This analysis by Yacine Boubia challenges the dominant economic explanations of populism by foregrounding the central role of cultural transformation. Drawing on Ronald Inglehart’s “silent revolution” and the cultural backlash thesis, it argues that immigration has become the most visible and politically charged symbol of broader shifts in identity, values, and social order. Populism, in this account, is not simply a reaction to material deprivation but a response to perceived cultural displacement and status loss. By linking economic disruption with identity-based anxieties, the article demonstrates how immigration functions as a focal point for wider conflicts over belonging, representation, and democratic legitimacy in contemporary Western societies.
The dominant narrative surrounding the rise of populism in Europe and the United States has long been grounded in economics. Globalization, automation, and trade shocks are often said to have produced a class of “left behind” voters who turned to populist leaders out of material deprivation. While this account captures an important dimension of structural change, it ultimately misdiagnoses the core political dynamics at work. Populism is not simply a reaction to economic hardship. It is, more fundamentally, a response to cultural transformation—one in which immigration has become the most visible and politically salient symbol of broader social change.
To understand this shift, it is necessary to return to the long arc of value change identified by Ronald Inglehart. Beginning in the postwar decades, advanced industrial societies underwent what he termed a “silent revolution,” as rising prosperity and educational expansion reshaped public priorities. Survival-oriented values gradually gave way to self-expression, autonomy, and cosmopolitan openness (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Norris, 2019). Over time, these shifts became embedded in institutions, elite discourse, and policy frameworks, particularly within urban, highly educated populations.
Yet this transformation was never evenly distributed. Large segments of the population—often older, less formally educated, and more rooted in national or local traditions—did not merely lag behind this shift; they experienced it as a form of displacement. What appeared to some as progress appeared to others as erosion: of authority, of social cohesion, and of a familiar moral order. The political consequences of this divergence became increasingly visible after the late 1960s, when cultural liberalization accelerated across Western democracies and elite consensus around multiculturalism and individual autonomy solidified.
It is within this context that immigration assumes its central political role. Immigration is not merely one issue among many; it is the issue through which broader cultural transformations are rendered visible, tangible, and politically immediate. Debates over borders, asylum, and integration are simultaneously debates about national identity, social trust, and the pace of cultural change itself. The European migration crisis did not create these tensions, but it crystallized them, transforming diffuse anxieties into direct political conflict across the continent.
The differential reception of refugee populations further illustrates how cultural categorization shapes political responses. The Ukrainian refugee crisis, following Russia’s 2022 invasion, was widely framed in Europe as a conventional interstate war producing displaced populations that were more easily incorporated into existing asylum systems. By contrast, earlier inflows of refugees from Syria and parts of the Middle East were more frequently politicized through debates over long-term integration, welfare capacity, and security concerns. Material conditions alone cannot explain these differences. They reflect processes of perceived cultural proximity, geopolitical framing, and institutional response mechanisms within the European Union.
Scholars of migration and political psychology have long noted that public attitudes toward migration are structured not only by economic calculations but also by perceived cultural distance and social trust. Emmanuel Todd’s recent work, La Défaite de l’Occident (2024), contributes to this discussion by emphasizing that societies interpret geopolitical and demographic change through deeper assumptions about cultural cohesion and civilizational identity. From this perspective, differential refugee reception reflects not simply policy design but underlying social narratives about similarity, belonging, and national self-understanding.
The framework developed by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart captures these dynamics with particular clarity. Their “cultural backlash” thesis argues that support for populist parties is driven less by absolute economic deprivation than by perceived status loss among groups once embedded within dominant cultural hierarchies (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Immigration, in this context, functions not merely as a policy issue but as a symbolic focal point through which broader anxieties about identity and social change are expressed. It becomes the terrain on which struggles over cultural authority are fought.
The United States exhibits a parallel trajectory. The rise of Donald Trump cannot be fully understood through economic grievance alone. Empirical studies of the 2016 election have consistently shown that attitudes toward immigration, cultural change, and racial identity were among the strongest predictors of support for Trump (Sides et al., 2018). His appeal lay less in policy detail than in his ability to articulate a sense of loss—of border control, national coherence, and institutional trust. Immigration functioned as the central issue through which these concerns were politically mobilized.
This mobilization was amplified by changes in the digital information environment. Scholars of political communication have highlighted how social media platforms and data-driven campaigning enabled more granular targeting of affective and identity-based grievances. While the precise influence of firms such as Cambridge Analytica is debated in the academic literature, broader research on “computational propaganda” and social listening suggests that political actors increasingly adapt messaging to pre-existing online sentiment patterns rather than shaping them from above (Bennett & Livingston, 2018).
None of this implies that economic factors are irrelevant. On the contrary, the structural effects of globalization have played a crucial role in shaping the terrain on which cultural conflict unfolds. Trade exposure, deindustrialization, and regional inequality have increased perceptions of economic insecurity in many Western societies (Autor et al., 2013). However, these economic disruptions do not translate mechanically into political outcomes. Their salience is mediated through cultural interpretation. Economic decline becomes politically consequential when it is embedded within narratives of identity, recognition, and perceived neglect.
In this sense, globalization operates as a force multiplier rather than a primary cause of populism. Communities experiencing economic stagnation are more likely to interpret immigration through lenses of competition and cultural threat, and more likely to view political elites as detached from their lived realities. Populist movements succeed precisely because they fuse economic anxiety with cultural grievance into a single coherent narrative—one that pits “the people” against both external pressures and internal elites (Mudde, 2004).
Across Europe, parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the National Rally (RN) in France have institutionalized this synthesis. While differing in national context, these movements share a common structure: opposition to immigration, skepticism toward supranational governance, and a broader critique of liberal elite consensus. Their success underscores the extent to which cultural backlash has become embedded within contemporary political competition.
The policy implications are significant. If populism were driven primarily by economic inequality, then redistribution and growth-oriented policies might be sufficient to mitigate its rise. But if it is rooted in cultural backlash, such measures will prove insufficient on their own. Economic policy cannot resolve conflicts over identity, belonging, and social norms. Nor can these conflicts be dismissed as irrational without further deepening political polarization.
A more realistic approach begins by recognizing that populism emerges from genuine, if conflicting, experiences of social transformation. The “silent revolution” identified by Inglehart has reshaped Western societies in profound ways, but it has also produced new forms of cultural stratification. In the United States, this process was accelerated by the political economy of the 1980s and 1990s, where deregulation and neoliberal convergence under both Republican and Democratic administrations coincided with the rise of cosmopolitan urban centers and multicultural policy frameworks. These developments, reinforced during the Clinton and Obama eras, contributed to a perception among some voters that cultural and institutional change was occurring without adequate democratic mediation.
Immigration, as the most visible manifestation of these broader transformations, will therefore remain central to political conflict in advanced democracies. Understanding populism requires moving beyond the false dichotomy between economics and culture. It is the interaction between structural change and subjective perception that drives political behavior. Until this interplay is fully acknowledged, explanations will remain partial, and policy responses will continue to fall short.
References
Inglehart, R. (1977). The Silent Revolution – Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, Cambridge University Press.
Autor, D., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. (2013). “The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade,” ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 8:205-240 (Volume publication date October 2016) https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015041
Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America, Princeton University Press.
Bennett, W. L. & Livingston, S. (2018). “The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline of democratic institutions.” European Journal of Communication, 33(2), 122–139. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323118760317
Todd, E. (2024). La Défaite de l’Occident, Gallimard.
As Hungary approaches the April 12 elections, Viktor Orbán’s long-standing rule faces a critical test shaped by both domestic discontent and geopolitical realignments. In this interview, Associate Professor Attila Antal characterizes the regime as a “constitutional dictatorship,” arguing that the election is not about democratic legitimacy but about securing “public support for its own dictatorial turn.” He highlights how authoritarian legality, sustained through a “dual state” and permanent emergency governance, has hollowed out democratic competition. At the same time, the rise of Péter Magyar and mounting generational and material grievances signal growing resistance. Situated within broader transnational authoritarian networks, Hungary’s election emerges as both a domestic referendum and a geopolitical fault line for European democracy.
As Hungary approaches its pivotal parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a defining juncture in the trajectory of European populism. After more than a decade and a half of rule by Viktor Orbán, the electoral contest no longer centers merely on party competition, but on whether an entrenched authoritarian-populist regime—characterized by institutional asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and the continuous production of political enemies—can still be meaningfully challenged through democratic means. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced new uncertainty into a system long sustained by what Attila Antal describes as a “hegemonic power bloc,” raising the stakes of what increasingly resembles a systemic referendum.
In this context, Attila Antal, Associate Professor at Eötvös Loránd University, offers a sobering interpretation of the current moment. In his view, the Orbán regime has evolved beyond conventional electoral authoritarianism into what he terms a “constitutional dictatorship,” where formal legality coexists with substantive domination. Most strikingly, Assoc. Prof. Antal argues that “the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn.” This diagnosis reframes the election not as a mechanism of accountability, but as a plebiscitary instrument designed to consolidate power under conditions of managed legality.
Crucially, Assoc. Prof. Antal situates Hungary’s electoral moment within a broader geopolitical reconfiguration. He underscores that Orbán has increasingly treated foreign and European policy “as a kind of geopolitical playing field,” cultivating alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian actors. The alignment with figures such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin reflects not only ideological affinity but also strategic positioning within an emerging transnational authoritarian network. As Assoc. Prof. Antal notes, Hungary has come to function as a “Trojan horse” for Putinist influence within the European Union, transforming the election into “a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest.” This external dimension is mirrored internally by a deepening social cleavage, as segments of Hungarian society remain firmly oriented toward the West while the regime consolidates a pro-Russian political base.
This external dimension intersects with internal tensions, including growing social discontent and a generational divide that reflects what Assoc. Prof. Antal describes as “a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism.”
At the core of Assoc. Prof. Antal’s analysis is the concept of authoritarian law and the “dual state,” where a formally normative legal order coexists with a politically driven prerogative structure. Under prolonged states of emergency and rule by decree, Hungary has become, in his words, “a contemporary example of dual state,” raising profound questions about whether elections can still function as instruments of democratic alternation. The opposition’s strategy of contesting the regime “by its own rules” thus reflects a deeper dilemma: whether authoritarian systems can be dismantled through participation in the very institutional frameworks they have reshaped.
Assoc. Prof. Antal’s assessment is stark. The durability of Orbánism, he suggests, lies in its capacity to adapt, radicalize, and survive through escalating authoritarianism. As he warns, the regime “can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial,” a trajectory that poses not only a domestic challenge but “a grave danger to both Hungarian and European societies as a whole.”
Here is the edited version of our interview with AssociateProfessor Attila Antal, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Geopolitics and Domestic Change Reshape Orbánism
From Left: Hungary PM Viktor Orban, Poland PM Beata Szydlo, Czech PM Bohuslav Sobotka and Slovakia PM Robert Fico pose prior their meeting in Prague on February 15, 2016.
Professor Antal, in your work you describe Hungarian authoritarian populism as a system that fuses political identity construction, executive aggrandizement, and the legal-institutional reorganization of power. In the 2026 campaign, do you see Orbánism still functioning as a hegemonic political project, or has it entered a phase of ideological exhaustion in which its capacity to define “the people” and monopolize popular sovereignty is beginning to weaken?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is a key issue for understanding the Orbán regime as a whole and the current situation. Indeed, Orbán has built an authoritarian regime in which the ruling parties have reigned as a kind of hegemonic center—or, to use Antonio Gramsci’s terminology, as a hegemonic power bloc. However, the transformation of the opposition has changed the situation and shaken this hegemonic project. This is, however, a complex situation: in recent years, Orbán had become so confident that he increasingly focused on geopolitics; more precisely, he treated foreign policy and European policy as a kind of geopolitical playing field, where he built power and political alliances with both Eastern and Western authoritarian regimes. It is no coincidence that the two most significant imperialist powers, Trump and Putin, have both assured Orbán of their support. So, I see the collapse of Orbán’s hegemonic project as only partially attributable to domestic political factors: we are witnessing that Orbán’s downfall has become a European and Western geopolitical issue and interest, and this resonates with the anger of Hungarian society, which, for the most part, remains oriented toward the West.
Enemy Narratives Persist but Face Social Limits
You have argued that authoritarian populism in Hungary relies on permanent enemy-production. In the current election, where Kyiv, Brussels, liberal elites, and domestic opponents are again being woven into a single antagonistic narrative, how should we understand this strategy: as a sign of discursive resilience, or as evidence that the regime has become trapped in repetitive forms of mobilization?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: The enemy creation of the Orbán regime is a highly complex story. There is no doubt that the constant creation of enemy images is one of the most prominent components of the authoritarian populist toolkit. Since 2010, the Orbán regime has operated with the following main enemy images: migrants, George Soros, civil society, Brussels, the gender politics, and the domestic political opposition.
From this perspective, 2022 marks a turning point, as Putin’s aggression required the construction of a new enemy image – an incredibly difficult task, given that the attacked Ukraine must be transformed into the new enemy. All of this is connected to the “Putinization” that has taken place within the Orbán regime. The propaganda and discursive framework are thus in place, yet creating this new enemy image also means that Orbán and his allies face the reality that a significant portion of Hungarian society is quite averse to Russians due to Hungarian history. At the same time, Orbán and his allies have succeeded in turning their own camp into a pro-Russian faction, which has resulted in an incredibly deep social cleavage.
Anti-Orbánism Unites a Fragmented Opposition
Tisza leader Péter Magyar begins a symbolic “one million steps” march to Nagyvárad, Romania, addressing reporters with supporters in Budapest, Hungary on May 14, 2025. Photo: Istvan Balogh / Dreamstime.
To what extent should the April 12 vote be interpreted not simply as a contest between Fidesz and Tisza, but as a referendum on whether a mature authoritarian-populist regime can still be electorally displaced despite media asymmetries, constitutional engineering, and patronage entrenchment?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: As I mentioned earlier, the Orbán regime itself and the new opposition forming against it can be understood within a geopolitical context. One could also say that, in many respects, the European Union has had enough of the Putinist influence that the Orbán regime represents as a “Trojan horse.” At the same time, this dissatisfaction is just as true of Hungarian society: at the moment, the opposition is held together by anti-Orbánism and the fact that the Orbán regime has seriously neglected governance and the basic needs of the Hungarian people. In this sense, the Hungarian election can indeed be interpreted as a referendum on the political system.
Dual State Logic Structures Political Competition
Your recent work on authoritarian law suggests that contemporary autocratic projects do not abolish legality so much as repurpose it. In the Hungarian case, how should we conceptualize the election itself: as a democratic mechanism still capable of producing alternation, or as a legally managed arena whose formal openness coexists with substantive authoritarian constraint?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: I think this is a very important question. When I analyzed the legal system of the Orbán regime, I drew on the “dual state” approach developed by Ernst Fraenkel, who studied the nature of National Socialist law in the interwar period. In this authoritarian state, there exists a legal system that is totally influenced by politics (which Fraenkel calls the Prerogative State), while at the same time there is the Normative State, which is less defined by political influence.
The Orbán regime has effectively been operating under a state of emergency since 2015, and since 2022, the prime minister has essentially been governing by decree. So, we are facing a contemporary example of dual state.
In my view, there is a very strong dilemma: can this system be overthrown by accepting its rules of the game and participating in the election, or can we overthrow the system as a result of a collective popular decision and establish new democratic electoral rules? It now appears that the opposition side of Hungarian society is choosing the former solution, that is, it wants to defeat the authoritarian system by its own rules. At the same time, it is certain that in the event of a possible change of government, we will have to face the problem posed by authoritarian law.
Enemy Logic Embedded in Governance Structures
Campaign poster of Viktor Orbán ahead of the April 12, 2026, parliamentary elections. Photo: Bettina Wagner / Dreamstime.
You have written about the “Constitutionalized Image of Enemy” embedded in the Hungarian Fundamental Law. How central is this constitutionalized enemy logic to the present campaign, especially in Orbán’s efforts to portray Tisza, Brussels, and Ukraine not as legitimate competitors, but as existential threats to the political community?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: The most recent amendment to the Fundamental Law took place in April 2025. The Hungarian Fundamental Law has indeed been used to create the prevailing political enemy images: certainly, with regard to migration and gender politics. I have termed this as the “Constitutionalized Image of the Enemy.” In this sense, therefore, the image of the enemy enshrined in the constitution did not play a role in the current campaign. At the same time, the 12th Amendment to the Fundamental Law established the Office for the Protection of National Sovereignty in December 2023, which played a very significant role in enabling the Orbán regime to essentially begin using state and bureaucratic tools against its political opponents and Hungarian society. In other words, the “dual state” mentioned earlier operates at the constitutional level as well.
Geopolitical Counterweight Shapes Opposition Rise
From the standpoint of your theory of authoritarian populism, is Péter Magyar best understood as a democratic challenger to Orbánism, or as a post-Fidesz corrective emerging from within the same political and ideological ecosystem?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is a very difficult question, and it would be too early to give any definitive answer at this stage. I would rather point out that the Hungarian election has a very strong geopolitical context. The Péter Magyar phenomenon and the European support structure behind it can also be understood as a geopolitical counterweight to Hungary’s shift toward Orbán and Putin. At the same time, there is no doubt that Orbán’s challenger was socialized within the Orbán regime and, in many respects, is attempting to correct the right-wing conservative politics that Orbán has betrayed. Here, however, it is worth noting once again that the vast camp behind the Tisza Party is far more complex and is currently held together by the constraints of the electoral system and anti-Orbánism.
Youth Revolt Meets Rural Entrenchment
Independent polling and current reporting suggest that younger voters are disproportionately aligning with Tisza, while Fidesz retains stronger support among older and more rural constituencies. Do you interpret this as a generational realignment against authoritarian populism, or merely as a contingent reaction to economic stagnation and elite scandal?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is also a key issue. There is no doubt that the authoritarian populism of the Orbán regime has, intentionally or not, created a generational and regional divide. A significant portion of rural and elderly Hungarian voters is far more susceptible to the enemy stereotypes and messages manufactured by the regime’s propaganda. Thus, there is a very strong generational revolt against Orbán’s authoritarian populism, particularly because Orbán is effectively blackmailing not only the EU but also Hungarian society: the former with constant vetoes, and the latter with constant threats of leaving the EU.
Middle-Class Erosion Fuels Political Backlash
Given your emphasis on the relationship between neoliberal restructuring and authoritarian populism, how important are material grievances—stagnant growth, inflation, deteriorating public services, and corruption fatigue—in weakening the regime’s capacity to maintain consent? Can economic deterioration disrupt a system whose legitimacy has long depended on symbolic conflict rather than policy performance?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: From a political-economic perspective, the Orbán regime was based on a class consensus in which the (upper) middle class and national big business formed an alliance. This was underpinned by pre-COVID-19 economic prosperity and massive amounts of EU funding. During this period of economic prosperity, however, a neoliberal state emerged that systematically dismantled public services, particularly in the healthcare and education sectors. When the polycrisis emerged (EU crises, pandemic, war), the dismantled Orbán state proved unable to handle the crisis: alongside the groups in the worst situations, the declining Hungarian middle class is the biggest loser of the Orbán regime. In other words, the rebellion against the Orbán regime is, in many respects, also of a material nature.
War Narrative Enables Democratic Suspension
How do you interpret Orbán’s continued “peace versus war” framing in light of your broader work on the politics of exception? Is this campaign discourse best seen as a contemporary form of emergency politics—one that converts geopolitical uncertainty into a justification for executive concentration and democratic suspension?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: As I mentioned, since 2022 the prime minister has essentially been governing by decree, encroaching even on areas of public policy where a state of emergency has no place. Meanwhile, political propaganda has constantly claimed that the Orbán regime is the only guarantee of peace. This has come to a head in the current campaign, with the Orbán machine conveying the message that the opposition is on the side of the Ukrainians and is dragging Hungary into the war. Governing through extraordinary measures is thus a political and communicative reframing: the Orbán regime has essentially suspended parliamentary democracy and portrayed the Ukrainian side (including the EU and the Hungarian opposition) as wanting war. I believe that this is not just some kind of fake news campaign, but the pure and frightening manifestation of an authoritarian state.
Sovereigntist Rhetoric Masks Strategic Dependence
Hungary’s pro-Russian posture has become a major campaign fault line. In your view, does Orbán’s Moscow-friendly stance still function as a coherent ideological expression of sovereigntist anti-liberalism, or is it increasingly becoming a liability as the war in Ukraine reshapes the moral and geopolitical boundaries of European politics?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: Orbán’s pro-Russian policy is a complex phenomenon. At least three aspects are worth highlighting. On the one hand, there is no doubt that, with regard to the international authoritarian right, there exists a kind of ideological coalition whose political-theoretical foundation is an anti-liberal conservative approach dating back to Carl Schmitt. Second, the Orbán regime has radically relinquished energy sovereignty in favor of Putinism. Third, there is also no doubt that Orbán and his regime are personally dependent on Putin’s system. Here, then, lies a radical contradiction: the Orbán regime, which is sovereignist at the level of propaganda, has deliberately renounced the sovereignty of the Hungarian state and is weakening European sovereignty in favor of Russia. The deeper implications of this can only be revealed after the election.
Militant Democracy as a Possible Path
You have shown how exceptional governance can become normalized. If Tisza were to win without a constitutional supermajority, would Hungary enter a phase of partial alternation without regime transformation—in other words, a situation in which a new government governs through institutions still structured by the old exception-centered order?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: I believe this is one of the main consequences of the dilemma I mentioned earlier: namely, how to dismantle an authoritarian system – either by adhering to its own rules or through more revolutionary means. If there is a change of government and a two-thirds majority is achieved, dismantling the authoritarian power of the Orbán regime will be a challenge. If, however, the change of government occurs with a simple majority, it may become inevitable to consider how the authoritarian system can be dismantled using the tools of militant democracy.
EU Influence and Domestic Revolt Intersect
Tisza Party volunteer collecting signatures in Mosonmagyaróvár, Hungary on June 5, 2024 during a nationwide campaign tour ahead of the European Parliament elections. Photo: Sarkadi Roland / Dreamstime.
