, electricity interconnectors, energy security, the Great Sea Interconnector, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), The emerging axis is supported by tangible defense ties: Greece has approved the purchase of Israeli PULS rocket systems, and Reuters has reported plans to strengthen joint exercises among Greece, Israel, and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus have solidified their own trilateral format focused on maritime security, natural gas infrastructure, energy diversification, and UNCLOS-based delimitation. The broader framework connecting Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel is the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which institutionalizes regional gas cooperation and uses energy as a tool for political unity. Collectively, these arrangements go beyond typical bilateral or trilateral diplomacy; they are forming the backbone of an emerging Eastern Mediterranean order, with Israel playing an increasingly central role.

Rising patterns show that Israel’s Mediterranean strategy is now part of a broader geo-economic vision extending from the Caspian Sea in the Caucasus-Central Asia region to India and Europe. In his February 2026 address to the Knesset, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi described India and Israel as sharing “ancient civilizational ties” and called for deeper cooperation through IMEC and I2U2, giving the relationship a geopolitical depth beyond transactional defense ties. This matters because Israel’s partnerships are no longer confined to immediate neighbors; they are increasingly tied to larger corridor projects, technology platforms, and Indo-Middle Eastern alignments. This relationship is anchored in the geopolitical logic of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a proposed multimodal route linking India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, with maritime, rail, energy, and digital components converging on Israel’s Mediterranean gateway, and again excluding Turkey. Promoted by its backers as a faster and more resilient alternative to existing routes—and widely read as part of a broader effort to balance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—IMEC helps explain why India–Israel ties now extend beyond bilateral cooperation into the strategic architecture of an emerging Indo-Mediterranean order.

At the same time, not every actor moving closer to Israel should be labeled as part of an open pro-Israel bloc. Saudi Arabia still publicly conditionally normalizes relations on Palestinian statehood, yet its strategic interests overlap with Israel’s on issues such as containing Iran, protecting energy supplies, and maintaining a favorable regional balance. The new Syrian leadership’s revived US-mediated security talks with Israel present an even clearer example of pragmatic convergence. These are not full alliances, but they do show that Israel is operating in an environment where former or potential adversaries are increasingly involved in patterns of coordination, deconfliction, or selective accommodation. The broader point is that Israel is trying to transform multipolar disorder into a hierarchical regional order: building networks where possible, managing enemies where necessary, and using both cooperation and calibrated force to expand the sphere within which it can act as the dominant regional power.

Strategic Compartmentalization and the Avoidance of a Civilizational Trap

This is where Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis becomes relevant—though not in the crude sense often invoked in moments of war. Huntington argued that post-Cold War conflicts would increasingly follow cultural and religious fault lines. Yet the emerging strategy of Washington and its regional allies is not to embrace such a clash outright, but to instrumentalize its logic selectively while containing its broader consequences. 

According to SIPRI, Israel is widely recognized to possess a nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice has ruled that Israel’s ongoing presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is illegal, and repeated UN reports under Security Council Resolution 2334 continue to document settlement expansion. At the same time, UN humanitarian reports recorded that, by early December 2025, Gaza’s Ministry of Health reported more than 70,000 Palestinians killed, over 170,000 injured, and mass displacement on a devastating scale. Taken together, these facts make any claim that Israeli actions remain firmly within a stable zone of legal and moral legitimacy highly questionable.

Thus, the US-Israeli challenge has never been limited to threat detection alone. It has also involved managing the political fallout from their responses. From Trump’s and Netanyahu’s perspectives, the operation against Iran needed to be framed in a way that preserved as much international legitimacy as possible, even when a clear legal justification was difficult to establish. At the same time, the conflict had to be prevented from escalating into a civilizational clash that could push Muslim-majority societies toward China and expand Beijing’s strategic influence across the Global South. Here, deeper contradictions become unavoidable. 