What would a Tisza victory actually reveal about the Orbán system: that authoritarian-populist rule remains vulnerable to democratic challenge, or that only an insider-led revolt from within the regime’s broader political class can break such a system electorally?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: Based on what we’ve seen so far, I believe a potential victory for Tisza would have two implications. On the one hand, it would signal that the EU has had enough of Putinism directly influencing European politics. On the other hand, it would mean that authoritarian populism has become completely detached from social reality, and that Hungarian society has had enough of a political agenda built on constant hatemongering and the suspension of normality.
Authoritarian Consolidation Beyond Legitimacy
Conversely, if Fidesz were to retain power despite signs of economic strain, ideological repetition, corruption exposure, and opposition momentum, what would that tell us about the resilience of contemporary populist rule in Europe? Would it suggest that once authoritarian populism successfully constitutionalizes its power, elections alone become insufficient to dislodge it?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: I believe this is the most important issue of our time. Unfortunately, my grim assessment is that the Orbán regime is not seeking democratic legitimacy in the 2026 elections, but rather public support for its own dictatorial turn. I have long regarded the Orbán regime as a constitutional dictatorship, which means, on the one hand, that contemporary autocracies have a constitutional framework, and on the other hand, that certain segments of society have renounced democracy and accept the exercise of authoritarian power. Overall, therefore, the Orbán regime can only survive by becoming increasingly dictatorial, a trend that poses a grave danger to both Hungarian and European society as a whole.
Competing Visions of European Sovereignty
From the perspective of European integration, do you see this election as a struggle between two models of sovereignty: Orbán’s confrontational, anti-imperial, anti-Brussels sovereigntism and a more cooperative, rule-of-law-based claim to national interest that Tisza is trying to articulate? Or is that dichotomy too neat for the political realities of contemporary Hungary?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: First of all, the Orbán regime is indeed imperialist, and it pursues policies that serve Russian imperialist interests. The Hungarian election is crucial from the perspective of European integration, as the dilemma is whether there exists a European sovereignty that can be relied upon to stand up against authoritarian tendencies such as Trumpism and Putinism. I am committed to the idea, as Karl Loewenstein put it, that democracy must develop its own self-defense mechanisms and fight back – in our case, at both the member state and EU levels.
External Validation Meets Internal Resistance
Matryoshka dolls featuring images of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump displayed at a souvenir counter in Moscow on March 16, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.
Hungary has become a reference point within transnational right-wing networks, and Orbán continues to attract symbolic support from US and European conservative actors. In analytical terms, how much does this external validation matter domestically? Does it strengthen the regime’s legitimacy, or does it mainly reinforce Orbán’s self-image as a global ideological entrepreneur?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: From the perspective of ideological and political networking, the Orbán regime truly acts as a mediator between Western and Eastern authoritarian tendencies. This is why organizing the European far right is of key importance to Orbán. All of this undoubtedly has an impact on his own camp. At the same time, Orbán’s status as a “global ideological entrepreneur” represents the very project against which the Hungarian opposition has been able to unite and become committed to a change of government.
De-capture vs. Persistence of Orbánism
Finally, through the lens of your work on authoritarian law and exceptional governance, what would be the most theoretically significant post-election question for scholars to watch: whether electoral alternation occurs, whether institutional de-capture proves possible, or whether the deeper legacy of Orbánism survives regardless of who forms the next government?
Associate Professor Attila Antal: This is also one of the most important dilemmas of our era from both a Hungarian and a European perspective, as the political and legal consequences of the Orbán regime are toxic to European integration as a whole. On the one hand, just as happened after World War II, we must once again grapple with the question of how to take democratic action against authoritarian legal and political systems. On the other hand, and even more importantly: we must finally prevent the distortion of liberal democracies toward authoritarianism not only through constitutional institutions but also through effective economic and cultural means. In my view, it is crucial to examine how global capitalism and neoliberalism have distorted liberal constitutionalism and how they have eroded the social foundations of democracies through austerity measures and the dismantling of welfare systems.
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi argues that Hungary’s April 12 election represents a critical test of whether entrenched populist rule can be electorally challenged. While he notes that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” he emphasizes that deeper dynamics—“ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control”—remain decisive. Assoc. Prof. Csehi highlights growing limits in Orbán’s populist discourse, which “has lost its novelty,” alongside shifting political conditions marked by economic grievances and the rise of the Tisza Party as a credible challenger. Yet, even in the event of electoral turnover, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, potentially leading to “a prolonged struggle over state capacity.” Hungary thus offers a crucial case for assessing the resilience and limits of populist governance in Europe.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Robert Csehi, Associate Professor and Program Director of the Political Science Doctoral Program at the Corvinus University of Budapest, offers a nuanced and theoretically grounded assessment of Hungary’s evolving political landscape on the eve of a pivotal electoral contest.
As Hungary approaches its parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a critical juncture. After sixteen years of rule under Viktor Orbán, the election has come to signify more than routine democratic competition. It represents a broader test of whether entrenched populist governance—characterized by institutional consolidation, discursive dominance, and asymmetrical resource control—can be meaningfully challenged through electoral mechanisms. The campaign unfolds amid deep polarization, intensifying geopolitical tensions, and mounting concerns over democratic resilience, media pluralism, and institutional fairness. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced a new dynamic into Hungary’s political competition.
Against this backdrop, Assoc. Prof. Csehi underscores that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” while emphasizing that the stakes extend beyond electoral turnover to questions of “ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control.” In his view, the durability of Hungary’s populist system is no longer assured. He identifies emerging cracks within the governing discourse, noting that “the supply of the populist worldview… has become less creative” and “has lost its novelty,” with the government increasingly relying on repetitive narratives—particularly around the war in Ukraine—to sustain mobilization.
At the same time, structural shifts on both the supply and demand sides of politics are reshaping the electoral terrain. The rise of the Tisza Party, Assoc. Prof. Csehi observes, has created “a new channel for people to express their grievances,”while also reactivating political engagement at the grassroots level. Concurrently, worsening economic conditions have intensified public discontent, as “people’s everyday grievances are rising,” and the government finds it increasingly difficult to externalize responsibility for inflation, corruption, and declining public services.
Assoc. Prof. Csehi’s analysis situates Hungary within a broader comparative framework, highlighting the uncertain trajectory of mature populist regimes. While electoral defeat could mark “the end of the Orbán regime” in formal terms, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, generating “a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture.” Conversely, a renewed victory for Fidesz would signal that such regimes retain significant resilience, even under conditions of economic strain and ideological fatigue.
Ultimately, as Assoc. Prof. Csehi concludes, the Hungarian case offers a critical empirical test: whether “a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed… in an electoral process.” In this sense, Hungary’s 2026 election stands as a defining moment not only for the country itself, but for understanding the resilience—and limits—of populist rule across Europe.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Robert Csehi, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Populist Discourse Losing Creativity
Poster from political party Fidesz showing the opponents of Hungarian PM Viktor Orban surrounding billionaire philanthropist George Soros, Budapest, April 8, 2017.
Professor Csehi, welcome. Let me begin with the broader picture: In your scholarship, you argue that Hungarian populism has endured through the continuous reconstruction of “the people,” the redefinition of “the elite,” and the rearticulation of popular sovereignty. In the current campaign, do you still see this triadic logic operating effectively, or are its mobilizational limits beginning to emerge?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: I don’t think we do see some limitations to the effectiveness of this renewed populist discourse in Hungary. I think there are fundamentally three changes that actually challenge Orban’s effective populist discourse.
The first one is, in essence, that the supply of the populist worldview in the discourse has become less creative. It has lost its novelty. There were references to the war, for example, in Ukraine already in the 2022 elections—so four years ago. I mean, the war had just broken out, and they already used warmongering during that period. They pushed the campaign to the extreme in 2024 during the European parliamentary elections. They used essentially the same narrative, the same discourse. And they haven’t managed to really renew this discourse, and they keep talking about the same thing. They keep appealing to people’s fear of the war now. So, in comparison to previous elections, where every four years you had a new enemy and a new elite that was conspiring against Hungary and the government, we don’t really see that in 2026 compared to 2022 or 2024. So that’s one major change.
The second one obviously also affects, or concerns, the supply side of politics, and you already mentioned the rise of the opposition Tisza Party, which means there is actually a new channel for people to express their grievances and to mobilize their political demands behind a party which seems to have more legitimacy. It’s probably not the right word, but it resonates with people much better than the old opposition parties, which, on many grounds, have lost the trust of the people over the years—not only because they were ineffective, but also because they were involved in all sorts of scandals throughout the years. And now there is a new party which actually effectively challenges the government on a lot of issues and calls attention to many things that previously the old opposition, as we refer to it now, had not done. Plus, they really go down to the countryside, and they really do talk to people. They are engaging with the people and the electorate, and that makes a huge difference. So these are on the supply side, which are extremely relevant.
And then there is one demand-side feature which really has had a great effect. Since 2022, the Hungarian economy has not been doing very well. So, this has put a lot of things on the political agenda. People’s everyday grievances are rising, from inflation to public services, corruption, etc. It is not like Fidesz or Orban is able to cover these up anymore. We had skyrocketing inflation in the past few years, and it has become extremely difficult for the government to externalize these kinds of problems. And so people don’t shove it off anymore, like, “Oh, well, we’re still doing better no matter what the government does.” “Yeah, they might be corrupt, they might be wrong on certain policy issues, et cetera, et cetera, but we’re still better off than we were four years ago.” They don’t say that anymore. So, effectively, the economy plays a huge role in this entire story as well.
Election Tests Incumbency Survival
To what extent should the April 12 election be understood not merely as a contest between Fidesz and Tisza, but as a broader test of whether long-term populist incumbency can withstand mounting economic pressures, corruption fatigue, and shifting voter expectations?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: That’s a good question. It will definitely be a test of incumbency survival, in a sense, but, in the background, it is really about ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control—namely, the extent to which these can still be maintained and used to hold power. I’m not sure to what extent these can actually withstand all the structural- and agency-based challenges that I’ve mentioned previously. So, it is going to be an interesting test from a political science perspective as well, to see whether they actually manage to survive or not, and to what extent a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed or won over in an electoral process. The jury is still out, and I’m really looking forward to seeing what happens afterwards.
EU Framed As Background Enemy
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives for a meeting with European Union leaders in Brussels, Belgium on Dec. 13, 2019. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.
You have shown that Orbán’s Eurosceptic populism often adopts an anti-imperialist framing, portraying Brussels as an external elite constraining Hungarian sovereignty. How central is this narrative in the current campaign, and does it retain its resonance in a context where access to EU funds and economic stability are increasingly salient concerns?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: It’s a very important point in the elections. Not in terms of the EU being a central topic—by all means, that’s not the case. Really, Orbán’s campaign is focusing on the war in Ukraine. Still, they have managed to somehow link this up with the EU. They have had billboard campaigns showing Ursula von der Leyen and Manfred Weber together with Volodymyr Zelensky, suggesting that the EU is taking the money of Hungarians and channeling it to Ukraine and to President Zelensky. So, they try to mingle these things together, mix them, and bring in the EU as, again, this sort of background power that is mistaken and on the side of war.
They have populist, moralist, discursive division, where Orbán portrays himself as a pro-peace political actor, whereas everybody else who does not agree with him, by definition, becomes pro-war, even if it does not really make sense.
So, in a sense, the EU is still there; it is referenced as, once again, occupying a pro-war position. As I said previously, they try to repeat the same claims as they did in the 2024 European parliamentary elections—drawing these very fine lines between who is on the side of peace and who is on the side of war, and they clearly place Brussels and the EU on the side of the war. And as I said, it is not only about the war per se. They also try to refer to the financial side of it, bringing this back repeatedly—claiming that the EU is taking your money, holding back funds, and channeling them to Ukraine. So, they frame it as financing the war instead of supporting Hungarian people, etc.
So, it is not center stage—I would say it is still the sort of antagonistic relationship between Ukraine and Hungary at the moment—but they do try to bring this into the discussion: that the EU is somewhere in the background, conspiring and doing all sorts of shady and harmful things. And the reason why they do that is that over the past years they have managed to convert their electorate into the most Eurosceptic segment of the population. In comparison to all other party supporters—with the exception of Our Homeland, the far-right party—probably the most Eurosceptic electorate is behind Fidesz at the moment. So it is just natural that they also play those tunes for their voters.
Tisza Promises Policy Reset
Tisza leader Péter Magyar begins a symbolic “one million steps” march to Nagyvárad, Romania, addressing reporters with supporters in Budapest, Hungary on May 14, 2025. Photo: Istvan Balogh / Dreamstime.
From the perspective of European integration, do you interpret this election as a confrontation between two competing models of EU membership—one sovereigntist and illiberal, the other oriented toward re-integration through rule-of-law compliance and institutional alignment?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: Yes and no. On the one hand, I would agree that Orban has had a very particular idea of defending sovereignty in the EU. He has thought that the defense of national sovereignty and national interest could only be pursued in a confrontational way. You have to use the channels of the European Council or the Council itself to block things and not really participate in negotiations and deliberations.
There have been multiple occasions where Orban was not present—they sent him out to have a coffee. From research, we know that Council negotiations have shifted somewhat in recent years. What we would describe as a kind of de-Europeanization in the Hungarian approach to EU affairs is what has occurred on multiple fronts.
Compared to that, Tisza and Magyar’s approach are definitely different from Orban’s on some issues. You mentioned the rule of law. Tisza claims that it will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as soon as it is in government. It also promises to resolve some of these rule-of-law issues and to bring back the funds that have been frozen under Orban’s regime. So, we can expect a return to more normal relations with the EU. This promise is also supported by the personnel envisioned to lead foreign and European affairs within the party.
That said, I say yes and no because I do think that Tisza also supports a model of European integration based on strengthening intergovernmental relations, as opposed to a supranational takeover in multiple areas. We have seen this time and again. They have run into conflicts on different policy measures, even within the European Parliament and within their own faction in the European People’s Party.
So, on the one hand, there is likely to be an effort to restore relations and the credibility of Hungary as a partner within the EU. On the other hand, there will be areas where they confront and challenge the direction of European policy. It is not going to be a return to the old days where Hungarian representatives simply nodded to everything the European Union demanded from the government. Rather, it will involve a stronger representation of national interests, but in a more cooperative—as opposed to confrontational—manner than Orban has pursued.
Turnover Won’t End Orbánism
If Péter Magyar and the Tisza party were to win, would that necessarily signify the end of the Orbán era, or has Orbánism become sufficiently institutionalized within the state, the media landscape, and patronage networks to persist beyond electoral turnover?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi:The easy answer, obviously, is that electorally this would be the end of the Orbán regime, at least temporarily.But when we really look into the structural features, I would say no. This will, in fact, be a very interesting period to study, to see how deep the roots of the regime actually went and grew, and how these roots actually act and behave under a new government.I would say there is fundamentally a deeper institutional structure here, which could make the life of the new government miserable on multiple accounts—from financial oversight to judicial oversight, etc. There are many aspects where the government has to govern effectively with its hands tied behind its back. So it is going to be difficult.
I would imagine that this will be something like a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture. They will try to take back some of these institutions with whatever legal means there are. Nevertheless, the government will have greater room for maneuver in terms of policies in many areas, and I do think that they can make changes that could have a positive outcome or resonance with the public.
And one thing we cannot really exclude as a possibility—again, the poll numbers are all over the place—but most independent pollsters show a 15 to even 20 percentage point lead for the opposition party, which could effectively also mean that Tisza would gain a two-thirds, or constitutional, majority. That would be a completely different ballgame, because with that, they could de-capture those institutions more easily. To what extent this would be done in a democratic way, or whether they would repeat something similar to what we have seen during the Fidesz era, I am not sure. I am just saying that there might be an opportunity for the new government to actually de-root the system, provided that they have a constitutional majority.
No Majority, No Regime Change
Some observers suggest that even a Tisza-led government could face significant institutional constraints stemming from constitutional engineering and entrenched loyalist networks. How should we conceptualize the possibility of electoral alternation without substantive regime transformation?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: This goes in line with my previous answer. Without a constitutional majority, what you will see is that there is likely to be governmental turnover, but there is not going to be a regime transformation. And then, there are different scenarios as to what will happen. If there is a constitutional majority, then we see a re-orientation or a re-democratization. If there is only governmental turnover without real regime transformation, what kind of room for maneuver does the new government have?
How do we conceptualize this? So this is definitely going to be an interesting case to analyze in terms of re-democratization attempts—whether they actually go deep or whether they are just going to hover at the surface, which we have seen before. We even had a study on this, on local governments, examining how they try to re-democratize even under a populist authoritarian regime. We might actually see something of this sort at the national level. But once again, the possible measures might be more confined if there is only a simple majority in Parliament, and that would definitely limit the options of the next government.
Loyalty And Shielding Protect Fidesz
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán gives a speech to convince his respondents in Szeged on March 4, 2014.
Your work on populist resilience to corruption highlights how such regimes adapt to and withstand scandal. In Hungary today, which mechanisms—discursive reframing, institutional shielding, or partisan loyalty—appear most crucial in sustaining support for Fidesz?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: Given that the regime has reached its peak and is really a mature system, from a populist regime perspective, I would say, in line with our theoretical frame, that it is mostly the institutional shielding and the partisan loyalty that dominate at the moment. Let me give you an example, which is essentially a reflection of both. There is this huge scandal about the former governor of the National Bank (György Matolcsy) and his son. There is a scandal going around that hundreds of billions of forints were actually channeled out into private funds—essentially, they were just paid out to… we do not even necessarily know whom. We do know that the governor’s son really benefited from this. And what is happening now is that there is practically no police investigation going on, or, if there is, it is extremely slow. We do not really know what is happening. In the meantime, we already know that, for example, the governor’s son has tried to, or has already started to, ship his luxury car collection to Dubai, and these kinds of things.
So wealth is going out, and in the meantime, nothing is really happening. And nobody is really talking about the Matolcsy family, etc. So there is this partisan loyalty going on, and there is this institutional shielding, which does not allow these institutions to actually do anything about it. There is no prosecution going on. There might be some prosecution, but we do not really know why it is so limited, why it is so slow, why it is kept secret, and why they basically let the governor’s son do anything he pleases, given the fact that we know that hundreds of billions of forints were, in a sense, privatized. So, I do think that these two mechanisms are the most dominant ones.
Discursively, they do not even really try anymore. It is more like, “Well, we have nothing to do with the issue—let the institutions run their course,” but the institutions are not doing anything. So, it is just a sort of bogus narrative behind it.
What has really changed, on the other hand, is Péter Magyar’s rise in politics, because he is essentially an insider. And when he appeared, that was one of his biggest assets in politics, since this insider status was extremely relevant. When he talks about corruption claims against the government, it seems to mobilize anger much more effectively. This is what really matters here, because, on many issues, anger is a very strong motivational factor in politics, including in unseating incumbent governments. This is absolutely not a good feeling, I have to say, but it does trigger mobilization, and mobilization is key, obviously.
Peace Narrative Masks Polarization
The campaign has been strongly shaped by geopolitical narratives, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine. Has Orbán’s positioning as a “peace-oriented” leader maintained its electoral appeal, or is his perceived proximity to Moscow becoming a source of political vulnerability?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: That’s not an easy question to answer. First of all, his portrayal of himself as “peace-oriented” is really just buying into his populist discourse of being a pro-peace person, while everybody else who does not agree with him is, by definition, pro-war. So, once again, you have this Manichean, moralistic kind of division within politics that populists are very fond of. Essentially, this type of division turns every political discussion and agenda point into a life-or-death situation. Here, it is literally portrayed as such: if we do not want this, then the next day, everybody is sent to the Ukrainian front and people will die there.
But I would not buy into this “peace-oriented leader” narrative at all. There is a columnist in one of the Hungarian weeklies who consistently describes Orbán as aggressor-oriented, and I think that is probably a better portrayal of what he actually is—without taking any normative position. If you ask what he means by peace, the government does not really have a clear idea of what peace would entail or how it should be achieved. In that sense, the aggressor-oriented description may be more accurate.
As for whether this narrative still works, I think it holds up quite well among the core electorate. We know from sociological and political studies that most of Orbán’s supporters come from the countryside, with lower levels of education and generally more limited economic means. Among these groups, the message still resonates. Talking about the war—through fearmongering, warmongering, and similar appeals—continues to be effective.
What they have also done quite effectively, and this is why they remain competitive, is to turn uncertainty around the war into anger. Studies on populism show that fear is not the main driver; anger is. Fear reflects uncertainty, whereas anger is directed—it needs a target. They have managed to convert uncertainty and fear into anger.
To some extent, President Zelensky also inadvertently contributed to this dynamic. A particular quote was picked up and amplified by pro-government media, portraying it as a threat to Orbán. This helped channel anger toward Zelensky and Ukraine.
They also continue to layer in additional discursive elements, such as claims that “they are taking your money.” Recently, the prime minister held town hall meetings across the country, where he accused protesters of siding with Ukraine and attempting to divert Hungarian resources there. This reflects a level of political rhetoric that is, frankly, quite unprecedented. Similarly, incidents such as damage to the Druzhba gas pipeline have been reframed as evidence that Ukraine is withholding Hungary’s energy supplies and weaponizing resources. This contributes to a constant, artificially orchestrated sense of anger directed at Ukraine. In that sense, the narrative still resonates with certain segments. There is some degree of creativity, but in terms of the broader narrative, they have not significantly shifted away from the war-centered discourse seen in 2022 and 2024.
Regarding Trump and Moscow, the situation is more complicated. Trump’s own actions—particularly the wars associated with his leadership—no longer support the earlier framing of him as a “pro-peace” figure. As a result, the government has largely stopped emphasizing this aspect and instead downplays it. Attempts to reinterpret such developments rhetorically have not been particularly convincing.
As for relations with Moscow, recent leaks concerning communications between Hungarian and Russian officials have raised questions. Depending on interpretation, these either reflect pragmatic diplomacy or suggest alignment with Russian interests, including the sharing of sensitive information.
Overall, both the Trump factor and the Russian connection appear to increase the government’s political vulnerability.
Trump Effect Mostly Symbolic
US President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrive for a working dinner at the NATO Summit in Brussels, Belgium on July 11, 2018. Photo: Gints Ivuskans / Dreamstime.
Hungary has long been embedded in a broader transnational network of right-wing populist actors. How significant is the “Trump effect” and Musk’s influence in this election, both in terms of symbolic validation and in reinforcing Orbán’s model of governance?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: I think it is really symbolic. I am not sure that, in terms of governance features, there is much there. Quite the reverse, I would say. It is really some American governors and high-ranking politicians who keep talking about copying this or that from Orbán, when it comes to, for example, dealing with LGBTQ issues in their states, etc. So, Orbán tries to position himself—and to some extent successfully—as a governance genius who should and could be copied by some of these international partners.
On the other hand, the extent to which they actually contribute to Orbán’s success is largely symbolic. As I said, the campaign is mainly about the war at this moment, so it is not really a question of whether there is transnational conservative endorsement or not—it does not matter that much. I do not see it that way. We had CPAC (the Conservative Political Action Conference) Hungary, which is a sort of mimic meeting of CPAC in the US where they invite right-wing politicians and intellectuals. It is a significant event. Just a couple of days ago, they announced that J.D. Vance, the US Vice President, is coming next Tuesday to Hungary. They probably wanted Trump to come but could not manage it, so it will be J.D. Vance. And the American government has already signaled that it supports Orbán’s re-election.
But, what matters most, once again, for the future—or for the short-term political room for maneuver of the government—is really the European partners. The EU and other European right-wing leaders are closely watching the election, because it could fundamentally change dynamics within the European Council and more generally within the integration process in the EU.
Hungary Tests Populism’s Limits
Finally, Professor Csehi, from a comparative perspective, what would each plausible outcome—a renewed Fidesz victory, a Tisza-led breakthrough, or a contested post-election scenario—tell us about the broader trajectory of populist rule in Europe and the capacity of democratic systems to dislodge entrenched illiberal incumbents?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: If Fidesz wins, this is still going to be an interesting scenario and an interesting political experience, which would tell us that, despite economic strains and despite the ideological fatigue that the government shows, and despite a strong challenger—a new challenger party emerging—the system still has some resilience. Then we would need to find out what actually triggered this resilience, or what made this resilience possible.
Now, this resilience, obviously, would send a message that electoral challenge is still possible, even with a populist regime that is extremely mature in its institutional design and structural features, etc. Therefore, none of these populist regimes are actually immune to a more systemic fatigue, and, if they want to survive, they need to be more creative in how they maintain the system.
But definitely, with a Tisza win, we would get very good information on how much democratic backsliding there actually was in the system, across different aspects. Most likely, this would generate immense knowledge that we could gain, and that would be extremely valuable for future studies. So I am very much looking forward to seeing what will happen. Those are my two cents on this point.
In this insightful ECPS interview, Professor Johannes Andersen offers a sobering diagnosis of Denmark’s evolving political landscape following the 2026 general election. He argues that the country is undergoing a profound structural transformation marked by voter de-alignment, declining trust, and increasingly fragmented party competition. While voters remain loosely anchored within traditional blocs, many no longer feel represented by specific parties, resulting in growing electoral volatility. At the same time, political parties are shifting from long-term representation toward short-term, issue-driven strategies. As Professor Andersen warns, this dynamic creates a paradox: expanded democratic choice coexists with rising confusion and distrust—pointing to a more unstable, yet still functioning, democratic system.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Johannes Andersen, Professor of Political Science at Aalborg University, offers a sobering and analytically rich assessment of Denmark’s evolving political landscape in the aftermath of the 2026 general election. Professor Andersen’s diagnosis captures a deeper structural transformation unfolding beneath the surface of what has long been considered one of Europe’s most stable democratic systems.
In the wake of Denmark’s closely contested 2026 general election, the country stands at a pivotal political moment—marked by fragmentation, the resurgence of the populist radical right, and renewed geopolitical tensions over Greenland. While the campaign was driven largely by domestic concerns such as the cost-of-living crisis and migration, the results also point to deeper shifts in political trust, voter alignments, and the structure of democratic competition. Professor Andersen’s analysis situates these developments within a broader transformation of democratic politics, emphasizing that Denmark is no longer experiencing episodic volatility but a sustained process of structural change.
At the core of his argument lies the claim that both voters and political parties are undergoing simultaneous and mutually reinforcing transformations. As he underscores, “we are witnessing really fundamental changes in this system,” driven by evolving voter attitudes and shifting party strategies. Voters, while still loosely anchored within traditional bloc structures, are increasingly detached from specific party identities – “voters no longer feel represented by a political party”—resulting in unprecedented levels of electoral fluidity. The fact that roughly half of the electorate has changed party allegiance in recent elections, with even higher volatility anticipated, illustrates the depth of this de-alignment.
At the same time, political parties have adapted by moving away from long-term representational commitments toward short-term, issue-driven competition. Rather than defending stable constituencies, they increasingly seek to maximize electoral appeal through targeted policy responses – “we are the best at solving this problem”—thereby reinforcing a political logic in which responsiveness replaces representation. This transformation is particularly visible in the growing centrality of migration politics, which now structures competition across both left and right.
Professor Andersen also highlights the gradual erosion of the welfare state as a unifying political project. Once the cornerstone of Danish social democracy, it has receded from the center of political discourse, replaced by fragmented issue politics and competing populist narratives. In this context, even strong executive performance does not necessarily translate into electoral gains, as demonstrated by the limited political returns from Denmark’s handling of the Greenland crisis.
Taken together, these dynamics point to what Professor Andersen describes as a new and inherently unstable political equilibrium—one defined by expanded voter choice but declining trust. As he cautions, “we are developing a new political culture based on growing confusion among voters,” where democratic dynamism coexists with increasing alienation.
The interview that follows explores these tensions in depth, beginning with the question of whether Denmark’s fragmentation reflects a temporary fluctuation or a more profound transformation of democratic politics.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Johannes Andersen, revised so slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Politics Has Shifted from Representation to Competition for Voters Across Issues
The Danish nation has cast its votes in the parliamentary elections. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Johannes Andersen, welcome. Let me begin with a foundational question:The 2026 election produced a highly fragmented outcome that appears to unsettle Denmark’s historically stable party system. Drawing on your work on political trust and voter attitudes, would you interpret this as a conjunctural fluctuation, or as evidence of a deeper process of de-alignment—where traditional cleavages and partisan loyalties are being replaced bymore individualized, volatile, and contingent forms of political engagement?
Professor Johannes Andersen: I would go for the second half of your question, because we are witnessing really fundamental changes in this system, and this has been going on for 10-20 years—perhaps even longer. There are two structural elements here that are very important. The first is that voters have changed their way of looking at politics, partly because political parties, at the same time, have changed their way of thinking about politics, developing politics, and approaching these questions more broadly. So, we have two structural elements that are both changing, and they are intertwined. I will try to explain that a little further.
When it comes to the voters, in the last election, half of the Danish electorate voted for a new political party. They changed their position in that sense. But most of them are still located within the blocs we know: the red bloc, or socialist bloc, and the blue bloc, the liberal or conservative bloc. So, voters are still, to a very large degree, positioned within these blocs. But they are changing parties within the blocs. As I mentioned, half of the voters changed their party in 2022. This time, my guess is that even more people—perhaps 55 percent of the voters—will change political parties.
So, in a way, you can see that voters no longer feel represented by a political party. This is one aspect of the fundamental change we are dealing with: people are becoming more confused and more insecure. They may still have a basic feeling that they are red or blue, but they are no longer linked to a particular political party.
That means that when election time comes, you see a great many voters searching for guidance. Last time, in 2022, up to 70 percent of voters used those tests published in newspapers, where they try to determine which party they should vote for. And many of them, on their first attempt, simply refused to choose the party the test suggested. But this is actually revealing. It points to a fundamental change: the feeling that one is not represented by a political party. That has changed profoundly for voters.
On the other hand, we have the political parties which are no longer oriented toward a particular group they want to defend, fight for, and help build a better society for. They are not trying to represent such groups in the best way they can. Instead, they are trying to compete for voters. They are becoming broader and broader in their appeal, and they are becoming better and better at identifying what a particular group wants. Then they propose political measures accordingly: we are the best at solving this problem; we are the best at solving that problem.
When it comes to issues, for example, water has been very important in the 2026 election. It could be pollution of the water. It could be the question of an ageing population—how should we deal with that? Or it could be the rising prices in the shops, where parties propose giving people a check, an amount of money they can use to buy groceries, especially food.
So, political parties are becoming more and more occupied with single issues, rather than with any structural or strategic project aimed at defending particular groups. On the one hand, then, we have voters who are becoming more insecure and who do not feel represented in any deeper sense. On the other hand, we have political parties that are increasingly eager to win more and more voters, no matter what.
And one of the issues that has become especially important for political parties—both in the red and blue, blocs—is immigration. The immigration question has become central even for the Social Democrats, and now also for the Socialist People’s Party, which is a left-wing party. They are becoming more and more interested in signaling that they do not want immigrants, especially those with a Muslim background. This issue has become very important for all of them, and they are now in competition over who is most eager to throw people out if they are involved in any kind of illegal activity—or perhaps even just visible Muslim religious activity. In that sense, they are eager to expel them, or even to throw them out.
The immigration issue—and especially immigration from Muslim countries—is, in a way, central. All these other issues they deal with—wanting to give people more money so they can buy food, wanting clean water, and so on—are linked to the immigration question in one way or another. They have to make sure that this does not become a way of scaring people. This is the fundamental structural situation in Denmark: on the one hand, people feel unrepresented; on the other hand, political parties are no longer truly interested in representing anyone. This is the issue, the structural issue, for understanding many of the details.
The Welfare State Has Faded from the Center of Danish Politics
Denmark votes in parliamentary elections in Copenhagen, Kastrup, Denmark, on November 1, 2022. Voters head to polling stations to cast their ballots in the general election. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
The electoral decline of the Social Democrats raises questions about the durability of catch-all party strategies. To what extent does this trajectory reflect not only the exhaustion of social democratic “big tent” politics under conditions of late modernity, but also a broader erosion of long-term voter attachments and collective identities that historically underpinned social democratic dominance?
Professor Johannes Andersen: I have reflected quite a bit on this question, because it opens up many important dimensions. One of the great strengths of the Social Democratic Party has been its development of the central idea of welfare rights. Citizenship has been understood not only in political and democratic terms, but also in terms of welfare-based social citizenship. The Social Democrats were able, as a strategic defense of workers and society more broadly, to build and expand the welfare state in increasingly comprehensive ways.
However, almost without anyone clearly noticing, this perspective has gradually been left out of both their political practice and public debate. Both the Social Democrats themselves and the organizations behind them, such as the unions, have become less focused on the welfare state—although unions and civil society actors still tend to emphasize universal welfare rights more than political parties do. At the same time, social organizations continue to defend welfare rights, but they face an increasingly difficult struggle. This is largely because the Social Democrats, historically the central defenders of the welfare state, have shifted their focus, becoming more and more preoccupied with the immigration issue.
This creates a highly uncertain electoral trajectory. On the one hand, the Social Democrats could regain support in future elections, perhaps reaching around 30 percent—high by contemporary standards, though still below their historical peak of around 40 percent, when they were the dominant force in defending the welfare state. On the other hand, they could also decline further, potentially falling to 15 percent or even lower. Such volatility is now entirely conceivable.
What we see, then, is a party increasingly focused on maximizing its electoral support by targeting specific issues. The Social Democrats, like other parties, recognize that voters can be mobilized around short-term concerns. If they can create the impression that they are capable of addressing these issues effectively, they may gain support—but they are doing so in direct competition with a growing number of parties.
This helps explain why there are now 12 political parties represented in Parliament. They are competing across a wide range of issues, and in the process, two key elements are eroding: first, the sustained defense of the welfare state system, and second, the belief among voters that the welfare state will reliably support them in times of need.
In turn, this opens the door to what we might describe as a more populist mode of politics. Parties increasingly link specific issues to direct promises – “we will solve this problem,” “we will address that concern”—while often adopting a critical stance toward elites. This dynamic is particularly evident among right-wing parties, especially those drawing support from rural constituencies, but it is also visible among left-wing parties, which similarly frame themselves as defenders of “the people” against elites or against the erosion of welfare state protections.
In short, this is a complex and evolving situation. The welfare state—both its defense and its development as a foundational pillar of Danish politics—has largely receded from the political agenda. Instead, across the 12 parties now represented in Parliament, there is a growing tendency to focus on short-term issues.
Geopolitical Leadership No Longer Guarantees Electoral Reward
Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen at a press conference during the COVID-19 crisis, Copenhagen, March 17, 2020. Photo: Francis Dean | Dreamstime.
Despite a potential “rally-around-the-flag” dynamic linked to the Greenland crisis, Mette Frederiksen did not translate geopolitical leadership into electoral gains. Does this indicate a growing decoupling between executive performance and electoral reward, suggesting that political trust has become more conditional, situational, and less anchored in traditional forms of leadership legitimacy?
Professor Johannes Andersen: Yes, that is correct. The Greenland issue did not ultimately help, although it appeared to do so at the outset. One of the reasons the election was called is that Mette Frederiksen saw an opportunity to gain additional support, and initially it seemed plausible that this could be achieved. However, the international crisis unfolded within the context of a centrist government composed of the Social Democrats, the Moderates, and the Liberals. While this coalition formally spans traditional bloc divisions, an analysis of Moderate voters suggests that they closely resemble those in the blue bloc. In that sense, one could argue that the government effectively contained two blue bloc parties alongside one from the red bloc.
During the Greenland crisis, the foreign minister was highly visible and active in defending Denmark’s interests as a kingdom, particularly in relation to Greenland. His performance was widely recognized, and voters appeared to acknowledge that he was doing a good job. Yet, when it came to the election, this did not translate into electoral gains. Support shifted within blocs—some voters moved toward the blue bloc, others toward the red—but there was no significant transfer of support across blocs. In effect, the situation resulted in a draw: neither side was able to capitalize electorally on the crisis.
This outcome likely came as a surprise to the government. Mette Frederiksen, who personally decided on the timing of the election, may have expected a more favorable result than what ultimately materialized.
A New ‘Center’ Is Emerging as a Strategic Position Against Extremes
Election campaign posters featuring Liberal leader and former Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen displayed on a street during the campaign period in Copenhagen, Denmark on June 15, 2015. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
With Lars Løkke Rasmussen occupying a pivotal position, how should we rethink the notion of “the center” in fragmented multiparty systems? Is it still a sociologically grounded median space, or increasingly a strategic and discursive construction emerging from systemic fragmentation?
Professor Johannes Andersen: As I mentioned, when we look at the voters of the Moderates, their profile is almost identical to that of voters in the blue bloc. Their support base aligns closely with the average blue bloc voter, and their appeal increasingly reflects this orientation. At the same time, they emphasize that they do not belong to either the traditional right or the left. Instead, they construct an image of both sides as “extremes,” positioning themselves as an alternative to these perceived poles.
However, Denmark has a long tradition of a different kind of center, represented by the Radical Left (Radikale Venstre), which is a particularly interesting case. Historically, this party emerged from socially engaged small farmers in the countryside who were struggling to sustain their livelihoods. It represented their political voice during a period of hardship. On the other hand, the party advocated for social rights; and it supported economic liberalism. In this sense, it embodied a form of social liberalism that has been deeply rooted in Danish political tradition. Indeed, social liberalism played a significant role in the development of the welfare state, even if the Social Democrats were the primary force advancing and defending it. This combination of social and liberal ideas constituted what we might call the “classic” center in Danish politics.
Today, with the Moderates and Lars Løkke Rasmussen in the lead, we observe a markedly different conception of the center. Their position is defined less by a substantive ideological synthesis and more by a strategic stance against what they label as “extremism.” They seek to exclude the political extremes and present themselves as the responsible and pragmatic alternative within the system.
In this sense, we are witnessing the emergence of a new kind of center. Unlike the traditional social-liberal center, this formation reflects a different logic of political competition. It could even be described as a form of “centrist populism,” should this tendency continue to develop. In some respects, the Moderates may display more pronounced populist features than some of the traditional right-wing populist parties in Denmark.
Their approach involves defending what might be termed “the good people” and their interests—specifically, those who do not identify with more radical positions. They portray themselves as protecting these citizens from the uncertainty and instability generated by both radical left- and right-wing actors. Rather than targeting conventional elites, they construct a political elite associated with extremism, against which they position themselves as defenders of ordinary citizens.
In this way, we can observe the emergence of a new form of centrism—one that is no longer anchored in a stable sociological base but instead arises from a strategic and discursive effort to represent “the common people” against perceived political extremes.
Stability Is Promised, but Volatility Defines the New Political Landscape
How should we normatively and sociologically assess the growing role of centrist kingmaker parties in proportional systems? Does their pivotality enhance pluralist representation, or does it risk distorting democratic accountability while reshaping citizens’ perceptions of fairness and representation?
Professor Johannes Andersen: You raise an important point, particularly with regard to stability. If we look more closely at the Moderates, for example, a year ago they were close to the threshold of parliamentary representation. Their level of support fluctuates significantly—it rises and falls, almost in a “U-shaped” pattern, if you will—and at present they happen to be near a peak.
However, they have emerged from a position where they were not even represented in some of the polls. It is entirely possible that they could return to that position in the future. This reflects a broader dynamic I mentioned earlier: on the one hand, voters increasingly feel unrepresented, and on the other, parties no longer see themselves as representing clearly defined constituencies. The result is a highly fluid political system.
This is what some scholars describe as “hyperpolitics,” where a wide range of actors are constantly communicating, mobilizing, and competing. In such a context, it becomes possible, within a very short time frame, for new centrist parties or initiatives to emerge. Their strategic objective is often to prevent so-called “extremists” from gaining political influence.
My expectation is that even if the Moderates were to disappear, another actor could readily assume the same role. This is because the underlying logic is politically attractive: it acknowledges the existence of conflict but downplays its depth and seeks to avoid polarization. The core argument is that allowing “extremists” to shape political outcomes would generate uncertainty and instability.
In this sense, these parties offer voters a promise of security and stability. At the same time, however, they are themselves embedded in the same uncertainty that characterizes the broader system. Voters are unsure where to turn, and parties are continuously introducing new issues and policy proposals in an effort to remain competitive.
Overall, this points to an increasingly unstable political landscape—one in which volatility, rather than equilibrium, may become the defining feature.
The Danish People’s Party Has Shifted to a More Symbolic, ‘Aristocratic’ Populism
Election posters from various Danish political parties ahead of the June 2019 parliamentary election, Copenhagen, May 20, 2019. Photo: Deanpictures / Dreamstime.
The resurgence of the Danish People’s Party suggests renewed populist energy without systemic takeover. Does Denmark exemplify a model of “contained populism,” and to what extent should this be understood less as a party phenomenon and more as a set of diffuse attitudes embedded within the electorate?
Professor Johannes Andersen: To be honest, I am not entirely sure. The reason is that we are witnessing some rather specific developments in Denmark. The Danish People’s Party, for instance, has undergone a noticeable transformation in its political outlook and style of communication. It has become fundamentally critical of all other political parties, positioning itself as the only authentic representative of “the people.”
At the same time, it has adopted a style that could be described as almost aristocratic. It presents itself as more conservative than even the Conservative People’s Party and seeks to stand above the rest, while claiming to defend all Danes. This stylistic shift is significant. Although it may appear merely rhetorical, it reflects a broader repositioning: the party now frames itself as a guardian of the nation as a whole, rather than as the representative of a specific social group.
In this sense, while the strategy retains a familiar populist logic—defending “the people” against others—it does so in a more generalized and symbolic manner. This marks a departure from earlier, more targeted forms of representation.
At the same time, the Danish People’s Party faces growing competition from the Danish Democrats, who have adopted a more concrete and socially grounded approach. Their focus is on rural communities—people living in small towns who are directly affected by the closure of local shops, medical facilities, and other welfare institutions. These voters often feel that development is bypassing them, that their communities are in decline, and that their economic prospects are increasingly uncertain.
The Danish Democrats seek to give voice to these concerns by advocating for rural development and emphasizing respect for farmers and local livelihoods. In this sense, they represent a more specific, socio-economic form of populism, in contrast to the broader, more symbolic approach of the Danish People’s Party.
What we see, therefore, are two distinct models of populism operating within the right wing of the blue bloc. One is generalized and national in scope; the other is more targeted and rooted in particular social groups. The interaction between these two forms generates a certain degree of turbulence within the political landscape. Rather than cooperating, these parties are engaged in direct competition, each seeking to outmaneuver the other.
Democratic Dynamism Paired with Growing Alienation
And the final question, Professor Andersen. Would you characterize Denmark’s current trajectory as one of adaptive democratic resilience, or do these developments reveal underlying reservoirs of distrust and alienation that could, under specific conditions, enable a more decisive populist radical-right breakthrough?
Professor Johannes Andersen: In a way, I would say that we are developing a new political culture based on growing confusion among voters, with more and more people becoming increasingly uncertain. At the same time, we have what I would call central, government-based mass political parties that are primarily focused on attracting as many voters as possible, without being particularly concerned with their voters’ underlying interests.
This creates a situation in which voters and political parties are constantly moving in and out of alignment with one another. Some voters feel they can no longer trust politicians, while some politicians seek support by claiming to defend all people, fundamental rights, and citizens against major threats. This dynamic opens new opportunities for political parties to gain access to power, while also expanding the range of choices available to voters. As we can see, there are now 12 political parties represented in Parliament, and voters are continually trying to determine which party to support—often changing their choice from one election to the next.
This results in a new and inherently unstable situation which, at its best, may be seen as reflecting positive democratic dynamics, since voters have the freedom to choose among a wide array of alternatives. That is a strength. However, this same instability is also contributing to growing distrust toward politicians. People are becoming increasingly critical of politics and political actors.