Iran and Hamas are cast as securitized and containable threats, while Gulf monarchies and other Muslim-majority states are engaged through donor diplomacy, regime-security guarantees, and calibrated alliance management. The objective is not simply to fight an adversary, but to prevent the war from consolidating an anti-Western political identity across the broader Muslim world—especially at a moment when parts of the Global South are drifting toward more China-friendly alignments.

This is precisely where the current war differs from a simple Huntingtonian interpretation. The conflict has not been allowed to evolve into a straightforward “West versus Islam” narrative. Instead, much of the diplomatic framework has sought to confine it to a narrower Iran-Hamas security issue. The Council on Foreign Relations noted that the Board of Peace relied heavily on participation from Gulf Arabs and Central Asians, while excluding direct Palestinian political representation at the highest levels of decision-making. Conversely, the UN Human Rights Office sharply criticized this setup as incompatible with a reparative, rights-based approach to reconstruction. From an analytical perspective, however, the main point is not whether the structure is morally convincing. It is that the structure acts as a mechanism of compartmentalization: some actors are isolated as threats to be disarmed or neutralized, while others are kept within a cooperative framework of reconstruction, stabilization, and donor politics.

The regional response confirms that interpretation. In their extraordinary GCC-EU joint statement, Gulf and European ministers condemned Iran’s attacks on GCC states, emphasized that GCC territories had not been used to launch attacks against Iran, invoked self-defense, and highlighted the importance of protecting maritime routes, supply chains, and energy market stability. Meanwhile, Carnegie noted that Gulf monarchies are caught between Iranian escalation and US recklessness, with their main focus on preserving fragile economic and security systems. This is not the language of a unified civilizational bloc; it is the language of regime survival. Nor did the broader Muslim political field unify into a single anti-Western Front. The OIC’s condemnation of Israeli attacks on Iran coexists with muted and ambivalent official Gulf reactions, while AP reporting emphasized elite anger at the US for exposing Gulf states to retaliation without sufficient warning or protection. As a European Council joint statement states, what emerged was fragmentation rather than bloc unity—and that fragmentation was not accidental but part of the crisis’s strategic outcome.

As a conclusion to this part, Gulf monarchies are neither full participants in an anti-Iran crusade nor members of an anti-Western camp. They are defensive actors seeking to preserve commercial credibility, domestic order, and external security amid a war they did not want. That posture is inherently compartmentalizing. It seeks to prevent regional collapse without fully endorsing the strategic logic that produced the crisis in the first place.

Washington’s Domestic Politics and the Uses of External Crisis

The domestic American context also matters, although it should be approached with analytical caution. While the operational details of the strike on Iran are often examined solely from a kinetic perspective, the decision-making process cannot be separated from the Trump administration’s increasing domestic vulnerabilities. The kinetic action serves as the ultimate “escape forward,” where the smoke of external conflict hides the fire of internal issues. Notably, two factors—the recently disclosed Epstein Scandal and the motivations of Trump’s eschatological cabinet—are significant. 

DOJ/FBI memorandum issued in July 2025 stated that investigators found no evidence of a Jeffrey Epstein “client list.” However, in March 2026, the Associated Press reported that newly disclosed files—previously omitted due to an alleged coding error—contained strong allegations involving Donald Trump. While this may not directly confirm a causal link between scandal exposure and war-making, as the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation note, it nonetheless supports a more defensible argument: a scandal-ridden domestic environment can increase the short-term political value of external escalation by diverting scrutiny, reinforcing partisan discipline, and shifting media focus to security rather than accountability.

Beyond the tactical use of distraction, this pressure is increasingly driven by a fundamentalist-Christian elite that has gained unprecedented influence within the cabinet. The appointment of Christian-Zionist ideologues to key bureaucratic positions in the US and diplomatic roles abroad, especially in Israel and the surrounding region, shows that the administration’s foreign policies are being guided by eschatological beliefs. The recent gathering of prominent pastors to “anoint” the President for a perceived war acts as a strategic response to the Epstein disclosures. By portraying the President as a Cyrus-figure—a flawed vessel chosen for divine geopolitical realignment—this faction provides a moral cover that redefines personal scandal as part of spiritual warfare.