As we can observe, the level of voter participation is relatively low and continues to decline. If this trend persists, it could become a serious problem. The Danish electoral system has traditionally been characterized by a high level of voter turnout, but this willingness to participate is now decreasing. We are therefore facing a fundamental challenge.
On the one hand, the system can still be described as a functioning democracy, with voters willing to explore different political options. On the other hand, it is producing increasing confusion among voters, who are becoming more critical of the democratic system as such.
In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Tomaž Deželan offers a sobering assessment of Slovenia’s post-2026 electoral landscape, portraying it as a microcosm of broader European democratic tensions. While the election outcome reflects a degree of democratic resilience, it simultaneously reveals deepening fragmentation, rising anti-establishment mobilization, and the normalization of populist political styles. Professor Deželan argues that Slovenia is undergoing a structural transformation in political competition, marked by leader-centric mobilization, evolving campaign strategies, and the growing influence of digital communication. Most strikingly, he contends that mainstream and center-left actors are increasingly adopting populist tactics themselves, thereby weakening their normative advantage. In this sense, Slovenia exemplifies a wider trend in which democratic actors risk eroding liberal-democratic standards while attempting to counter populism.
In the aftermath of Slovenia’s closely contested 2026 parliamentary elections, the country has emerged as a revealing case for scholars of democratic resilience, party-system transformation, and the adaptive capacity of populism in contemporary Europe. Long regarded as one of the more stable and institutionally consolidated post-socialist democracies, Slovenia now appears to be entering a more uncertain phase marked by electoral fragmentation, ideological polarization, and the growing normalization of political styles once associated primarily with the populist radical right. The narrow result of the election may have prevented an outright illiberal breakthrough, yet it also exposed how fragile the liberal-democratic center has become under mounting domestic and transnational pressures.
In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Tomaž Deželan, Chair of Policy Analysis and Public Administration at the University of Ljubljana, offers a nuanced and sobering interpretation of Slovenia’s evolving political landscape. Rejecting simplistic binaries, he argues that the current moment reflects both “a sign of democratic resilience” and the simultaneous emergence of “competitive illiberalism” within a formally democratic order. In his account, the 2026 election did not simply confirm the endurance of liberal democratic forces; it also revealed the strengthening of alternative actors and strategies that challenge the older political equilibrium from multiple directions.
A central theme of Professor Deželan’s analysis is the structural transformation of political competition itself. Slovenia’s fragmented party system, he suggests, can no longer be understood merely through the lens of episodic volatility. Instead, it points toward a deeper reconfiguration in which traditional party collusion, leader-centered organization, new gray zones of funding, and increasingly unregulated campaign practices coexist with novel forms of mobilization through civil society, digital platforms, and technocratic-populist appeals. Particularly striking is his observation that “we are bringing the messy world into Slovenia,” as strategies pioneered elsewhere in Europe and beyond increasingly shape domestic political behavior.
The interview’s central insight emerges most sharply in Professor Deželan’s comparative reflection on the changing repertoire of democratic actors themselves. As right-wing populists gain confidence, sophistication, and digital reach, he argues, mainstream and center-left forces have struggled to articulate a compelling non-populist response. Instead, they have increasingly adopted emotional and adversarial tactics of their own. Hence his stark conclusion: “democratic forces have, to some extent, responded to populism with populism,” and in doing so, they risk ceding further ground rather than reclaiming democratic initiative. This diagnosis is especially important because it shifts attention away from populist actors alone and toward the strategic exhaustion of those who claim to defend liberal democracy.
Professor Deželan also situates Slovenia’s trajectory within a broader European and transatlantic context. He traces the reconceptualization of Europe in more sovereigntist and ethno-national terms, the continued resilience of Janez Janša’s SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party) through leader-centric and affective mobilization, and the rise of anti-establishment formations such as Resnica as symptoms of deeper crises of trust and representation.
Taken together, Professor Deželan’s reflections suggest that Slovenia is not an outlier but a condensed laboratory of wider democratic tensions. This interview therefore offers not only an interpretation of one national election, but also a timely warning about how liberal-democratic systems may erode when their defenders begin to mirror the very logics they seek to resist.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Tomaž Deželan, revised so slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Slovenia Shows Both Democratic Resilience and Emerging Competitive Illiberalism
Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Deželan, let me begin with the broader picture: In light of the razor-thin electoral margin between liberal and right-wing blocs, how should we theorize Slovenia’s current trajectory—as a case of democratic resilience under stress, or as an early-stage manifestation of competitive illiberalism within a formally consolidated democracy?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: First of all, thank you for the invitation. It is actually both. Obviously, there are different dynamics going on in Slovenian society, and they have been present for quite some time. But you are right: the latest election does show, in a way, a sign of democratic resilience, which has always been the case, particularly with support for the center-left liberal parties. Because, basically, when the center-right parties did not end up as at least relative winners of the national election, it was usually the case that the center-left liberal parties managed to secure at least a relative majority, often due to some sort of fear of autocratization of society or growing illiberalism. So, in that sense, we can see a clear demonstration of democratic resilience.
This is particularly evident in the fact that it was the first case since 1996 that the main governmental party ended up as the winner of the election. But it was a tight one, as you said—razor-thin—so there are also other things going on.
We also have to recognize that, even though the main governmental party, Gibanje Svoboda, ended up as a relative winner, there was, during the election campaign, a very clear idea that the left bloc is the key safeguard against growing illiberalism and autocratization. For example, Slavoj Žižek described it as a civilizational decision, and in many ways a lot of Slovenes, particularly supporters of the center-left, felt this way.
However, we also have to acknowledge that this party and the current Prime Minister did demonstrate some authoritarian actions or styles of governing, which were quite heavily criticized within the public. The current government also faced corruption scandals that were not fully examined and concluded in the period leading up to the election.
Moreover, we observed some visible steps by the current government and the Prime Minister that clearly portrayed big business, as well as certain professions, as parts of the elite, which indicates elements of populism. So, in that sense, the bloc that is supposed to defend democracy and liberal democratic values does demonstrate some problematic features.
At the same time, there is competitive illiberalism emerging, particularly in the form of two parties that can claim some degree of electoral success. This is especially true of the Christian Democrats, a minor center-right party that managed to gain support even though they did not strongly differentiate themselves from the dominant center-right Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and its leader Janez Janša. This suggests that appearing as a close competitor, but also as an ally of the main illiberal force in the system, can be a successful strategy. As a result, we now have two alternatives that clearly support a more illiberal agenda and can generate more than 10% of the vote, which is quite significant in Slovenian terms.
So, in that sense, we can claim that there is a sign of democratic resilience—the democratic forces did not lose the election, if not outright winning it. At the same time, there is a clear indication of emerging alternatives to the well-established model of Janez Janša and SDS, and that is something new.
Fragmentation Signals a Shift Toward Post-Cartel Politics
To what extent does the pronounced fragmentation of Slovenia’s party system reflect a structural reconfiguration of political representation—perhaps akin to a transition toward “post-cartel party” dynamics—rather than episodic electoral volatility?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: There’s something going on there as well. For example, it’s true that political parties still heavily depend on the state, and obviously they are almost completely funded by the state. They also really try to avoid competition. Particularly the traditional parties like the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats and the conservatives, such as the Slovenian Democratic Party, try to avoid heavy competition. This kind of collusion is a pattern. There is also quite a lot of professionalization, particularly in terms of new ways of communication with the public, especially among the larger parties. Particularly the Slovenian Democratic Party, which has the upper hand here.
But obviously, there is also a clear response to a failure of the current model, and basically we can see that the calls for this kind of technocratic style of government mixed with populism are very clear, particularly with the two—I already mentioned the Christian Democrats—with this party that particularly calls for better governance of the economic system. This is their main kind of—I won’t say a differentiating point from the Slovenian Democrats, as they are actually supporting the same agenda—but it is obvious that they have managed to set the pace in that area, so basically this is their salient topic.
But at the same time, the new party, Democrats, led by Anže Logar, former foreign minister in the Janša government, has managed to instill this response to a failure of communication between the two camps. Basically, he is very much into this technocratic model of governance. He also kind of demonstrates this general—I won’t say shift of Slovenian parties, because more or less they have always been like that—but a very clear feature of centralized power concentrated around the leader or a very close leadership.
And then, not all of these new parties demonstrate this pattern of alliances with social movements. At the same time, however, the relatively new Gibanje Svoboda party, like the Liberal Democrats, does exhibit something that is not a feature of the traditional cartel model—namely, close alliances with social movements. In this sense, it was actually social movements that decided the election, as they effectively shaped the campaign leading up to it, which was at least partly run by external advisors from companies linked to both private and publicly affiliated Israeli organizations.
Basically, civil society actually alerted to this campaign that was supposedly also linked to the Slovenian Democratic Party, even though this has not been confirmed yet. There have been some connections—this is clear now—but the rest is still open and up in the air. But anyway, it was civil society that managed to mobilize a large part of the center-left voters to get to the polling stations and actually defend this democratic resilience bloc.
In a way, we can definitely see some sort of post-cartelization of Slovenian parties, but there is no clear model here, because different strategies are employed by different parties that do manifest this, I would say, important move toward a different kind of model. Particularly due to new avenues of funding for Slovenian political parties, it is very clear that even though almost all funding comes from the state, there have been and there are clear avenues and clear indications of funding that is quite a gray area. For example, there are links to different foreign agents or foreign interests that invest in companies supporting one or the other options. As well as what we have clearly seen is that the regulation of the electoral campaign is far too narrow and has basically opened up a field for a longer, at least medium-term campaign that is quite unregulated, as well as quite prone to abuse in terms of funding, and also of some conventions that were usually, or prior to these elections, quite well abided by.
So, in a way, we are bringing the messy world into Slovenia, which is getting messier by the minute, and obviously we are also seeing the strategies of other political parties—particularly populist and right-wing parties that we have been observing across Europe and the world—entering the Slovenian political arena. This was not the case during our period of independence; it started to appear in the middle of the past decade, but now it is very clearly present, and basically all parties are employing those tactics.
Slovenia Is Not Turning Eurosceptic—It Is Reimagining Europe
Photo: Marko Bukorovic / Dreamstime.
Drawing on your work on Europeanization, how do you interpret the increasingly salient tension between pro-European liberalism and nationalist-populist contestation? Does this indicate a recalibration of Slovenia’s embeddedness within the EU’s normative and institutional order?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: Unfortunately, you could say so even though there is still very strong support for European integration and for the EU, citizens have always been quite fond of Europe as such, because it has long been seen as a signal or a concept of progress. Europe was the alternative to Yugoslavia during the communist period and has remained so, which is why there has always been a positive notion of Europe.
That said, particularly after entry into the EU and following various crises, people have learned that Europe can also be a messy thing. Many people have become at least somewhat disillusioned, especially when they observed similar political dynamics reappearing at the European level as those seen in the national arena—particularly the rise of populism and right-wing themes. Europe had always been perceived as something better for Slovenes: more civilized, more democratic, and more committed to respecting democratic values.
However, when Eastern European leaders and countries began to demonstrate behavior that most Slovenians rejected—whether in the European Parliament or other EU institutions—this created a degree of public disappointment. This also provided an opportunity for conservative parties to take advantage of such sentiments, although it should be noted that the radical left—or simply the left—has occasionally attempted to capitalize on this kind of resentment as well. Primarily, however, it was the main party on the right, the Slovenian Democrats, that began to reshape this image of Europe—maintaining support for the EU but advocating for a different kind of Europe. For instance, another center-right party, which also has a member of the European Parliament and a former president, promotes a more economically oriented, arguably neoliberal, but still globally competitive Europe.
By contrast, the main party on the right has redefined Europe in terms more aligned with the Visegrád model—a Europe that is sovereigntist and strongly ethno-national. In a sense, this represents a Europe that is no longer Europe as it was previously understood by Slovenians. Therefore, I would not necessarily describe this as growing Euroscepticism or outright disappointment with Europe per se. Rather, it reflects a reconceptualization of Europe shaped by a certain degree of disillusionment—one that aligns more closely with authoritarian models in the East, envisioning a Europe that allows Central and Eastern European countries to thrive without imposing democratic reforms or rule-of-law constraints, which are perceived as limiting its global effectiveness.
This is what we have been observing, and it was not the case during Slovenia’s accession to the EU or in the early stages of membership. Of course, these developments should also be understood in relation to broader trends across Europe—particularly in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland—which serve as important benchmarks. More recently, especially with the Trump administration, this shift has gained an entirely new level of legitimacy.
Janez Janša Mobilizes Both Supporters and Opponents
Prime Minister Janez Janša delivers a keynote speech at a protest in support of Ukraine in Ljubljana, March 2, 2022. Photo: Dreamstime.
Right-wing populist leader Janez Janša’s Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) demonstrates enduring electoral resilience. How might we explain the persistence of its support base in terms of ideological anchoring, leader-centric mobilization, and affective polarization?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: That’s quite a challenging question, but it is actually all of the things you mentioned, because there is no party without the leader—there is no Slovenian Democratic Party without Janša. There simply is not, even though this is the best-organized party in the country. This mobilization around the leader is as strong as possible. In that sense, having a figure like him—who has led the government three times, in different periods, often during crises—is crucial. It is discussed and debated, but his role during Slovenia’s independence is undeniable. So, in that sense, this is the key programmatic point and also the central element that mobilizes the public in a very effective manner. Supporters of Janša become highly emotional when it comes to him, but even those who oppose him react emotionally as well. He also has a strong mobilizing effect on the left.
And sometimes this proves to be crucial when competing with him. In a way, it is a very strong party organization from the ground to the top, with a clear hierarchy and a rather authoritarian style of leadership and governance that resonates with voters who want to see a strong leader. I would not necessarily say authoritarian, but certainly a strong leader, especially given that, across the board, we have often had leaders who did not demonstrate the same level of leadership skills. He does, and that resonates well within the center-right camp.
What is particularly interesting now is that they are gaining support—becoming more and more successful—with what I would call unusual constituencies. Previously, their base consisted largely of more traditional voters from non-urban environments—older and less educated—but now they are achieving quite significant success with the youth vote, which they did not demonstrate in the past. At the same time, they continue to retain their traditional voters.
So, Janša and the party are being transformed in line with what we are seeing with the MAGA movement in the US. They have developed a very sophisticated network of individuals who are highly effective in communicating their messages to different audiences, and this is also evident in their outreach to younger voters. In that sense, they have reinforced the image of Janša as a clear leader and the best possible choice, particularly through effective youth mobilization. This is largely due to their youth wing, as well as networks of influencers who are not their traditional supporters but whom they have managed to bring on board. They are clearly thriving in this area.
So, you could say there is no party without Janša, but you could also say that they are developing a sophisticated model that does not rely solely on mobilizing their traditional base but is also bringing in new constituencies—and this is what frightens the left the most.
Anti-Establishment Politics Is Filling the Vacuum Left by Institutionalized Parties
The parliamentary entry of anti-establishment actors such as the right-wing populist movement Resni.ca suggests a widening space for anti-systemic politics. To what extent does this reflect deeper crises of institutional trust and political representation?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: You’re right—“Resnica” actually means “truth” in direct translation, and it clearly reflects a lack of trust, or distrust, in virtually everyone. Slovenian society suffers from low levels of trust in politicians, political parties, state institutions, other social institutions, and even fellow citizens. In that sense, Slovenians trust no one.
Resnica, which originates from resentment toward the Janša government and its actions during the pandemic, embodies this dynamic. Initially, it was expected to be a temporary, post-pandemic phenomenon that would eventually fade. However, that has not been the case. The movement managed to secure a visible share of votes in elections immediately after the pandemic, and although its momentum appeared to stall for a time, it re-emerged in this national election.
At this point, it has successfully reasserted its anti-establishment position, largely because all other parties are perceived as part of the establishment. Even Janša and New Slovenia—the Christian Democrats—cannot credibly claim to be anti-establishment, as they have all been in government at least once. In fact, every party currently represented in parliament has governed at some point. This is where Resnica holds a clear advantage.
This is also how it generates support and secures votes. While it is not the only party with anti-establishment origins, parties such as the Left—now part of the government and previously a supporting actor—have lost much of that appeal. As they became more institutionalized and integrated into formal politics, they relinquished their anti-establishment identity, which Resnica has effectively appropriated. As a result, Resnica draws support from across the ideological spectrum. Some of its voters come from the radical left, others from the extreme right, but its core appeal lies in its anti-establishment, anti-elite positioning.
Looking ahead, its role could be pivotal in government formation. Without Resnica, it may be difficult to form a government, regardless of its composition. However, participation in government would require the movement to transform itself, effectively becoming part of the establishment it opposes.
Immediately after the elections, Resnica signaled that it would push its priorities, but within a short time, it became apparent that such participation could fundamentally alter its identity and mode of operation. It is now publicly stating uncertainty—or even reluctance—about cooperating with any party associated with the elite, which effectively includes all other actors. This makes its future trajectory highly uncertain.
There is also the possibility that its support base could grow further, particularly if new elections were held due to a failure to form a government, although this scenario seems unlikely. What remains to be seen is how any engagement with the establishment would affect its electorate.
What is clear, however, is that this represents a new pool of voters in Slovenian politics. Even though some center-left voters abstained, overall turnout remained stable because these are voters who typically do not participate but were mobilized by Resnica. In that sense, it represents a genuine game changer in Slovenian politics.
Riot police guard Slovenia’s parliament in Ljubljana as protesters rally against corruption, government policies, and economic crisis, November 27, 2012. Photo: Markspickz | Dreamstime.
Consensus Politics Is Eroding Under Pressure for Structural Reform
Slovenia has historically been viewed as a relatively stable post-socialist democracy. Do current developments indicate convergence with more polarized Central European trajectories, or does Slovenia retain distinctive institutional and cultural buffers?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: That’s a very good question. Of course, Slovenians value stability and appreciate periods without crises. This is also why the anti-Janša sentiment is so strong in Slovenia, as Janša is often associated with disruption, and Slovenians generally do not want disruptions. In that sense, this consensual style of governing—without major breakthroughs but also without major crises—is very much preferred in Slovenian society. Stability therefore remains very high on the priority list for virtually all political parties, even though some of them, particularly Janša’s SDS, are sometimes tempted to pursue more radical steps when in government.
I would expect stability to remain the dominant feature this time as well, particularly given the configuration of parties that have entered parliament, as well as the patterns of political behavior that Slovenians are accustomed to among their political elite. Stability is likely to be the primary objective, and it is already very high on the agenda in post-election negotiations, partly due to the global situation and conflicts such as those in Iran, Gaza, and Ukraine, but also in terms of internal dynamics.
At the same time, things are changing. In particular—though not exclusively—center-right political parties are increasingly prioritizing major reforms, that is, broader structural changes, which were often avoided in the past because people tend to resist change. In this sense, we may be witnessing a gradual transformation of Slovenia’s traditionally consensual, stability-oriented system toward a more erratic, but perhaps also more consequential, political arena—one that is being actively pushed, in particular, by some of the current opposition forces.
Slovenia Is Following a Populist Script Written Elsewhere
From a comparative perspective, how does Slovenia’s 2026 election refine our understanding of the evolving drivers of populist radical right (PRR) mobilization across Europe?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: As I said before, we are seeing a script that has been written elsewhere. In particular, the links of some party leaders to populist regimes or populist leaders abroad show how they benchmark their behavior and, at times, even rely on similar infrastructures. So, the script has clearly been written elsewhere. As I noted earlier, the success of Trump—rather than the Trump administration itself, but his re-election—along with the subsequent actions of his administration, has amplified what Slovenian populist agendas had already been in the past. As a result, these actors are now more willing and more confident in openly articulating positions that they previously sought to conceal or at least soften.
What we are seeing now is the growing importance of social networks and digital platforms, along with a hybridization of political communication in which traditional modes are reinforced by more postmodern forms, and vice versa. This has been accompanied by a higher degree of sophistication and a significant increase in resources devoted to these strategies—something that was not evident before.
We also observe a clear emphasis on emotional mobilization, particularly through fear. Notably, fear has also become a feature of what we might describe as left-wing populism. In this sense, democratic forces have, to some extent, responded to populism with populism. Center-left parties, which traditionally did not rely on such strategies, have struggled to develop effective alternatives to counter the populist dynamics emerging on the right.
This is also where civil society, as mentioned earlier, has played a role. Although civil society organizations—especially those advocating for democracy and the rule of law—are typically among the most active and vigilant actors, the intensity of the electoral contest has led to the widespread adoption of populist tactics across the political spectrum. And this trend is unlikely to reverse.
In essence, the democratic resilience bloc appears to have concluded that, at least for now, populism is the only effective means of countering populism on the right. More broadly, this suggests that pro-democratic forces currently lack the tools necessary to engage effectively with the forms of populism we are witnessing—not only globally, but also in Slovenia.
Without Compromise, Slovenia Risks Majoritarian Polarization
Looking ahead, do you anticipate a re-consolidation of liberal-democratic governance through coalition pragmatism, or a continued expansion of anti-systemic and populist actors under conditions of fragmentation, digital disruption, and socio-economic uncertainty?
Professor Tomaž Deželan: I would like to be an optimist. Of course, many Slovenians hope—and across the board, particularly those on the center-right who did not support the radical right but rather the moderate right—hope to see liberal-democratic institutions to consolidate as we have experienced them over the past three decades, and even their further deepening. They genuinely feel this way and hope for it.
But I am not such an optimist. I think the current result represents an opportunity, even though the outcome is highly uncertain and it is unclear who will ultimately form the governing coalition. Still, I would say this may be a last opportunity to return to a more consensual, albeit sometimes unstable, form of government. In such a scenario, we may again see changes in government in the final year before elections, as was usually the case in the past, though not this time.
At the same time, there would be a renewed necessity for negotiation, deliberation, and dialogue within the system. What I fear—and what many Slovenians seem to fear—is that, if new elections are held, we may end up with clearly defined blocs and a type of system that we do not want: one dominated by majoritarian logic, lacking deliberation, and prone to creating disruptions in society, ultimately further polarizing the Slovenian political community, which is already highly strained.
So, in a way, there is a broad hope that political forces will come together. The most viable configuration for such an outcome would likely involve cooperation between the Social Democrats, the center-left liberals such as Gibanje Svoboda, the Christian Democrats, and the Democrats of Anže Logar, a center-right liberal party. In other words, bringing together Christian Democrats, liberals, and Social Democrats to form a stable, moderate center.
Such a coalition may not produce dramatic transformations or elevate Slovenia into a dominant position in any particular domain, but it could respond to the expectations of the Slovenian public—namely, stability, a moderate style of governance, and responsiveness to ongoing crises without generating new divisions. At present, there is a widespread concern about deepening divisions and a strong desire to avoid them.
In this ECPS interview, Professor Marco Tarchi offers a nuanced interpretation of Italy’s recent referendum defeat, arguing that the outcome reflects not merely institutional disagreement but a deeper political conflict shaping democratic contestation. Rather than a technical rejection of judicial reform, the vote became a broader judgment on government authority, where competing visions of democracy—majoritarian mandate versus constitutional constraint—collided. Professor Tarchi underscores how political narratives, rather than policy details, drove voter behavior, with opposition forces successfully framing the reform as a threat to institutional balance. At the same time, he highlights the enduring role of historical memory and ideological legacies in structuring contemporary debates, while emphasizing that the result ultimately reveals both the resilience of Italy’s constitutional order and the limits of governing authority in a polarized political environment.
Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has suffered her first major political setback after voters rejected her proposed judicial reform in a referendum, with around 54% voting “No.” Although framed as a technical institutional change, the vote quickly evolved into a broader judgment on her government, revealing growing political vulnerability ahead of next year’s general election. High turnout—close to 60%—underscored strong public engagement, yet failed to deliver the mandate Meloni sought. Opposition forces have seized on the result as evidence that she can be defeated, while analysts suggest the loss has weakened her image of political invincibility and complicated her wider constitutional ambitions, including proposals to strengthen executive authority. Amid economic pressures, geopolitical tensions, and escalating rhetoric toward the judiciary, the referendum signals a more competitive and uncertain political landscape.
Answering written questions from the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Marco Tarchi, Professor Emeritus at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Florence, offers a sharply contextualized reading of the outcome—one that shifts attention away from institutional technicalities toward the primacy of political conflict and historical memory. For Professor Tarchi, the referendum cannot be understood as a straightforward assessment of judicial reform. Rather, it was “heavily influenced by the political conflict between the center-right government and the center-left opposition,” a confrontation that “overshadowed the discussion on the specific content of the reform.”
At the core of this conflict lies a deeper struggle between competing conceptions of democracy and legitimacy. The government framed the reform as the fulfillment of an electoral mandate—“a commitment to those who had granted it the legitimacy to govern”—thus advancing a majoritarian understanding of democratic authority. By contrast, opponents invoked the limits of the rule of law and the post-fascist constitutional order, effectively denying that “the people [are] the ultimate and primary source of government legitimacy” when institutional balances are at stake. In this sense, the referendum crystallized a long-standing tension between popular sovereignty and constitutional constraint.
Crucially, Professor Marco Tarchi situates this tension within Italy’s enduring historical framework, noting that “the appeal to anti-fascism has certainly served to mobilize left-wing voters” and continues to influence political contestation, particularly given the post-fascist lineage of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI). In this respect, historical memory operates not merely as rhetorical strategy but as a durable structuring force in contemporary Italian politics.
Far from signaling institutional fragility, however, Professor Tarchi interprets the outcome as evidence of systemic resilience: the referendum demonstrates that popular will can “grant a mandate” but also “revoke it,” reaffirming the solidity of Italy’s constitutional architecture. Yet politically, the message is unmistakable. What prevailed, as he concludes, was “a purely political conflict”—one that has re-opened Italy’s competitive political arena and exposed new limits to governing authority.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Marco Tarchi, revised so slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Green ballot paper for Italy’s constitutional referendum on judicial reform, with pencil. Photo: Michele Ursi / Dreamstime.
The Referendum Reflected a Politicized Clash, Not a Technical Judgment
To what extent should the recent referendum defeat be interpreted not simply as a rejection of a specific judicial reform, but as a broader refusal of an attempt to redefine the constitutional equilibrium between popular mandate and judicial autonomy?
Professor Marco Tarchi: It should be noted that the referendum result was heavily influenced by the political conflict between the center-right government and the center-left opposition, which overshadowed the discussion on the specific content of the reform. The issue of the constitutional balance between the popular mandate and the autonomy of the judiciary was raised by the opposition to accuse the government of seeking an authoritarian shift—an accusation obviously rejected by those who had voted for the reform in Parliament. The referendum result demonstrates that supporters of the “No front” succeeded in convincing a majority of the electorate that the reform would alter this balance.
In your view, what does this referendum reveal about the political risks that populist-led governments incur when they seek to transform anti-elite rhetoric into concrete institutional engineering?
Professor Marco Tarchi: Since I don’t consider the Meloni government populist, this question makes no sense to me.
Opponents Denied That Popular Mandate Alone Could Justify Institutional Change
The Meloni government presented the reform as a necessary correction to judicial corporatism, while its opponents depicted it as a threat to the post-fascist architecture of checks and balances. How should we understand this clash of narratives in light of competing conceptions of democracy, sovereignty, and the rule of law?
Professor Marco Tarchi: In the Meloni government’s view, the reform—having been included in the program presented to voters in 2022—constituted a commitment to those who had granted it the legitimacy to govern. It thus reflected a substantive interpretation of the concept of democracy, one also implicit in the use of a popular referendum to approve or reject choice made by the parliamentary majority.
Opponents, however, invoked the limits of the rule of law and, in this case, denied the government the right—despite its adherence to parliamentary procedures—to alter the existing balance of power. In doing so, they signaled that they do not regard the people as the ultimate and primary source of governmental legitimacy.
Does the outcome suggest that, in Italy, the judiciary still retains a distinctive symbolic status as a constitutional counter-power, such that reform projects in this domain are almost inevitably judged through the prism of democratic suspicion?
Professor Marco Tarchi: “Democratic suspicion” toward the reform was expressed only by opposition parties and the association representing the judiciary, which proved to be a de facto political counter-power, significantly contributing to the referendum result.
References to Anti-Fascism Will Continue to Shape Opposition Strategy
Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy and leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, speaks at an electoral rally ahead of the national elections in Turin, Italy, September 13, 2022. Photo: Antonello Marangi / Dreamstime.
To what extent did the referendum confirm that constitutional politics in Italy remains deeply shaped by historical memory, particularly the legacy of fascism, anti-fascism, and the constitutional settlement designed to prevent the concentration of power?
Professor Marco Tarchi: The appeal to anti-fascism has certainly served to mobilize left-wing voters, but it has already been used on numerous other occasions since the creation of the Meloni government, due to the post-fascist ideological affiliation of Fratelli d’Italia, and will most likely continue to be used by the opposition to counter the government’s actions in many other areas.
How far can this vote be read as a test of the limits of majoritarianism in contemporary Italy—namely, the point at which electoral strength ceases to confer legitimacy for altering institutions intended to restrain executive dominance?
Professor Marco Tarchi: This vote demonstrates that the concept of popular willcan be used either to grant a mandate to transform the institutional structure—as happened in the 2022 elections—or to revoke it, as in the referendum.
Majoritarian Reform Has Occurred Before Without Any Populist Label
How does the politicization of judicial reform in this case illuminate the tension between majoritarian conceptions of democracy and liberal-constitutional principles within populist radical right governance?
Professor Marco Tarchi: On a previous occasion—the 2001 reform passed by the Amato government, which radically modified Articles 114 to 133 of the Constitution without making concessions to the opposition’s proposals—the “majoritarian conception of democracy” was applied without there being any populist party in government and without any denunciation of a violation of liberal constitutional principles.
In the Italian case, where populism has often thrived on the denunciation of intermediary powers, does the referendum reveal that the rhetoric of popular sovereignty is more effective when directed against institutions than when deployed to restructure them?
Professor Marco Tarchi: Beyond this specific case, many examples in other countries – from the Austrian case of 2000 onwards – show us that this is one of the typical limits of populist action.
Political Conflict Overshadowed the Substance of the Reform
How should we interpret the high turnout in this referendum? Does it suggest that a significant segment of the electorate understood the vote as a constitutional choice of first-order importance, or that the referendum was successfully transformed into a plebiscitary judgment on the government itself?
Professor Marco Tarchi: The judgment on the government certainly prevailed, but it is impossible to empirically calculate how much the specific content of the reform influenced the outcome.
How should we situate this referendum within the longer trajectory of Italian populism, particularly the enduring distrust toward political and judicial institutions since the crisis of the First Republic?
Professor Marco Tarchi: Italian populism, especially during the crisis of the First Republic, extolled the judiciary’s role as a bulwark against political corruption. If the referendum vote was viewed from this perspective, one would paradoxically argue that it marked a success for the populist vision of the relationship between professional politicians and judges. But I repeat, what prevailed in this case was a purely political conflict.
No Political Actor Has Easily Translated Support into Structural Reform
Could the defeat be seen as evidence that populist radical right actors are more successful at politicizing dissatisfaction than at building broad consent for complex institutional redesign, especially when such redesign touches the judiciary?
Professor Marco Tarchi: With the already stated reservations about the alleged populist nature of the Meloni government— which I dispute —I would answer yes. I would add, however, that other political actors also found it difficult to transform the dissatisfaction that had fueled their success into consensus for the institutional overhaul. This was demonstrated by the failure in 2016 of Matteo Renzi, then both head of the government and the Democratic Party, to pass his constitutional reform to abolish the Senate.
To what extent can the referendum be read as a test of “state capture” dynamics, and does its outcome suggest resilience or fragility in Italy’s institutional architecture?
Professor Marco Tarchi: Given the result, one should deduce a substantial solidity of the Italian institutional architecture.
In comparative perspective, how does this referendum differ from those moments in which governments in Turkey, Hungary or Poland were able to advance far-reaching judicial transformations? Does Italy’s constitutional culture still provide stronger antibodies against that trajectory?
Professor Marco Tarchi: I see no substantial similarity between the Italian situation and the others mentioned, which are also very different from each other.
The Future of Reform Now Depends on the Next Election Outcome
To what extent might this result affect Meloni’s wider constitutional ambitions, especially proposals aimed at strengthening executive authority or introducing direct popular legitimation for the premiership?
Professor Marco Tarchi: This certainly represents a setback to Meloni’s proposed reform of the role of Prime Minister. Whether it can be revived or permanently shelved will depend on the outcome of the next general election.
Finally, what does this referendum tell us about the medium- and long-term trajectory of Italian and European politics: are we witnessing a momentary setback for a successful populist radical right government, or an early sign that constitutional resistance can still interrupt projects of hegemonic consolidation?
Professor Marco Tarchi: I repeat that I do not consider the Meloni government a “radical right-wing populist government,” and therefore this question is irrelevant to me.
In an era marked by intensifying polarization and electoral fragmentation, France’s 2026 municipal elections offer a revealing lens into the country’s shifting political equilibrium. In this ECPS interview, Professor Philippe Marlière argues that while mainstream parties retain urban strongholds, the populist radical right continues to consolidate its territorial and sociological base. Crucially, he underscores that “polarization… tends to benefit the far right,” enabling the National Rally to advance its normalization strategy within an increasingly conflictual political environment. Beyond electoral outcomes, the interview highlights deeper structural transformations—from cross-class realignment to the erosion of centrist politics—suggesting that France is not experiencing a rupture, but a gradual reconfiguration that may decisively shape the dynamics of the 2027 presidential contest.
Giving an in-depth interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics at University College London, offers a nuanced and empirically grounded assessment of France’s evolving political landscape in the wake of the 2026 municipal elections.
Held against the backdrop of an increasingly polarized European political environment, the elections revealed a fragmented yet structurally revealing electoral map. While mainstream parties retained control of major metropolitan centers such as Paris, Marseille, and Lyon, the populist radical right—anchored by the National Rally (RN)—continued to expand its territorial base across smaller municipalities and peripheral regions. Notably, the RN and its allies consolidated support in medium-sized towns and traditional strongholds in northern deindustrialized zones and the Mediterranean southeast, while also making inroads into previously resistant regions such as western France. At the same time, opinion polls suggest that RN candidates remain above the 30 percent threshold ahead of the 2027 presidential race, underscoring their growing electoral competitiveness.
As Professor Marlière emphasizes, these results must be understood through the dual lens of fragmentation and consolidation. “The French electoral landscape is deeply fragmented and also polarized,” he observes, highlighting the coexistence of institutional instability with the strengthening of ideological blocs. Indeed, he notes a “consolidation of the two blocs at the extremes,” with both the far right and the radical left reinforcing their positions without producing a decisive electoral rupture.
At the core of his analysis lies a striking argument captured in the headline insight: polarization itself has become a structural driver of far-right normalization. “This kind of polarization tends to benefit the far right,” Professor Marlière explains, as it enables the RN to position itself as a seemingly “reasonable, ‘moderate’ political force” within an increasingly conflictual political field. In this context, the long-term strategy of dé-diabolisation appears to be advancing, albeit unevenly. While the RN remains constrained in major urban centers, it has become, in Professor Marlière’s words, “a party that is increasingly on course to become normalized.”
Equally significant is the sociological transformation of the far-right electorate. No longer confined to economically marginalized groups, the RN now draws support across a broader cross-class coalition, including professionals and retirees—a shift he identifies as a critical turning point since the 2024 European elections.
Taken together, the 2026 municipal elections do not signal a dramatic rupture but rather a deepening of structural trends. As Professor Marlière cautions, “the tectonic plates… are aligning in a way that looks favorable for the National Rally,”even as electoral uncertainty persists. In this interview, he unpacks the implications of these developments for democratic resilience, party competition, and the high-stakes trajectory toward 2027 presidential elections in France.
Philippe Marlière is a Professor of French and European Politics at University College London.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Philippe Marlière, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
France’s Electoral Landscape Is Fragmenting While Extremes Consolidate Their Ground
Professor Marlière, welcome, and let me start right away with the first question: The 2026 municipal elections seem to have produced a fragmented but revealing map of French politics; the far right advanced in many provincial towns, mainstream parties held key metropolitan strongholds, and the left remained unevenly competitive. From your perspective, what do these results tell us about the current stage of France’s populist realignment?
Professor Philippe Marlière: I think the main lessons of that local election are, first of all, the very high level of abstention. That confirms that, when it comes to voting, the French are voting less and less. Some would call it civic disengagement. It does not necessarily mean that the French are no longer interested in politics; it simply means that they vote less. Turnout was also lower in 2014, which was the last “normal” local election, as the previous one took place during the COVID pandemic and is therefore not really comparable.
The second point, as you mentioned, is fragmentation. The French electoral landscape is deeply fragmented and also polarized. I think we will return to this later.
Thirdly, there is a form of consolidation of previous electoral trends. I am thinking here of the two major elections in 2024—the general election and the European election. There was no major upset or breakthrough, but rather a continuation of existing dynamics. Notably, as you pointed out, there is a consolidation of the two blocs at the extremes: on the far right with the National Rally, and on the far left—the radical, populist left—with Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s France Insoumise. Both camps can claim gains, and their positions appear to have strengthened.
So, overall, that would be my general assessment of this local election.
The National Rally Consolidates Territorially but Still Struggles in Major Cities
The National Rally expanded its local presence but again struggled to convert momentum into decisive victories in major cities. Should this be read as evidence that the populist radical right is becoming structurally embedded in French politics, or do these results still reveal significant sociological and territorial ceilings to its expansion?
Professor Philippe Marlière: I think for the National Rally it is hard to say that this was a bad election. It is not a fantastic election, because a fantastic result would have meant winning a number of large cities, and in France a big city is one with over 100,000 people. They did not manage to do that. They had hoped to win the city of Toulon. That said, they did win one, and, to be fair, that is at least a good result in Nice, which is, of course, one of the bigger French cities. They won in Nice with Éric Ciotti. Technically, he is not a member of the National Rally, but he is the former leader of Les Républicains, who left the party in 2024 and now runs a small party allied with the National Rally. So that is a significant gain.
Apart from that, however, the election highlighted the weakness of the National Rally in big cities and urban areas, which are now strongholds of the left. My assessment, therefore, is that this was not a breakthrough in terms of winning major cities; it did not achieve that. What it did do, however, is to consolidate its power base in medium-sized cities—places with around 20,000 inhabitants or fewer. It is now a party with a solid and territorially widespread base.
There are also three regions where it is particularly dominant: in the north, especially in former mining areas that were once socialist bastions but are now strongholds of the far right; in the southeast, which has long been a strong area for the National Rally; and in parts of the southwest as well. So I would not describe this as a setback, but neither is it a major victory. It is a party that is increasingly on course to become normalized—people in small towns now vote for the National Rally in ways that were not typical before.
At the same time, when you look at opinion polls—which is what ultimately matters for a presidential election in a year’s time—they are very favorable for the National Rally. Any candidate, whether Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella, is polling well above the 30% threshold, while all other competitors remain significantly behind.
A Weakening Center and Identity-Driven Politics Reshape French Populism
The crowd and supporters with French flags during the campaign meeting (rally) of French presidential candidate Eric Zemmour, on the Trocadero square in Paris, France on March 27, 2022. Photo: Victor Velter.
In your work, you have emphasized that populist projects must be understood in relation to their national political cultures rather than as interchangeable European phenomena. What, in your view, is specifically French about the current configuration of populism and the populist radical right revealed by these municipal elections?
Professor Philippe Marlière: It is an important point to contextualize the rise, or sometimes the setback, of the populist far right across Europe. You cannot compare all situations; they are not entirely similar. However, there are similar trends. There are differences, but also common patterns.
So, while sharing similarities with other national contexts, the French case may be specific in the sense that it exacerbates some of these trends. One example is polarization. The French political landscape is extremely polarized, and that makes a very significant difference. Polarization means that you have left-wing parties, right-wing parties, and a political center, which in France is weakening—Macron’s party did not perform well in this election, which is not a surprise.
When polarization intensifies, it creates a climate of tension in which debates revolve less around economic and social issues and more around personalities and questions of identity. We have seen a great deal of that. In the end, this kind of polarization tends to benefit the far right. The far right has used this climate to position itself as a reasonable, “moderate” political force, in contrast to other parties that have contributed to this polarized environment. I am thinking here in particular of the populist radical left associated with Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
This dynamic becomes a tool that enables the National Rally to present itself—rightly or wrongly—as a more mainstream party. The mainstreaming of the National Rally is still ongoing. It is a process that could potentially enable the party to win the presidential election in a year’s time.
So far, there has been what is often described as a “glass ceiling” in presidential elections: the far right could not win because it was perceived as too extreme, prompting a counter-reaction from voters. This time, however, if the party succeeds in presenting itself as part of the mainstream—regardless of whether that perception is accurate—it may facilitate its path to electoral victory.
From Peripheral Protest to Nationwide Presence, the RN Vote Is Expanding
The far right’s local breakthroughs were especially visible in smaller towns, deindustrialized areas, and parts of Mediterranean France. How far do these results confirm that support for the populist radical right continues to be rooted in a combination of territorial abandonment, social insecurity, and cultural anxiety?
Professor Philippe Marlière: There are aspects of the National Rally vote which clearly underline what you have just said—social insecurity, anxiety, and a feeling of being abandoned by the central state. There are some strong indicators, such as people feeling that when you live, for instance, in a small town, or in a suburban or peri-urban area, you lack many of the things that make life easier, such as good public transport and good public services. There are issues around that, and studies have shown that this feeds and strengthens the National Rally vote in general. So there is clearly that aspect.
But I think what is new, and something which will worry anyone concerned about a major National Rally victory in France in a year’s time, in the presidential election, is that this vote has not only nationalized. You mentioned the three zones of strength of the National Rally in the north, in the southeast, and the southwest—that is true—but it is also present in other parts of France. Think, for instance, of Brittany in the western part of France, a place where traditionally the National Rally would get very few votes. Now, the party can also get very decent scores in that part of France.
So, there is a nationalization of the vote, but it is also a vote that has spread across different social classes. It is no longer only the vote of the young, unemployed, relatively uneducated working class, or the working class in general. It also includes professionals and retired people, which is a new development. The turning point was the European election of 2024, when, for the first time, retired people—who had been the main supporters of Macron—switched en masse to the National Rally. That is a sign of electoral strength, because retired people tend to vote more than younger people, who abstain more.
All in all, the tectonic plates, so to speak, are aligning in a way that looks favorable for the National Rally. That said, I am not suggesting that the presidential election is a foregone conclusion or that the far right will win. A great deal can happen between now and April 2027, notably a last-ditch reaction from French voters who might prefer to vote for another candidate simply to prevent the far right from winning the highest political office in France. Much will also depend on the candidate who faces the National Rally in the second round.
Education and Class Remain Key Barriers to Far-Right Urban Expansion
University teachers, research staff, and students demonstrate against French government reforms to the academic system in Paris, France on April 2, 2009. Photo: Olga Besnard / Dreamstime.
Conversely, the RN’s continuing weakness in many large metropolitan centers suggests that urban France still resists the populist radical right. To what extent is this an effect of class composition, educational attainment, immigration-linked demography, or the continued political toxicity of the far-right label?
Professor Philippe Marlière: There are very strong sociological variables or indicators that explain why some populations and categories of voters support the far right, and why others distrust and resist it. I think there are such sociological variables at play.
Gender is one of them. Women still tend to vote less, in general, than men for the far right. The gender gap has narrowed compared to 20 or 30 years ago, but it remains. Interestingly, among younger voters—the 18–24 age group, for instance—the gender gap is even wider. There is a broader trend, not only in Europe but globally, of young men being more attracted to the far right than young women. Women, in fact, are often put off by the far right and tend to resist it.
The second variable is education, and here again the French case is not particularly unique. It is a pattern observed in many countries. The general sociological rule is that the more educated you are, the more likely you are to vote for the left. Conversely, those with lower levels of education—primary or secondary schooling, possibly the baccalaureate but no university education—are more likely to support the National Rally.