In this context, Epstein’s emergence as a posthumous influence agent suggests that the timing of these disclosures may be less coincidental and more coercive. Trapped between the threat of legal disgrace and the demands of his Dominionist base, the President’s move toward external escalation becomes an expected outcome of survival politics. The combination of these allegations with radical religious rhetoric shows that the administration is being pushed into a policy space where aggression is used as the main tool for maintaining domestic stability and ideological legitimacy.

Europe’s Passive Alignment with Trump’s Vision

Europe now appears less as a strategic leader and more as a sign of Western division. Although it remains an important economic player, its geopolitical influence is diminishing. It is a giant in market size, but surprisingly weak in political unity, strategic direction, and external influence. Its direct reliance on Hormuz crude is lower than Asia’s, but it remains highly vulnerable to energy price shocks, industrial setbacks, and alliance pressures. What is especially notable is that Europe has faced the recent escalation in the Middle East while transatlantic relations are already strained. A recent European Parliament study notes that since early 2025, EU-US relations have been increasingly tense over NATO, Greenland, Ukraine, trade, technology, climate, and China, indicating a deeper split in strategic visions across the Atlantic. A recent ECPS Report concurs, finding that the transatlantic relationship has reached a turning point under Trump-era right-wing populism, with erosion in security, trade, international institutions, and democratic norms. In this context, Europe faces the Iran-Israel crisis not with confidence, but amid broader geopolitical confusion. 

Yet this is exactly what reveals Europe’s muted stance on Israel. While Washington has become a source of pressure and unpredictability for Europe, the EU has struggled to develop a clear and independent position on Israel. This silence signifies more a weakness than a deliberate strategy: leadership gaps, the lack of a strong, shared perspective within the Union, and the lingering influence of Cold War-era habits of outsourcing hard security to the US. The ECPS volume is especially useful here because it views the current Atlantic crisis not as isolated turbulence but as a systemic shift that requires greater European agency and strategic independence. Europe’s relative passivity, then, should be seen not just as deference but as a sign of unpreparedness: a wealthy political bloc that has yet to turn economic influence into geopolitical power.

Conclusion

The 2026 war with Iran should be seen as more than just a regional military conflict or a temporary energy crisis. It reveals a broader shift in the global order, in which the lines between war, energy security, alliance politics, and narrative control are increasingly blurred. What is emerging isn’t a return to a stable US-centered system, nor a fully developed multipolar balance, but rather a fragmented and coercive landscape. In this environment, major powers, regional players, and smaller states seek to gain advantages through selective alliances, limited escalation, and compartmentalized crisis management. In this context, Israel has acted with unusual clarity, trying to turn global uncertainty into regional dominance through military deterrence, strategic partnerships, and corridor politics. The Gulf monarchies sit at a crucial middle ground, balancing pressure, exposure, and opportunities. Europe, on the other hand, seems less a driver of outcomes than a reflection of Western fatigue—economically significant, politically hesitant, and strategically unprepared for a world where American leadership has become both less dependable and more disruptive.

The deeper significance of this moment lies specifically here. The crisis isn’t just about Iran, or even about the immediate future of the Middle East. It’s about how power is exercised in an era when the liberal language of rules, institutions, and multilateral restraint persists but increasingly lacks the material cohesion or political authority that once sustained it. Strategic compartmentalization has become the preferred way to manage disorder: adversaries are securitized and targeted, partners are reassured and selectively brought in, and broader civilizational escalation is contained rather than solved. This might bring temporary stability, but it does so by reinforcing a new international logic—one characterized by differentiated legitimacy, asymmetrical coercion, and declining normative consistency. The real lesson of the Iran war, then, isn’t just that energy geopolitics has returned, but that it now functions within a more severe and openly hierarchical struggle over who will shape the regional and global order to come.


 

References

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