This also applies to younger voters. While Jean-Luc Mélenchon does appeal to the youth, his support is concentrated among more educated young people—those pursuing higher education and living in urban areas—as opposed to young salaried workers who left school early and live in rural areas, who tend to support the National Rally. In this sense, education is an even more decisive factor than age.
This helps explain why France’s major cities are now governed by the left. Paris and Marseille have socialist mayors, while Lyon has re-elected a Green mayor. This reflects the sociological profile of urban electorates, which tend to be more educated and relatively well-off, and therefore more inclined to support left-wing parties. By contrast, in smaller localities across France—where there is a lack of public services and higher unemployment—the National Rally performs more strongly.
The RN’s Normalization Is Aided as Much By Opponents as by Strategy
In light of these municipal results, do you think Marine Le Pen’s long strategy of dé-diabolisation has reached its limits at the local level? Or has it succeeded enough to normalize the RN in parts of France even if it still falls short of full urban legitimacy?
Professor Philippe Marlière: De-demonization is to start with—yes, you are right to stress that—a process. If it is a process, it has been initiated by political forces, and obviously, the forces that want de-demonization to happen are the National Rally, to begin with. Marine Le Pen has been very clear about this in the past. “We have been demonized,” she has said several times, and that has to stop.
So, what do you do about that? You adopt a strategy. First, you try to appear less radical, less far-right in the way you conduct your political activities and in your discourse. You remove the more radical, extremist elements within your party. This has been done.
However, I would say this has mainly been implemented among RN officials—that is, those in elected positions, particularly at the national level. For instance, considerable effort has been made by the National Rally to ensure that, within its group of MPs in the National Assembly, there are no sympathizers of extremist or fascist groups, and that no one makes anti-Semitic or Islamophobic statements. A great deal of work has gone into this. Marine Le Pen herself and Jordan Bardella present a very polished image to the public, unlike Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was repeatedly convicted for racist or anti-Semitic statements. That marks a clear difference.
Nonetheless, there are still, among supporters and even at the local level, elected RN representatives who occasionally—and quite often—make such statements. So the process is not entirely complete. Much has been achieved, but it remains ongoing.
There is also another dimension to de-demonization. It can only succeed if it receives some assistance from opponents, and in France, opponents of the far right have, in fact, contributed to this process. This is not a recent development; it began some time ago. Parties on the center-right and the right have progressively adopted elements of the RN’s discourse, and sometimes even aspects of its policy agenda. By doing so, they contribute to making the RN appear more moderate and more mainstream. If mainstream parties frame issues in similar terms to the far right, then the far right no longer appears as extreme or dangerous.
A certain degree of support has also come from the media. French media, as studies suggest, have shifted to the right. Some private channels, such as CNews, owned by the billionaire Bolloré Family, as well as formerly mainstream radio stations with large audiences, have clearly moved in that direction, if not toward the radical right. In such a context, de-demonization becomes more likely.
However, as you pointed out, there is still resistance, particularly at the grassroots level. We saw this again in 2024. After the first round of the general election, the far right was ahead and appeared on track to secure a possible absolute majority. Then what the French call a “Republican front” emerged, involving significant tactical voting between left-wing parties and also between the left and Macron’s supporters. This tactical coordination led to the defeat of many RN candidates, and in the end, the RN did not win.
So, overall, de-demonization has been underway and has been quite successful for the RN. However, the process is not yet complete. There remains a kind of anti–far-right reflex among the electorate, which has so far prevented the RN from winning major elections.
The Boundary between Mainstream Right and Far Right Is Increasingly Blurred
Photo: Dreamstime.
One of the most striking outcomes of the elections was Éric Ciotti’s victory in Nice and the broader sense that parts of the mainstream right are moving closer to the RN. Do you see this as a local anomaly shaped by specific rivalries, or as a more durable sign that the boundary between mainstream conservatism and the populist radical right is eroding?
Professor Philippe Marlière: That is a very important point, and it concerns the future not only of the far right—whether it will eventually win a major election, such as a presidential or general election—but also the future of the mainstream right, the post-Gaullist right, which is what Les Républicains represent, with their legacy of de Gaulle and Chirac. I would say it also concerns the future of French politics in general, because having a far-right president and government would be a major development not only in French politics, but also in European and even global politics.
The mainstream right, notably Les Républicains (LR), plays a pivotal role in this, because figures and studies show that there is a porosity between the LR electorate and the far-right electorate. In some constituencies, voters from both sides support each other’s candidates when needed, for instance in the second round of an election. If the only candidate facing a left-wing contender is from the National Rally, you will often see a significant transfer of votes from LR voters to RN candidates, and vice versa. So it works both ways.
However, the rising and dominant force is not LR. LR is now a shadow of what used to be the dominant party on the right in French politics, particularly until the Sarkozy era. It is a party that has been losing votes and representation with each election.
As a result, LR finds itself in a kind of impossible situation. If it forms an alliance with the far right—which some within the party are now considering—it risks accelerating its own decline. That was Éric Ciotti’s choice in 2024, when he was leader of LR. He argued that the party should form an alliance and work with the far right. This represented a complete break with the tradition of figures like Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Chirac, who were firmly opposed to the far right. When the party rejected this line, Ciotti left, taking with him more than 20 MPs. Yet this has not resolved LR’s dilemma, as there remains a strong temptation among some of its officials and elected representatives to cooperate with the RN.
The problem is that by working closely with the far right, LR further legitimizes it and signals to voters that there is little difference between the two. This could lead to a scenario similar to what happened on the left in the 1970s, when the Socialists, under François Mitterrand, formed an alliance with the Communists and eventually became the dominant force.
In the current context, however, with a de-demonized far right and potentially a figure like Jordan Bardella running a relatively mainstream campaign, not very different from LR on socioeconomic issues, there is a real risk that what remains of the LR electorate could shift further toward the RN.
So, it is a very complex situation for LR. What we may be witnessing is a broader recomposition of the right, with the RN potentially becoming the dominant party and LR relegated to the role of a junior partner. This would represent a complete reversal of the post-war political order, where the far right becomes the main party, and what is considered the mainstream right becomes a junior partner.
The Macronite Center Has Given Way to a Reconfigured Right-Wing Bloc
More broadly, do these elections suggest that the French right is moving toward a process of recomposition in which traditional conservatism, Macronite liberalism, and the populist radical right are being forced into a new and unstable relationship?
Professor Philippe Marlière: Yes, the striking thing about that local election is that it really marks the end—although we already knew this—of the Macronite center. It was, in a way, positioned both on the left and on the right. Macron wanted to strike a balance between the moderate left and the moderate right. That was his project in 2017, when he was first elected. We saw that during his first term there was a shift to the right, and in his second term nothing has changed. The Macron party is now firmly on the right and has been governing with right-wing forces. It has been in power with LR, for instance. So there is no doubt that this marks the end of the attempt to find a kind of centrist position in French politics, where one could combine elements of the center-right and the center-left. That is over. The Macron party is firmly on the right.
Moreover, the local election showed that the electorate of Macron, in general, clearly supports the forces of the right in the second round when their candidate cannot run. So this very original attempt to create a genuine center that synthesizes the moderate left and right has come to an end.
As for the rest of the right, I have already addressed this in my previous answer. LR finds itself between a rock and a hard place. It has tried to cooperate with the Macron party in government, but that has not really helped, as it continues to lose votes. At the same time, it faces the major and direct challenge from the RN. So it is a very complex situation for the right.
Just one more point about LR: it did relatively well in this local election, and the reason is the same as for the Socialist Party—they entered the election from a position of strength. They already governed many cities across France. LR is the party that runs the greatest number of cities. The difference with the Socialist Party is that the latter tends to be strong in large cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, whereas LR is stronger in medium-sized cities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, where it governs many municipalities. So it has managed to survive this election and perform relatively well.
This illustrates the paradox of French politics. The two parties that dominated French politics from the 1970s until 2017, when Macron was elected—the Socialists and LR—are no longer in a position to win national elections. However, they remain dominant at the local level, where they still have strong territorial bases.
French President Emmanuel Macron at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest, Romania on August 24, 2017. Photo: Carol Robert.
Republican Discourse Now Normalizes Formerly Far-Right Themes
Your work on laïcité and the “islamo-gauchisme” controversy has shown how republican language can be reworked in increasingly exclusionary ways. Do you think the municipal campaign confirmed that themes once associated with the far right have now migrated into broader mainstream discourse, thereby indirectly strengthening the populist radical right?
Professor Philippe Marlière: Yes, you are right on that. It is not only the far right, the National Rally, that has been normalized and mainstreamed; a certain type of racist discourse has also become quite mainstream, particularly around Islamophobia. But that is not new. This is part of the debate on so-called Islamo-gauchisme. Islamo-gauchisme was essentially directed at French academics or intellectuals who were allegedly in cahoots with Islamists in France. That was never demonstrated, but nonetheless it became a central claim. And, of course, when such claims are made, they give a significant boost to the far right, because the far right does not even need to intervene in that debate. That debate was largely carried out by the Macron government and by LR. So this is where we are.
What is interesting is that the election also showed that, in some areas—particularly in the outskirts of major cities, including several cities around Paris—mayors from ethnic minorities were elected. They are French citizens, but they come from minority backgrounds. The most notable example is Saint-Denis, a large city of around 150,000 inhabitants. It was traditionally a communist stronghold, then governed by a socialist mayor for one term, and has now been won by a La France Insoumise candidate who is Black. This is very good news for Mélenchon, who has recently advanced the idea of a “new France.”
What does this “new France” represent? It is a multicultural France shaped by immigration. France has long been a country of mass immigration, and the sons and daughters of migrants—born on French soil and holding French citizenship—are now increasingly involved in political life. Some have been elected as mayors, local councillors, and even MPs, which marks an important shift. Twenty years ago, the French political class was overwhelmingly white. While this remains the case for some parties, others—particularly on the left—have increasingly incorporated this diversity.
This is what Mélenchon has gained. He won a number of cities, I believe up to seven, which is a solid result. It is not a major breakthrough, given that La France Insoumise is a relatively young party that started from scratch, but moving from zero to seven is significant. These include important cities such as Saint-Denis, Roubaix, Vénissieux, Vaulx-en-Velin, La Courneuve, and Créteil—places with substantial populations of ethnic minorities.
What La France Insoumise is doing is quite specific. It reflects Mélenchon’s broader strategy of mobilizing young voters—particularly those pursuing higher education and living in urban areas—alongside ethnic minority communities in the banlieues. He believes that by consolidating this electorate, he can position himself to reach the second round of the presidential election.
Without Alliances, the Far Right’s Path to the Second Round Appears Assured
Torn campaign posters of Jean-Luc Mélenchon during the French presidential election in Bordeaux, France on February 19, 2022. Photo: Jerome Cid / Dreamstime.
And finally, Professor Marlière, looking ahead to the 2027 presidential election, do these municipal results suggest that France is still moving toward a contest structurally shaped by the RN and the populist radical right, or do they also reopen the possibility that broader democratic coalitions—of the mainstream left, center, and moderate right—can still contain that trajectory?
Professor Philippe Marlière: That is an important question. It is also a difficult one to answer, because the situation is so fluid and things can change from one month to another. It will very much depend on the work on the ground by political parties. Can they enter into an alliance? It seems that, if you want to defeat—or to qualify for the second, decisive round of the presidential election, you need to enter into an alliance. If you go it alone, if you do not make an alliance on the left or on the right, you will further split the total vote of your political family. And if you further split the vote, everyone expects the far right to qualify, given how strong it is in the polls.
There are two places in the second round, and it seems that one is already taken by the far right. It used to be a major upset when the far right qualified for the second round; now it would be a major upset if it did not. So, let us assume the far right will be in the second round. The question then becomes: who will face it? I think there are three possible scenarios.
One appears to be a lose-lose scenario, but paradoxically it is quite plausible today. This would be the qualification of Jean-Luc Mélenchon. He is a well-known figure who can appeal to highly mobilized segments of voters—particularly young people and ethnic minorities. In a fragmented electoral landscape, the threshold to qualify for the second round could be relatively low, around 15–17 percent, which he could reach. However, this would be a lose-lose scenario because, despite the de-demonization of the far right, Mélenchon himself has been heavily demonized. According to polls, he is the most disliked political figure in France, even more so than far-right leaders. In such a case, he would likely be defeated, and the far right would have a relatively easy path to victory.
The two other scenarios would involve either a candidate from the center-left or from the right reaching the second round. For the center-left, this would likely require unity, possibly through a primary election to select a common candidate. I am quite pessimistic about this, as the left remains highly fragmented. Some support the idea of a primary, while others oppose it. For instance, former President François Hollande may be considering another run and does not favor a primary.
On the right, a similar question arises: will they unite and organize a primary to choose a candidate? There are significant differences between figures such as Édouard Philippe, a former prime minister under Macron, and Bruno Retailleau, the leader of LR, whose discourse and policies are closer to the RN. So there is a clear gap.
Without such unity, the first scenario remains plausible. In that case, one could say, as a scholar of populism, that the two populisms in France are converging—one on the radical left and the other on the far right. And, unfortunately, it seems that of these two, the one that repels more voters is Mélenchon.
In this ECPS interview, Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen offers an in-depth assessment of Denmark’s 2026 general election, highlighting both continuity and change in one of Europe’s most stable democracies. He characterizes the outcome as “a very poor election for the traditional governing parties,” underscoring the historic decline of established actors alongside the emergence of “a highly fragmented parliament.” While domestic concerns dominated the campaign, Dr. Henriksen emphasizes that strict migration policies have not contained the populist radical right, as evidenced by the resurgence of the Danish People’s Party. At the same time, he cautions against overstating democratic crisis, noting Denmark’s enduring institutional trust. Instead, he points to media fragmentation and digital communication as key forces reshaping political competition and voter alignment.
In the aftermath of Denmark’s closely contested 2026 general election on March 24, the country stands at a critical political juncture—marked by fragmented blocs, the resurgence of the populist radical right, and renewed geopolitical tensions over Greenland. While domestic issues such as the cost-of-living crisis and migration shaped the campaign, deeper transformations in political communication and democratic contestation are also unfolding. Giving an in-depth interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen, a postdoctoral researcher at Roskilde University working at the intersection of politics, media, and digital society, whose research on digital counter-publics, alternative media ecosystems, and anti-systemic populism, offers important insights into these developments.
Reflecting on the election outcome, Dr. Henriksen underscores that “this was a very poor election for the traditional governing parties,” pointing to the historically weak performance of both the Social Democrats and the center-right Venstre. He further highlights that “we now have a highly fragmented parliament,” a development that is likely to render coalition-building both complex and protracted. Indeed, the emergence of multiple competitive actors across the political spectrum has produced what some observers describe as “Dutch conditions” of party fragmentation and even “Belgian conditions” of prolonged government formation.
At the same time, Dr. Henriksen draws attention to the resurgence of the populist radical right, particularly the Danish People’s Party, emphasizing that restrictive policy convergence has not neutralized such forces. As he notes, the Danish case illustrates that strict migration policies do not necessarily diminish the electoral appeal of the radical right, but may instead coincide with renewed voter mobilization around issues of identity, economic anxiety, and national direction.
Beyond electoral dynamics, the interview also engages with the transformation of political communication in digitally mediated environments. While cautious about attributing direct causal effects to alternative media, Dr. Henriksen observes that “it has been very difficult to define” the election in terms of a coherent overarching narrative, suggesting that media fragmentation and hybrid communication systems are reshaping how political competition is structured and understood.
Importantly, despite these shifts, Dr. Henriksen does not interpret recent developments as signaling a systemic crisis of democracy. Denmark, he argues, remains a high-trust society with robust institutional foundations. Yet, it is increasingly “no longer isolated from trends we see elsewhere in Europe,” including fragmentation, anti-incumbent voting, and the growing salience of populist communication.
Taken together, Dr. Henriksen’s reflections situate the Danish election within a broader European trajectory, where established party systems are under pressure, populist actors continue to adapt, and democratic politics is being reshaped by both structural and communicative transformations.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Voters Reward Clearer Political Profiles on Both Sides
Denmark votes in parliamentary elections in Copenhagen, Kastrup, Denmark, on November 1, 2022. Voters head to polling stations to cast their ballots in the general election. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
Dr. Henriksen, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me begin with the electoral outcome itself: How should we interpret the 2026 Danish election results, where both the red and blue blocs fell short of a majority? Does this fragmentation signal a structural transformation of Denmark’s party system?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: Thank you for this question—it is a very broad one. I will try to narrow it down to a few key takeaways, and then we can elaborate further during the interview.
The first takeaway is that this was a very poor election for the traditional governing parties. The Social Democrats, for instance, remained the largest party, but they fell to a historic low—their worst result since 1903. The center-right party, Venstre, as it is called in Danish, also suffered a historically weak result.
The second takeaway is that we now have a highly fragmented parliament. This means that coalition-building will be unusually difficult and potentially lengthy—at least, that is what commentators are suggesting at the moment.
The third point is that overall voter turnout was lower than usual, although still high by international standards. I interpret this as a sign that voters have been dissatisfied with the centrist government we have had over the past four years.
The fourth point is that there were clear winners outside the old or established center. The Danish People’s Party, for example, performed strongly with 9.1%, and the Socialist People’s Party on the left became the second-largest party.
Thus, the election did not simply produce fragmentation for its own sake; rather, it suggests that voters rewarded parties with clearer profiles on both sides of the political spectrum. In this sense, the Danish People’s Party can be seen as one of the main winners.
I also heard a commentator suggest that these are “Dutch conditions,” in the sense that we now have many parties represented in parliament. There is a political science measure for the effective number of parties, and it has reportedly never been higher in the Danish parliament. Another commentator added that we may face “Belgian conditions,” meaning that it could take a very long time to form a government with so many parties involved. I find this framing quite insightful.
Regarding whether this signals a structural transformation, I would say it is important to view the situation in light of the decline of the Social Democrats. They have been in government for an extended period—first leading a left-leaning government and then a centrist coalition. This development should therefore be understood in the context of their weakening position, including their time in power during COVID-19. It appears they have struggled to maintain momentum, which is reflected in the election results. At the same time, we do see clear signs of fragmentation—this is quite evident.
We can also observe that centrist parties, such as the Moderates, have become highly important in the coalition-building phase. Although relatively small, both blocs—the left and the right—depend on their mandates to form a government. As a result, they are likely to play a very prominent role.
Finally, this election also points to the growing importance of person-driven politics rather than party-driven politics. For voters, the election itself has been quite fragmented. It is not entirely clear what the main issues have been; instead, individual political figures have played a central role. We can see that some of the key figures, such as Martin Messerschmidt and Lars Løkke Rasmussen, have attracted a significant share of the vote. This indicates a broader shift toward more person-driven politics and person-driven electoral outcomes.
Unpopular Reforms Cost the Social Democrats Voter Support
Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen at a press conference during the COVID-19 crisis, Copenhagen, March 17, 2020. Photo: Francis Dean | Dreamstime.
The Social Democrats emerged as the largest party but recorded one of their weakest results in over a century. To what extent does this outcome reflect voter fatigue with incumbency, and to what extent does it point to deeper shifts in political trust and democratic legitimacy?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: It’s a very good question. There is clearly an incumbency story here. It is important to situate the Social Democrats’ decline in voter support within a broader anti-incumbent mood among voters, which I alluded to, earlier. After nearly seven years in power, the party has been carrying the burdens of office. As we know from political science, this is challenging for governing parties, particularly when they are associated with unpopular reforms. One notable example is the abolition of a national holiday in 2024, known as the Great Prayer Day. This decision appears to have resonated strongly with voters across the political spectrum, and the party has been penalized for it. I think that when the government abolished the holiday, it did not anticipate the extent of its electoral impact. That is an important factor to consider.
At the same time, it would be too narrow to interpret the result solely as voter fatigue. The Social Democrats were squeezed from both sides. Some left-leaning voters felt that the party had become too restrictive on immigration, while some right-leaning voters continued to distrust it on economic issues. In this sense, the outcome reflects both incumbency effects and the limits of a centrist repositioning, which is relatively unusual in the Danish political context. So, while the party remains electorally dominant in relative terms, its broad coalition appears thinner and more fragile than before.
That said, I do not see strong evidence—at least at this stage—of a more generalized crisis of democratic legitimacy. Denmark still has stable political institutions, and the economy is in relatively good shape compared to some other EU countries. Voter turnout also remained relatively high, and the election process was fair. Therefore, framing this as a general crisis of democratic legitimacy may be an overstatement. However, much will depend on what kind of government ultimately emerges.
The Danish People’s Party Re-Emerges as a Major Force
The election saw a notable resurgence of the Danish People’s Party and other anti-immigration actors. How do you explain this revival in light of your research on anti-systemic populism? Does it indicate that such movements have successfully re-entered the electoral mainstream?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: That is a good question. There is clearly a strong case to be made that the Danish People’s Party has re-emerged as a significant force. They moved from around 2–3% to 9.1% of the vote, effectively tripling their support compared to the previous election. They have campaigned on issues such as zero net Muslim migration and cost-of-living concerns, including proposals like abolishing petrol taxes. They have been very successful in doing so, and I would also argue that they have run one of the most effective social media campaigns, which likely contributed to their performance.
This revival suggests that anti-immigration politics have not disappeared; rather, they were partially displaced and fragmented. This election indicates that when economic anxiety, migration, and broader questions about national direction become salient again, these constituencies can be remobilized electorally.
In relation to my own research, I have focused less on elections per se and more on anti-systemic movements and forms of mobilization. From that perspective, the Danish People’s Party has been particularly successful in tapping into this kind of anti-systemic mobilization.
At the same time, we also see another far-right party, the Danish Democrats, led by former minister Inger Støjberg. While they share a similar anti-immigration stance, they have not been as successful in converting this into electoral support. To me, this suggests that additional factors are at play. One key element appears to be the effectiveness of social media campaigning, particularly on the part of the Danish People’s Party and Morten Messerschmidt.
A Key Lesson for Social Democratic Parties in Europe
The Danish case has often been cited as an example of mainstream parties absorbing far-right agendas—particularly on immigration. In light of the latest election results, do you see this strategy as containing or, paradoxically, legitimizing populist radical right discourse within mainstream political competition? Do the election results suggest that this strategy has reached its limits—or even backfired?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: Yes, I definitely think this election lends support to the argument that the strategy of normalizing far-right rhetoric and policies within the center and the center-left has its limits—perhaps even backfiring to some extent. For example, Denmark has maintained one of Europe’s toughest migration policies, and yet the Danish People’s Party still achieved a very strong electoral result.
When we examine the data, particularly in comparison to the 2022 election, we also observe one of the largest estimated voter shifts from one party to another—specifically from the Social Democrats to the Danish People’s Party. This is based on the data currently available, although it will require further analysis. At the very least, this suggests that voters are moving from the Social Democrats to the Danish People’s Party, and that this shift is closely linked to the migration issue.
What this indicates is that a strict mainstream migration policy does not automatically neutralize the radical right or the far right in electoral terms. This is an important lesson for other social democratic parties across Europe that are observing the Danish election and seeking to shape their own positions on migration and anti-immigration policies in light of these developments.
Far-Right Digital Counter-Publics Remain Highly Active
Your work emphasizes the role of alternative news media in shaping political perceptions. To what extent do you think digital counter-publics and alternative information environments influenced the electoral performance of populist and radical right actors in this election?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: Let me begin with alternative news media. I would say that, in themselves, they do not have a significant impact on electoral outcomes. I have been collecting articles from Danish alternative news media throughout the election, and only one outlet—one that is somewhat close to the Social Democrats, called PUPU—has actively covered the election. I have also followed debates on national television, where at least one editor from a right-leaning outlet was invited to participate in discussions on migration, particularly concerning Muslims and the Danish Muslim population. So, there is certainly something to this, but it is not an impact that we can clearly observe.
When it comes to digital counter-publics connected to alternative news media, it is becoming increasingly difficult for researchers to obtain reliable data from platforms, which makes this question quite challenging to answer. Based on my intuition, however, these counter-publics—especially those associated with the far right and the Danish People’s Party—are highly active. I am quite confident that the Danish People’s Party’s social media strategy has aimed to mobilize some of these digital counter-publics. How successful these efforts have been, and the extent of their overall impact, remains difficult to determine—particularly given the ongoing challenges of accessing data from different platforms.
No Electoral Impact from the Greenland Issue
Election campaign posters featuring Liberal leader and former Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen displayed on a street during the campaign period in Copenhagen, Denmark on June 15, 2015. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
Despite intense international attention on the Greenland crisis, domestic issues ultimately dominated the campaign. How do you interpret this gap between geopolitical salience and voter priorities? Was the so-called “Greenland effect” electorally significant or overstated?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: As I see it, the only politician who really managed to benefit from the “Greenland effect,” or to gain something from it, was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, from the Moderates. There was a documentary film about the days leading up to and during the crisis, when it was at its peak, and Lars Løkke Rasmussen traveled to Washington to meet with American politicians.
I think he was the only one who really gained something from this in electoral terms, at least. I am not entirely sure why. Mette Frederiksen was certainly in a position to benefit as well, since she played a significant role in managing the situation and coordinating with European counterparts. However, we do not see this reflected in the numbers, at least not in the electoral outcome.
If we consider the Greenland case more broadly, it mattered quite a lot in the run-up to the election. Mette Frederiksen called the election while still benefiting from the visibility and leadership image created by Trump’s pressure over Greenland. During the campaign itself, however, the issue was clearly overshadowed by domestic concerns. These included rising costs of living, the green transition, debates over clean drinking water, healthcare for an aging population, and, of course, immigration. These issues ultimately dominated the campaign. The established parties struggled to mobilize effectively across all of them, although the Social Democrats were more successful on issues such as the green transition and welfare, while the Danish People’s Party mobilized strongly on immigration as well as welfare and healthcare-related concerns.
Potential Spillover into Populist Narratives
At the same time, could the Greenland issue have indirectly shaped the election by reinforcing narratives of sovereignty, external threat, and national unity—particularly within populist communication frames?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: As I mentioned earlier, perhaps—but not to a very strong extent. I think it is, to some degree, a matter of time. We will have to see whether concerns over Greenland spill over into broader, more classic right-wing populist debates regarding border control, security, national cohesion, and immigration. That said, I would still be somewhat hesitant to answer definitively in the affirmative. It is also a question of timing—we will have to see, especially as the formation of a coalition government will likely take a few months, according to some political analyses. These topics could certainly resurface.
Fragmentation Elevates the Moderates to Kingmaker Status
The Moderates, now positioned as a pivotal kingmaker at the political center, occupy a decisive role in post-election coalition building. From your perspective, does this development represent a stabilizing corrective within Danish democracy, or does it instead point to a deeper fragmentation of political representation?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: I think it points to a deeper fragmentation of political representation, as you suggest. Today, the left-leaning bloc has chosen the Moderates as the kingmaker, which is entirely new information. However, the left-leaning bloc still needs the mandates from Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s party to succeed, so the most likely scenario is a left-leaning government with the Moderates as part of it—although I would not put my head on the block for that.
It is somewhat striking, because leading up to the election, many expected that Lars Løkke Rasmussen and the Moderates would assume the kingmaker role. However, learning from the last election, the Social Democrats appear to have tried to avoid that situation, as it would have placed considerable pressure on them—even as the largest party—within an increasingly fragmented party system. Time will show what role the Moderates and Lars Løkke Rasmussen—who hold 14 seats in parliament—will ultimately play in forming the government.
One additional point is that Lars Løkke Rasmussen has been the clearest advocate for forming another centrist government. He has maintained this position consistently from the outset. If the government formation process drags on, he may find himself in a particularly strong position, as having a clear and consistent stance can be advantageous in such a fragmented political landscape. There is a great deal at stake, and forming a government will be a difficult political process. It could prove especially interesting for the Moderates.
No Clear Narrative Defines This Election
Various major Danish daily newspapers in Copenhagen, Denmark, on April 17, 2015 displayed on a table. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
Your research highlights how digital environments can foster echo chambers and partisan homophily. Do you see evidence that such dynamics contributed to the electoral polarization—or fragmentation—observed in this election? How might these dynamics have influenced voter alignments in this election, particularly regarding contentious issues such as immigration, economic redistribution, and national sovereignty?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: The short answer is no, but I think the fact that it was not possible for either political parties or the media to construct a very clear storyline for this election—for voters, at least—really says a lot. It is something that political commentators across the spectrum agree on: this has been an election that has been very difficult to define. It has been unclear whether the election was about policies related to the green transition, immigration, or other issues. It has been highly fragmented, and none of the parties has been able to set the agenda in a decisive way.
My hypothesis—perhaps also from a researcher’s perspective—is that we are witnessing the long-term effects of media fragmentation. Legacy media and social media together are making it increasingly difficult, within this hybrid media environment, for the media to establish a coherent narrative for voters—one that clearly identifies the main dividing lines between parties and presents the election as a unified communicative and political process. Of course, social media is not new to this election, but we may now be seeing its longer-term effects more clearly.
I do not have a definitive answer as to why it has been so difficult for the media. Denmark still has a high-quality, high-trust media system, with outlets that voters generally trust. So it is somewhat puzzling why it has been so difficult to formulate a cohesive narrative about the election.
European Trends Reshape Danish Politics
Denmark is often described as a high-trust, low-polarization society. Yet your work suggests that even such contexts are not immune to the rise of anti-systemic communication. Do the current election dynamics indicate an erosion of this “Nordic exceptionalism,” or rather its adaptation under new digital conditions?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: I think the fact that the far-right party, the New Right—which we have not discussed—entered parliament in the last election is indicative of this—an erosion of Nordic exceptionalism, at least to some extent. They only entered with 2.1% of the vote, so Denmark remains a high-capacity democracy with fairly high turnout, as we have said—a little lower than in the last couple of elections—and there is still broad institutional legitimacy.
On the other hand, one could argue that Denmark is no longer isolated from trends we see elsewhere in Europe. The fragmentation we discussed, anti-incumbent voting patterns, migration-centered competition, and increased pressure on mainstream, established parties all point in that direction.
However, my analysis is that much of the anti-systemic mobilization and communication has been picked up and channeled very successfully by the Danish People’s Party, particularly through social media campaigns. The Danish People’s Party has been one of the parties that has gained the most from this election. So, it has not been a landslide erosion of democratic trust; rather, it is a sign of an increasingly polarized political landscape. We may also be observing some longer-term effects, particularly the difficulties faced by the media system in providing a clear and coherent narrative of the election for voters.
Nativist Strategies Can Backfire Electorally
Pakistani or Indian migrants in Copenhagen, Denmark, September 22, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.
In your view, how does the Danish election contribute to our understanding of populism beyond the traditional left–right spectrum? Do we observe forms of “valence” or “anti-systemic” populism that cut across ideological divides, especially in digitally mediated environments?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: I will have to give a somewhat boring answer to this—and also one that is not particularly favorable for my own research on anti-systemic populism—but I do not see it as the main case here. It is not the central story of this election. There is, however, an interesting argument in how the Social Democrats appropriated a far-right nativist discourse, which appears to have backfired in terms of voter transitions to the Danish People’s Party. I think this is partly because the Danish People’s Party was effective in exploiting the opportunities it was given. What I mean by this is that we do not observe the same voter transition to the Danish Democrats, who did not achieve the electoral success they had anticipated. So, to a large extent, this comes down to the social media campaigning of Morten Messerschmidt and the Danish People’s Party.
Anti-Centrist Voting Defines the Election
The election results indicate gains both for the populist radical right and for certain left-wing actors. Does this suggest that populism in Denmark is increasingly transcending the traditional left–right divide? From a comparative perspective, how does Denmark’s experience relate to broader European trends in populist radical right mobilization? Does the Danish case still represent a distinct model, or is it converging with patterns observed in countries like Germany, Austria, or Sweden?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: First of all, I would not say that the Danish case shows that populism has fully transcended the left–right divide, at least not in a symmetrical sense. What we do see, however, is a clear revolt against the status quo and the established parties. A more accurate formulation is that this represents a kind of anti-centrist voting, spread across the spectrum on both the left and the right.
On the right, we have the Danish People’s Party, whose recovery was clearly tied to classic populist radical right themes such as immigration, national protection, and related issues. They campaigned on zero net Muslim migration and on cost-of-living grievances. On the left, we see the Socialist People’s Party, which mobilized around classic welfare issues and a stronger green profile.
In comparative terms, Social Democrats in countries such as Sweden, Germany, and perhaps the Netherlands are likely looking at this election and drawing lessons from it—particularly that they should avoid adopting strategies that appropriate nativist tropes from far-right parties. I think that would be my answer to this question.
No Strong Cordon Sanitaire in Danish Politics
A Conservative Party election billboard reading “Stop Nazi Islamism” draws public attention and criticism during the campaign period in Copenhagen, Denmark on April 15, 2015.. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
Denmark’s far right has historically been constrained by institutional and cultural factors, including elements of a cordon sanitaire. Do recent developments suggest a weakening of these barriers, particularly through digital mainstreaming processes?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: Good question. Historically, when we compare Denmark to Sweden and Germany, for instance, we do not have as strong a cordon sanitaire tradition as we see in the German context, where certain parties, such as the AfD, are very actively and explicitly excluded.
The Danish political scene is characterized by a relatively wide spectrum of voices that are allowed in. So, I do not think that the 2% threshold for entering parliament necessarily prevents a broader range of parties from gaining representation; rather, it allows for what one might call a “long tail” of parties. So, I tend to disagree slightly with that premise.
Regarding whether this relates to digital mainstreaming processes, there has certainly been a mainstreaming of nativist discourse. That is quite clear to me. And, as I mentioned before, it is now up to Social Democrats across Europe to consider whether they want to follow the same path as the Social Democrats in Denmark.
A Left-Leaning Government Is Likely to Emerge
And finally, looking ahead: Based on these election results, what are the key risks and opportunities for Danish democracy? Do you foresee a consolidation of mainstream politics, or further growth of anti-systemic and populist forces in future elections?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: For this election, and for the government coalition-building process currently underway, I think we will see a left-leaning bloc entering government. As for the long-term effects, this relates more to how difficult it can be to form a centrist government, especially in a political party system that does not have a strong tradition of doing so. I think the three parties that formed the previous government were not very successful in this regard, and we can see that reflected in voter turnout—the voters simply did not like it.
On the other hand, this did not translate into strong anti-systemic mobilization. I think this is more closely related to Denmark being a high-trust society, where people are not concerned about fraud and are not worried about being misinformed by state media, for instance.
I think we need to center our attention on the core pillars of democracy that sustain it, rather than focusing solely on a specific election outcome. Of course, that is also very important, but to understand why we do not see strong anti-systemic mobilization on either the left or the right, we need to look at trust in the media system and the political system.
In this timely commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines how recent parliamentary debates on gender identity in Portugal signal the consolidation of culture-war politics within the legislative arena. Moving beyond the technicalities of legal reform, the analysis shows how competing moral frameworks—centered on “non-negotiable values”—are reshaping political conflict and generating affective polarization. The 20 March 2026 vote reveals a coordinated right-wing effort to reframe gender as a matter of state authority and child protection, while opponents view it as a rollback of rights. Situated within broader debates on populism and cultural backlash, this piece highlights the growing centrality of symbolic politics in contemporary European democracies.
Debates on gender identity in Portugal have brought to the fore one of the core logics of contemporary culture wars: the notion of non-negotiable values, rooted in deeply held ethical commitments and/or religious beliefs. Precisely because these values are framed as non-negotiable, they tend to generate what the literature describes as “affective polarization,” thereby intensifying the conditions for culture-war politics.
The Event
On 20 March 2026, Portugal’s right-wing parliamentary parties secured approval in principle for three bills on gender identity, tabled by Chega, CDS-PP, and PSD. All three passed with the support of PSD, Chega, and CDS-PP, while the opposition bloc — Socialist Party (PS), Liberal Initiative, Livre, Communist Party, BE (Left Bloc), PAN (Party of Animals and Nature), and JPP (an Azorian new party) — voted against. A separate Left Bloc proposal was rejected at the same stage.
What was approved is not yet final law, but it marks a clear attempt to reverse the framework established by Law No. 38/2018, which enshrined self-determination in the legal recognition of gender identity. The core shift is the reintroduction of medical validation for changing name and sex in the civil registry, replacing the current model based on self-identification. In political terms, the vote signals a coordinated right-wing effort to re-medicalize legal gender recognition and to reframe the issue not primarily as a question of individual autonomy, but of state oversight and child protection.
The CDS-PP bill goes further, proposing to ban puberty blockers and hormonal treatment for minors under 18 when used in the context of gender incongruence or gender dysphoria. Chega’s proposal, meanwhile, explicitly frames the revision in terms of the “protection of children and young people.” For supporters, these initiatives are presented as corrective safeguards; for opponents, they represent a rollback of rights, a renewed pathologization of trans identities, and a moral panic translated into lawmaking.
Crucially, however, the parliamentary vote of 20 March was only a first reading. Approval “in principle” means that the bills now move to committee, where they will be debated and amended in detail before any final overall vote. Only after that stage could a final text proceed to presidential promulgation or constitutional review and, eventually, publication in the Diário da República. The immediate significance, then, is political rather than juridical: the Portuguese right has opened a legislative offensive against the country’s existing gender identity framework, but the legal outcome remains unsettled.
The Context
For a long time, Portugal was portrayed as a country immune to populism. However, as Zúquete (2022) has shown, contrary to that illusion of “exceptionalism,” Portugal has experienced different types of populist solutions, from charismatic military figures to mainstream political actors, especially during the 1990s, when CDS-PP — the Christian-democratic party — began to articulate a low-intensity version of Camus’s “great replacement” thesis.
In fact, to understand this debate and political decision, it is necessary to frame it within a long tradition of culture wars in Portugal. As I argued in my book (Ferreira Dias, 2025), debates on moral values are part of the Portuguese political fabric, as illustrated by the so-called Revolta da Maria da Fonte (Maria da Fonte’s Revolt) in the nineteenth century, a popular uprising against heavy taxation on rural communities and the ban on burials in churches for public-health reasons.
However, the most critical topics of debate in Portugal are colonial memory and national self-esteem, both linked to the myth of the “good colonizer” (v.g. Cardina, 2025; Smith, 2025; Vala, Lopes & Lima, 2008). The so-called “lusotropicalism” produced a form of self-esteem grounded in the myth of colonial exceptionalism, that is, the supposedly distinctive Portuguese capacity to mix with native populations and to produce a mulato community free of racism.
With the emergence of postcolonial and critical studies, and of the Epistemologies of the South (Sousa Santos, 2016), there emerged a generation of Portuguese academics and activists who questioned those assumptions, giving greater room to the subalternized voices of history.
While this postcolonial, postmodern and critical generation gained space in Portuguese universities, global social changes were also taking place, with the rise of the so-called woke culture and a subsequent global response labelled “cultural backlash” (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).
A widespread paranoia gained ground in Western societies around the idea of “cultural Marxism,” helping to consolidate a radical right that claimed to be conservative while often operating in reactionary and illiberal registers, through populist leaders such as Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Viktor Orbán. At the same time, parts of the left became culturally radical, hyper-moralized, and at times susceptible to symbolic forms of historical and social purification (Mounk, 2025; McWhorter, 2021).
The struggle between this “conservative moral majority” and “progressivist morality” has accelerated culture wars. This context, together with the moral panic surrounding globalization, helps explain how Chega rose so quickly in Portugal — a country where cultural backlash, in many respects, arrived before woke culture acquired real social depth.
The Proper Debate
Paulo Núncio is one of the most visible CDS-PP deputies in this debate. He is well known for his ultraconservative positions and his opposition to woke culture. As coauthor of the CDS-PP bill on puberty blockers and hormonal treatment for minors, he is not initiating a new line of intervention but rather reaffirming a longstanding political agenda: for years, he has been one of the clearest exponents of culture-war politics within CDS-PP, and this initiative should be read as one more moment in that broader trajectory. In that sense, the issue of gender is not merely a policy question; it becomes a privileged arena for moral and political confrontation. Núncio has come to personify this agenda: he is the most visible CDS-PP figure in the field of culture-war politics and one of the most politically consequential voices of the Portuguese right on these matters.
What matters here, however, is not only the profile of one deputy, but the wider political grammar at work. The right is increasingly learning that moral conflict mobilizes more effectively than technocratic disagreement. Gender, in this setting, functions as a condensed symbol through which parties can speak about authority, family, childhood, education, and the limits of institutional neutrality.
That is why this debate exceeds the legal content of the bills themselves. At stake is a deeper dispute over who has the authority to name social reality: the individual, the family, the clinic, the school, or the state. Once framed in these terms, the controversy ceases to be a narrow disagreement over administrative procedure and becomes a struggle over moral sovereignty. This is the true grammar of culture wars: not distributive conflict, but symbolic boundary-making.
In Portugal, this grammar is still relatively recent in parliamentary form, but it is no longer marginal. What happened on 20 March 2026 suggests that the Portuguese right now sees legislative action on gender not as an isolated intervention, but as part of a broader attempt to reorganize the national moral agenda. Whether that attempt will prevail in law remains uncertain; that it has already shifted the political center of gravity is much harder to deny.
References
Applebaum, A. (2021). Twilight of democracy: The seductive lure of authoritarianism. Vintage.
de Sousa Santos, B. (2016). Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide. Routledge.
Ferreira Dias, J. (2025). Guerras culturais: Os ódios que nos incendeiam e como vencê-los. Guerra & Paz.
McWhorter, J. (2021). Woke racism: How a new religion has betrayed Black America. Portfolio.
Mounk, Y. (2025). The identity trap: A story of ideas and power in our time. Penguin Books.
Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108595841
Smith, H. (2025). “Many races – one nation: Racial non-discrimination always the cornerstone of Portugal’s overseas policy.” In: C. Roldão, R. Lima, P. Varela, O. Raposo, & A. R. Matias (Eds.), Afroeuropeans: Identities, racism, and resistances (pp. 235–246). Routledge.
Vala, J.; Lopes, D. & Lima, M. (2008). “Black immigrants in Portugal: Luso-tropicalism and prejudice.” Journal of Social Issues, 64(2), 287–302. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00562.x
Zúquete, J. P. (2022). Populismo: Lá fora e cá dentro. Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.
Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a leading scholar of the far right and researcher at the Observatory of Political Radicalities at the Jean Jaurès Foundation in Paris, argues that France’s 2026 municipal elections revealed more than the continued advance of the National Rally (RN): they exposed a deeper reconfiguration of the French right. In this interview with ECPS, Professor Camus shows how the RN’s local gains—57 municipalities and over 3,000 council seats—coexist with persistent weakness in major metropolitan centers. More importantly, he underscores that “the boundary between the mainstream and the radical right is blurring locally,” particularly where segments of Les Républicains and RN voters increasingly converge. The interview offers a nuanced account of electoral realignment, selective republican resistance, and the uncertain road to 2027.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a researcher at the Observatory of Political Radicalities at the Jean Jaurès Foundation in Paris, underscores that France’s 2026 municipal elections reveal not only the continued advance of the National Rally / Rassemblement National (RN) but, more importantly, a gradual reconfiguration of the right in which the lines separating mainstream conservatism and radical populism are increasingly porous at the local level.
Reflecting on what he calls a “mixed bag” outcome, Professor Camus notes that the RN has achieved “a substantial gain” by winning 57 municipalities and securing over 3,000 council seats, yet “failed in all major cities and metropolises.” This dual pattern—territorial expansion alongside persistent urban resistance—captures the paradox at the heart of contemporary French politics. While the party has consolidated its presence in “small and medium-sized cities”and in economically distressed regions such as Pas-de-Calais and Moselle, it continues to face structural limits in gentrified metropolitan centers like Paris, where “the extreme right is very weak for obvious sociological reasons.”
Yet, the most consequential development, as Professor Camus emphasizes, lies not simply in where the RN wins or loses, but in how it increasingly interacts with the broader right-wing ecosystem. In several regions, particularly along the Mediterranean corridor, “the core voters of the Conservatives… are very close to voters of the National Rally,”facilitating patterns of vote transfer and informal cooperation. This dynamic signals a shift from the once rigid cordon sanitaire toward what Professor Camus describes as a more “selective” Republican front, contingent on local contexts and strategic calculations.
The significance of Éric Ciotti’s victory in Nice further illustrates this transformation. While rooted in the city’s longstanding conservative and post-colonial sociological profile, the result also points to a deeper convergence: “locally… the Republicans and the National Rally have platforms that are very similar.” In this sense, Ciotti’s ascent functions as both a local phenomenon and a symbolic “vitrine,” enabling the RN to present itself as part of a broader conservative continuum rather than an isolated extremist force.
At the national level, however, this convergence remains contested. Professor Camus highlights an unresolved strategic dilemma within Les Républicains, torn between maintaining ideological autonomy and pursuing alignment with the RN. As he cautions, any such coalition would likely be asymmetrical: “the dynamic is on the side of the National Rally… the agenda will be set by the National Rally.”
Taken together, the interview suggests that France is not witnessing a straightforward normalization of the far right, but rather a more complex process of political recomposition. The RN’s rise is embedded in enduring socioeconomic grievances and cultural anxieties, yet its ultimate trajectory will depend on whether the boundaries that once separated it from the mainstream right continue to erode—or are strategically reasserted—in the run-up to 2027.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Jean-Yves Camus, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
The RN Has Expanded Locally, but Still Hits a Metropolitan Ceiling
Cyclists and pedestrians take over the Champs-Élysées during Paris Car-Free Day, filling the iconic avenue from the Louvre to the Arc de Triomphe under a clear sky. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Jean-Yves Camus, welcome, and let me start right away with the first question: The 2026 municipal elections seem to have produced a paradoxical outcome: the National Rally / Rassemblement National (RN) expanded its local footprint yet failed to secure the kind of major urban victories that would have symbolized full normalization. How should we interpret this mixed result—does it confirm the RN’s structural implantation, or does it reveal enduring sociological and territorial ceilings?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: You’re right to say that the outcome of this election is very much a mixed bag for the Rassemblement National (RN). On the one hand, they significantly increased the number of seats they gained on city councils—up to more than 3,000. They won 57 cities, which is, of course, a substantial gain compared to the 13 cities they secured in 2020. But they failed in all major cities and metropolises, with very significant losses. They expected to win Toulon and secured 42% in the first round, but ultimately did not win. Due to a consolidation of votes against the National Rally, they were also expected to seize Marseille but did not. Paris remains a territory where the extreme right is very weak, for obvious sociological reasons. It is a gentrified city, which is largely alien to the ideology of the party. So, the cities they seized are small and medium-sized. The largest is Perpignan, which they retained in the first round with just over 50%, but this is the only city with more than 100,000 inhabitants that will be in the hands of the Rassemblement National.
So, I would say there is still significant progress to be made. In view of the presidential election, winning 57 cities is a notable achievement, but when it comes to the presidency, you need votes from the main metropolises. It remains to be seen whether, in a presidential contest, the outcome will be more favorable for the party. Let us remember that city council elections are based on proportional representation, which is not the case for presidential elections. These are local votes that rely heavily on the personality of the candidate for mayor, making this a very different mode of voting, with distinct patterns. Most voters in city council elections focus on very local issues, whereas presidential elections operate on an entirely different level.
What I take from this vote is that the party has expanded its reach to many small cities where it already had a number of strongholds. For example, in the département du Pas-de-Calais, one of the former industrial areas in northern France, they were highly successful and captured more than 10 small cities with populations between 3,000 and 10,000—a significant gain. On the other hand, if you look at a department with a similar sociological profile just north of Pas-de-Calais—the département du Nord, at the border with Belgium—they did not seize any towns, contrary to expectations. This suggests that electoral success depends heavily on how well the local branches of the party are organized, the quality and performance of the candidates, and whether there is genuine local momentum.
They also performed very well in the former industrial area of Lorraine, particularly in the département of Moselle, which borders Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. These are areas where unemployment remains high, where we see multiple generations struggling with long-term economic insecurity, and where many people face difficulties maintaining stable and adequately paid employment. Unsurprisingly, the party performs strongly there. They also did well in the Mediterranean belt, from Perpignan at the Spanish border to Menton at the Italian border—an area where the party has long enjoyed support. However, despite failing to win Toulon or Marseille, they made a very significant gain in Nice, a major city with international appeal.
That said, it was not the Rassemblement National itself that won Nice. Rather, it was a smaller party, Les Républicains, led by Éric Ciotti, now the mayor of Nice, who identifies as a Gaullist and is working toward uniting the right ahead of 2027.
Populism in France Is Deeply Rooted, Not a Temporary Surge
You have long argued that right-wing populist parties must be understood through their specific national histories rather than as a perfectly homogeneous European bloc. In the French case, what do these local election results tell us about the specifically French configuration of populism, nationalism, and anti-elite politics in 2026?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: This situation tells us, first of all, that in most cases the Rassemblement National is still unable to build a coalition with the mainstream conservative right. In many cities, Les Républicains, the mainstream conservatives, remain strong. I think the main outcome of this election is that both Les Républicains on the right and the Socialist Party—the Social Democrats on the left—retain most of their strongholds. They are still the most important and relevant parties at the local level.
The National Rally has two options. The first is that of Marine Le Pen, who said after the vote: “My party is neither left nor right. I want to call on all people, regardless of their political affiliation, to vote for us in 2027. So, not left, not right.” The second option is that of Jordan Bardella, the new president and chairman of the party, who argues that, if they want to win in 2027, they must work toward a coalition of the right. But this coalition of the right is still very much contested from within among mainstream conservatives. Some of them, like Xavier Bertrand, chairman of the northern region of France, or Valérie Pécresse, chairperson of the Île-de-France region, argue that if they ally with the National Rally solely to defeat the left, they will probably lose their specificity. If they enter into a coalition with the National Rally, the policies of the National Rally will prevail, and they will not be able to act as the driving force in recovery.
That is a very wise analysis of the situation. If the conservative right enters into a coalition with the National Rally, the dynamic is on the side of the National Rally. Politically, the agenda will be set by the National Rally—by Le Pen or Bardella—and the conservatives will become a second-ranked partner in the coalition.
Another specificity of France is that it has a populist far-right party that has been above the 10% mark since 1984—over 40 years. Contrary to what many analysts have suggested, this is not a short-term political phenomenon. It is a structural part of political life, both at the local and national levels.
This also means that the French right, which until the 1980s had been divided between a liberal wing and a conservative wing, is now divided into three segments: a liberal, center-right one; a mainstream conservative one; and an identitarian, populist, anti-EU family. This is a major challenge.
Finally, there were elections in Denmark yesterday (March 24, 2026), and the outgoing Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, stated in her acceptance speech that there is a broad consensus on restricting immigration policy in Denmark, which is true. This consensus ranges from the Social Democrats to right-wing populists. In France, however, this is not the case. Immigration and asylum policies remain highly contentious issues, and there is no way the Socialist Party—the Social Democrats—can find common ground even with the mainstream conservative right. Restricting immigration and limiting the rights of asylum seekers is still associated with a small segment of the right wing of the Conservative Party, within Éric Zemmour’s party, which does not perform very well at the local level. Yet this remains central to the ideology of the National Rally. Any coalition, any cohesion of the right for 2027 will therefore have to confront these policy differences on immigration. No agreement, no coordination.
Marine and Jean-Marie Le Pen rallied during the meeting for the celebration of May 1, 2011 in Paris, France. Photo: Frederic Legrand
Blocking the RN Remains Possible, but No Longer Automatic
Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella framed the elections as evidence of a historic breakthrough, yet the two-round system once again appeared capable of blocking the far right in key urban contests. Does the municipal vote suggest that the so-called “Republican Front” is weakened, resilient, or merely transforming into more selective and local forms?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The so-called Republican front has become more selective. Obviously, in the southern part of the country, from Perpignan to Menton, the fan base—the core voters of the Conservative Party, the Republicans—are very close to voters of the National Rally. So they tend to transfer their votes to National Rally candidates in the second ballot because they share common ideas: mostly rejection of the left, even when it is moderate, a desire to curb immigration, and a very strong stance against what they call Islamic fundamentalism. Sometimes, the distinction between fighting Islamism and opposing Islam and Muslim immigrants becomes blurred. So, there is considerable cooperation at both the membership level and among voters between the Republicans and the National Rally.
In other cases, such as Toulon, it seems—although it is still too early to say definitively—that one of the reasons why the National Rally did not win is that the local bourgeoisie and business community had concerns about what the city would look like under National Rally governance. This is a very local situation. Toulon was won by the Front National in 1995, and the way the city was governed at the time was widely regarded as dreadful. It was a total failure, both economically and administratively. There may still be lingering negative memories from that period. You must remember that this whole area of France is heavily dependent on foreign investment and tourism, including mass tourism, with foreigners building and buying homes and condominiums, sometimes for retirement and sometimes for vacation. In such a context, how the city is perceived by outsiders—especially from other countries—is extremely important. I believe that the Rassemblement National is still not seen by these foreign investors as a fully normalized party. There remains a fear of what it might do, a fear of the future, and uncertainty about how things would look under its rule.
But this is only one example; Toulon is a very specific case. In Marseille, it was a completely different story. First of all, turnout was much higher in the second round than in the first. Secondly, the candidate from the radical left chose to withdraw, and it appears that a significant portion of his voter base supported the Socialist Party candidate in the second ballot, thereby limiting the National Rally’s chances of winning. This is particularly interesting because voters from the far left seem to have backed the Socialist candidate, despite Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the radical left La France Insoumise, being highly critical of the Socialist Party.
It, therefore, appears that left-wing voters still seek to block the National Rally from winning their cities. They may not like the Socialist Party—they may view it as too moderate, too pro-business, too pro–free market, and too strict on immigration—but when faced with a choice between the National Rally and the left, they ultimately vote for the left.
There is, therefore, still a possibility that in 2027, if Jordan Bardella or Marine Le Pen reach the second round, some form of Republican front will re-emerge to block the National Rally from winning the presidency. Why? Because Marine Le Pen remains associated with an embezzlement case involving funds from the European Parliament, and she is expected to stand trial next June. Jordan Bardella, meanwhile, is a 32-year-old, relatively inexperienced politician who has never been a mayor or a member of the National Assembly. He is a Member of the European Parliament but has never served in the National Assembly.
France still sees itself as one of the world’s major powers. It possesses nuclear weapons and plays a role in numerous international negotiations, as seen in both the Ukraine conflict and the Iran–Israel–United States tensions. Many French people may therefore feel that it is somewhat unwise to entrust such responsibility to someone who, while undoubtedly capable, lacks the necessary experience.
In 2017, France elected the youngest president in its history—Emmanuel Macron—who was only 39. By the end of Macron’s second term, many French citizens may feel that he lacked sufficient experience, as he had not been a Member of Parliament and had only briefly served as a minister. He may be seen as one of those figures from the higher administrative elite with limited experience at the grassroots level—someone who had never previously been elected—and that this, in hindsight, may have been a mistake.
Ciotti’s Victory Signals Convergence Between Republicans and the RN
How significant was Éric Ciotti’s victory in Nice for the broader right-wing ecosystem? Should we read it as an isolated local triumph shaped by personal rivalry, or as a more durable sign that the boundary between the mainstream right and the Le Pen camp is continuing to erode?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: There are two different things here. The first is the Nice election, with Éric Ciotti winning over Christian Estrosi, who had the backing of the center-right and President Macron. And then there is what it represents at the national level.
Nice has always been a very peculiar city. Back in the 1970s and 1980s, the mayor was Jacques Médecin, who was officially a center-right member of the government but was very close to the local extreme right, even before the Front National was founded in 1972. This has traditionally been a stronghold of the arch-conservative right. That was the situation before World War II, and it remained so afterward. The Gaullist movement was never very strong, especially after 1962, when Algeria was granted independence. A large number of what we call repatriés—repatriated people—settled in the area, and they were strongly opposed to de Gaulle for obvious reasons. They were also very right-wing, particularly on the issue of immigration and the Muslim population. That remains an issue to this day.
In addition, Christian Estrosi performed very poorly. You have probably heard about the many controversies that emerged during the campaign, and there are ongoing inquiries into some of them. So he is partly responsible for his own failure.
So, the election of Éric Ciotti aligns very well with the sociology of this city and with expectations for change. It also reflects the fact that, locally, between Nice and Menton, the Republicans and the National Rally have platforms that are very similar, or at least very close to each other.
At the national level, Ciotti’s party is, in a way, a Gaullist formation. Marine Le Pen and Bardella also refer to General de Gaulle when it comes to the idea of France being independent, both from the United States and from other powers. They claim to be Gaullist in their approach to relations with the European Union and in their economic policy, emphasizing a return to strong industry, and so on.
This movement, when it was launched as a splinter group from the Republicans, was both a personal project of Éric Ciotti—he wanted to achieve something he felt he could not achieve within the Republicans—and a reflection of a broader trend within the Gaullist movement to drift toward a more right-wing stance on immigration and on relations with, especially, Muslim immigration.
This group has captured several cities, such as Montauban, Vierzon, and Sablé-sur-Sarthe. These are medium-sized cities. It can serve as what we call in French a vitrine—a kind of showcase demonstrating that there is an ally which is, in fact, part of the mainstream conservative right and not burdened by the controversies that have surrounded the history of the National Front and the National Rally. So Marine Le Pen and Bardella can say: look, we have mayors from a Gaullist party, which shows that we do not belong to the extreme right. We are simply the real conservative right, while the Republicans are no longer truly conservative because they have governed alongside Macron’s ministers and are, ideologically, closer to the center-left than to traditional right-wing ideas.
Republicans Remain Strong Locally but Divided Nationally
Éric Zemmour’s election campaign, meeting in Cannes,France on January 22, 2022. Photo: Macri Roland.
At the same time, Les Républicains retained or regained a number of municipalities. Do these results indicate that the traditional right still possesses a meaningful territorial base independent of the RN, or is it increasingly being forced into a strategic choice between centrism and nationalist realignment?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: Les Républicains retain a significant base at the local level. The controversy within the Republicans concerns the presidential contest.What we have seen after the city council vote is two leaders from the Republicans, Laurent Wauquiez and Bruno Retailleau, expressing opposing views regarding the presidential election. One explanation is that both of them are, in fact, candidates for the presidency. Retailleau argues that if they retain traditional conservative ideology, and perhaps go a little further on the issue of immigration, they can still win the presidency. Wauquiez, by contrast, argues that if they remain alone as Les Républicains, they will not succeed.
So, he suggests that they already have much in common with the National Rally. What, then, are the differences between them? On this basis, he proposes organizing a primary among all right-wing candidates, from Édouard Philippe on the center-right to the National Rally, to Zemmour’s party and its candidate, who will obviously be Sarah Knafo. They would then rally behind whoever wins the primary election.
Retailleau, however, rejects this approach outright. In other words, he insists that they have nothing in common with Zemmour’s party. So, why hold a primary contest with actors who do not share the same platform and ideology?
In other words, part of the center-right does not want to become hostage to the most right-wing parties in the country, especially since Zemmour’s party stands to the right of the National Rally. Zemmour’s party promotes the idea of the “Great Replacement.” It also advances the view that Islam is not compatible with French citizenship and supports the idea of “remigration,” that is, the compulsory return of all non-European immigrants. This is, therefore, a completely different ideological framework.
My view is that this controversy will continue for many months to come, especially since we do not yet know who the National Rally’s candidate will be. As I mentioned earlier, Marine Le Pen will stand trial on appeal next June, and the outcome will be known then. She may be disqualified from running. If that happens, Bardella will carry the colors of the National Rally. This means that, for the time being, the National Rally faces some difficulty in entering the pre-campaign phase, and this gives the Republicans time to take advantage of the situation and clarify their strategy.
Perceived Cultural Loss, Not Just Reality, Drives RN Support
Muslims demonstrating against Islamophobia outside the Grande Mosquée de Paris, France. Photo: Tom Craig.
Your previous work has emphasized the role of cultural insecurity, as well as socioeconomic dislocation, in shaping support for the populist right. Did these local elections confirm that diagnosis, especially in provincial France and smaller towns where the RN performed more strongly than in metropolitan centers?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: It is absolutely true. When we look at the map of the cities won by the National Rally, what we see are many small and medium-sized cities where there is a strong feeling of cultural loss—a perception that there is more immigration, more mosques being built, and more immigrants and refugees arriving. Many people feel very uneasy about this. It is a perception of insecurity, even in cases where there is no actual crime or insecurity. That is very important to understand.
It is not because you live in a safe city that you do not believe immigration is increasing—10, 20, or even 50 kilometers away in a larger city—and that sooner or later immigrants will come to your own town and change its cultural history, what you consider necessary to be truly French, and what you think is required to live in your community.
I think we still have a problem with immigration from former French colonies, whether from North Africa or West Africa. It is as if we have not fully come to terms with our colonial past, and with the fact that we not only accepted these immigrants but actively encouraged them to come. Large industries and major business interests brought them to this country. So, they deserve recognition for what they contributed and for the role they played in building the country’s industrial base. Yet, they remain disadvantaged, and racism and xenophobia persist.
On the other hand, among native French people—those whose families have lived in the country for generations—especially in today’s unstable international context, there is a growing perception of a clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world. This perception plays an important role, particularly along the Mediterranean coast, in shaping support for the National Rally.
The social situation is also very important. As I mentioned earlier, in many parts of France, these areas have been deindustrialized since the late 1970s, and there is no realistic prospect that these jobs will return. You may recall that President Trump, during his campaign in Pittsburgh, told steelworkers that their jobs would come back—but they did not. The same is true in northern France: industrial jobs will not return.
In other words, people feel they have no future, no new forms of employment or specialization for younger generations. There is a strong sense of dispossession, alienation, and abandonment. In some small towns, public services are also disappearing. Public services include the post office, the local school, the railway station—everything that signals the presence of the state. This also includes the presence of police or access to hospitals. Many hospitals have been closing in this country, and when people have to travel an hour to reach emergency care, they understandably feel that the state is no longer taking care of them. So, a protest vote in favor of the National Rally emerges in this context.
Major Cities Favor Stability Over Populist Alternatives
Conversely, how do you explain the RN’s continuing difficulty in major cities? Is this primarily a matter of candidate quality, urban demography, coalition arithmetic, class composition, or the party’s still-incomplete process of dédiabolisation?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: In major cities, you have to remember that most of them, including Paris, have become gentrified. A gentrified city means a high proportion of people with higher education, better-paid jobs, and incomes above the average wage. There is also a tendency to reject extremes and to seek stability.
If you look at cities like Marseille, Paris, Lille, Strasbourg, and so on, there is also a significant share of the population that comes from an immigrant background and who, obviously, do not want to vote for the National Rally. So the conditions are in place to prevent the National Rally from winning in the largest cities, such as Lyon, Paris, and Marseille.
This is not the case in small or medium-sized cities. There, the population is different, often with incomes below the average and facing many difficulties, including in rural areas where the National Rally has made very significant inroads.
Moreover, the organizational apparatus of the major parties still retains some hold over the electorate in major cities, whereas the electorate in small and medium-sized cities and rural areas is much more volatile.
Municipal Results Do Not Predict Presidential Outcomes
Leaflets featuring candidates for the 2024 legislative elections in Versailles, France, on June 28, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.
Finally, Professor Camus, do these municipal elections offer any reliable indication for the presidential race ahead? More specifically, do they suggest that France is still heading toward a Le Pen– or Bardella-centered contest, or do they reopen the possibility that broader coalitions of the mainstream left, center, and moderate right could yet alter the expected scenario?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: First of all, in political science, we know that we cannot infer from city council elections what the outcome of a presidential election will be. These are two very different types of elections, not the same mode of scrutiny, and, of course, a very different context—especially in a country like France, where the presidency is very powerful. We are a semi-presidential system.
Second, I would insist that there is still one year to go until the election. The only thing we know for sure is that Emmanuel Macron is not allowed to seek a third term. As for the other contenders, we know quite a few—especially Édouard Philippe, who retained his mayorship of Le Havre last Sunday and is one of the contenders for the center-right—but there are others, and there are many contenders within the Republican Party. We do not yet know who will be the candidate of the Social Democratic left; there may even be several. The only thing we know for sure is that the candidate of the National Rally will be either Le Pen or Bardella, and we know that the candidate of the radical left will be Jean-Luc Mélenchon. So let us wait until we really know who will stand for president, and then look at the first polls.
What the National Rally expects is a second round between Mélenchon and Bardella. Why? Because opinion surveys show that the dédiabolisation of the National Rally has progressed to such an extent that the radical left is now rejected by a higher proportion of voters than Le Pen or Bardella. This is something we would not have said 10 or even 5 years ago. The rejection level of the radical left is around 60%. Fewer than 50% of French people today say that the National Rally is a threat to democracy—49% still see it as such, but that is no longer a majority. So, the hope of the National Rally is a second round between two candidates from the extremes, which would allow it to win.
On the other hand, what I see emerging is what we call the central bloc—that is, Macron’s majority—playing the card of stability: you do not want to vote for one or another extreme, so let us vote for stability.Maybe you do not agree with everything the center-right has done over the past decade, but if you are faced with the National Rally in the second round, please vote for stability—keeping France a democracy and keeping France within the European Union. This kind of strategy may work.
The only problem is that in 2017 and in 2022, the majority of the French did not vote for Macron because they shared his ideas; they voted for him because they rejected Le Pen. And if, in 2027, we again have to vote for a candidate whose policies we do not truly support, only out of rejection of the National Rally, then I would expect very difficult times. Because voting for a president, at least in the French context, should mean supporting his ideology, his project for the country, what he wants to do, and the kind of legislation he wants to pass. If you vote only to avoid what you perceive as a threat, then democracy is not very solid.
